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# Impact of ‘The Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009’ on the Local Governance in Bangladesh: A Focus on People’s Participation and Accountability

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University of Rajshahi

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**IMPACT OF ‘THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT (UNION  
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PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

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DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

RAJSHAHI UNIVERSITY

APRIL, 2015

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IN BANGLADESH: A FOCUS ON PEOPLE’S  
PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

*A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of Public Administration at the  
Rajshahi University, in fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of*

*Doctor of Philosophy*

By

**MST SHUVRA CHOWDHURY**

**PhD Fellow**

**Session: 2011-2012**



DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

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**April 2015**

## **Declaration**

I hereby declare and confirm that this doctoral dissertation entitled “**Impact of ‘the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009’ on the Local Governance in Bangladesh: A Focus on People’s Participation and Accountability**” is exclusively the result of my own autonomous work based on my research and literature published, which is seen in the notes and bibliography used.

I also declare that no part of the dissertation submitted has been used for any other paper in another higher education institution, research institution or educational institution.

To the best of my knowledge and belief the work does not infringe the copyright of any other person.

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## **Certificate**

I hereby certify that Mst Shuvra Chowdhury has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) at the Rajshahi University, Bangladesh and that the candidate is qualified to submit this dissertation entitled “**Impact of ‘the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009’ on the Local Governance in Bangladesh: A Focus on People’s Participation and Accountability**” to the Department of Public Administration, Rajshahi University in application for that degree.

I also declare that this dissertation is from the student’s own work and effort, and all other sources of information used have been acknowledged.

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**Mst Shuvra Chowdhury**

## Abstract

This is an impact study of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009. It is about the scope of people's participation, and thereby accountability of public officials, i.e. **Social Accountability Mechanisms (SAM)** in local level planning at the *Ward Shava* (Ward Meeting hereinafter WS) and budgeting at the *Unmukto Budget Shava* (Open Budget Meeting, hereinafter OBM) processes. The state of the application of two other techniques of **New Public Management (NPM)**, i.e. Right to Information (RTI) and Citizen's Charter (CC), by the citizens in the planning and budgeting processes has also been explored. This study has employed both qualitative and quantitative data derived from both primary and secondary sources.

**The first observation** is that, for the very first time, grassroots people are engaged in the local level (Union Parishad hereinafter UP) planning and budget preparation in Bangladesh, as a result of the enactment of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 ("the Act, 2009"). It is evident that the process of planning and budgeting through WS and OBM, as processes, are well-designed by the Act, 2009. The Act offers people the opportunity of direct engagement to identify problems, related to their livelihoods, at the Ward level.

At each stage of the planning process, there are provisions for engaging ordinary citizens, as well as representatives of Civil Society Organizations (CSO). The obvious expectation of Parliament was that general people, with their associates, could demand answerability of the UP functionaries. This study also finds that the mandate of the process of dissemination of information, under the provisions of the Right To Information Act 2009 ("RTI") and Citizens' Charters ("CC"), has empowered those UP Councillors who want to be responsive to the general people at the WS and OBM. However, the flow of information at the UPs, through their Union Information and Service Centers (UISC), website of Local Government Division (LGD), at the notice board and billboard of the UP office etc., has not created transparency, as most village residents do not access these sources.



**The second set of observations** is related to the outcomes/ changes which have occurred with the implementation of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009. It is evident that, when people are offered legitimized engagement in the planning and budgeting cycle, they have the ability to identify their areas of priority needs and to bargain with the UP functionaries. The fund utilization process has been monitored by the people at the OBM. Dissemination of other information, including a UP's income, expenditure, project beneficiary list, project list, etc. has enhanced transparency. The trust of the voters in their elected UP officials, has also been enhanced, since many of the people who participated at both the WS and OBM have expressed their satisfaction with those processes. Personal motivation of the elected and government officials of UP to involve the public in the processes and involvement of NGOs have been seen as means for enhancing the capacity of the UP functionaries to implement these provisions.

**The third set of findings has depicted** the challenges which have to be resolved to secure more participation by citizens and more responsiveness of the UP functionaries. Inconvenient times and places of meeting, religious codes and patriarchy, lack of education and awareness of the general people and mistrust of the UP functionaries due to institutionalization of corruption are some reasons that discourage people's access to the WS and OBM. On the other hand, lack of resources, local power structure, lack of cooperation from government officials, lack of capacity of the UP functionaries and interference of national politicians in local matters are some challenges of **SAM** that reduce the UP functionaries' responsiveness and answerability to the needs of their voters. However, non-compliance with the strategy of **bottom- up** planning, lack of a standardised charter of services for UPs or citizens' engagement in developing CCs, lack of customer focus, lack of realization of user charges, lack of experts on the application of ICT at the UP are some challenges of implementation of the **NPM** techniques that are hindering effective service delivery and popular participation in planning and budgeting at the UP level

Finally, some suggestions for UP, including capacity building of the UP functionaries to conduct social mapping for UP plan preparation, placement of government officials in UP offices, partnership with private, other public and NGO programs, e-Governance, utilisation of ICT, advertisement and mass awareness building programs etc. have been offered, for improved socio economic development of the local people.

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## Abbreviation

ACC	– Anti-Corruption Corruption
ADB	– Asian Development Bank
ADP	– Annual Development Plan
AFID	– Allowance for the Financially Insolvent Disabled
AIDS	– Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AL	– Awami League
BAKSAL	– Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League
BBG	– Basic Block Grant
BBS	– Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
BDO	– Basic Democracy Order
BNP	– Bangladesh Nationalist Party
CARE	– Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
CARR	– Committee on Administrative Reform / Reorganization
CBO	– Community Based Organization
CC	– Citizen’s Charter
CHRI	– Commonwealth Human Rights Initiatives
CLP	– Char Livelihood Project
CMOPC	– Context Mechanism Outcome Pattern Configuration
CO	– Circle Officer
CSO	– Civil Society Organization
CSP	– Civil Service of Pakistan
DC	– Deputy Commissioner
DFID	– Department for International Development
DPHE	– Directorate of Public Health and Engineering
EC	– European Commission
EGPHP	– Employment Generation Program for Hardcore Poor
ESCAP	– Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific
ESDO	– Eco-Social Development Organization

FFW	– Food For Work
FGD	– Focus Group Discussion
FWM	– Female Ward Member
FY	– Financial Year
FYP	– Five Year Plan
GDI	– Gender Development Index
GDP	– Gross Domestic Product
GoB	– Government of Bangladesh
GS	– Gram Sarkar
HC	– High Court
HIV	– Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HYSAWA	– Hygiene Sanitation and Water Supply
ICS	– Indian Civil Service
ICT	– Information and Communication Technology
KI	– Key Informant
LG	– Local Government
LGD	– Local Government Division
LGED	– Local Government Engineering Department
LGI	– Local Government Institution
LGSP	– Local Governance Support Project
LIC	– Learning and Innovation Component
MDG	– Millennium Development Goal
MLO	– Martial Law Order
MMS	– Manab Mukti Sangstha
MP	– Member of Parliament
MTBF	– Medium Term Budget Framework
NESH	– National Committees for Research Ethics in Norway
NGO	– Non Governmental Organization
NILG	– National Institute of Local Government
NPM	– New Public Management
NRDP	– National Rural Development Policy

OAA	– Old Aged Allowance
OBM	– Open Budget Meeting
OBS	– Open Budget Session
ODA	– Overseas Development Agency
OECD	– Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMS	– Open Market Sale
P/GP	– Palli / Gram Parishad
PAC	– Public Accounts Committee
PARC	– Public Administration Reform Commission
PB	– Participatory Budgeting
PBG	– Performance-Based Grant
PC	– Planning Committee
PIO	– Project Implementation Officer
PP	– Participatory Planning
PRSP	– Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RMP	– Rural Maintenance Program
RTI	– Right to Information
RWP	– Rural Works Programme
RWP	– Rural Development Work
SAM	– Social Accountability Mechanism
SAP	– Structural Adjustment Program
SC	– Standing Committee
SDO	– Sub-Divisional Officer
SFYP	– Sixth Five Year Plan
SGS	– Swanirvar Gram Sarkar
SLDSP	– Sirajganj Local Development Support Project
SLGDFP	– Sirajganj Local Governance Development Fund Project
SSC	– Scheme Supervision Committee
SSN	– Social Safety Net
SSNP	– Social Safety Net Program
SWO	– Social Welfare Officer

TDC	– Thana Development Committee
TDCC	– Thana Development and Co-ordination Committee
TI	– Transparency International
TIB	– Transparency International Bangladesh
TIP	– Thana Irrigation Program
ToR	– Terms of Reference
TP	– Thana Parishad
UDCC	– Union Development and Co-ordination Committee
UN	– United Nations
UNCDF	– United Nation Capacity Development Fund
UNCRD	– United Nation Centre for Regional Development
UNDP	– United Nations Development Program
UNO	– Upazila Nirbahi Officer
UP	– Union Parishad
UWAO	– Upazila Women Affairs Officer
USAID	– United States Agency for International Development
UZC	– Upazila Chair
UZP	– Upazila Parishad
VDP	– Village Defense Party
VGD	– Vulnerable Group Development
VGF	– Vulnerable Group Feeding
VSOB	– Voluntary Services Overseas Bangladesh
W&MA	– Widow and Maternal Allowance
WAO	– Women Affairs Officer
WB	– World Bank
WC	– Ward Committee
WEP	– World Food Program
WM	– Ward Member
WS	– Ward Shava
ZP	– Zila Parishad

## List of Glossaries

<i>Barendro</i>	A region with unique physical characteristics
<i>Chowkidary/ Chowkidars</i>	Watchmanship/ <i>Watchmen</i>
<i>Dalali</i>	Brokerage
<i>Dalal Chokra</i>	Circle of mediators/ brokers
<i>Gram Prodhan</i>	Head of village
<i>Gram Sarkar</i>	Village Government
<i>Gram Shava</i>	Village Assembly
<i>Hat</i>	Local market place
<i>Izara</i>	Lease
<i>Jamindar</i>	Landlord
<i>Jalmahal</i>	Water estate (fisheries)
<i>Khoar</i>	Place to keep unattended animals
<i>Mastaan</i>	Gangster
<i>Gosthi</i>	Kinship
<i>Manusher Jonno Foundation</i>	Foundation for people
<i>Military Janta</i>	Military Ruler
<i>Mouja</i>	Lowest land unit
<i>Pourashavas</i>	Municipalities
<i>Palli / Gram Parishad</i>	Village Assembly
<i>Panchayet</i>	Village Assembly
<i>Proja</i>	Inhabitants
<i>Parishad</i>	Council
<i>Shava</i>	Meeting
<i>Sepoy</i>	Soldier
<i>Sunni</i>	A branch of thought of Islam
<i>Sufi</i>	A branch of thought of Islam
<i>Swanirvar Gram Sarkar</i>	Self Reliant Village Government
<i>Shalish</i>	Local Judicial System
<i>Thana</i>	Police station
<i>Union</i>	A rural area consisting of some villages
<i>Upazila</i>	Sub District
<i>Upazila Nirbahi Officer</i>	A civil servant deputed by the Government to UPZ as Chief Executive Officer
<i>Unmokto Budget Shava</i>	Open Budget Meeting
<i>Ward Shava</i>	Ward meeting
<i>Zila</i>	District
<i>Warish</i>	Inheritor
<i>Zamindar</i>	Landlord



# Chapter One

## Introduction

### 1.1 Introduction and Background of the Study

In modern democratic countries, people are ruled by their representatives and democracy at the local level is a system under which ordinary people are governed by their friends and neighbors of their choice. There is a wide range of reasons for the governments of developing countries to adopt decentralization policies and programs to make local government a real, effective and democratic government. These include the inequitable economic growth, pressure from below for increased participation in the development process, failure of increased responsibilities of national government, need to strengthen local organization to design and implement their own projects and need to assist disadvantaged groups (Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983) that are the results of over centralization. In this work, the case is argued that higher economic growth and per capita income are the outputs of those countries which have involved local government institutions in planning and development; and economic stagnation is the output of those that have not involved local government institutions (Emerich, 1961 cited in Obaidullah, 1999).

True local democracy is characterized by regular and genuine elections, the rights of the majority, as well as of minority and opposition groups, to influence policy-making processes, and respect for basic civil and political rights of all. The values of democracy are the prerequisites of good local governance. The United Nations have considered “good” governance as an essential component of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)<sup>1</sup>, because “good” governance establishes a framework for fighting poverty, inequality, and many of humanity’s other shortcomings (UN, 2007). Over the past quarter century, many countries have adopted both democratic governance and decentralized government in one

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<sup>1</sup> In September 2000, world leaders met together at United Nations Headquarters in New York to adopt the United Nations Millennium Declaration. The Millennium Declaration (GA Resolution A/54/2000), was adopted by all the 191 member states of the United Nations to attain peace, security and development. This declaration fixed eight ambitious target oriented Millennium Development Goals (MDG) for improving human condition by 2015. These Goals are 1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 2) Achieve universal primary education 3) Promote gender equality and empower women 4) Reduce child mortality rates 5) Improve maternal health 6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases 7) Ensure environmental sustainability 8) Develop a global partnership for development.

form or another. By the 2000s, more than 95 percent of the countries with democratic political systems had decentralized administration or government (Cheema and Rondinelli, N.D.). Decentralized Local Government Institutions (hereinafter LGIs), with practice of local democracy, is essential for overall development of any country.

Bangladesh inherited a decentralized local government system<sup>2</sup> from its British rulers and, since then, has been practicing local democracy at the local level. Strong democratic and accountable local government is determined as the centre point for development both in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and in the National Rural Development Policy (NRDP) in Bangladesh (Aminuzzaman, 2010). Yet, unfortunately, strengthening of local government bodies has remained one of the most important governance-related issues in Bangladesh over the last four decades: without much progress. Before and after the independence of the country, every Government tried to make changes in the structure of local government bodies in order to strengthen their local political bases. In truth, decentralization of power has been more in rhetoric than reality. There were hardly any opportunities for the general people to participate in the decision-making processes of the local government bodies i.e., Union Parishad (hereinafter UP)<sup>3</sup> and to hold representatives of these bodies accountable for their actions.

As a result of consistent pressure from the donor agencies and persistent demands from academicians and civil society organizations, the Parliament of Bangladesh enacted ‘the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act of 2009 (hereinafter the Act of 2009). Few distinguishing features of the newly enacted Act are: *Ward Shava*<sup>4</sup> (Ward Meeting hereinafter WS), *Unmokto Budget Shava* (Open Budget Meeting hereinafter OBM)<sup>5</sup>, Citizen’s Charter<sup>6</sup> (CC) and Right to Information<sup>7</sup> (RTI). Through these provisions, the

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<sup>2</sup> See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.

<sup>3</sup> Union Parishad (hereinafter UP) is the lowest tier of existing structure of local government system in Bangladesh. The other two tiers are *Upazila Parishad* (hereinafter UZP) at the *Upazila* (sub-district) level and *Zila Parishad* (hereinafter ZP) at the *Zilla* (District) level.

<sup>4</sup> Sections 4 and 5 of the UP Act of 2009 state that a *ward shava* (ward meeting) should be constituted in each ward, consisting of all the voters enlisted in the voter lists. The elected member of the local Council from the Ward would act as the chair of the *ward shava* while the elected Woman’s Member from the area would act as the Advisor.

<sup>5</sup> Section 57 of the UP Act of 2009 provides for finalization of the UP’s yearly budget in an open meeting which is commonly referred to as an *open budget meeting*.

<sup>6</sup> Section 49 (1) of the Act of 2009 states that each UP would publish a “*Citizen Charter*” through which all citizens would be notified what sort of services they are entitled to receive from the UPs, conditions associated with the service provision and their definite time period.

Act aims at establishing strong, participatory and accountable local governance in the country. Moreover, the UP is expected to prepare a five year plan which will cover the Sixth Five Year Plan (hereinafter SFYP) (2011-2016) of the Government of Bangladesh (Hereinafter GoB) and meet the objectives of MDGs simultaneously (Ahmed, 2011).

Against the above background, this study intended to explore the impact of the Act of 2009 on the functioning of the Union Parishad, having particular emphasis on people's participation and accountability. The degree of improvement made in the governing process of UPs as a result of the Act of 2009 has been assessed.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Article 15 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh guarantees the fulfillment of people's basic necessities, including employment at a reasonable wage and the right to social security (GoB, 2011:5). With increasing *per capita* income of people, life expectancy, and economic growth rate, Bangladesh has transformed itself from an international 'bottomless-basket-case' to a country which is virtually self-sufficient in food, with steadily increasing standards of literacy and health (GoB, 2011; World Bank, 1996). According to the vision and objectives of the perspective plan of MDGs, seven broad targets have been set by the GoB in its SFYP which are: (i) Income and Poverty (ii) Human Resource Development (iii) Water and Sanitation; (iv) Energy and Infrastructure (v) Gender Equality and Empowerment (vi) Environmental Sustainability and (vii) Information and Communications Technology (ICT) (GoB, 2011:20-22). In analyzing MDG achievement, it is found that the country has reduced the poverty gap and decreased the child and maternal mortality rate. It has achieved gender parity in enrollment in primary and secondary education and by the year 2015, the country will achieve its universal primary education enrollment target. Beside these success stories, there are some other goals which deserve special attention such as sustainable environment, opportunities for employment for youth, access of women in every sphere of life etc.

Bangladesh, with 47 million people under the poverty line, is still classified as a low-income developing country. As the PRSP observes, "the poor group in Bangladesh is severely disadvantaged in terms of ownership of assets and has inadequate access to institutional finance as well as basic services including quality education, health care,

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<sup>7</sup> Section 78 of the Act has ensured citizens' right to information.

water and sanitation” (GoB, 2011:18 ). It is suggested that the poor, powerless and vulnerable group should be engaged in the decentralized local institutions for achieving equitable development of the society (Hinton, 2010). Effective local institutions with genuine power are likely to be in better position to formulate and implement policies in line with the citizens’ aspiration that can improve the quality of public services and promote local development (UNDP, 2009). But in general, the poor and powerless people have always been excluded from the planning or decision making processes. They have become a dormant part of the society. Increased citizens’ participation in the governing process is perhaps the most important feature of good governance. The more the scope for the participation of people at local institutions, the more will be the involvement of citizens in the governance process (Hinton, 2010). The social protection programs for unemployed, disabled, widows, orphan or old age would not be exercised properly if they do not participate in it (Ahmed and Islam, 2011).

Traditionally, planning in Bangladesh is of two types: perspective plan/national plan and sector wise plan. The traditional process followed a “top down approach” for planning as these were made by professional planners and the regional and local plans were made under the direction of central planners (Zahid and Rahman, 1994). The UP received sector-wise allocation from the budget under the Annual Development Plan (ADP) and the UP functionaries utilized the funds in their own discretion. Thus, local needs and problems were neglected in the local development planning since it has been evident that citizens remained outside the local and national decision-making domain, particularly in the programme design and implementation process (Rahman, 2005:15). As a result, general people were unable to make their representatives accountable to them and their needs and aspirations were hardly reflected or mainstreamed in government development agenda. It is also evident that, due to serious gaps in the institutional structure, people’s representatives were unable to push pro-poor agendas. The LGIs, more specifically the UPs, were substantially dependent on central government agencies for their planning process, budgetary allocation and administrative function (Rahman, 2005).

Around 85 Social Safety Net (hereinafter SSN) programs<sup>8</sup> are being implemented by LGIs. A recent study has revealed that 5.6% beneficiaries of the Employment Generation

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<sup>8</sup> Employment Generation Program for Hardcore Poor (EGPHP), Vulnerable Group Development (VGD), Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF), Food for Work, Old Age Allowance, Rural Maintenance Program,

Program for Hardcore Poor (EGPHP) and 10.76% beneficiaries of Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) do not fulfill the requirements for receiving such facility. Safety net programs like Old Aged Allowance (OAA) and Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGD) etc. are being affected by nepotism, bribery and bias (Ahmed and Islam, 2011). It is found that 5% beneficiaries of the Employment Generation Program for Hardcore Poor (EGPHP) are relatives of local UP Chairman and Members and 7.5% beneficiaries of VGD are relatives of local government representatives (The Daily Star, 29.04.2011). In the UP Act 2009, provision of formation of WS and compulsion to hold OBM are supposed to enable people to get involved in the identification of their needs and selection of priorities that, in the long run, will ensure their participation in the total decision-making process.

Corruption is pervasive in all spheres of public life in Bangladesh (World Bank, 1996). According to Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB), total estimation of bribery for the year 2012 is 2.4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 13.4% of the annual budget, which mostly affects the poorer section of the society (The Daily Star, 29.12.2012). Practically, the activities of UPs are confined within allocation of the benefits of Social Safety Net Programmes (SSNP), which are executed by Project Implementation Officers (PIO) of the UZPs (Alam, *et al* 1994). It is found that all UP chairmen of Dimla UZP<sup>9</sup> complained that PIOs took bribes for implementation of rural infrastructural development programmes (The Daily Star, 22.07.2012). Bribing the UP functionaries for government services and getting less results are common in the government food aid programme named Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) (The Daily Star, 24.08.2010). Due to defective service delivery systems, half of the food allocations for Rural Development Work (RDW) and SSN do not reach the target population. The Dhaka Tribune (01.10.2013) stated the reason behind the fact in this way, “Misuse takes place at different stages: from receiving goods from government’s food warehouses, to formation of project committees, to implementation of the projects, to getting the seal of approval from the project officials”.

The cases filed by the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) could not be proved in court, in most cases, because the poor and powerless victims are unable to give a disposition against the corrupt activities of the UP functionaries. The UP functionaries are so powerful that they can manage to escape from the existing law and justice system

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Allowance for the Financially Insolvent Disabled, Open Market Sale (OMS) etc. occupied 14.75% of the total budget in the year 2010-11 (The Daily Star, 29.04.2011).

<sup>9</sup> It is one of Upazilla of Nilphamari District of Bangladesh.

prevalent in the country (The Daily Star, 24.08.2010). The ineffective judicial system and lack of proper audit are also deterring the poor and powerless people for whom the UPs are entitled to provide social protection. Thus, it can be said that the overall service delivery system of LGIs is warped in a vicious cycle. Along with the above two provisions of the Act 2009, the declaration of citizens' charter and rights to information is supposed to enable people to know about their rights and responsibilities.

It is argued that, "over the last decades, public administration acquired several synonyms such as "public affair", "public service", "public policy" or "public management" depending on the emphasis of particular approach, school or training institutes" (Huque, 1990:2). In the present day's literature of local governance and public administration, **New Public Management (NPM) and Social Accountability Mechanisms (SAM)** are well-accepted. These techniques empower citizens so that they can enter into the political process of administration and demand accountability of their political representatives and administrative officers.

In recent times, there have been many social accountability tools including participatory public policy-making, participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking, citizen monitoring and evaluation of public service delivery etc. There are two types<sup>10</sup> of accountability mechanisms 1) public accountability mechanism 2) social accountability mechanism. Public accountability mechanisms safeguard against misuse and abuse of local power discretion through institutional mechanisms for oversight and checks and balances. Due to the imperfection of public accountability mechanisms, social accountability measures are being created as complements (Yilmaz et al., 2008). The top-down methods of accountability, such as political checks and balances<sup>11</sup>, administrative

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<sup>10</sup> Some practitioners supplement this classification by 1) horizontal accountability and 2) vertical accountability mechanism. Horizontal accountability mechanism is imposed by government internally through institutional mechanisms for oversight and checks and balances. It is the capacity of state institutions to check the abuse of power by other public agencies and branches of the government: e.g. Parliament, Judiciary, Anti-Corruption Commissions, Audit Institutions, Ombudsman Offices, Human Rights Commissions etc. (UNDP, 2010; Sarkar and Dutta, 2011:1).

<sup>11</sup> Political accountability is an important type of accountability in democratic societies where political executives are held accountable for their actions and for those of their subordinates. It is also known as Ministerial responsibility. In Parliamentary systems with Ministerial responsibility, civil servants act in the name of Ministers. Thus, civil servants and their organisations are accountable to the Ministers concerned who, in turn, are accountable to the Parliament. Ministers, being people's representatives, are political

rules and procedures<sup>12</sup>, financial checking<sup>13</sup>, and formal law enforcement agencies like courts and police<sup>14</sup> have limited success in both developed and developing countries. Before enacting the 2009 Act, people had little scope to enter into the accountability processes of the UP except at election time. The election is a vertical accountability mechanism that prevails in all democratic countries which does not offer citizens the opportunity to express their preferences on specific issues, to contribute in a meaningful way to public decision making or to hold public actors accountable for specific decisions or behaviors. SAM is about direct citizen engagement in making public representatives and officials responsible to their demands (Yilmaz et al., 2008). This mechanism beyond voting enables people's right to place their preferences. For strengthening voice and capacity of citizens, "demand side of governance" has been getting more attention, where citizens directly demand greater accountability and responsiveness from public officials and service providers (Malena et al., 2004:1-3). UNDP (2010:10) defined SAM as "a form of accountability that emerges through actions by citizens and civil society organization(CSOs) aimed at holding the state to account, as well as efforts by government and other actors(media, private sector, donors) to support these actions". It thus balances and enhances government accountability, which involves various political, fiscal, administrative and legal mechanisms (ibid). It has also been suggested that social accountability initiatives are most effective when these are 'institutionalized' and when the states' 'internal' (horizontal) accountability mechanisms are "more transparent and open to civic involvement" (Malena et al., 2004:4). In local government policy formulation and implementation, the poor and marginalized people get more space through social accountability mechanisms and these mechanisms are part of broader

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heads of the Government and, accordingly, are accountable to the Parliament. So, political accountability is concerned with ensuring accountability of elected and/or appointed officials.

<sup>12</sup> Administrative accountability assumes that public officials are held accountable to citizens for actions taken by such officials. Administrative accountability refers to mechanisms, such as rules and regulations and instructions, supervision, hierarchy etc., by which government's officials act and by which they are also held accountable for the discharge of their actions (cited in Younis and Mostafa, 2000: 24). In addition, internal rules and norms as well as some independent commission are responsible to hold civil servant within the administration of government accountable. Behaviour of the civil servants, in their respective departments, is bounded by rules and regulations. Moreover, they are subordinates in a hierarchy and accountable to superiors.

<sup>13</sup> Financial accountability concerns tracking and reporting on the allocation, disbursement, and utilization of financial resources and it is ensured through using the tools of auditing, budgeting, and accounting.

<sup>14</sup> Legal accountability is usually based on specific responsibilities which are formally or legally conferred upon authorities. Hence, actions and decisions made by the public officials are placed under judicial review when they act outside the scope of legal power or without legal power and, most importantly, they abuse the given power. Apart from personal ethics and commitment to accountability, the most important mechanism for ensuring legal accountability is effective judicial review (Younis and Mostafa, 2000: 27).

efforts to deepen democracy and ensure a robust public sphere in which to give feedback and control government actions (Yilmaz et al 2008:14). Obviously, civic engagement is necessary element of social accountability measures and without the participation of people, through the institutionalized social mechanisms, there would no accountability. Through social accountability mechanisms, people express their voice<sup>15</sup> which refers to both the capacity and methods of people to express their views, through a variety of formal and informal channels<sup>16</sup> and mechanisms. Voice is about people expressing their opinions. Voice includes the channels of complaint, organized protest, lobbying and participation in decision making, service delivery and policy implementation (Goetz and Gaventa 2001 cited in O'Neill et al 2007; UNDP, 2010). So, this research has intended to discover, the extent to which the process of WS is able to identify the real beneficiaries of services entitled by UP and the extent to which the provision of WS and OBS enhances people's participation in practice. It has also intended to explore whether the citizens can directly demand greater accountability and responsiveness from public officials or not.

The public sector of most developed countries began to change in the late 1980s and early 1990s through a new paradigm called NPM (Hughes, 1994 and Yamamoto, 2003). Borins (1995:12 cited in Ehsan, 2004: 70) defined NPM as:

a normative conceptualization of public administration consisting of several inter-related components: providing high quality services that citizens value; increasing the autonomy of public managers; rewarding organization and individuals on the basis of whether they meet demanding performance targets; making available the humane and technological resources that managers need to perform well; and appreciative of the virtues of competition, and maintaining an open-minded attitude about which public purposes should be performed by the private sector rather than the public sector.

Decentralized Government: from hierarchy to participation and teamwork is one of ten principles of NPM for reinventing the government (Osborne and Gaebler's, 1992 cited in Ehsan, 2004: 73). Pertinent to this study it can be argued that the provisions of WS, OBM, RTI and CC of the Union Parishad Act, 2009 are closely interconnected with NPM

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<sup>15</sup> In 1970 Hirschman (1970) introduced the concept of 'voice' in private goods consumption. This is a tool which consumers use if private production of goods and services are not satisfactory. Samuel Paul (1992) and others utilized this concept in public sector. They argued that public voice is necessary for public institutions to be accountable, responsive and efficient in service delivery system (cited in Andrew and Shah, N. D.).

<sup>16</sup> Channels are lines through which messages pass from sender to receiver. A network is defined as a system of crisscrossing lines of channel.



principles. These actually consist of strategic planning, decentralisation, improved accounting and performance auditing, improved financial management, citizen as customer, user charges, use of information technology etc. which are some typical characteristics of NPM as well (Ehsan, 2004). Thus, this study has intended to discover whether and how the people utilize the provisions of CC and RTI to hold their representatives accountable at the WS and OBM.

Through exercise of the provisions of UP Act, 2009 mentioned above, people are supposed to be in a better position to hold people's representatives accountable for their actions and would compel them to remain transparent in their activities. Since the Act of 2009 was passed, five years ago, and all these provisions have closer linkage with issues like people's participation and accountability, a study intending to explore the impact of the Act on the system of local governance is now needed.

### **1.3 Research Objectives**

The general objective of the research is to explore the impact of the Act of 2009 on the governance of UPs with particular focus on the people's participation and accountability. Specific objectives of the research are as follows:

1. To review the existing legal framework of UP that offers the scope for direct engagement of citizens and holding the UP functionary's accountability for their actions i.e. Social Accountability.
2. To observe participation of people in the *Ward Shava* and Open Budget Meeting and to explore whether participation is spontaneous or induced.
3. To explore the extent of success of Citizen's Charter and Right to Information as social accountability mechanisms for ensuring accountability of people's representatives for their actions in *Ward Shava* and Open Budget Meeting.
4. To observe responsiveness of the UP functionaries to the needs of the citizens and to explore the effectiveness of social accountability mechanisms through civic engagement.

5. To identify problems affecting people's participation and accountability in the UPs and to suggest remedial actions to overcome those.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

The core research question to be addressed in this research is 'What improvements have been made in the functioning of the Union Parishads as a result of introduction of the Act of 2009?'

Some specific questions are:

1. What is the process of involving people in the *Ward Shava* and Open Budget Meeting?
2. To what extent *Ward Shava* and Open Budget have enhanced participation of people in the planning process of UP?
3. How are people holding their representatives accountable for their actions through CC and RTI?
4. To what extent have *Ward Shava* and Open Budget enhanced responsiveness of UP functionaries and to what extent have CC and RTI managed to hold people's representatives accountable for their actions?
5. What initiatives are necessary to overcome existing problems of people's participation and accountability in the functioning of UPs?

#### **1.5 Literature Review**

There have been two "waves" in the evolution of decentralization reform (Cheema and Rondinelli, N.D.: 2; Olsen, 2007). The 'first wave' or generation of decentralization from Africa was not an encouraging experience. During the late 1960s to mid-1970s, integrated national planning strategies were initiated in many developing countries. It was argued that 'decentralization' was not successful because it was not decentralisation rather the alternative to decentralization process where functions and powers were transferred to central government field offices. It lacked sufficient people's participation. It was not accountable to civil society organisations (Olsen, 2007:3). Rondinelli (1983:182-185)

based on his empirical study<sup>17</sup> found how centralized and bureaucratic public organizations impeded development activities. The international donor agencies, development partners and, in some cases, politicians felt that decentralization was necessary for smooth functioning of local and central institutions, equitable economic development especially of rural poor and speed up solving social, political and economic problems. The decentralization reform efforts had little impact on administrative change and failed in many parts of Asia and Africa (Crook and Manor 1998:1 cited in Bergh, 2004:780) due to the following reasons:

- participation was not increased
- local administrative performance and capacity were not enhanced
- distribution of wealth, status and power was not altered
- implementation was poor due to lack of clear objectives, inadequate resources, shortage of skilled manpower, and general resistance from senior bureaucrats (Olsen, 2007: 2-3 ).


By the beginning of the 1990s, a ‘second wave’ or generation of decentralization was globally observed in an increasing number of developing countries as ‘decentralization in the variant of *devolution*’, i.e. transfer of powers to elected local governments (Olsen, 2007; Rondinelli and Cheema, N.D.). At that time, donors-supported government decentralization was part of the general civil service reforms or of the structural adjustment programs (SAP), to reduce central government administration and make it more effective. The second wave concept of decentralization was confined to hierarchical government structures and bureaucracies but later broadened to include political power sharing, democratization, market liberalization and expanding the scope for private sector decision-making (Olsen, 2007; Cheema and Rondinelli, 1983). During the 1990s, public participation through Non-Government Organisations (NGO) was adopted as a measure of decentralization as well as an opening of governance (Cheema and Rondinelli, N D). The figure below illustrates the complexity and inter-linkages of the latest

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<sup>17</sup> It was based on eight case studies on decentralized programs supported by United Nation Centre for Regional Development (UNCRD) from eight Asian countries where decentralization included: provincial decentralization in Indonesia, Philippine, Thailand, deconcentration of power on district in India, Pakistan, power transfer over semi-autonomous district administration in Malayasia and India (Rondinelli, 1983:182)

decentralization reform processes, which focus on areas such as state reform, local governance, local democracy and local economic development as key aspects of a sustainable and viable local-level development process.

**Figure 1.1**  
**Decentralization and State Reform**



Source: Olsen (2007)

Decentralization is linked with local governance and is associated more with establishing downward accountability to citizen levels as opposed to upward accountability from local elected governments to the central government level. Transfer of expenditures and political responsibility to the local authorities may be supported to alleviate the burdens on the central government. It may also be a means of more revenue generation by mobilizing more local resources. This means that decentralization can be a “win-win situation” for both central and local governments (Olsen, 2007:2-3). The practical guide of USAID (2000) provides a conceptual understanding for programming decentralization and democratic local governance in countries. Political will and local governance tradition are two important indicators for measuring local governance status of any country. The user guidebook suggested that strong political will and strong local governance tradition is necessary for implementation of a State’s decentralization policy.

There have been different studies on “decentralization” and “local governance” in the context of LGIs of Bangladesh. Aziz (1991), Obaidullah (1999), Siddiqui (1992, 2000, 2005), Hoque (2002), Rahman (2005), Talukder (2009), Ahmed (2012) traced the background and evolution of the LGIs in Bangladesh. Studies have been carried out separately on Zilla Parishads, Upazilla Parishads (Rahman, 1991; Alam, Huque and Westergaard, 1994; Ahmed, 2012, Ahsan, 2010) and Union Parishads. Major issues in other studies have included citizen participation and women’s participation, capacity

building of LGIs, problems of resource mobilization and strengths and weaknesses in functioning of local government bodies. Some notable studies on LGIs are discussed below:

Sarker (2012) explored local-level citizen participation practice in the planning processes in utilizing the grants provided by the government and development partners and the state of accountability and transparency of the UP functionaries. His survey found that the local problems are identified by ward level meeting, standing committee meeting or by direct involvement of the people in the UP council. The challenge of planning in a UP was that the prioritized needs and demands of general public are bypassed by the influential politicians and local elected functionaries. Moreover, due to work load of agriculture or day-long labour, although people are informed they are unable to be present in the open budget session or other meetings. The women could not participate due to the distance of the meeting places. Aminuzzaman (2010) revealed the overall local governance conditions and challenges and his review of relevant literature found that the UP population has limited understanding of UP functions and has limited expectations of the institution; the UP functionaries lack the skills and resources required to discharge the UP's prescribed functions; the UP chairman often takes decisions with his close associates; most of the time, the female members are excluded from the decision-making process; and that government officials, who are transferred to the UP, are not accountable to local people or UP functionaries as they are answerable to their own line departments. His empirical study on service delivery system of UPs found that critical service areas like education, health, nutrition, family planning, irrigation, agricultural services are managed by central government or their line agencies without any involvement of UPs. Thus, UPs are kept isolated and have been made non-responsible bodies in providing critical service delivery institution for the locality. Aminuzzaman (2011), in his study, further extended the literature regarding challenges of UPs. These are low level awareness of general people, excessive power of the Council's Chair, limited revenue base, centralized project and programme design, weak relationship between administration and elected representatives, coordination power of UNO among line departments, role and relationship of MPs with local elected actors. Ahmed (2012) found three major issues for Union-level local governance. In the case of utilization of development allocations of UPs, almost all schemes are fragmented schemes such as earth works for repair and construction of roads. The allocation and physical size of the project is also shorter without any technical supervision. Among total fund allocation,

90% is utilized for rural physical infrastructure in the form of public works rather spending on social development or poverty alleviation projects. Moreover, the UP lacks technical and management capacity for project identification and execution and there are problems in coordination among various institutions and actors such as NGOs, CBOs and government offices in UP planning process.

Panday (2008) argued that women's participation in politics directly affects the outcomes of the decision-making process. The study identified some actors and factors that are responsible for women's political participation, both at local and national levels. The actors are government policies, programs, mechanisms for women, the women's organization, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), and the donor agencies. The factors are education, mobility, and structural deficiencies in politics, religion, culture and patriarchal attitude. To him, women's political participation in reality is representation without participation. Shamim and Kumari (2002) identified the reasons why women have not received adequate facilities from planning and development in rural local government. These reasons are their inadequate representation, non-participation, and non-involvement in the preparation and execution of plans for their economic development and social justice in decentralized institutions. Talukder's (2009) study findings suggest that, in order to get meaningful outcomes from the democratic decentralisation, and particularly to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), a gender mainstreaming approach in policies and procedures of local government, along with its administration, is an integral task of governance. He stated that the elected women in reserved seats do not have specified responsibilities and cannot fully participate politically like their male counterparts do. Khatun and Doula (2011) found that UP women functionaries did not have an effective role in the development activities of village women and children. The UP itself did not take any steps regarding these activities and, being illiterate and poor, the powerless women were far away from initiating any program spontaneously. The study also revealed that there was a strong lack of an infrastructural mechanism that could motivate women members to initiate some projects such as old-age education programmes, training centres and recreation centres for the villagers. Khan (2000), in her study, observed that equitable participation by women in political decision-making is very important for all areas of national and local development. She argued for women's participation in national budgetary policy, social reforms and peace and justice.

Husain (2000) studied women's participation in the national and local electoral process of Bangladesh. The study revealed that women, who had never been found outside their homes before, had sought election as candidates. The male-dominated traditional society has not yet welcomed the sudden rise of women in politics. The study also argued that the religious fanatics with high male bias create hindrances in women's electioneering activities. She argued that women empowerment is extremely important because it establishes accountability, transparency, reduction of corruption, choice of development activities, greater local resource mobilization and better delivery of services in the rural areas. To her, strengthening local administration means participation of women in the decision-making process of local government bodies and electoral process.

Aziz (1991) examined the structural pattern and functional arrangement of the UP to identify the existing problems. He categorised the problems of UPs into five groups; structural, functional, judicial, financial and political. The study identified predominance of the rich in rural leadership, improper women's representation, limited scope of people's participation, lack of field agencies' coordination, and poor management capability as the maladies of UPs. Mohammad (2011) has identified some challenges of UP and his study, based on secondary data, found that UPs have limited revenue collection, its institutional capacity is very nominal because most of the UP functionaries lack knowledge and understanding of the operational procedures and functions such as budgeting, planning and resource mobilization. Khan (2011), in his study of 164 UPs from six districts, focused on legal and practical constraints faced by the UPs, as well as the tax paying behavior of the residents of the UPs. The study also identified challenges that UPs are facing while performing their assigned responsibilities and providing their services to their clientele. Haque (2009) analyzed the current level of activities and functions of the Standing Committees (hereinafter SC), their involvement with the local people as well as the perceptions of local communities regarding their performance. It also presented a policy framework on better functioning of standing committees of UP to strengthen the local governance. He found that, in developing countries like Bangladesh, local government suffers from negligence and is most often lost in the shadow of national policies, practices, and efforts at economic growth and social and political development. He observed that the UP still remains weak due to inefficiency, lack of resources, and political corruption resulting in a low level of confidence of the people in it. The study

revealed that the people have very little access to the decision-making process of standing committees, mostly because of nonfunctional committees, as well as procedural lapses. National Institute of Local Government (NILG), with joint collaboration of Voluntary Services Overseas Bangladesh (VSOB) (2006) found in their study<sup>18</sup> that 60% of SCs were not functioning. The study found proper representation of women and indigenous people in the standing committees. The UP functionaries and community people were unaware about the SCs. Based on the result of the research, the main reasons for non-functioning of the standing committees included: UP Chairman's apathy; knowledge gaps on the SCs, ignorance of UP members and lack of proper monitoring.

Faruki (2011) studied five UPs of Jessore and Satkhira Districts to identify the problems of resource mobilization of the lowest tier LGI of Bangladesh. The data of the study revealed that the UPs which receive more grants from the Treasury are less careful to mobilize funds from within their own boundaries. The UPs which are adjacent to central government administration and the chairmen of UPs who have special connection with Ministers and MP (Member of Parliament) are more influential than others and they get the lion's share of the grants. He found that, most of the time, the UP becomes merely a distributing agent of the central government and focal motives of creating LGIs and their social objectives go unattended. The leadership ability of local democracy is absent and thus a parasitical leadership is emerging. They did not take any initiative to mobilize people or local resources but always pursued grants from government, semi government, non- government and donor agencies. The study of Ullah and Pongquan (2011) evaluated UPs' revenue trends and performance, budget and planning practices, effect of central grants on local revenue and recent initiatives for Union capacity building. They argued that the new system of participatory budgeting and planning practices in UP has been facilitating democratisation of local planning, including the process of decision-making. It has created a pathway for mass participation in the decision-making process from the central to the local government. According to the UP functionaries surveyed in this article, the new system of budgeting and planning has induced local officials to make strategic plans in using UPs' financial resources and to collect taxes which were unlevied or uncollected before. It is observed that the system has created local ownership and a stake in project selection and implementation with their local knowledge. They also

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<sup>18</sup> The study was conducted on six UPs in six Divisions.



depicted that UP functionaries have not been provided with training on the operational side of budgeting like defining budget cycles, making revenue estimates, classification of expenditure as recurring or capital and conducting open budget hearings.

Panday (2011) scrutinized the existing local government system of Bangladesh in the light of present the decentralization and governance debate. His study, based on secondary data, found that, in reality, the local government bodies have never been self-regulating entities. To him, the local government units are extensions of central government where the scope of local people's participation is very limited. In most cases, the decentralisation policies are changed in response to the wish of the political party in power. Lack of authority and power, hierarchical central -local government relations, inadequate financial resources, lack of trained personnel and lack of transparency and accountability are some reasons which impede real decentralisation in practice in Bangladesh. Panday and Asaduzzaman (2011) in the light of their empirical study, found that conflicting political cultures and bureaucratic elitism are obstacles to decentralisation in Bangladesh. They coined the term *Dalal Chakra* (vicious circle of mediators/ brokers) who negotiate the final service delivery of the LGIs of Bangladesh in practice. They found three forms of mediators who play their role of intermediaries among civil servants, ruling party leaders and common man: top level mediators, mid-level mediators and lower level mediators. These are, for example, ruling or opposition Party political leader, local elite, student leaders, UP Chair, local contractors, trade union leader, UP member, clerk, messengers, household maids and male servants of higher officials etc. Democracy Watch (2009), in its annual report for 2009, highlighted the policy problems of UPs. The study was conducted on 28 UPs during March, 2006 to December 2010. Main findings suggested that UPs are not keen to undertake new development initiatives. The study also revealed the conflict and relationship among UP functionaries, Upazilla Parishad Chairman and UNO that affected their smooth functioning. Assaduzzaman (2008), in his study, observed that the UP is the only local body that can create a steady bridge and healthy relationship between the local people and the central government. He highlighted the bitter and painful experiences of the masses in dealing with the UP officials. Although elected by the poor people, UP officials do not serve their interests. From reality, it is discovered that the UP officials serve the interests of three groups: ruling Party members, local government officials and the local elites. The members of these groups always maintain good relationships with each other, to abuse power and misuse government resources.

Very few studies have been carried out on the application of the techniques of SAM and NPM in the perspective of LGIs of Bangladesh. Monem and Baniamin (2013:237-255) revealed how various public accountability mechanisms are unable to check the corruption of the public servants of the country. Their study revealed that corruption takes place in public offices in the name of bribes, graft, extortion, nepotism and cronyism, pilfering and larceny, delays in service provisions, embezzlement, kickbacks, and misappropriation of funds and so on. They categorized two types of corruption: incidental corruption (petty graft, small scale embezzlement, bribes etc.) and systematic corruption (large scale embezzlement, misappropriation etc.) which are being done by public officials ranging from *darwan*/peon (guard/messenger) to the top level civil servants, ministers and MPs. Sarkar and Dutta (2011) found that the **Social Accountability Mechanism (SAM)** in the domain of local democracy have changed the pattern of traditional bureaucracy and governance practices. Their empirical study observed how the level and extent of citizen participation is related to social accountability, the poor are empowered and the citizen is engaged in governance institutions. Social mechanisms made citizens aware of their rights. Weak political culture and democratic institutions; poverty; lack of awareness; integrated initiatives on accountability; measures of civil society organizations; community based monitoring units; information sharing and social inclusion are some challenges of local government institutions. The study found that participatory budgeting has increased people's participation; and budget formulation, decision-making, and resource mobilization have changed the pattern of power relations. Hinton (2010) explored a "community solidarity" approach (which means socially and economically empowering the poor) and combined this approach with the elected local government body, especially with the UP council of Bangladesh. A questionnaire survey explored the empowerment and mobilization of the extreme poor, their representation in community-based organizations, access to resources and services, the existence of formal spaces and opportunities for participation and the skill and knowledge of the UP. The study found that extremely poor people were capable of raising issues with UP functionaries and holding government to account, leading to greater transparency and responsiveness of local government.

The term Participatory Budgeting (hereinafter PB) has been used under different names in different regions of the world. In recent years, various donor agencies like United Nation

Development Program (2010), World Bank (2007) and the European Commission (2007) have depicted various success stories from various parts of the world where social accountability measures are being used for greater accountability and transparency. However, “people’s participation in decision making process and in budgetary practice<sup>19</sup> through devolution of political and fiscal power in local level has been taking shape in the LGIs all over the world” (World Bank, 2007). The World Bank (2007) found some actors in participatory budgeting processes. These actors are LGIs, individual citizens, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). It revealed some limitations of participatory budgeting related to people’s empowerment and manipulation of public officials over the process. It argued that there are three main benefits of participatory budgeting: it increases public learning and promotes active citizenship; promotes social justice and spurs administrative reform. Research regarding assessment of the performance of the LIC (Learning and Innovation Component) of LGSP (Local Government Support Project)<sup>20</sup> depicted some potentials of UP in relation to local level development and service delivery (Aminuzzaman, 2011). Observation was made that the UP had the ability to absorb and manage financial resources to undertake both conventional and non-conventional activities, to mobilize social capital i.e., women, community members and union facilitators to ensure social accountability and quality assurance of the delivery of services. However, study on the decision making process in the context of the participatory planning and budgeting process of Bangladesh is absent.

Panday and Rabbani (2013) have studied the context of the policy making process of the Right To Information Act 2009 of Bangladesh. They have depicted various success stories of application of RTI based on secondary data. Some challenges which include yellow journalism and ethics of journalist, mindset of the bureaucrats and the provisions of the RTI Act itself have been identified as threats of application of RTI. Baroi (2013) studied the implementation of the RTI Act at the UP level. He revealed that implementation of the RTI Act depended upon some factors which include understanding

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<sup>19</sup> Participatory budgeting began in 1989 in the municipality of Porto Alegre, the capital of Brazil’s southernmost state and consequently implemented in 12 cities of Brazil. By 2005, it had been expanded to more than 300 municipalities worldwide (Wampler, 2007).

<sup>20</sup> Sirajganj Local Governance Development Fund Project (SLGDFP) funded by UNDP and UNCDF operated successfully from 2000 to 2007 in the 82 Union Parishads at Sirajganj District. The positive outcomes of the project has been adopted by the Government of Bangladesh in the present Act 2009 of UP. At present the UPs are getting finance in the name of LGSP-II (Local Government Support Project) funded by the World Bank for capacity building of the institutions. For detail see chapter 4.

of policy standard and objectives by the implementers, cooperation and commitment of implementers, adequate and appropriate resources, favorable socio-economic conditions, target group behavior and existing administrative practice etc. His study revealed that lack of mass awareness is one of the major obstacles for application of RTI by the citizens since there is lack of initiative for popularizing the application of the RTI Act among citizens. Jamil (2011), in his comparative study of implementation of CC in the urban governance of Nepal and Bangladesh, on the basis of a questionnaire survey, revealed that Bangladeshi people have no knowledge of the existence of CC in their municipalities. It is revealed that various strategies including bribing, lobbying and using middlemen were followed by citizens of Bangladesh to get service in due time. Lobbying has been identified as a popular strategy to get any service. His study also revealed that citizens do not lodge complaints due to their shyness. But he revealed that there is a positive relationship between complaint and getting services. Jamil found trust is the factor that regulates the utilization of CC by the citizen where government officials of Bangladesh are regarded as corrupted, biased, and less helpful compared to the officials of Nepal.

The literature review found that research has been done on specific issues of UP. Previous studies on UPs remain restricted to structural and functional aspects of UPs and to identifying the factors hindering smooth functions of this body. The preceding review has identified an important aspect of study related to civic participation and accountability that has never been studied before. Matters like responsible LGIs and downward accountability of elected political leaders to citizens were never considered for study. More specifically, it can be said that the scope of participation of people and accountability of UP functionaries has never been created in this way it has been in the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009. Thus, study of impact of this Act deserves special attention.

## **1.6 Significance of the Study**

The existing political-administrative arrangement has prevented people from getting their rights with justice and equity. The traditional budgeting and planning process puts the poor out of the decision-making process. Although numerous donor agencies such as UNDP and CARE initiated participatory planning and budgeting processes in various parts of the country, an impact assessment of UPs' planning and budgeting procedures needs to be carried out for the betterment of the lives of poor and marginalized people.

The CC and RTI are two important elements of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009. Theoretically, the provisions of CC and RTI, which have been embedded in the Act are supposed to empower citizens with knowledge. How far these two elements have empowered the rural poor with knowledge and how far the rural poor have utilized their knowledge in demanding their needs be met and the answerability of UP functionaries are two important matters to explore. Have the provisions of the Act made any change in traditional service delivery systems or have they achieved nothing? The main objective of this study is to explore the state of people's participation and the state of the accountability in the functioning of the UPs, in accordance with the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act of 2009. Being the lowest tier of local government bodies, UPs can play an important role in institutionalizing democracy, achieving good governance and fostering socio-economic development if they are practiced in accordance with the new law. Democratic norms and practices at the grassroots can provide a solid foundation for exercising democratic practices at the national level. Good governance requires, among other things, effective people's participation as well as transparency and accountability in the process of governance. On the other hand, accountability allows people to require their representatives to use their power for the benefit of the people. Practice of accountability compels people's representatives to remain transparent in their activities as well. Thus, both people's participation and accountability are two important issues of governance that can help establishment of sound and effective local government in the country. A number of factors have prompted the conduct of the present research which includes the following:

**Firstly**, people's participation and accountability are two important features of social accountability mechanisms and good governance as well. Donor agencies have been stressing these issues for last few years. So, experimentation with the mechanisms in the context of Bangladeshi LGIs has added some new dimensions in the study of social accountability.

**Secondly**, the present study is unique in its nature and a pioneering work, since it has explored the improvement in the functioning of UPs as consequence of ratification of the Act of 2009. For the very first time, efforts have been made to combine both people's participation and accountability in a single research within the country context after enactment of the Act of 2009.

**Thirdly**, the present study have provided new insights to academics and researchers who would like to explore participation of the mass rural poor in the planning and budgeting process of UP and accountability of the UP functionaries thereby.

**Fourthly**, impacts of application of CC and RTI by the general people in the planning and budgeting process of UP have added some interesting findings regarding answerability and responsiveness of the UP functionaries.

**Lastly**, the study has come up with some interesting policy recommendations that may help the government of Bangladesh in revamping their policy to make necessary arrangement for ensuring people's participation and accountability in the functioning of the UPs.

## **1.7 Chapter Outline**

The thesis comprises of eight chapters:

***Chapter One: Introductory Discussion:*** This chapter has represented an overview of the research including research problem, literature review, research objectives and questions, justification of the study, literature review and structure of the thesis.

***Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework of the Study:*** This chapter is comprised of two parts. The first part has discussed various key concepts related to local governance pertinent to the objectives of the study. The second part has developed an analytical framework based on the discussion of the first part that had helped the smooth progression of the research.

***Chapter Three: Methodology of the Study:*** Various aspects of research methodology have been employed in this study has been discussed in this chapter. Moreover, discussions on arguments in favor of using methodological approaches, sample selection, study area selection, validity of data and problems of data collection have been made in this chapter.

***Chapter Four: Local Government Reforms in Bangladesh: Past and Present Initiatives:*** Since this study has confined its focus on people's participation and accountability, attempts have been made there to explore previous participatory and accountable system of LGI in Bangladesh. Moreover, this chapter has provided a brief

historical development of local government institutions and its present structure in Bangladesh. In addition, an analysis has been made on different reform initiatives having a detailed focus on the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act-2009' in relation to evolution of strong local democracy in the country.

***Chapter Five: State of People's Participation at the Local Level: Role of Ward Shava (WS) and Open Budget Meeting (OBM):*** This chapter has delineated the real scenario of people's participation in the UPs through analysis of primary and secondary data. It has also explored the process of WS and OBS of UP and illustrated the outcome of peoples' participation in the participatory planning and budgeting process in term of their access, understanding and ability to participate in social accountability mechanism.

***Chapter Six: State of Accountability at the Local Level: Role of Citizen Charter and Right to Information:*** This chapter has explored the state of accountability of the people's representatives to the citizens in the participatory planning and budgeting process. It has clarified the role of introduction of citizen's charter and right to information in holding representatives accountable for their actions. This study has also depicted the process of application of CC and RTI by the UP functionaries and by the citizens as well.

***Chapter Seven: Service Delivery at the Local Level: Challenges of People's Participation and the UP Functionaries' Accountability:*** This chapter has revealed the major challenges encountered through planning and budgeting process of UP which is hindering the implementation of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act 2009. That discussion has actually depicted the governance process and service delivery at the local level as the outcome of participatory planning and budgeting process which has regionally-based differences.

***Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Recommendations:*** This chapter has depicted the major findings of this study and has recommended ways for overcoming hindrances in the way of effective functioning of the local government institutions.

# Chapter Two

## Theoretical Framework

### 2.1 Introduction

The intention of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework that serves as a vision for the researcher on various issues related to the objectives of this research. The chapter has operationalised key concepts and laid out hypotheses to identify whether a local government structure is democratic or not. This Chapter is comprised of two parts. The first part considers various key concepts related to local governance pertinent to the objectives of the study. The second part has developed an analytical framework, based on the discussion of the first part, which helped the smooth progression of the research.

### 2.2 Operationalization of Some Key Concepts

#### 2.2.1 Local Governance and its Components

The terms “governance” and “government” are considered synonymous, both in dictionaries<sup>1</sup> and in traditional use (Stoker, 1998). “Democratic governance implies a mandate for governments to create or strengthen channels and mechanisms<sup>2</sup> for public participation in decision-making, to abide by the rule of law, to increase transparency in public procedures, and to hold officials accountable” (cited in Cheema and Rondinelli N.D.: 6). Based on the philosophy of the State, whether its government is steering into the depths of globalisation or painstakingly building the foundations for social and political progress at the village level, “governance” must be considered, since it is the most critical issue at the interface of democracy and development (cited in Siddiqui, 2000:2; GoB, 2004). Haque (2011: 47), after reviewing the literature<sup>3</sup> on governance, concluded that

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<sup>1</sup> According to Oxford Dictionary, the term “governance” means the act or manner of governing, of exercising control or authority over the actions of subjects, a system of regulation (Oxford Dictionary: 2010: 672).

<sup>2</sup> Here the term “channel” is used as the *medium* through which information passes and “mechanism” is the tool through which participation takes place.

<sup>3</sup> He has identified two paradigms to conceptualize governance: 1) Aid agency driven paradigm; 2) Academic paradigm. In the analysis of the first paradigm he argued that the process of governance focus on state and market relationship; more specifically on better management of both public and private institutions for policy formulation and implementation. The scholars of second paradigm previously had stressed attention to power and authority relationship in different context of government and at present in the context of industrialized nations, governance is seen as networks rather hierarchies.



“there is still confusion about the conceptualization of the term”. Aminuzzaman (2006:12) conceptualised governance in a three-dimensional perspective developed by researchers:

- The process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored and replaced;
- The capacity of governments to manage resources efficiently and formulate, implement and enforce sound policies and regulations; and
- The extent of participation of the citizens in the affairs of state.

The above-mentioned three dimensions of governance include accountable government institutions and the capacity and extent of citizen’s participation, since accountability and people’s participation are two important elements of governance. It is argued that, governance is not about interaction among various government, social organization and citizens: rather it serves the citizens through public resource utilisation and through exercise of regulatory powers (Graham et al., 2003 cited in UN, 2007:3).

Various international donor agencies, such as UNDP, ESCAP, WB, ODA/DFID and ADB<sup>4</sup> have identified various components of governance (Haque, 2011: 53-61; Waheduzzaman 2010:27; Aminuzzaman, 2006: 14-16). The components of governance have become distinct since it is viewed, “as the sum of three major components: process, content and deliverables. The process of governance includes factors such as transparency and accountability. Content includes values such as justice and equity” (Aminuzzaman, 2006:13). Here, equity indicates ownership of services of government institutions and justice implies providing those services to the people who actually need them. Deliverables emphasises equity and justice and implies the delivery of basic services to the citizens, especially the poorest, for a life with dignity. In view of the logic stated above, it is arguable that a process of accountability and participation by all citizens, avoiding social exclusion for equity and justice, is not only a major component of governance but it is a core value for democracy and human development.

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<sup>4</sup> UNDP has identified eight elements such as accountability, participation, rule of law, transparency, consensus orientation, equity building, effectiveness, efficiency and strategic vision. ESCAP identified accountable, participatory, follows the rule of law, transparent, consensus-oriented, equitable and inclusive, effective and efficient and responsive government for good governance. World Bank identified six elements of good governance such as accountability, participation, rule of law and control of corruption, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, political stability and absence of violence. ODA/DFID and ADB identified four elements such as accountability, participation, legitimacy, predictability and transparency for good governance.

The subsequent discussion gives attention to the LGIs, since this study is confined to exploring the local governance of Bangladesh. Local government is one form of decentralized system, which is affected by the transfer of authority or responsibility for decision-making, planning, management or resource allocation from a higher level of government to its subordinate units (Rondinelli, 1986 cited in Sarker, 2003). Mawhood pointed out that “decentralization is a structure of government where bodies are created at the local level, separated by law from the national/centre, in which local representatives are given formal power to decide on a range of public matters” (Cited in Talukder, 2009:23). Since the decentralized institutions are operated by people’s representatives and they are elected by the mandates based on people’s needs and demands, it is argued that the local government institutions will be more exposed to, and responsive to, local needs and aspirations (Johnson, 2001).

Effective functioning of LGIs through democratic decentralisation requires three essential elements: devolving substantial powers onto elected bodies at lower level, devolving substantial resources and developing two kinds of accountability: the horizontal accountability of bureaucrats to elected representatives, and the downward accountability of elected representative to ordinary people (Manor, 2011:3). In the context of local level institutions, devolution of power is of the utmost importance, since “it is an ideal form of decentralisation<sup>5</sup>. It combines democracy, participation with technical efficiency” (cited in Panday and Assaduzzaman, 2011:157). Devolution means transfer of functions or decision-making authority to legally-incorporated and elected local government bodies. Linkage among three core dimensions of decentralisation, such as political, fiscal and administrative, is necessary in designing, implementing and evaluating decentralisation processes.


Theoretically, devolution, as well as the normal working of LGIs, creates the mechanisms for people’s political participation and, thereby the people’s representatives’ responsiveness to the demands, that usually arise from that participation. People’s

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<sup>5</sup> Generally there are four types of decentralisation in different countries, which include political, administrative, and fiscal and market (Panday and Asaduzzaman, 2011). The World Bank provided definition of various forms of decentralization. Political decentralisation means groups of people at different levels of government—central, meso and local—are empowered to make decisions related to what affects them; administrative decentralisation means different levels of government administer resources and matters that have been delegated to them, generally through a constitution; fiscal decentralisation implies that previously-concentrated powers to tax and generate revenues are dispersed to other levels of government, e.g., local governments are given the power to raise and retain financial resources to fulfill their responsibilities; market decentralisation (divestment/privatization) occurs when government privatizes or deregulates private functions (cited in Yuliani, N.D.:2).

participation and their ability to make the functionaries' responsive, as well as their direct engagement in the working processes of LGIs, are the main thrusts of devolution.

**Figure 2.1**  
**The Gravitational Tendencies of Decentralisation**



Source: EC (2007:19)

It is defined by UNDP (2004:4) that “local governance comprises of a set of institutions, mechanism and process through which citizens and their groups can articulate their interests and needs, mediate their differences and exercises their rights and obligations at the local level”. Not only the elected people’s representatives but also the administrative units to which powers are transferred are accountable to the local electorates. That is why local governance refers to “the existence of working systems of collective action, that manage a locality’s public affairs, that are accountable to local residents” (Olowu et al., 2004:1). In assessing the impact of people’s participation and devolution in the development of strong and democratic LGIs, there arises a question like the “chicken and egg argument of “which comes first?” (cited in Siddiqui, 2000: 8). Siddiqui states the importance of both devolution and participation in the following way:

On the one hand, devolution, allowing a sharing of information, providing a channel for the views and demands of local people and operating in an accountable manner, is seen as critical to participation. On the other hand, participation is seen as imperative to the proper functioning of devolution. Participation is closely associated with the concept of equity, which means that all men and women have equal opportunities to improve or maintain their well-being (Siddiqui, 2000:9).

The role of people’s participation and accountability of their representatives are central to the process of governance. They require in-depth consideration.

### 2.2.1.1 People's Participation

Participation is one of the most important requisites for upholding democratic values. The terms “people”<sup>6</sup> and “participation” need to be examined separately as it is very difficult to define each of them. Aristotle, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Jefferson were persons for whom the concept of ‘participation’ was one of the most important ingredients for democracy (Haque, 2011: 53-61; Siddiqui, 2005; Cooper, 1983:13-45). It has been argued that there was a closer relationship between State and citizens in historical times, in contrast to the realities of modern democracy. Since the time of the ancient Greeks, the question of the relationship between participation and social and human development has been much debated (Cooper, 1983:13-45). According to Aristotle, participation in the affairs of state as a citizen was essential to the development and fulfillment of the human personality. To him, the best State, in the final analysis, is one where there is broad participation, with no class dominating others (Mishra, Sharma and Sharma, 1984:26). He believed that individual’s participatory role carried great importance in democratic practice. Aristotle’s perspective of citizen’s participation is of the direct and active involvement of citizens in the affairs of government. The participatory activity involves citizenship development and education (Cooper, 1983:18). In *The Social Contract*, Rousseau argued for the direct participation of citizens in the affairs of a small city-state, where there would be relative economic equality and economic independence. He argued that the absence of great economic disparities would prevent the development of political inequality (Cooper, 1983). Cooper (1983: 19) noted Rousseau’s argument as follows:

Participation in the making of public decisions serves an educative and developmental purpose. Through this process, citizens learn how their interests are related to the interests of others. They discover their interdependence with their fellow citizens; they come to realise that they must consider public decisions from a broad perspective. The citizen is forced to see congruence between his own self-interest and the public interest by interacting with and seeking cooperation from others. In Rousseau’s words, “By dint of being exercised, his faculties will develop, his ideas take on a wider scope, his sentiments become ennobled, and his whole soul be so elevated”. A “general will” would emerge to serve the “general interest”.

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<sup>6</sup> The “people” are not a homogenous entity (Oakley, 1995:6). In every society, there exists division of people relating to class, ownership, occupation, gender, community and culture (ibid). It has been argued that rural people are divided between two groups on the basis of the political and economic structure “1) elite and more powerful groups, who will exercise substantial control over policy formulation, over important resources like land and who usually reap the advantages of development intervention and 2) the broad mass of excluded, disadvantaged people, commonly referred to as ‘rural poor’, who exert little influence on the existing political structure, have only limited resources for development, who gain little advantage from development interventions” (Oakley, 1995:6).

Rousseau believed that the practice of participation through interdependence within the political community strengthens the participatory system. The qualities of effective participation improve by the active participation of citizens in decision-making process. The more one participates, the better one is equipped for participating. Thus, the participatory system would be self-sustaining. He also argued that the political community would be broken up into smaller units for far greater intimacy because it will enable face-to-face interaction among citizens (Cooper, 1983).

However, other literature shows that these theories are not beyond criticism. It has been argued that the earlier theories of participatory democracy were very ambitious because they included educating the public as a governmental responsibility (Pateman, 1970:21). The theories of democracy and participation asserted an intimate relation between the individual and their institutions. Yet such a relationship is not denied in modern governance study and there is no denying the fact that the citizen's direct involvement is necessary, or at least produces a better output, in development activities. The postmodern view of citizen participation supports active citizenry for open, transparent, performing and accountable governing institutions, in place of outdated, ineffective, unrepresentative and underperforming bureaucratic government institutions (Moynihan, 2007:55-56). In the whole process of participation, the people's bottom-up perspective<sup>7</sup> (Asnarulkhadi, 1996 cited in Nikkah and Redzuan, 2009) is necessary, because in this approach, people have some control over the whole development process (Oakley and Marsden, 1984 cited in Samah and Aref, 2011). Thus, the postmodern view emphasizes "community participation, grassroots movements and local decision making" (Finger, 1994 cited in Panda 2007, Nikkah and Redzuan, 2009). It is argued that people must be involved in decisions that affect their lives, thus gaining confidence, self-esteem and knowledge and developing new skills (Javan, 1998 cited in Nikkah and Redzuan, 2009).


In the 'bottom-top' perspective, participation as an end in itself focuses on participation as a process in which people are directly involved in shaping, deciding and taking part in the development process. Thus, the process is much more valued and achievement of the

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<sup>7</sup> According to Conyers (1986) there are three approaches for community development: "top down", "bottom up" and "partnership". "In the 'top-bottom' approach to community development participation turns into passive and static events which can then be induced or even coerced participation (United Nations, 1981) or a compulsory participation (Oakley, 1989), or manipulative participation (Midgley, 1986) by the government or other external bodies" (cited in Samah and Aref, 2011:188). The partnership approach of community development involves both government authority and the individuals of community (Nikkah and Redzuan 2009).

development goal is of secondary importance (Moser, 1989:84 cited in Samah and Aref ,2011). It has been argued that, in the bottom–top process, “the authentic form of participation (Midgley, 1986), direct participation (Richardson, 1983) or active participation (Gilbert and Ward, 1984) from people emerges, where their confidence and competence are built up” (cited in Samah and Aref, 2011:188).In this situation, participation becomes a process "of achieving greater individual fulfillment, personal development, self-awareness and some immediate satisfaction" (Richardson, 1983: 57). However, the level of participation<sup>8</sup> is seen as a continuum, in which citizen control (Arnstein, 1969), citizen-defined problems and decided action (Koneya, 1978), authentic participation (Oakley, 1989), spontaneous participation (UN, 1981) and participation as end (Moser, 1989) represent as the highest level of participation. On the other hand, therapy and manipulation (Arnstein, 1969), decide and announce decision through bulletin (Koneya, 1978), compulsory participation (Oakley, 1989), coerced participation (UN, 1981) and participation as means (Moser, 1989) represent the lower levels of participation (cited in Samah and Aref, 2011:189)

**Figure 2.2**  
**Participation as Process and its Outcome**



Source: Developed by author based on above literature.

However, the concern of this study is not to draw a relationship between participation processes and their outcomes. Rather, it seeks to explain and explore how the consequences of participation process impact on the effectiveness of the local governance process. The above theoretical discussion of people’s participation along with various approaches makes it clear that active/direct participation of people in decision making, decision implementation, benefit sharing, evaluation and monitoring is prerequisite to create equitable human and social development and governance. Thus, active participation is essential for people’s knowledge and citizenship<sup>9</sup> development. It

<sup>8</sup> Appendix-2.1. The figure **Typologies or Models of Participation - A continuum**’ shows various types of participation developed by prominent authors and the manifold levels of participation in each type of participation.

<sup>9</sup> The act of any person is taking part in public affairs.

develops people's confidence, competence, individual fulfillment and development, self-awareness to control, shape, decide and take part in the development process. It is much valued than the achievement of the development objective.


### 2.2.1.2 Accountability

Accountability lies at the heart of many of the potential benefits expected from decentralisation (e.g. citizen participation in local affairs, improved service delivery, transparency). It has become the cornerstone of public management because it constitutes the principle that informs the processes by which decisions are carried out. The principle is that those who hold and exercise public authority can be held responsible or answerable for their actions or inactions (Aucoin and Heintzman, 2000). While describing accountability as relationship between two parties it has been stated that:

Accountability refers to the nature of a relationship between two parties. A relationship may be characterized as lacking in accountability or highly accountable. In a relationship between two parties, A is accountable to B, if A is obliged to explain and justify his/her actions to B, and B is able to sanction A if his/her conduct, or explanation for it is found to be unsatisfactory" (cited in O'Neill et al, 2007:3).

A widely used definition of accountability is "the means by which individuals and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for their actions" (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). There are mainly two dimensions/parties in an accountability system: 1) being answerable to someone and acceptance of sanctions and 2) the right of a higher authority<sup>10</sup> to call someone to account, demand answers and impose sanctions" (UNDP, 2006)<sup>11</sup>.

**Figure 2.3**  
**The Accountability Relationship: a Static Model**




Source: O'Neill et al., (2007:3).

<sup>10</sup> Authority is the ability of a person to make decisions that affect the conditions of an institution. It is an integral part of organization and closely related to responsibility. Various sanctions, willingness and individual's personality are necessary elements of authority for production of better outputs of an organization.

<sup>11</sup> Literature found two parties in accountability relationship i.e. 1) answerability and 2) enforceability are also called 1) controllability or 2) sanction, 1) demand and 2) supply side of accountability, 1) a bearer of a right or a legitimate claim and 2) the agents or agencies responsible for fulfillment or respecting that right or 1) an accounter and 2) an accountee, with the accounter being the agent that demands answers and enforces sanctions (cited in O'Neill et al 2007:4).

However, the concern of this study is to explore the effectiveness of the accountability measures in LGIs. Devolution of power extends the discretion of the representatives, since they enjoy enormous power and authority. Thus, effective accountability systems are required for appropriate use of that discretionary space (Yilmaz et al, 2008). Accountability is the answerability for performance; or, in the case of the public sector, it is the obligation to expose, explain and justify actions taken on behalf of those delivering services to the public (Basu, 1994).

**Figure 2.4**  
**Accountability, Voice and Responsiveness Relationship**



Source: UNDP (2006)

Through devolution, both elected and appointed officers are conferred with the authority to make new rules and policies to meet the needs of the citizens (Yilmaz et al 2008:27). Such authority to make new rules or decisions regarding their localities, subject to State law, administrative penalty (e.g monetary fines) or local fiscal decision-making are some factors may be abused by the public officials (Lankina,2008). Misuse, abuse or nonfeasance in that discretionary power can induce people to enter into the process and influence the process of decision-making and budgeting (Lankina, 2008). The power holders in LGIs must possess some capabilities to use discretionary power positively: including (1) administrative capability for utilization of existing tools and techniques through which citizen can place their demands and (2) leadership ability to guide the people about using that techniques and managerial ability to coordinate among actors involved with the institutions (World Bank, 1998).

Accountability is closely related with transparency. According to Transparency International (TI), transparency is a ‘characteristic of governments, companies, organizations and individuals of being open in the clear disclosure of information rules, plans, processes and actions’ (Transparency International 2009:44). It is believed that transparency produces accountability. The literature shows that there is still ambiguity



about how accessibility of information affects accountability and improves governance (McGee and Gaventa, 2010:13). If the power holders are obliged to make decisions in front of their electorates, or the electorates are given a chance to make their own decisions, there is more chance to bypass the power holder's personal preferences (Lankina, 2008 and World Bank, 1998). It has been argued that there are three reasons that people express their voice. Firstly, people can express their beliefs and preferences freely. Secondly, it creates scope for accountability and the poor get a chance to see that their demands are reflected and implemented. That means their preferences; opinions and views take place in government priorities and policies. Lastly, by implementing people's demands and preferences, judgment regarding the power holders is made accountable, whether the implementation is made on the basis of equity or justice or not (O'Neill et al., 2007).

### **2.2.2 Participatory Planning and Participatory Budgeting as Social Accountability Mechanisms (SAM)**

Planning is a scientific tool for decision-making which entails operational<sup>12</sup> decisions for better outcomes of the process. Participatory planning and budgeting are part of the participatory planning process. It has become a common trend with the introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy at the national level and community-driven development initiatives at the local level (Malena et al., 2004:10). Wampler (2007:21) defines it as "Participatory budgeting is a decision-making process through which citizens deliberate and negotiate over the distribution of public resources". While describing the importance of PB in creating transparency it is stated that,

Participatory budgeting also helps promote transparency, which has the potential to reduce government inefficiencies and corruption. Because most citizens who participate have low incomes and low levels of formal education, participatory budgeting offers citizens from historically excluded groups the opportunity to make choices that will affect how their government acts. Put simply, participatory budgeting programs provide poor and historically excluded citizens with access to important decision-making venues (ibid).

The decision-making processes of LGIs through PP and PB reflect the policy-making directions of government. PP and PB in the LGIs is a bottom-up approach to planning, in which people's needs are articulated to government agencies for political consideration.

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<sup>12</sup> There are three distinctive types of decisions, such as, initial decision, ongoing decisions and operational decisions. Initial decisions about a project concern needs and priorities, where to start: and what to do; on-going decisions are taken after the initial decisions are made. Operational decisions concern the enumeration of initial and on-going decisions which encompass the substance of project decision-making (Khan and Asaduzzaman, 1995).

PP and PB at the local level create a social audit system where transparent income and expenditure flows empower people with knowledge. It is necessary to link government's policy process, planning and decision-making since all are inter-connected and inter-dependent. As it is stated that,

Failure to link policy, planning and budgeting may be the single most important factor contributing to poor budgeting outcomes at the macro, strategic and operational levels in developing countries. In many countries, the systems are fragmented. Policy making, planning and budgeting take place independently of each other.....In the absence of effective decision-making processes, policy making and planning are disconnected from each other and from budgeting, and they are not constrained by resource availability or by strategic priorities. Overall, this leads to a massive mismatch between what is promised through government policies and what is affordable (World Bank, 1998: 31-32).

PP and PB both are political processes which involve political participation and political accountability. Participatory budgeting is a political process that enables people's mandatory participation in local decision-making processes, which, in turn, stimulates political decentralisation of the LGIs. The main function of political decentralisation is about representation of popular participation and the task of the local representatives is to "map the multiplicity of citizen interests onto policy decisions" (Schneider, 2003:39). In general, political decentralisation allows (Olsen, 2007):

- Political institutional formation with sub-governmental institutions.
- Citizen engagement in local development activities and demand representation through their representatives.
- Participation of citizens and Civil Society Organizations (CSO) in public decision-making processes.
- Autonomy to spend a local government's own resources.
- Representation through an election process.

However, for ensuring accountability through fiscal decentralization, the demand side measures include publicly accessible local government financial information (including budgets and end of year financial statements); strong public involvement in the budgetary process through participatory budgeting practices; gender sensitive planning, budgeting, and resource allocation, reinforced by gender audits; independent budget analysis; and participatory public expenditure tracking programs that monitor budget execution and leakage of funds (Olsen, 2007:2-3). Olsen (2007:2-3) defines political accountability as "a process whereby citizens hold their elected officials to account for their behavior and

performance. This could be, for example, directly through elections. Political accountability can also be improved through elected local officials' overseeing local executives, through activities that increase awareness about the policy performance of local governments, or through direct citizen involvement in policy decision making beyond elections". It is indispensable that LGIs would have sufficient financial resources to fulfill local people's demands effectively since institutional outcomes largely depend on their financial capacity. It is argued that better service delivery from government-allocated funds is the supreme duty of the LGIs (Olsen, 2007:2-3). In this fiscal decentralisation process, the people's representatives are entitled to fulfill the following responsibilities (Olsen, 2007:2-3):

- Improve downward and upward financial accountability include strong local capacity for budgeting and public financial management;
- Set standards for control on intergovernmental transfer revenues (i.e., clean audit reports, submission of financial statements);
- Publication of transfer figures;
- Transparent local public audit systems--with publicly available audit findings;
- Clear rules for responsible local borrowing (including rules regarding defaults),
- Public access to borrowing information; and
- Clearly defined rules regarding hard budget constraints for local governments.


So it can be argued that, through PP and PB, people get their rights to make their representatives accountable otherwise than by election. These are processes in which every citizen gets opportunity to formulate, analyze, implement, monitor and evaluate his/her own budget. In the literature, the most common cycle follows the following stages:

**1. Participatory Budget Formulation.** The old and traditional system of central planning cannot help the poor, particularly the rural poor, to improve their standard of living. Thus, it has been felt that the involvement of those people in development activities is very much relevant and will increase the efficacy of planning (ESCAP, 1978 cited in Zahid and Rahman, 1994:13). Planning is necessary for the implementation of different activities of a State and society in order to achieve social and economic objectives. Simply, "planning refers to identification of problems and resources, determination of preferences, selection of strategies and distribution of responsibilities" (Samad, 1990 cited in Zahid and Rahman, 1994:10). Participatory budget formulation is the first stage of a planning process where mass people identify their own prioritized needs.

**2. Participatory Budget Analysis:** This stage offers an opportunity to citizens to assess whether the `budget has been formulated in accordance with the government's social commitments or not. In participatory budget analysis processes, citizens, who have not participated in the budget formulation process, can press their demands, raise questions, and discuss these with their neighbours. This enhances people's understanding about budget issues. In fact, this stage is an effort to publicize public income expenditure decisions and encourage debate on budgetary issues, as well as an attempt to engage the people in active citizenry (Malena, et al., 2004:10). In this stage, various organized groups compete, mobilize, negotiate, and deliberate over available resources (Wampler, 2007:31).

**3. Participatory Public expenditure/input tracking:** Public funds spending through project implementation is an important aspect of participatory budgeting. In this stage, disbursement of funds from government, donor agencies or other sources and utilization of those funds for various projects is disseminated through the use of media, publications and public meetings. Project implementation is an ongoing process and sometimes it may take several years for implementation of a certain project. This stage involves citizens tracking how public funds are spent. Involvement of citizens is supposed to identify the leakages or bottlenecks in the flow of public money (Malena et al., 2004:11).

**Figure 2.5**  
**Application of Participatory Budget Cycle**



Source: Adapted from Malena et al., (2004:11)

**4. Participatory performance monitoring and evaluation:** This stage offers citizens opportunity to monitor implementation of projects and performance of public services. In this stage, people evaluate whether the implementation of a project achieved its projected outcome or not. There are many participatory monitoring and evaluation tools such as public opinion surveys, public hearings or citizens report cards<sup>13</sup> used in various countries (Malena, Forster and Singh 2004:12). The performance data of monitoring and evaluation is presented in public interface. This stage offers citizens the opportunity to come together and demand greater accountability from the service providers.

The effectiveness of this system implies responsive and accountable LGIs and equitable economic, political and social development of the country. Pertinent to the study's objectives, it has explored the participatory budget formulation at WS and budget analysis at OBM of UP.

### **2.2.3 Citizen's Charter (CC) as NPM techniques for Responsive and Accountable Government**

A Citizen Charter (hereinafter CC) is a display of public services. It is provided for the citizens who are entitled to receive services. It mentions the types of services available, the service fee, the responsible person providing the service, the service quality, the duration for providing the service, the terms and procedures of service delivery and the remedy if the service is not available, etc. (Khadka and Bhattarai, 2012:1). It is in fact a declaration and pledge from the service-providing institution to furnish public services according to the needs of citizens ;where issues of accountability and transparency are of utmost importance(cited in Jamil, 2011:175). The *Citizen's Charter* was introduced by Prime Minister John Major's Conservative Government in the United Kingdom<sup>14</sup>,in 1991, as an instrument for improving public sector management. It was concerned with "doing more with less but doing it nicer" and he stated that "the charter programme will find better ways of converting money into better services" (cited in Jamil, 2011:176).The

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<sup>13</sup> Citizen Report Card (contains performance of government activities prepared by citizens) presented to government officials to demand accountability and lobby change (Malena, et al., 2004:11).

<sup>14</sup> Following the UK's Citizen's Charter initiative several countries implemented similar programmes e.g., Australia (Service Charter, 1997), Belgium (Public Service Users' Charter 1992), Canada (Service Standards Initiative, 1995), France (Service Charter, 1992), India (Citizen's Charter, 1997), Jamaica (Citizen's Charter 1994), Malaysia (Client Charter, 1993), Portugal (The Quality Charter in Public Services, 1993), and Spain(The Quality Observatory, 1992).

Citizen's Charter (CC) was one of the strategies of New Public Management (hereinafter NPM) and is considered a gateway to getting quality public services. The elements of Citizen's Charters include the following:

- Setting measurable standards for service delivery
- Specifying service delivery and timeframe
- Giving opportunity to choose alternate services
- Scope to complaint and provision for corrective measure
- Value for money: that means all citizens will be given equal treatment and the value or service renders shall be more than the fees to be paid (Khan, 2010).

It has been argued that the success of new management techniques is notoriously unreliable (James et al 2005). But the CC is considered to be an efficient, appropriate and relevant mode of delivering quality services on the basis of citizens' interests, needs and aspirations. It encourages citizens' active participation in the formulation and implementation of policies that are essential to their daily life (Jamil, 2011:175). As Iftekhharuzzaman (2012:1-3) argued,

As a legally non-binding social contract, the Citizens' Charter contributes to accountability and transparency in a process that involves a series of collective efforts which eventually lead to a public commitment by all stakeholders to promote governance quality and level of accountability to the people..... It is also essentially a set of tools and processes for building effective bridges of the public officials and public representatives with citizens, a sense of collective ownership and responsibility. It is a non-conventional process of holding the power-holders accountable and responsive to the people on whose mandate they exercise the power.

Active participation of the people is a main element of democratic governance. It has been argued that CC is one of the techniques that facilitates participation of people and empowers people with voice. It also builds the capacity of the people to raise their voices and demand accountable, transparent and pro-people governance (Jamil, 2011).

#### **2.2.4 Right To Information (RTI) as NPM techniques for Responsive and Accountable Government**

RTI is a fundamental human right. The acceptance of RTI law worldwide comes as an indicator of the growing recognition of the importance of the citizens' access to information as a catalyst for strengthening democracy, promoting human rights and good governance, and fighting against corruption. The UN General Assembly, in its very first session in 1946, adopted Resolution No 59(I)<sup>15</sup> on "Freedom of Information" which states:

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<sup>15</sup> <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/033/10/IMG/NR003310.pdf?OpenElement>

Freedom of Information is a fundamental human right and ... the touchstone of all the freedoms to which UN is consecrated.

According to the Bangladesh Right To Information Act 2009, “Information” includes any memo, book, design, map, contract, data, log book, order, notification, document, sample, letter, report, accounts, project proposal, photograph, audio, video, drawing, painting, film, any instrument done through electronic process, machine readable record, and any other documentary material regardless of its physical form or characteristics, and any copy thereof in relation to the constitution, structure and official activities of any authority” (RTI Act, 2009:7140)<sup>16</sup>. It empowers citizens to seek and receive information and official documents from authorities covered under the law.

Accountability of public officials is the cornerstone of good governance and a prerequisite for effective democracy. It has been found by researchers that people’s dissatisfaction with government relates largely to issues of responsiveness and accountability. It is argued that they are kept out from the circle of service provisions (Malena, et al., 2004). Poor people report that State institutions are “often neither responsive nor accountable to the poor” and “not accountable to anyone or accountable only to the rich and powerful” (Narayan et al. 2000, pp. 172 and 177 cited in Malena et al., 2004:5). So it is suggested that, by enhancing the availability of information, strengthening citizen voice, promoting dialogue and consultation between groups of actors and creating incentives for improved performance, the RTI, as a social accountability mechanism, can go a long way toward improving the effectiveness of service delivery and making public decision-making more transparent, participatory and pro-poor (Sarker and Dutta, 2011). Theoretically, it is presumed that, by providing critical information on rights and entitlements and soliciting systematic feedback from poor people, RTI, as a social accountability mechanism, provides a means to increase and aggregate the voice of disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. This enhanced voice empowers the poor and increases the chance of greater responsiveness of the State to their needs. It is thus evident that, theoretically, as a social accountability measure, people, by accessing or generating relevant information and building a credible evidence base, hold public officials accountable. Two sources of data are used for this purpose.

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<sup>16</sup> [http://www.moi.gov.bd/RTI/RTI\\_English.pdf](http://www.moi.gov.bd/RTI/RTI_English.pdf)

- 1) Supply side data/ information ( from government and service providers); and
- 2) Demand side data/information (from user of government services, communities and citizens).

The performance of both parties, in terms of their access to the information, is dependent on availability of both sources of data. It is argued that the supply side information, such as policy statements, budget commitments and accounts, records of inputs and outputs and expenditures, audit findings etc. is crucial for transparency and accountability. However, the demand side data is generated through various participatory methods and tools (Malena, et al., 2004:9). Thus, the availability, reliability and accessibility of quality data is key determinant of the success of social accountability mechanism. Recent innovations in citizens' legal right to information, participatory budgeting and community development processes have tested the extent to which 'transparency of decisions [...] go[es] hand-in-hand with transparency of consequences' (Prat 2005: 869 Cited in McGee and Gaventa , 2010).

### **2.3 Policy Impact Study: Through a Theoretical lens**

Policy impacts of policy processes are the consequences of government activity. It is argued that, in the case of a well-organized programme, policy makers are concerned mainly about the outcome of that programme. In general, the questions like "So what?"; "Do they work?"; "Do these programs have any beneficial effects on society?"; "Are the effects immediate or long-range?"; "Positive or negative?"; "What about persons not receiving these services?"; "what is the relationship between the costs of the program and the benefits of the society?" etc. are supposed to be asked by the Government (Dye, 1972:366). Policy "impacts" are changes in the society which are brought about as a result of some government activities (Dye, 1976:95). "Policy output" and "policy impact" should be distinguished for better understanding of policy impact. As David Nachmias (1979:3) argued that policy outputs are tangible measures and are observable indicators of what governments in fact do. Policy output is about the amount of money spent, the units of services provided, the number of staff employed and it says little about the attainment of the desired policy objectives.

Policy output, however, tells little about performance. Policy impact tells about the performance of any projected program's accomplishment status of the goals. Performance



gets incorporated with implementation of specific policy or programs. The performance of the policy (from policy identification to implementation) involves societal demands leading to political interaction with government (Putnam, 1993). According to Putnam

a high performance democratic institution must be both responsive and effective and sensitive to the demands of its constituents and effective in using limited resources to address those demands” (Putnam 1993: 9 cited in Lankina, 2008:2).

Crook and Manor used a range of indicators and measures of performance. These were **effectiveness, responsiveness and process**. As it has been stated above that output is about tangible measures for implementation of a certain policy, its effectiveness is related to the service provided by the output measures. Responsiveness is defined as “the degree of congruence between policies, outputs and popular preferences” and process is transparency and fairness of local officials (Crook and Manor 1998: 18). To measure performance, two distinct but interrelated types of policy evaluation research have emerged: 1) process evaluation and 2) impact evaluation (Howard and Clarence, 1970 cited in Nachmias, 1979). Howard E. Freeman coined this term as “**comprehensive evaluation**” and suggested to explore 1) to determine whether the process of a definite policy has been implemented by the predetermined guidelines or not 2) whether the changes have been occurring with its predetermined outcomes or not (cited in Nachmias, 1979: 5-6). So the present study is designed for a comprehensive evaluation of four important provisions of the UP Act, 2009 which intends to explore the process and identify the changes of people’s participation and thereby UP functionaries’ accountability and responsiveness as well.


In social science research, it is argued that “science deals with intricacy by using an analytical framework to break down systems into their key components and processes” (Pawson and Tielly, 2004:6). It is also argued that, “Effectiveness of a program is thus not dependent on the outcomes alone (cause–effect): rather there is a consideration of the theoretical mechanisms that are applied, and the socio-historical context in which the programmes were implemented. Thus, the final explanation of a program considers context-mechanism-outcome”(Pawson and Tielly,2004:6).Based on this theoretical discussion, the study will thus evaluate both process and outcome of the certain provisions of the Right To Information Act, 2009. Pertinent to this study, the explanation of Pawson and Tilly’s Context Mechanism Outcome Pattern Configuration (CMOPC), regarding critical realist evaluation, is relevant,

with system modelling of the policy process. System approaches involve identifying various components of a system and assessing the nature of the links and relationships among each of them. The societal demands that arise from the environment can be explained through Easton's (1965) 'Political System' model. Osman (N.D.) described Easton's "political system" in the following way:

It is composed of those identifiable and interrelated institutions and activities in a society that make authoritative decisions (or allocations of values) that are binding on society. The environment provides inputs to the decision process/political system in the form of demands and supports. Inputs into the system are provided through outside interests, particularly from pressure groups, consumer groups and interest groups. These environmental inputs are converted through the political system into outputs or policies.

The following Figure- 2.6 **Systemic View of People's Participation and Accountability** has been drawn on the basis of Easton's system model and Pawson and Tilley's Context Mechanism Outcome Pattern Configuration. Pertinent to this study the components of this system have been discussed below:

**Figure 2.6**  
**A Systemic View of People's Participation and Accountability**



Source: Developed by author (Jenkins, 1978 cited in Mosabbir, 2006:25; Nachmias, 1979: 5-6; Pawson and Tielly, 1997, 2004:6-9)

### 2.3.1 Inputs

The four provisions of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 treated here as mechanisms as well as inputs for participation and accountability. "Mechanisms describe what it is about programs and interventions that bring about any effects. Mechanisms are often hidden, rather as the working of a clock cannot be seen but drive the patterned movements of the hands" (Pawson and Tielly, 2004: 6). In the present study, the mechanisms

are supposed to enhance people's participation, and thereby accountability, of the UP functionaries. It is argued that "it is not programs that work but the resources they offer to enable their subjects to make them work. This process of how subjects interpret and act upon the intervention stratagem is known as the program mechanism and it is pivot around which realist research revolves" (Pawson and Tielly, 2004: 6). So the mechanisms of the UP Act, 2009 i.e. WS, OBM, CC and RTI which offer scope for people's participation and UP functionary's accountability in decision making and planning process, access to information and utilization of charter of services of UP are the inputs of the system.

### **2.3.2 Process**

It has been mentioned earlier that an impact study should include both process and change of the programmes that have been designed for some sorts of intended result. In this study, the processes of participatory planning and budgeting and utilization of citizen charter and Right to Information at Ward Shava (WS) and Open Budget Meeting (OBM) have been considered. Each provision regarding WS, OBM, CC and RTI has some specific objectives relating to people's participation and accountability. The process is about implementation of each provision according to its stipulated guidelines. In fact, this is the most important part of evaluation research. It is obvious that any policy becomes futile if it is not implemented. The implementation stage can be affected by many problems and even the most robust and well- designed policy can collapse at this stage (Nachmias, 1979). The process of participatory planning and budgeting, with access to and utilization of rights to information, and a charter of services made by the people at WS and OBM are main parts of the system to hold their representatives accountable. Compliance with the guidelines of the mechanisms by the UP functionaries in the formation of WS, OBM and dissemination of information and charter of services are essential to making this system work.

#### **2.3.2.1 Participatory Planning Process through *Ward Shava and Open Budget Meeting***

The national planning of the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) follows the Medium Term Budget Framework (MTBF) which links policy, planning and budgeting. The MTBF is defined as "an approach to budgeting that integrates policy, planning and budgeting within a medium term framework (estimates for 1 year, and projection for 4 years) (GoB, 2012:9).

The sixth Five Year Plan, entitled “Accelerating Growth & Reducing Poverty”, is expected to be prepared by the local governments from the bottom up. Thus, the finalized policies and plans of the UPs are to be sent to respective line Ministries<sup>17</sup>. The line Ministries are expected to determine their strategic objectives and identify the major activities by operationalizing the strategies into actions. The national planning involves people’s participation through the LGIs at grassroots level. As the Government policy states,

Participatory planning and open budget meetings are held at grassroots level. In participatory planning meetings, the local governments gather information to decide upon policy priorities, revenue collection and expenditure. In open budget meetings, the views of participants are discussed and incorporated in the budget, where possible (GoB, 2012:14).

The elected UP consists of one chairman, nine members, and three women members from three reserved seats for women. There are nine wards in each UP. Each Ward Committee is supposed to organize WS at least twice in a year. Ward Committee (hereinafter WC) is supposed to be formed of at least seven voters of the concerned ward. Respective ward member or woman member of reserved seat of that ward is supposed to be the convener of the committee<sup>18</sup>. Beside this, two UP members, one school teacher, local social workers (one male and one female), one representative from NGOs and preferably a freedom fighter or a general citizen constitute WC (UP Circular, 2012). Among them one will act as Secretary of WC. The prioritized demands of WS are supposed to be scrutinized by Standing Committees (hereinafter SC) and Union Development and Co-ordination Committees (hereinafter UDCC). The Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 includes a provision for formation of 13 (thirteen) standing committees. Each standing committee is supposed to be composed of the UP functionaries, UP women functionaries; co-opt members, experts and general people for providing specific policy instruction and service to the locality. According to Section 95 of the LG (UP) Act, 2009 and UP circular the UP Chairman acts as UDCC Chair. The UP members, all UPZ officers, UP officers, representatives from social workers, NGO officials, and school teachers will also be members of this committee (UP Circular, 2011). For each UP, OBM is to be held at least twice in a year. According to the UP operational manual, the participatory planning<sup>19</sup> and budgeting processes of UPs maintain the following stages:

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<sup>17</sup> Appendix 4.7 shows Institutional Framework for Local Level Plan


<sup>18</sup> Woman member from reserve seat will be convener of three wards by rotation. So each year each UP must have three WC where woman member from reserved seat will be convener of that committee.

<sup>19</sup> Planning includes both annual and five year plan.

**Stage-1 Preparatory task of WS:** The first step of participatory planning is to decide on initiating ward meeting and its schedule in the UP meeting. In this stage, a Ward Committee is formed to organize WS in ward level. According to the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 each elected member acts as the chair of the WS in his/her Ward while the elected woman member would act as the advisor. Thus, a woman member is advisor of three wards, as one Woman Member is elected for three general Ward. According to section 6(4) of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 the secretary of the UP is obliged to note and present the resolutions of the meeting at a UP meeting.

**Stage-2 Social Mapping:** The local residents are expected to divide into small groups and develop priority-based demands to improve their livelihoods. The demands are supposed to be made by utilizing data collection formats on the basis of social mapping, direct observation, resource classification and discussion. These formatted priority-based demand lists must be presented in the WS.

**Figure 2.7**  
**Steps in Participatory Planning Process of UP in Bangladesh**



Source: Adapted and Modified from UP operational manual (2012) and Rahman (2004 cited in Rahman, N.D.)

**Stage-3: Meeting of WS:** UP is supposed to direct the members of the WC to publish the date and agenda of the WS at least seven (7) days before the meeting, by distributing leaflets, invitation letters and notices. The drafts of various development work plans are expected to be presented at the meeting for discussion. Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 2009 states that a ward shava/meeting (hereinafter WS) must be constituted in each ward, consisting of all the voters enlisted in the voter lists. The quorum of the WS will be fulfilled with five percent of the total voters.

**Stage-4: Union Development Plan:** The UP collects the proposals of all wards and classifies them into various development sectors such as infrastructural, agriculture, health, education, safe drinking water and sanitation, sports and culture, women empowerment, children and youth etc. The Planning Committee of the UP (consisting of all members and the Chairman of the UP) is supposed to send these proposals to Standing Committees for review and recommendation. The SCs are obliged to prepare a prioritised demand list for the UP, on the basis of prioritised demand lists of the WS and available funds. The annual plans of the UP and year-wise aggregated five year plan are supposed to be formulated on the basis of this lists. The Planning Committee is obliged to submit the first year plan with its estimated expenditure (which is the yearly budget of the UP) and the final draft of the five year plan, with recommendation of SC, to UDCC. The five year plan would be approved in the general meeting of the UP. On the basis of this five-year plan and yearly prioritised demands of the WS, the UP would formulate its budget.

**Stage-5: Participatory Budgeting at *Unmukto Budget Shava* (Open Budget Meeting OBM):** It is mandatory to publish the approved plans on the notice board of the UP, at focal points of the concerned ward, and on the website of LGSP-II. The ward committee is supposed to organize a WS to inform people about approved plans. The UP is responsible for organizing a budget session in an open place and presenting a yearly budget before the standing committee and people minimum 60 (sixty) days before the financial year. It is stated in the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act that the UP is responsible for organizing an Open Budget Meeting (OBM) at the end of the month of May and the finalized plans<sup>20</sup> of preparatory budget meeting of the ward level is required for that meeting (Union Parishad Operational Manual, 2012:42). The decisions of standing committees and the priorities of WS are to be considered in the UP's yearly budget. After each financial year, the UP will present its income and expenditure statement to the standing committee and general people for information. So the process of OBM of the UP Act; will be studied to explore participatory budgeting.

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<sup>20</sup> The stipulated timeframe for preparatory budget meeting i.e. WS is within the month of April of any financial year.

### **2.3.2.2 Charter of Services**

According to the Act, 2009 each UP is legally responsible to provide charter of services which is supposed to contains declaration of various services of UP, its terms and specific time frame<sup>21</sup> for getting that services. The provision of CC in ‘the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act 2009’ ensures people’s right to get dissemination of description of all services with their specific terms & conditions and a system for grievance resolution within specific time frame. At this point, CC is about description of all those services of people’s entitlements which are supposed to be provided by the UP. In this study, the right and entitlement to various services of UP which are supposed to be finalized in WS and OBM have been considered as charter of services. So, how do the UP functionaries furnish and disseminate the charter of various services and how do people have access to this charter?

### **2.3.2.3 Right to Information (RTI)**

Right to Information empowers citizens to seek and receive information and official documents from authorities covered under the law<sup>22</sup>. The UP Act, 2009 conform the right through its section 78, 79 and 80<sup>23</sup>. This sections assure that anyone can seek required information from UP and the information providing authority is liable to provide specific information and explanation for not providing information (if any) covered under the law.

In this study people’s right to information indicates the information regarding WS and OBM such as meeting place and time, formation of WC and Scheme Supervision Committee (hereinafter SSC), implementable sectors/scheme lists, budget information such as expected income from resource mobilization, various grants from the UP’s own funds, block grants from LGSP-II and performance-based allocation, sector- wise expenditure allocation, final service recipient list etc. So, how do the UP functionaries provide various information regarding WS and OBM and how do the voters access this information?

### **2.3.3 Environment/Context Analysis**

In natural science research or in laboratory experiments, it is believed that the potential causal mechanism is activated automatically. An evaluation study discovers the circumstances and conditions under which something is happening. It also explains the

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<sup>21</sup> Discussion on the provisions of the UP act 2009 has been made in the chapter-4.

<sup>22</sup> The Right to Information act, 2009.

<sup>23</sup> Discussion on the provisions of the UP act 2009 has been made in the chapter-4.

factors responsible for changes. It is about explanation of certain causal relationships. In social science research, evaluating the impact of a program is an obvious attempt to consider the societal context and environment within which the process is being operated.

Ackoff stated that the environment of every social system contains three levels of purpose: "the purpose of the system, of its parts, and of the system of which it is a part, the super system" (Ackoff, 1981, p. 23). In this study, the effect of the mechanisms/inputs itself, of the other mechanisms of the UP, such as its financing from national government, own resource mobilization, personnel system etc. and of the existing local government system within which these mechanisms are working have been considered, to explore people's participation and UP functionaries' accountability.

It is argued that, like a policy-making process, a policy-implementation process is also affected by various interacting actors, institutions and factors (Osman, N.D., Panday, 2008). It appears that, for implementing new programs in decentralized LGIs, existing local governance traditions, such as how the LGIs operated, through appointed or elected officials, the local capacity for providing services, whether national and central political Parties dominate politics at local levels, whether local administrations are managed in the interest of the Party in power, wastage, corruption, the oversight system of local government expenditure and the extent of citizen involvement or interest in local public affairs have to be taken into consideration (USAID,2000).

In this study, the inputs are supposed to work within this existing local political administrative setting. Moreover, it is argued that the local political setting is crucial to understanding the factors that drive accountability (Lankina, 2008 cited in Yilmaz et al 2008:6).More specifically, it is stated that local residents, local governments, producers of local government services and higher levels of government (including central government) are regarded as crucial elements in a local accountability system (Yilmaz et al 2008:6). Thus, the contexts of local politics and administration of UP have been considered to explore the impact of theLG (UP) Act, 2009.

#### **2.3.3.1 Local Governance Context Analysis: Political Will and Local Governance Tradition**

Strong political will is characterized by a clearly-stated desire to reform on the part of the Government and key non-governmental actors, in the enactment and implementation of law.



Weak political will is lip service to the importance of decentralisation and little or no promulgation and virtually no implementation of law (USAID, 2000). In this regard, whether the UPs have strong or weak governance tradition that have to be taken into consideration.

A strong local governance tradition is characterized by a long history of popularly-elected local governments that effectively provide basic services. In such a tradition, local functionaries are accountable for their financial expenditures by established practices, local government autonomy, political competition or a diversity of political parties at the local level and local decision-making process. Weak local governance tradition is characterized by appointed local officials elected to local government institutions; weak local capacity for providing services; few national, centralized, political parties that dominate politics at all levels; local administrations that are managed largely by the interest of the Party in power; wastage, corruption and weak oversight of local government expenditure; and little citizen involvement or interest in local public affairs (USAID, 2000).

Since the government has enacted the act, 2009 attempts have been made thereto explore existing local governance tradition and government's reform initiatives regarding the process of participatory planning and budgeting and dissemination of CC and people's RTI.

### **2.3.3.2 The Political and Administrative Structure**

In terms of devolution of power, three forms of decentralization, political, fiscal and administrative, have to be explored in the study of LGIs. Politics, political Parties and political decentralisation are inexorably linked with modern democracy. Democracy cannot survive without a responsible and responsive Party system.

The way political Parties behave is greatly influenced by cultural and social factors (Khan, Islam and Haque, 2008). According to Elkins and Simeon (1979: 127) "Political culture is one of the most popular and seductive concepts in political science; it is also one of the most controversial and confused". Almond and Verba (1963: 14) saw political culture in terms of ".....the political system as internalized in the cognition, feelings and evaluations and its population." Dahl (1956) looks at it as people's orientation to problem solving, collective action, and the political system and inter-subjectivity. It is argued that political culture and tradition influence public resource allocation and accountability style

of politicians (Lankina, 2008:11). Lankina (2008:21-23) argued that LGIs should have their own revenue sources and inter-governmental fund transfer system. In terms of fiscal autonomy, the following matters determine whether the LGIs are dependent on central government or not.

- Rules that determine the total amount of transfer-the distributable pool;
- The way the distributable pool is allocated among local governments.
- The purpose of the transfer system- an unconditional general purpose grant versus a conditional specific transfer.
- Local government involvement in the design and management of the intergovernmental transfer system (Lankina, 2008:22).

Political and administrative autonomy is also necessary for a participatory and accountable local government system. There exists various upward accountability mechanisms for check and balance of local power exercises but autonomy with a downward accountability mechanism is necessary for local discretion. It is argued by Lankina (2008:26) that, “without sound mechanisms for downward accountability, the sole emphasis on upward accountability measures limits local government autonomy in local decision-making and service delivery, negating the intended empowering of local governments”. Knowledge of the local political setting is crucial to understanding the factors that drive accountability (Lankina, 2008 cited in Yilmaz, et al., 2008:6).

Four actors are typically relevant in a local accountability system: local residents, local governments, producers of local government services and higher levels of government (including central government) (Schroeder 2004:5 cited in Yilmaz et al, 2008:6). Relation of elected functionaries with bureaucrats has substantive impact on local service delivery. It is argued that for facilitating local development through democratic decentralisation four things to be ensured: accountability to people; a relationship between elected functionaries and local bureaucrats; a congenial operation of this relationship and feasible short as well as long term programs (Siddiqui, 2000:22).

In the context of the above discussions, the study was intended to explore the relationship of central government units with UP's through the planning and budgeting process. The study was also intended to explore the impact of the existing political culture on the participatory planning and budgeting process at WS and OBM.

### **2.3.3.3 Socio – economic Condition /Poverty**

The World Bank (2007:42-43) termed this analysis “vulnerability analysis”. In the context of the present study objectives, attempts have been taken to explore existing socio-economic conditions of the inhabitants of the study area. Whether people living in such socio-economic status value participatory planning process at WS or not has been a matter of exploration. Moreover, the literature on local government service delivery of Bangladesh illustrates that the rich and influential people have substantive control over the allocation of LGIs. As such, attempts have also been made to explore the socio-economic conditions of the functionaries of UPs and the people who participated in the working process of UPs through WS and OBM.

### **2.3.3.4 Gender Analysis**

In generally, it is generally accepted in the society that the female are in inferior position to their male counterparts. The vulnerable conditions of divorced, widowed, aged and workless women are beyond description. Their mental torment and their life struggle, sufferings and day-to-day living in rural and urban areas are more miserable than could be explained in a single paper (Monsoor, 1999). As the World Bank (2007:42) state:

Gender inequality remains pervasive and is a barrier to growth and poverty reduction. Levels of asset entitlements differ hugely between men and women in different contexts. Even where women have *access* to assets, they are less likely to have decision-making control over the use of those assets. Because women are more likely to be marginalized by or excluded from the State, market, and societal institutions that govern their lives, gender disparities tend to be greater in low-income countries, communities, and households.

The human society is divided on the basis of gender, class and power structures etc. The female voters are integral part of an electoral process since they constitute half<sup>24</sup> of total voters of any country. This study is about participation of all, both male or female, as voters in the working process of UP's in Bangladesh. The females are considered as targeted vulnerable groups in all plans of GoB (Afsar, 1997). Bangladesh ranked 75<sup>th</sup> position out of 136 countries in the year 2013 compared to 116<sup>th</sup> position out of 136

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<sup>24</sup> The western liberal arguments in support of increased representation of women in politics are: (a) women compromise about half of the population and should be represented adequately to establish a government by the people; (b) women are more likely to see an open and transparent government; (c) women will bring a different perspective to politics; (d) women can broaden the political agenda; (e) women are more aware of the needs and issues which affect them; and (f) extensive participation of women in public life is likely to lower the level of corruption (Ahmed, 2005 cited in Alim, 2007:3).

countries in the year 1997 in the Gender Development Index (GDI) (Afsar, 1997; The Gurdian, 2013). It seems that the women of the country have transformed themselves into a better position, although they were portrayed in the following way;

Women in Bangladesh, as elsewhere, are commonly depicted as subjugated and subordinated in a patriarchally-dominated society. This image of subordination is enhanced and amplified by the traditional views of stereotyped female roles in the family and society. The main factors stated to contribute to this subordination are the negative impact of tradition, religion, patriarchy, seclusion or purdah and paternalistic attitudes in the socio-economic and legal sphere (Monsoor, 1999:22).

In view of this perspective, participation of women in the various social accountability mechanisms stated above has been taken into consideration in studying participation in UPs.

#### **2.3.4 Change/Outcome**

It is the real outcome derived from the stipulated policy guidelines. Policy outcome completely depends on the implementation process and contextual interaction. Pawson and Tilly (2004:2) described how policy implementation causes positive impacts on society. They stated that,

Social programmes are regarded as products of the human imagination: they are hypotheses about social betterment. Programmes chart out a perceived course whereby wrongs might be put to rights, deficiencies of behaviour corrected, inequalities of condition alleviated. Programmes are thus shaped by a vision of change and they succeed or fail according to the veracity of that vision.

The impact study is concerned with examination of the extent of changes directed by policy implementation guidelines. It is about the explanation of operationally-defined policy goals, specification of criteria of success, and measurement of progress towards the goal (Nachmias, 1979). In light of the statement of the problems of this study and preceding literature review, it is evident that, before enactment of the LG (UP) Act, 2009, the people were kept outside the planning and budgeting process and had no institutional arrangement for participation. UP functionaries did not comply with the guidelines for formation of various committees, were corrupt, and people had low expectations from UPs. Since the enactment of the LG (UP) Act 2009, the UP is expected to prepare its five year plan through the WS and finalize it in OBM, which will cover the Sixth Five Year Plan (hereinafter SFYP) (2011-2016) of the Government of Bangladesh (hereinafter GoB) (Ahmed, 2011, Union Parishad Operational Manual, 2012:38). Thus, the changing pattern in terms of people's participation and UP functionaries' accountability in

the planning and budgeting process and utilization of CC and RTI, at WS and OBM, has been considered as a potential outcome in this study. The following dimensions, related to participation of people in the WS and OBM and utilization of RTI and CC, have been developed to depict the real change in the decision-making process of UPs.

#### **2.3.4.1 Access to Participation Mechanism**

It means issues such as: selection of place for meeting; process of invitation to the meeting and poor or no understanding of the concepts used in the meeting which are some major reasons that hinder large segments of the population in real participation (Andrew and Shah, N.D). Did the voters have information regarding formation of WS and OBM and charter of services? How did they get this information? Did the voters understand the concepts used in WS and OBM? The preceding literature review found that UP functionaries lacked knowledge and understanding of the operational procedures and functions such as budgeting, planning and resource mobilization (Haque, 2009). How do voters participate in the planning and budgeting process? Thus, people's understanding regarding WS, OBM, CC and RTI has been considered to explore their access to these mechanisms.

#### **2.3.4.2 Ability to Participate**

Ability to participate in a participatory budgeting process is limited when citizens are less interested in learning about their rights, the fiscal responsibility of the government or broader social policies (Wampler, 2007). How do the people of the study area place and negotiate their demands in the planning and budgeting process? Does each one participate in the decision making process? It is obvious that people will be ignored when they are less empowered with knowledge. Empirical study revealed that sometimes citizens were excused from work and asked to meet to make representations about local issues. This was done to create the formality of participation without true participation (Lankina 2008). Thus, people's ability to place and negotiate demands, in both WS and OBM, has been considered to explore their ability to participation in this study.

#### **2.3.4.3 Access and Right to Information**

Access and Right to Information such as various allocations of GoB, various service provisions and their terms and conditions which are to be decided in WS was studied. The

OBM offers opportunity to citizens to assess whether the budget has been formulated in accordance with the Government's social commitments that have been stipulated through policy guidelines or not. In participatory budget analysis process, citizens who have not participated in WS can raise their question and discussion with UP functionaries. For that citizens are supposed to know about their right to seek information from UP functionaries. Do the voters have knowledge about various charters of services and their right to seek information? So, people's access in CC and application of RTI for participating in WS and OBM has been considered.

#### **2.3.4.4 Placing Demands at WS**

The planning process is supposed to follow the guidance provided by the UP operational manual<sup>25</sup>. It is supposed that priorities are to be given for women in that process. It has been depicted in the figure 2.7 that people are supposed to social map their local needs on the basis of resource classification. Placing Demands at WS because the LG (UP) Act 2009 offers an opportunity to voters to participate in the decision-making process of the UP's annual plans. So how did the people social map and identify their needs? How do they place their demands at WS? These questions have been resolved in this stage of the process of PP. It has been revealed by the researcher that "public officials have confined the meeting discussion; they have spoken and people have just listened to" (Malena, et al., 2004:10). So, this study has also included the role of the UP functionaries. How well they have conveyed information to their voters and paid attention to the peoples' needs have also been taken into consideration.

#### **2.3.4.5 Information Transmission Medium**

It is evident that the medium had a significant effect on participation (cited in Andrews and Shah, *N.D.*). An information transmission medium is a device that transmits ideas, collects feedback and entertains criticism and negations voiced by citizens through their participation in budget forums and public meetings. What are the information transmission mediums for budget or other various information related to WS and OBM? Various block grants of GoB, budgetary information or charters of services are supposed to be posted on UP notice boards, published on websites and delivered through written

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<sup>25</sup> In the social mapping stage, general people are supposed to identify their development needs by dividing themselves among small groups.

documents. Do the voters have access to that written information? So, this study has aimed to explore whether these medium obstruct or facilitate citizens communication as well as participation with UP planning and budgeting and access to charter of services.

In this study of the impact of the LG(UP) Act 2009, utilization of RTI and CC for organizing planning and budgeting in WS and OBM the following profile for model UP councilors have been developed:

#### **2.3.4.6 Responsiveness**

Authority and responsibility is directly related with responsiveness. The term authority implies people's representatives' power to make decisions and responsibility implies the duties<sup>26</sup> for which the power holders are accountable to the people. Responsiveness as a form of behaviour refers to the extent to which the State, having heard the voices of its citizens, responds to their demands and concerns (cited in O'Neill et al 2007). It is perhaps a useful intermediate outcome to assess the effectiveness of voice and accountability interventions (O'Neill et al 2007). The relationship of voice, accountability and responsiveness has been put simply in the following way:

$$\text{Responsiveness to citizens} = f(\text{Voice} + \text{accountability})$$

Here, in terms of responsiveness to the voice of poor people, "f" refers to existing political and organization culture (O'Neill, et al., 2007:8-9). Responsiveness is answering the question how the duty bearers consider the interests of the poor and marginalized people in the existing political, social and administrative context. Responsiveness depends on the discretionary power which is entailed by law conferred to the duty bearer and his capability to utilize that power.

**Answerability** ensures people's right to know from the functionaries about their actions (McGee and Gaventa, 2010). This process binds the elected representatives and government officials to answer or to explain causes for not paying heed to that demand (Sarker and Dutta, 2011). The mechanisms like CC and RTI are supposed to empower

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<sup>26</sup> In this study the duties are implied to inform people about the formation of the memberships of WC meeting, ensure their participation in the meeting, prepare Citizen's Charter and provide service appropriately, make service information available so that their demands are articulated and fulfilled.

people to demand answers about utilization of various government allocation, budgetary allocation etc., from the elected public officials. So, how the UP functionaries respond to people's demands or answer and explain to citizens have been considered to explore the application of the provisions of RTI and CC in the LG (UP) Act 2009.

#### **2.3.4.7 Administrative Behaviour**

As Huque argued that, "human behavior in an organizational setting is important, especially behavior that involves making decisions or influencing the behavior of others" (Huque, 1990:53). On the basis of the theories of traditional and modern behavioral approaches Huque (1990:73) argued that there are some motivational factors which range from pay, power, privilege, status, satisfaction, work environment, professional growth to corruption and graft that affect humane behavior. He further argued that these factors may change with time, place, personnel, issue or circumstances of administration. In any public organization, the objectives of the public officials (either elected or recruited) are to provide services to its citizens. They provide services to citizens as per the instruction manual provided to them. The term "administrative skill" is a segment of administrative behavior which is determined by the attitude of those public officials when they interact among themselves or with the service receivers (Huque, 1990). In this perspective, citizen participation is defined as "interaction of citizens and administrators, concerned with public policy decisions and public services" (Callahan, 2007). Effectiveness of any organization is dependent on the role, traits and managerial ability of leaders as managers in that organization (Huque, 2007:225). Although UP functionaries are political, they have to perform numerous administrative functions. Various Government and Non Government Organizations (NGOs) projects are implemented through these institutions. The elected officials' managerial ability is also associated with their discretionary administrative power. Their managerial and administrative skill is necessary for accomplishment of those activities with success.

Coordination among various actors and networking are necessary for good local governance. Many central government and Non-government organizations (NGOs) projects are implemented through these institutions. How are these projects accumulated in the LGI's regular planning and budgeting process? Are the UP functionaries able to



accommodate all GO-NGO projects' planning in the UP's regular planning process in the WSs? How do they involve people in that planning process? UP functionaries are responsible to provide a charter of services regarding people's entitlement and right to various services of UP. Thus, the study has intended to explore UP functionaries' ability and skill to inform people about charter of services, various allocations from government and their rights to plan in WS and finalize in OBM.

#### **2.3.4.8 Transparency and Openness**

These are two sides of a coin. Transparency is about openness of information. The planning or budgeting process will be more responsive to public demands if it happens in the presence of people. The availability of information regarding people's rights will make them informed. The openness or transparency of information regarding people's rights is essential for responsiveness. The right or the capability to demand answers leads to accountability of power holders. Here two important responsibilities arise for the duty bearer:

- provide information and empower people with their rights and
- Fulfill their demands which will be raised from those rights.

How is information, including that about the charter of services, regarding WS and OBM, being disseminated by the UP functionaries? How do the UP functionaries offer opportunity to citizens to utilize that information and charter of services? How are people known to their right? How do the UP functionaries response to the voters' needs?

#### **2.3.4.9 Leadership Ability and Answerability**

People with specific qualifications and traits emerge as leaders. Generally, it is argued that leadership is viewed as "a power relation, or as a form of influence or persuasion.... Sometimes leadership is associated with a formal position in an organized system; other times, with an informal relationship between the individuals who make things happen and those who lend them implicit or explicit support" (Huque, 2007:223). To better understand, it is necessary to distinguish between political and public leaders. Mughan and Patterson said that political leadership is the process of mobilizing followers to achieve common goals while Hall said that public leaders are those who stand for and

hold office (Huque, 2007:223). Again, on the basis of leadership style, Mooney and Reilly differentiated three types of leaders: “titular”, “controller” and “organizer”. “A titular leader accepts his followers’ advice; a controller does the opposite and ignores them; and an organizer tries to strike a balance to get the best results” (cited in Huque, 2007: 225). Here, in this study, organizing capacity of the leaders is determined as the key factor of the discretion of a duty bearer. Do the UP functionaries provide scope to the voters to raise their demands in WS and OBM? How do they invite people of the locality to participate in the planning and budgeting process in UP? In the participatory planning process in the WS, citizens are supposed to raise their demands and, in OBM, citizens are supposed to raise questions and negotiate with UP functionaries. So, how the UP functionaries offer opportunities to citizens to raise their demands in WS and discuss and negotiate in OBM through their leadership ability have been considered.


### **2.3.5 Feedback**

A new initiative alone is therefore not a guarantee of success: its progress needs to be monitored and necessary adjustments to be made where appropriate (Mintzberg 2004: 5). Obviously, if the outcomes of policy implementation are as they are expected at the initial stage, these will bring greater societal and political development. If the impact study finds that the changes or outcomes deviated from the policy decisions, these again are taken for consideration later in the policy process. It is argued that any new strategy is an interactive process which requires constant feedback between thought and action and successful strategies always evolve from experience (Mintzberg 2004:5). Corrective measures have been taken for consideration for tackling the challenges (if any) of proper functioning of the processes in the phase of “**Feedback**”.

## **2.4 Analytical Framework of the Study**

An independent variable is presumed to cause or determine a dependent variable. In this study, people’s participation and UP functionaries’ accountability are dependent variables which are assumed to be caused by the implementation of the provisions of the LG(UP) Act, 2009 within existing local governance context. In light of the above discussion the following theoretical framework has been drawn for the study:

**Figure 2.8**  
**Analytical Framework of the Study**



## 2.5 Conclusion

The conceptual framework of this study “A Systemic View of People’s Participation and Accountability” is interconnected with input, process and outcome of the LG (UP) Act, 2009. The subsequent chapters have been developed by following this framework. Following this theoretical framework, this research has intended to depict the real outcome, i.e. the extent and impact of people’s participation and the UP functionary’s accountability in the UP, which are regarded as important ingredients of the local governance process.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Research Methodology**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

This Chapter considers various aspects of research strategy, units of analysis, data collection tools and techniques that have been used in this study. Arguments in favour of methodological approaches, sample selection, study area selection, validity of data and problems faced in data collection have also been included.

##### **3.1.1 Research Strategy**

In evaluation, many strategies stress developing an in-depth understanding of the context within which an intervention occurs (cited in Bryman, 2001). Evaluation research is probably as old as social research itself (Babbie, 2004). One most common question generally asked in evaluating new policy intervention is whether the interventions of the new programme<sup>1</sup> have achieved their anticipated goals<sup>2</sup> or not. Most often, quasi-experimental design is used in evaluating programs. However, in recent years, evaluations have also been done on the basis of qualitative approaches (Yin, 1994:15, Bryman, 2001).

In making evaluation of the impact of the Act, 2009 on local governments, a number of questions have been addressed. These are:

- (1) to what extent have provisions like Ward Shava(Ws) and Open Budget Meetings (OBM) enhanced people's participation in the governing process of UPs?
- (2) to what extent have provisions like Citizen's Charter(CC) and Right to Information (RTI) managed to hold UP functionaries accountable for their actions or inaction?
- (3) How do these mechanisms work? and what factors are affecting the working of these mechanisms?

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<sup>1</sup> Policy impact evaluation consists of study of both process and change of the interventions and Dye (1972:367) argued that comprehensive evaluation can be termed as "program evaluation".

<sup>2</sup> It is argued that goals of a policy or program are not always known and that is why it is suggested that evaluation research should not be limited to evaluate the achievement of those goals (cited in Dye, 1972:367).

Pawson and Tielly (2004, 1997) stated that “realist evaluation asks not, ‘what works?’ or, ‘Does this program work?’ but asks instead, ‘what works for whom in what circumstance and in what respects, and how?’” and advocates the empirical and critical realism approach in interpreting data. Realism is often termed as critical realism (Pawson and Tielly, 1997). It is a philosophy of social science that helps to deal with social complexity (Pawson and Tielly, 1997). It is defined as “a logic of inquiry’ that generates distinctive research strategies and designs” (Pawson and Tielly, 2004:10). Empirical realism argued for adopting appropriate methods for collecting and interpreting data in order to understand reality. Critical realism is a specific form of realism which, in a real social context, depicts natural events and changes of a particular situation; and relates this situation with established structures. As Bhaskar argued, “these structures are not spontaneously apparent in the observable pattern of events; they can only be identified through the practical and theoretical work of the social scientist” (Bhaskar 1989:2 cited in Bryman, 2001:13). In the field of social science research, Yin (1993:4-6) argued for case study research strategy when the subjects of research can relate to real life context. It is suggested to focus basically on contemporary events, and ask how and why questions. The impact of a policy constitutes of the effects on the *real-world condition* which includes (Dye, 1972:367):

- a) Its impact on the target situation or group
- b) Its impact on situations or groups other than the targets (spillover effects)
- c) Its impact on future as well as immediate conditions
- d) Its direct costs, in terms of resources devoted to the program
- e) Its indirect costs, including loss of opportunities to do other things

Based on the above discussion, the study was designed using a case-oriented<sup>3</sup> qualitative research strategy, as case studies emphasize detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or conditions and their relationships (Yin, 1994: 6). The term “case study” usually refers to a detailed examination of a single unit, such as person, a small group of people or indeed a single organization. It can enable a researcher to explore, unravel and understand issues, problems and relationships. The reasons behind the selection of this strategy are:

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<sup>3</sup> Unlike other research strategies include experimental research strategy, which requires control over behavioral events, survey research does not ask “why” type questions, or do historical and archival analysis (may /may not) nor does it focus on contemporary events (Yin, 1994:6).

- (1) Research methods are conventionally divided into quantitative, qualitative and participatory, each with differing underlying approaches, tools and techniques. Case studies can include data triangulation and it is argued that “the contrast between quantitative and qualitative evidence does not distinguish various research strategy” (Yin, 1994: 14).
- (2) The key strength of the case study method is the fact that it uses multiple sources and techniques in the data gathering process.
- (3) A social science study outlines the proceedings of a research method in advance, for example, what sort of evidence to gather and what kind of research method to follow. This case study strategy could guide this study from the very outset, with all its methodological support.
- (4) The research strategy also determines which data analysis techniques are to be used to answer the research questions. The case study method investigates an issue using a combination of informal interviews and participant observations.
- (5) It elevates understanding of a complex issue or object and extends experience or adds strength to what is already known through previous research.

This study is basically composed of qualitative data. However, quantitative data, although in limited scale, has also been used to supplement arguments drawn from the qualitative data. This situation can be termed as a dominant-less dominant design (Creswell, 1994). Here, the dominant design is the qualitative data, while the less dominant one is quantitative data. Denzin (1978) termed it as “triangulation” in order to refer application of combination of methodologies in the study of similar phenomenon. Denzin (1970 cited in Bryman, 2001, Denzin, N.D.:2) distinguished four forms of triangulation:

1. **Data triangulation**, which entails gathering data through several sampling strategies, so that slices of data at different times and social situations, as well as on a variety of people, are gathered.
2. **Investigator triangulation**, which refers to the use of more than one researcher in the field to gather and interpret data.

3. **Theoretical triangulation**, which refers to the use of more than one theoretical position in interpreting data.

4. **Methodological triangulation**, which refers to the use of more than one method for gathering data.

The processes of working of different mechanisms that are being used for people's participation and ensuring accountability of the UP councilor, and the intensive analysis of the factors that affect final service delivery of UP to local inhabitants, are qualitative in nature. The data regarding the participation of people at WS and OBM; socio-economic data; sector-wise allocation of public services to people; gender-based allocation; intergovernmental fiscal transfer; and budgetary allocation from various NGOs and donor agencies etc are quantitative in nature. Additionally, qualitative judgments of quantitative data have been made in this study.

### **3.1.2 Units of Analysis: Individual vs. Organizational Analysis**

In social science research, the most typical units of analysis are individual, but there are virtually no limits to what or who can be studied. Babbie (2004) argued about studying various units such as individuals, groups, organizations and social artifacts (such as books, poem, painting, automobiles, buildings, songs, poetry) on the basis of the infrastructural pattern, landscape, ethnographical characteristics, occupational variation etc. Overall features of the locality have been taken into account by observation for better understanding the living conditions of the people in the study area. In the context of the present study, the following units of analysis have been chosen for extensive analysis:

**Individual:** The study has been designed to know how various mechanisms are involved in the functioning of the working process of UP. So, the inhabitants who are entitled to get services from UP are the units of analysis of this study. Individuals have been stratified on the basis of:

- a. Participation at WS and OBM
- b. Gender (male/female)
- c. UP functionaries (both elected and government) responsible to render services

d. Members of various committees such as Ward Committee (WC), Union Development and Coordination Committee (UDCC) and Standing Committee (SC).

e. Others indirectly involved with UP service delivery system (PIO, UPZ Chairman, Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO), UPZ level line officers directly involved in providing services to the UP people etc.

**Organization:** The study is about analyzing the impact of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 on local governance. Thus, it is confined to studying the UPs of Bangladesh since the Act was enacted exclusively for the UP. Pertinent to the study objectives, the units of UP's such as WS, WC, OBM, SC, UDCC have been selected for extensive analysis.

### 3.1.3 Measurement of Indicators

In the study of the process and impact analysis of the Act, 2009 the dimensions and indicators of various concepts have been conceptualized in the following way:

**Table 3.1**  
**Measurement of Indicators**

Participatory Planning and Budgeting Process Study	Dimensions of Variables	Indicators
	Demand Side Indicators	
	Access to Participation Mechanism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Men/ Women Participation</li> <li>Received Information regarding WS and OBS</li> </ul>
	Ability to Participate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Knowledge about Open Budget and WS</li> <li>Understanding of Information</li> <li>Information dissemination medium</li> </ul>
	Placing demands at WS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ability to place demand in WS and OBS</li> </ul>
	Assessing participation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Final accepted demand list</li> </ul>
	Supply Side Indicators	
	Discretion of UP functionaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Administrative Skill for organizing WS/OBM</b></li> <li>Circulation of Ward Meeting/Invitation People / Determining meeting place</li> <li>Formation of WC, SC and UDCC</li> </ul>
	Leadership Ability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Participatory scope provided by UP functionaries</b></li> <li>Concept used in WS and OBS</li> <li>Meeting agenda</li> <li>Who decides/ create demand in WS and OBS</li> </ul>
	Responsiveness of UP functionaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Supply of goods and services</b></li> </ul>



Impact Study Participation of People's at WS and OBM and role of RTI and CC for citizen participation and accountability in participatory planning and budgeting process.	Demand Side Indicators	
	Responsiveness of the UP functionaries	<b>RTI</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Received Information regarding WS and OBS</li> <li>Received Information about Money allocation from Various GO/ NGO</li> </ul> <b>CC</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Received Information about various services provided by the UP</li> <li>Its cost</li> <li>Who are eligible</li> </ul>
	Answerability of UP functionaries	<b>RTI</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seek answer for Information</li> </ul> <b>CC</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Seek answer for entitled service</li> </ul>
	Transparency and Openness	RTI and CC <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Information dissemination</li> </ul>
	Supply Side Indicators	
	Responsiveness of UP functionaries <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Managerial Ability</li> <li>Administrative Skill</li> </ul>	<b>RTI</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide Information regarding WS and OBS</li> <li>Provide Information about Money allocation from Various GO/ NGO</li> </ul>
		<b>CC</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide Information about various services provided by the UP</li> <li>Service Cost</li> <li>Eligibility of receiving that service</li> </ul>
	Answerability of UP functionaries	<b>RTI</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide answers for Information</li> </ul>
		<b>CC</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Show cause for not providing service</li> </ul>

### 3.1.4 Study Area Selection and Sampling Procedure

Bangladesh has a large population living in the rural areas. 37.8% population of the country is engaged in economic activities<sup>4</sup> of whom 66% are male and 9.8% are female. National literacy rate of the population of the country is 47.68%, of which 49.82% are male and 45.54 % are female (BBS, 2011:xiii). This study has been conducted in six different UPs of Rajshahi and Rangpur Divisions. Division-based data have been gathered in a limited scale to discern the status of socio-economic groups of the population of the study area.

<sup>4</sup> 30% of the people are engaged in Skilled Agriculture/Forestry and Fishery and others are engaged in various occupations such as professional 5.6%, managerial 12.4%, Clerical Support Workers 2.7%, Service and Sales Workers 9.3%, Craft and Related Trade Workers 12.9%, Technicians and Associates Professionals 1.8, Plant and Machine Operator and Assemblers 8.4 %, Elementary Occupations 16.6% and other Occupations 0.02%.

**Table 3.2**  
**Division Basis Data Related to Population**

Division	Rajshahi		Rangpur	
Total Population	1,80,27,522		1,54,34,619	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
	90,01,031	90,26,491	76,19,116	78,15,503
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
	28,89,925	1,51,37,596	8,37,563	1,45,97,056
Number of Households <sup>5</sup>	44,61,097		3,79,460	
Head of Household (Sex basis)	Male	Female	Male	Female
	91.2%	8.8%	90.7%	9.3%
People Residing Abroad	1,26,002		27,126	

Source: BBS (2011)

At present, there is a total of 4550<sup>6</sup> (4550x9=40,950/ward) UPs in Bangladesh. Each UP is divided into nine wards. Considering required time, resource and the purpose of the study, 18 (18 = 6 × 3 (1 No, 4 No, & 7 No) Wards have been selected from 54 (6x9) wards) from 6 UPs from 3 Districts<sup>7</sup> (1. Rajshahi, 2. Sirajganj & 3. Lalmonirhat) purposively<sup>8</sup>. The practice of participatory planning and budgeting has been implemented in Sirajgonj since 2000 by GoB (Aminuzzaman, 2010). The GoB has enforced the Local Government Support Project (LGSP-I) (2007-2011) with financial assistance from World Bank (WB). At present, LGSP-II is being executed in 4550 UPs of Bangladesh. Moreover, UPs and their planning and budgeting activities are being supported by various local NGOs funded by international donor agencies. There are also UPs all over the country that is not getting such assistance. Based on these differences, six UPs from three Districts have been selected purposively. Among these, UPs of Sirajgonj District have long-term experience of organizing participatory planning and budgeting. UPs of Rajshahi District are being supported by various donor-driven programs<sup>9</sup> which are working to ensure that different provisions of the UP Act, including participatory planning and budgeting and dissemination of RTI and CC, are practiced appropriately.

<sup>5</sup> A group of persons, related or unrelated, living together and taking food from the same kitchen (BBS, 2011:2).

<sup>6</sup> Retrieved from <http://www.bangladesh.gov.bd/?q=bn#> on 28.08.2014

<sup>7</sup> See appendix 3.7. It shows the country map and location of the study area.

<sup>8</sup> In generally, purposive sampling method is employed in qualitative study when basic target is to answer the research questions from specific settings, persons and event (cited in Panday, 2008).

<sup>9</sup> Sacheton has been working under Sharique project on Local Governance and other issues in Rajshahi which is a SDC funded Local Governance Project implemented by InterCooperation-Bangladesh.

**Table 3.3**  
**Sample Frame of the Study on the Basis of Location**

District	Upazilla	Union Parishad	No of Wards	Sample frame for WS
Sirajgonj	Raigonj	Ghurka	9	3 (1,4, and 7 No)
	Ullapara	Hatikumrul	9	3 (1,4, and 7 No)
Rajshahi	Paba	Hariyan	9	3 (1,4, and 7 No)
	Godagari	Gogram	9	3 (1,4, and 7 No)
Lalmonirhat	Aditmari	Vadai	9	3 (1,4, and 7 No)
	Kaliganj	Kakina	9	3 (1,4, and 7 No)

The UPs of Lalmonirhat District are not getting such benefits from any NGO. Two UPs from two different UPZs of each District have been selected for context analysis of the local governance process. Systematic sampling procedure has been followed for selection of the respondents of functionaries and general people of the concerned UP. Among nine wards of each UP, ward no. 1, 4 and 7 have been selected systematically so that equal number of male and female UP functionaries have been selected for the interview process.

### **Rajshahi District**

It is a District under Rajshahi Division and contains an area of 2407.01 square kilometers. There are a total of 9 UPZ and 71 UPs under this District<sup>10</sup>. 46.4% people of this District have no sanitation facilities while 30% of the people don't have any facilities of electricity, and 82.4 % of the people utilize straw / dried cow dung as cooking fuel (BBS, 2011). However, the total number of households is 6,30,068 of whom male headed household is 90.9%(5,72,785) while the female headed household is 9.1%(57,283)(ibid).

### **Hariyan UP (Paba UPZ)**

The official name of the Union Parishad, is 8 No Hariyan UP<sup>11</sup>. It is placed in Paba Upazila under Rajshahi District. The population of the Union is 28042, in which 14,307 are males and 13,735 are females. The total number of villages in Hariyan Union are 23 and the total number of *Mouja* is 16. The Hariyan UP is about 20 kilometers away from Rajshahi City. The literacy rate of this area is about 60%.

### **Map of the Hariyan UP**



<sup>10</sup> <http://www.rajshahi.gov.bd/node/399936>

<sup>11</sup> <http://harianup.rajshahi.gov.bd/search/node/>

### Gogram UP (Godagari UPZ)

### Map of the Gogram UP

The official name of the Union Parishad, is 5 No Gogram Union Parishad. It is placed in Godagari Upazila under Rajshahi District. The total area of the UP is 57.49 square kilometers and the population of the Union is 33,282, in which 16,928



are males and 16,354 are females. The total number of villages in Gogram UP is 60 and the total number of *Mouja* is 50. The literacy rate of this area is about 40%. 1,121 indigenous families live in this UP.<sup>12</sup>

### Sirajganj District

It has an area of 2497.92 square kilometers. It is a District under Rajshahi Division. There is a total of 9 UPZ and 83 UPs. 41.9% of the people of this District have no sanitation facilities while 52.4% of the people don't have any facilities of electricity and 83.5 % of the people utilize straw/ dried cow dung as cooking fuel (BBS, 2011). However, the total number of households is 7, 10,687 of whom male headed household is 92.6 % (6,58,099) while the female headed household is 7.4% (52,588) (ibid).

### Ghurka UP (Raiganj UPZ)

### Map of the Ghurka UP

The official name of the Union Parishad, is 4 No Ghurka Union Parishad. It is placed in Raiganj Upazila under Sirajganj District. The total area of the UP is 27.68 square kilometers and the population of the Union is 47,000. The total number of villages in Ghurka Union are 33 and the total number of *Mouja* is 16.



<sup>12</sup> <http://gogramup.rajshahi.gov.bd/node/995641>

### Hatikumrul UP (Ullapara UPZ)

### Map of the Hatikumrul UP

The official name of the Union Parishad, is 9 No Hatikumrul Union Parishad. It is placed in Ullapara Upazila under Sirajganj District. The total area of the UP is 14.70 square kilometers and the population of the Union is 48,186, in which 24,340 are males and 23,846 are females. The total number of villages in Hatikumrul UP is 39 and the total number of Mouja is 05. The literacy rate of this area is about 49%.



### Lalmonirhat District

It has been a District under Rajshahi Division since 2009 and at present it is under Rangpur Division. It has an area of 1240.93 square kilometers. There are a total of 5 UPZ and 45 UPs in this District. 31.2% of the people of this District have no sanitation facilities while 77.6% of the people don't have any facilities of electricity and 52 % of the people utilize straw/dried cow dung as cooking fuel (BBS, 2011). The literacy rate of this area is about 65%. However, the total number of households is 2, 89,470 of whom male headed household is 91.3 % (2,64,220) while the female headed household is 8.7% (25,250) (ibid).

### Kakina UP (Kaliganj UPZ)

### Map of the Kakina UP

The official name of the Union Parishad, is 8 No Kakina Union Parishad. It is placed in Kaliganj Upazila under Lalmonirhat District. The total area of the UP is 58.58 square kilometers and the population of the Union is 31390, in which 16260 are males and 15987 are females. The total number of villages in Kakina Union are 16 and the total number of Mouja is 07. It is 15 kilometers away from Lalmonirhat District.



### Vadai UP (Aditmari UPZ)

The official name of the UP is 6 no Vadai UP. It is placed in Aditmari Upazila under Lalmonirhat District. The total population of the Union is 35,619, of which 18,501 are males and 17,118 are females. It is 9 kilometers away from Lalmonirhat District.

### Map of the Vadai UP



### 3.1.5 Data Collection Protocols

Any research has to deal with the issue of time in designing the research. It is not about time requirement for doing any research: rather it is about time dimension of study which may be relevant with present or any given time (Babbie, 2004). The study has been carried out on the basis of one financial year of a UP i.e. 2012-2013. The income and expenditure from various sources, budget sessions, and WS of this time span have been considered for this study.

The study has been conducted on the basis of primary as well as secondary data. Primary data relating to the subject matter of the study has been collected through the following techniques:

#### Questionnaire Interview

In order to collect the primary data, different types of structured questionnaires were used, having both closed and open-ended questions. A limited number of Likert scaling type questions have been used in the questionnaire. One type has been used for UP functionaries (Chairman, Members, and Secretary as administrative unit) and another type has been used for local people who have participated in both OBM and WS.

In addition to the above, one more type of questionnaire has been used for Key Informants (KI) including Ward Committee (WC) members, UDCC members, PIO, Chair and Vice-chair of Upazila Parishad, Social Welfare officer, Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO), Upazilla women Affair Officer and NGO officers etc.



**Table 3.4**  
**Respondents of the Study**

Category of Respondents	Total number of Respondents in each ward (No 1, 4, 7)	No. of Respondent to be Selected	Respondent per UP	Total Sampled	Total Interviewed
UP chairman	N/A		1 (100%)	6	6 (Appendix-3.3)
UP Secretary	N/A		1(100%)	6	6 (Appendix-3.3)
Ward member	1	1	3 (33%)	18(6x3)	17 <sup>13</sup> (Appendix-3.3)
Reserved seat for Female member	1 (from each three wards)	1	3(100%)	18 (6x3)	18 (Appendix-3.3)
General people participated at WS and OBM	The number will be collected through WS resolution and OBM participant list	4 (2 male and 2 Female from each ward)	4x3=12	72 (12x6)	79 (Appendix-3.1)
Others KII (Subject to their availability)	Ward Committee members, UDCC members, PIO, Chairmen and Vice-chairmen of Upazila Parishad, Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO), Local Political Leaders and others		5	30(5x6)	36 (Appendix 3.2)
<b>Total</b>	<b>150</b>				<b>162</b>

### Focus Group Discussion

The study also carried out a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) at Union Parishad level for those who did not participate at WS and OBM. In each ward, two FGD sessions (one for male and another for female) have been conducted for better understanding the issues why general people do not participate in that process. Homogeneity of participants has been maintained in FGD sessions and each FGD session included 8-12 poor local inhabitants, depending upon their availability for this purpose.

**Table 3.5**  
**Participants InFGDs**

Category of Respondents	No. of FGD per ward	Number of people per FGD and (total respondent in ward)	Respondent per UP	Total participant Projected	Total participants
General people did not participate at WS and OBM	2	6-8 (12-16)	36-48	216-288	323 (Appendix-3.4)

<sup>13</sup> The field study conducted interview sessions with a total 47 UP functionaries of the study area following the sample frame as stated in the methodology of the study. A male member of 4 No ward of Ghurka UP was not interviewed due to illness.

## **Documentation Review**

Primary data have also been collected from review of different UP documents. The documents, including UP minutes of meetings, resolutions of WS, proposals of ward level budget by voters of the ward, formation of Standing Committees (SC) and their activities, yearly budget sheet, income statement of UP of the FY 2012-2013, and resolutions of the UDCC and WC, have been reviewed for proper understanding of the functions and working processes of the UPs. UPs' minutes of monthly meetings have been scrutinized to depict a clearer picture whether organizing WS and OBM has been taken into consideration or not in those meetings. The minutes of meeting of UDCC, WC, PC and SCs have also been scrutinized, since these committees are directly related to WS and OBM. The participant list of WS has been collected through documentation review and participants who were interviewed were selected from these lists collected from various UPs of the study area. The projects were cross-checked and then taken to WS and finalized at OBM. Various project lists against budgetary allocation for the FY 2012-13 have been observed. Moreover, the final service recipients' lists have also been reviewed to explore the process of service delivery of UPs. Since the UPs are utilizing LGSP funds, whether the funds were utilized according to the fund utilization guidelines or not was also reviewed.

## **Direct Observation**

A direct observation has been made of the functioning of various WSs in Hariyan and Kakina UP and OBMs of Gogram, Hariyan, Ghurka and Hatikumrul UPs (Appendix 3.5). The researcher and team observed the entire meeting. The meeting time, place, information transmission medium have also been noted for a better understanding of the process of planning. How information regarding planning and budgeting was disseminated in the UP's premises and locality has also been taken into consideration. The rising demands of the poor people, as well as the style of answerability and responsiveness of UP functionaries, have also been observed.

## **Secondary Data Collection**

Secondary data have been collected from published documents (books, journals, magazines, newspapers etc.), unpublished theses, reports of various commissions and committees, research monographs and by browsing the internet.



## **Data Collection Techniques**

The study has employed various processes for exploring people's participation and UP functionaries' accountability in the planning processes of UPs. Moreover, attention has been given to exploring the impact of RTI and CC in those processes. For collecting field data, a research team, consisting of five graduate students from the Department of Public Administration, Rajshahi University, has been trained about various issues under the planning and budgeting process prescribed by the UP Act, 2009. The following protocols for data collection techniques have been used.

**First phase:** Direct observation was made on the WSs and OBMs (**Appendix- 3.5**) since these processes of planning maintained specific dates. For observing the meetings, the researcher maintained regular contact with the secretaries of six (06) UPs over the phone. The researcher contacted them from late March of 2012, since the dates of organizing WS and OBM were specified in that way by UP Act and instruction circulars. At the time of direct observations of WS and OBM, precautions have been taken so that the presence of the researcher did not influence the spontaneous processes of those meetings. Conversations were held with the people who attended these meetings. The budget sessions did not maintain the prescribed times as were announced for people's gathering in those meetings by the UP chair. Waiting for six/ seven hours to observe a meeting was time consuming, but the researcher observed the entire process of both WS and OBM to ascertain the real process of planning. Direct observations were also made on six (06) UPZs and three (03) Districts along with the (06) UPs regarding the dissemination of CC and various information regarding service provisions that are prioritized at WS and finalized at OBM. In addition, how the UP functionaries interacted with the citizens of respective UP has also been observed by the researcher. The researcher ascertained whether there were any formal procedures for seeking information from UP functionaries and whether there were any counters where people could lodge their complaints (if any) as per the sections of the UP Act 2009 regarding RTI and CC.

**Second phase:** A detailed work plan was made for collecting data through the other techniques. At the time of direct observation of WS and OBM, various documents of UPs, such as budget statement of previous years, real income expenditure statement, various service recipient list, resolutions of WS, UDCC and SC, LGSP-II allocation and its service

recipient lists and prioritized demand lists, have been collected for analysis and for selection of the respondents as per sample frame of the study. The respondents were selected by documentation review. The names of the respondents who participated at WS were selected randomly from the WS resolution book before the field visit. 10 service recipients of LGSP-II allocations were also selected at Gogram and Hariyan UP<sup>14</sup>, to explore what happened to the projects when the fund allocation has been made through the statutory planning and budgeting procedure as per Government's instructions and with the support of NGOs. The contact addresses and numbers of the UP members and Chairs, members of WC's, UDCC's, SC's, PIOs, UPZ chair, UNOs, NGO officials etc. were also collected and appointments were made with them to arrange convenient times for field visit.

The data collection at field level (**Appendix-3.4**) through FGD and interview sessions started at Rajshahi, Sirajganj and Lalmonirhat Districts. To collect data in each ward, the team was divided into two groups. One group, along with the researcher, conducted questionnaire interviews, while the other group arranged a FGD session, and the researcher became the facilitator of the FGD sessions. The FGDs were conducted by a FGD guideline (**Appendix-3.6**) so that, in some cases, the researcher became the note taker and the other members of the team facilitated the sessions. In addition, a recorder was used to record conversations of the participants of the FGD session. The research team had two female members, so that it was convenient for the researcher to conduct the FGD sessions with the female voters of the study area who did not participate either at WS or OBM. The key informants (KI) were interviewed through open-ended questionnaire. The interview sessions with the KIs were conducted on the basis of their availability at the time of researcher's field visit to study area.

### **3.1.6 Data Presentation and Analysis**

In this study, data has been gathered using various tools, techniques and sources. Data relevant to the purpose of the study were presented on the basis of the conceptual framework of the study. At first, various data which are both qualitative and quantitative

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<sup>14</sup> These respondents were selected in these two UPs since LGSP-II allocations were provided to female voters. The intention of the researcher was to explore whether those who receive such allocations had participated at WS or not. In the other UPs, LGSP –II allocation has been implemented in infrastructural projects that have been cross-checked by the FGD participants whether the projects have been implemented or not.

in nature have been presented and analyzed separately and then the irrelevant data have been rejected. As such, the relevant data regarding the process of people's participation through WS and OBM and UP representative's accountability through utilization of CC and RTI at WS and OBM and their impact on the working process of UP have been analyzed separately. Since the study is qualitative in nature, the analysis has been made on qualitative judgment revealed from both primary and secondary data and some quantitative data, in limited scale, presented through bar-chart of MS-Excel and SPSS application to support the qualitative analysis.

### **3.1.7 Assessing the Qualities of Research Design**

Quality of research design has also been taken into consideration as part of social science research methodology. Special caution has been undertaken in developing the theoretical framework based on secondary literature. The research design is based on that framework and has also followed the procedures of data collection method as has been used in previous studies. This is about the **external validity** of research design, which has been supported by further studies.

In designing the case studies, it was considered whether multiple evidence collection sources and chain of evidence have been used or not. This is about research **construct validity** which "establishes correct operational measures for the concept being studied" (Yin, 2004:33). So, in this study, data collection methods have been designed in such a way that the concepts have been accurately reflected by those measures. Multiple sources have been utilized for achieving the same query. Thus, cross-checks have been automatically done and valid database has been created through this process. Through various data collection techniques, it was explored that reliable data has served the purpose of the study.

**Internal validity** has been maintained in designing the analytical framework of the study and data analysis has been maintained following that pattern. This analysis procedure is termed as pattern matching by Yin (1994:106). Analysis of data has been made in the way that it has represented exact and specific explanations about "how" things happen. If things do not happen as predetermined then explanations have been suggested.

### **3.1.8 Problems of Field Study**

Political instability during February, 2013 to December 2013 has been encountered as the major problem that has impeded the smooth progression of the study. The researcher encountered transport and security difficulties in moving around the three different Districts included in this study.

At the first phase of data collection, it was very difficult for the research team to identify the respondents who participated at either WS or OBM when they were sampled for interview sessions. Consequently, it has been revealed that some names entered in the WS resolution book were fake entries. It has been disclosed by those people that they were invited to a tea party and their signatures were collected. Although it was difficult for the researcher to conduct interviews with the respective Ward members who organized such fake meetings, the reasons behind such misconduct were explored through the interview sessions

It is well known that corruption is pervasive in the LGIs, more specifically in the UPs of Bangladesh<sup>15</sup> (TIB, 2012). The UP member and Chair stand in the middle of the local power structure and manipulate people's power to complain against them. It has been observed that people were afraid while disclosing their views to the researcher. They informed that they do not share their views and sometimes the respondents did not believe that their views and opinions had any value or worth. As a result, they tried to answer the research questions just to satisfy the researcher. The quality of data suffered in such cases. At the time of FGD sessions, people tried to hide corrupt acts of their elected representatives. Such concealment has also affected the quality of the data of the field study.

This situation is also applicable for the UP members and chairs who were either the opponent of the UP chair or opponent of the political party in power. It was observed by the researcher that, in certain UPs, one UP member has hidden some facts regarding the problems of UP planning and budgeting while others have uncovered it. Some spouses of female UP members acted as members of the UP, so it was difficult to conduct interview sessions with the female members, as they did not know anything about WS and OBM. The provisions of the UP Act 2009 are still unknown to many UP members. So it took a long time to make them aware of what the researcher intended to explore.

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<sup>15</sup> Bangladesh ranked at the top position as most corrupt country by Transparency International for consecutive five years since 2001 (Panday and Rabbani, 2013).

Sometimes, the researcher had to conduct interviews in a hurry due to the workload of UP functionaries. The government staffs of the UPZ level have been deployed in more than one UPZ, so it was very difficult to conduct interview sessions with the officials according to the sample frame. In addition, it was difficult to arrange FGD sessions during the daytime, as the rural people were busy with their daily work.

### **3.1.9 Ethical Considerations**

Ethics in social research is defined as a concept which refers “to a complex set of values, standards and institutional schemes that help constitute and regulate scientific activity. Ultimately, research ethics is a codification of ethics of science in practice. In other words, it is based on general ethics of science; just as general ethics is based on commonsense morality” (NESH, 2006:5). In this study of the unit of individual and organization, some specific ethical codes have been followed since it is argued that “social research is conducted by, for, and about people, there is always the potential to harm others” (Ester and Kristin, 2002:22). Maintaining confidentiality and obtaining informed consent are two issues which are of particular relevance in researches (Ester and Kristin, 2002). In this connection following ethical issues presented by Diener and Crandall (1978) have been maintained in this research:

- Whether there is harm to participants;
- Whether there is a lack of informed consent;
- Whether there is an invasion of privacy;
- Whether deception is involved; (cited in Bryman, 2001:479)

On the basis of the above issues, this study has progressed consistent with sound ethical principles. In the data gathering process, the participants of the FGD and the respondents of the interview sessions have been made well-informed about the purpose of the study. Cautions have been taken for the sake of the poor and powerless rural voters who participated at FGD sessions in the context of the conflicting local politics of Bangladesh in studying the process of planning and budgeting of UPs. Privacy has been maintained for gathering data from the UP members and chair of the study so that the researcher got quality data for the purpose of the study. In addition, privacy has also been maintained in the data analysis process of the study.

### **3.1.10 Concluding Remarks on Methodology of the Study**

Research methodology is an important part of this study, since it has guided this research with all its tools and techniques, for exploring the facts that have been intended to be explored by the researcher. It is worth mentioning that a sound methodology has enabled the researcher to explore the process and changes of the PP and PB and utilization of CC and RTI in those processes. Case study research strategy and data- gathering method triangulation has made the researcher flexible in gathering various data from various sources related to the objective of the study. The interactions between the researcher and the respondents put them at ease to express their opinion. The quality of data has become more reliable for this reason and a valid database has met the expectations of the researcher regarding the research objectives as well.

## **Chapter Four**

### **People's Participation and Accountability at the Local Level: A Review of Past Reform Initiatives in Bangladesh**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

In this century, the majority of the nations are mutually connected and guided by the direction of various international agreements, treaties or a spirit of cooperation. Sometimes these nations have agreed that the central power of a state would be transferred to the local level. It is evident that some nations' powers are concentrated at the centre and so decentralization of State power is a matter of debate (Cheema and Rondinelli, N.D). It has been evident that globalisation, which is the outcome of an international free market economy and technological change, has shaped the functions of the modern State (ibid). The Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 offers scope for direct participation of people in identifying their own problems through its local level planning process. This process is supposed to ensure accountability of UP functionaries and also ensure better service delivery to local poor citizens as well. In this subcontinent, the existing form of politics-administration relationship in the affairs of state emerged in the last of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and developed until the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. An attempt in this chapter has been made to shed light on the present institutional set-up of responsible LGIs in Bangladesh and the challenges that have hindered the process of evolution and development of responsible LGIs in the country.

#### **4.2 Chronological Development of Local Government Institutions in Bangladesh**

##### **4.2.1 Ancient Bengal: Self Sustaining LGIs**

If a comparison is made on the basis of present day's capitalist economy, technological development and globalization, it would be evident that the early stages of human civilization were different than the modern times. In this subcontinent, only local government existed instead of any single central government at the centre (Siddiqui, 2005:29). It was found in the religious books in Hinduism that there were organized

villages and village institutions in early India<sup>1</sup> (Roy, 1936 cited in Ahmed, 2012:120, Siddiqui, 2005:29, Chaudhury, 1968:23). There is no specific date as to when Hinduism was created and it is not evident whether the *Panchayat* system<sup>2</sup> prevailed in all of India<sup>3</sup> or not. But it was found that caste-based Headmen and a Panchayat system existed in the northern part of India and was restricted only to the people of the Indus Valley Civilization to govern the local people (Siddiqui, 2005, 29-31).

There is no concrete information regarding local-self government in the eastern part of India, which is present day's Bangladesh. However, there is evidence to suggest the existence of structured village institutions (Siddiqui, 2005:33). Some villages or small towns were regulated by rajas or chiefs who were selected hereditary (Siddiqui, 2005:33). The Chief/Raja obeyed existing laws and customs and he could be deposed or fined by the people under him (Nehru, 1945:24 cited in Alderfer 1964:70). Ahmed (2012:120) stated that "despite changes of kings, monarchs and dynasties, the village panchayats remained unchanged in respect of their power, function and status. Those councils were spontaneous and self-sustaining institutions, independent and free from all outside interferences". While describing the Panchayat system Alderfer (1964:70) stated

"The village Panchayat in ancient India was an elected council with both executive and judicial powers, and its membership was respected by the King's officers, according to the Shukra-Nitisai, a description of the Indian village written about 800 A.D. Land was distributed by the panchayat, taxes were collected by it and paid to the central government for the village as a whole. The panchayat settled disputes between inhabitants and groups within the village, and appointed financial, educational, management, and protective officers and employees. The state officials, the King's men, were interested primarily in keeping law and order, and in collecting revenue for the central government. Otherwise, villages were able to operate their own, and through the centuries they evolved a complex but workable and indigenous system of agriculture, commerce, crafts, land use, family relations and protection based substantially upon mutual aid"

These organized agrarian villages began to degenerate with Muslim rule in the late 1100s A.D. The duration of their rule was much shorter than that of the Hindu rulers and their rules had a quite insignificant impact on the local government institutions (Palmer, 1971:37). They developed their own administrative system, with a view to conquering

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<sup>1</sup> The existence of Village Self Government was found in "the Rig Vedas". It is the oldest collection of religious writings of Hinduism dating back from approximately 1200 B.C. (Siddiqui, 2005:29).

<sup>2</sup> The Panchayat system consisted of local elder people and a Headman. Based on their functions there were four main Panchayat: 1) Caste Panchayat 2) Village Panchayat 3) Single-purpose Panchayat and 4) Panchayat for resolving disputes. Functions of the system were to maintain religious values and settle disputes among its members, to do some civic and public works and to resolve inter class conflict.

<sup>3</sup> The historical context of Bangladesh, Pakistan and India is the same as these were united before 1947.



more lands and maximizing revenue for the royal treasury (Ahmed, 2012:120). It is argued that, during this period there was “no element of a responsible or accountable government” (Younis and Mostafa 2000:65).

#### **4.2.2 British Period: Evolution of Modern LGIs**

In the first quarter of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, some British merchants under the banner of the East India Company came to India for the purposes of trade. The British are considered to be the greatest landmarks in the evolution of an administrative system and institutions in this Indian subcontinent. The grant of Diwani<sup>4</sup> to the Company by the Moghuls in 1765 was another landmark in the territorial acquisition of the company and consequent increase in the administrative duties of the civil servants of the company (Khan, 1980:73-74). The company “did not have any specific field for expansion” and it “eliminated or cut down the power of their chief rivals” (Palmer, 1971:40). The self-sustaining village communities at that time had been termed<sup>5</sup> “the little Republics”<sup>6</sup> by Sir Charles Metcalfe (cited in Ahmed, 2012:120). Before the expansion of the direct ruling power by the British Crown the company and its administrator’s main concern was to collect revenues, protect life and property and development of western services of government such as communication, public health, public works, and education (Alderfer, 1964). Mostafa and Younis (2000:65) while explaining the government system of that stated that,

During this period, the machinery for the administration of revenue and maintenance of law and order was developed. All powers of government were concentrated in the heads, who were styled Collector or deputy Commissioner of the district-the principal unit of British Indian administration. The Collector was responsible for the collection of revenue and the maintenance of law and order. He was accountable to the Board of Revenue and Governor General’s Council. But there is no evidence that there was a separation of powers of government between the executive and the legislature. Both Governor and later the Governor –General in Council exercised executive and legislative powers.

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<sup>4</sup> Robert Clive obtained the diwani or the role of revenue collector or financial administration from the emperor Shah Alam II and the East India Company became the ruler of Bangla ,Bihar and Orissa (Ali, Rahman and Das, 1983:38).

<sup>5</sup> Governor General of British India from 1835-36.

<sup>6</sup> In his famous minute of 1830, Sir Charles Metcalfe, the then acting Governor-General of India, wrote: "The village communities are little republics, having nearly everything they can want within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds revolution....but the village community remains the same. . . This union of the village communities, each one forming a separate little state in itself, has, I conceive, contributed more than any other cause to the preservation of the peoples of India, through all the revolutions and changes which they have suffered. It is in a high degree conducive to their happiness, and to the enjoyment of a great portion of freedom and independence. I wish, therefore, that the village constitutions may never be disturbed and I dread everything that has a tendency to break them up." (<http://www.lokrajandolan.org/ancientindia.html>)

The Charter Act of 1853, for the first time, created a legislative Assembly consisted of all government officials<sup>7</sup>. After the Sepoy mutiny, the British Crown took over power<sup>8</sup> from the Company and its administrator tried to involve Indian people in every sphere of administration for tackling law and order situation (Rahman, 2005). The Indian Councils Act, 1861 initiated provincial legislatures in India but the Governor-General had veto power over any decision proposed by the enlarged legislative council (Mostafa and Younis, 2000:66). The Indian Councils Act, 1892 enlarged the non-official membership in Legislative Councils in India and the members got the right to ask questions and discuss the budget. The Indian Councils Act, 1909 for the first time allowed Indian people<sup>9</sup> to participate in the election of various legislative assemblies. It greatly expanded the membership<sup>10</sup> and functions of the Legislative Councils in India. There were three main types of members of the Legislative Councils: officials, nominated non-officials and elected non-officials. Under the 1909 Act, the electorates were divided into three main types: general types included special *Jamindar* (landlords); class types included inclusion of Muslim other than Hinduism, and special types included member of Chamber of Commerce (Palmer, 1971:53).

The political involvement of general people in central and provincial government took shape in the year 1919 and “there was no evidence that the government was made accountable to the people until 1919” (Mostafa and Younis, 2000:66). The Montagu and Chelmsford Reports endorsed responsible government in India and thereby the Government of India Act, 1919 was drafted with the aim that the Legislative Assembly was “to be made more representative than the previous unicameral Indian Legislative Council” (Palmer, 1961: cited in Mostafa and Younis, 2000:66). The structure of the federal government of British India was shaped in the following way,

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<sup>7</sup> The legislative council consisted of 12 members, among them the Governor General as Commander in Chief, 4 members from the Administrative Council and 6 government officials from the Province.

<sup>8</sup> The Governor-General was also called the Viceroy of the Indian Presidencies. He acted as the chief administrator in British India. He was accountable to the Secretary of State for India (Mostafa and Younis, 2000:66), a British Cabinet Minister.

<sup>9</sup> The elected members of Provincial Legislatures had a tenure of 5 years. There was no provision for participation for women members. The members were elected from electorates consisting of persons who fulfilled either of the following conditions: (1) Paid an annual income tax of Rs. 10,000 or annual land revenue of Rs. 750 (2) Member of the Senate of any University (3) Experience in any Legislative Council in India or (4) Title-holder.

<sup>10</sup> The members of the Assembly increased by 60 in the year 1909 and no more than 28 members were appointed (Ali, Rahman and Das, 1983:38).

Under the Act of 1919 the bicameral central legislature had sixty members in the council of state out of which 33 were elected and 145 members in the legislative assembly out of which 104 were elected. It demarcated the provincial subjects from the central subjects. However, it created diarchy<sup>11</sup> in provinces by distinguishing reserved subjects from transferred subjects. The reserved subjects like police, jail, justice, finance etc. were the responsibility of provincial governors and his executive council and not of ministers or the Legislative council. The ministers were given the responsibilities to nation-building departments like local self-government, education, health etc.” (Ali, Rahman and Das, 1983:39).

Although the Provincial Assemblies were responsible and Provincial Ministers were accountable to the Provincial Legislatures, the Governor General’s Council was accountable only to the Secretary of State for India in London (Palmer, 1971: 57 and Mostafa and Younis, 2000:66).

**Table 4.1**  
**Elected Popular Representation in Legislative Assemblies**

Act	Representation at Legislative Assembly	Government official	Non official/Elected
<b>The Charter Act , 1853</b>	12	12	Nil
<b>The India Council Act, 1861</b>	6-12	50%	50%
<b>The Government of India Act, 1909</b>	60	28 (Maximum)	32
<b>The Government of India Act , 1919</b>			
Legislative Assembly	145	41	104
Council of the state (60)		27	33
<b>The Government of India Act, 1935</b>			
Legislative Assembly	141	39	102
Council of the state(58)		26	32

Source: Adapted from Ali, Rahman and Das (1983:39)

In true sense, the Government of India Act, 1935<sup>12</sup> introduced provincial autonomy and initiated responsible government. Khan (1963: iii)” explained the term “responsible government” as:


This phrase was used in a comprehensive sense and implied transfer of power from the British Parliament to Indian institutions and from the bureaucracy to elected representatives of the people in the subcontinent. Translated into practice, it implied the establishment of legislative institutions and the participation of politically-elected ministries in the administration of public affairs. This was a complete departure from the existing pattern in which the bureaucracy had been free of Ministerial and legislative controls.

<sup>11</sup> Diarchy was introduced as a constitutional reform by Edwin Samuel Montagu (Secretary of state for India, 1917–22) and Lord Chelmsford (viceroy of India, 1916–21). The principle of diarchy was a division of the executive branch of each provincial government into authoritarian and popularly responsible sections. The first was composed of executive councilors, appointed, as before, by the crown. The second was composed of ministers who were chosen by the governor from the elected members of the provincial legislature. These latter ministers were Indians. (<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/174960/dyarchy>).

<sup>12</sup> This Act abolished diarchy in the Provinces and provided provincial autonomy. It envisioned a diarchy in center (Palmer, 1971:61).

Theoretically, it was a bold step toward making government accountable. However, the attempt to create responsible government in the Provinces failed. The reasons behind failure of responsible government were explored by Palmer(1971:57). He put much emphasis on the facts that there were no stable political Parties and that the Governments were comprised of officials and nominated non-officials. Furthermore, the Governor could override the advice of the Ministers. During the British period, some important steps towards developing rural institutions with public representation were initiated through enactment of the Village Choukidary Act of 1870, the Bengal Local Self-Government Act of 1885, the Bengal Village Self-Government Act of 1919, and the Government of India Act 1935.

**Figure 4.1**  
**Administrative Organogram for British India**



**Source:** Developed by author from Ali, Rahman and Das (1983), Palmer (1971), Rahman (2005) and Siddiqui (2005).

The first initiative, which was the first enactment of “the Village Chowkidary Act of 1870”, dealt with the creation of Village Police for tackling the deteriorating law and order situation as one of the consequences of the *Sepoy* mutiny of 1857 (Siddiqui, 2005:40)<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> For detail regarding the structure, function and composition of LGIs of British India see Siddiqui (2005:39-49).

Lord Ripon's ideas, thereby, the famous resolution of 1882 and the Bengal Local Self-Government Act of 1885, expressed the urgency of rural local government "as an instrument of political and popular education" (Alderfer, 1964:71). According to the Act of 1885 there were three tiers of local government units: Union Committee at the union level, Local Board at sub district level and District Board at district level (Siddiqui, 2005).

This arrangement of LGIs at local level was criticized by Edward V. Levinge, head of the Bengal District Administration Committee (1913-14). His arguments were against the relationship among the tiers formed by the Act, 1885. The Union Committee and Local Board were made dependent on the District Board in terms of finance. According to the committee, the local self-government system was imposed from above whereas the system ought to have grown from the grassroots (Siddiqui, 2005:43-44). The Bengal Village Self-Government Act of 1919 was passed accepting the proposals from the Bengal District Administration Committee. The then newly- created Union Board<sup>14</sup> replaced previous Chowkidary Panchayats and Union Committees to create a self-governing institution in rural India and became popular. Limited number of men subject to their capacity of paying tax had voting power but women had no voting power.

The Circle Boards were created at the *Thana* (Police Station) level, against the recommendations made by the Levinge Commission. The Commission had recommended the abolition of the Local Boards created by the Act of 1885. The Circle Officers (hereinafter CO) supervised and controlled the Union Boards and acted as a coordinating agency between the District Board and the Thana administration (Siddiqui, 2005:45 and Rahman, 2005). Siddiqui (2005:45) suggested that "the Bengal Village Self-government Act of 1919 did not correct the defects of the Local Board" and consequently the local Boards were abolished. Due to its "**top down approach**", the LGIs failed to succeed as, in the case of the Union Board, they had to depend on District Boards. The only income source of Union Board was traditional land tax. The financial incapacity and non-democratic nature of the District Boards<sup>15</sup> made these institutions futile (Siddiqui,

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<sup>14</sup> The Union Board was composed of 6-9 members of whom two third were elected and one third were nominated by the then District Magistrate. Those who were above 21 years old and paid a rupee as land tax were elected among residents of a Union. After the election, the members elected a president and a vice president of the Union Board from among themselves (Siddiqui, 2005:44).

<sup>15</sup> The District Board was consisted by one third nominated members and two third elected members. Male persons who resided at the district, aged minimum 21 and paid land tax or Chowkidary tax had voting power. Women had no voting power.

2005:45). The Deputy Commissioner (DC) at the district level, as agent of the non-representative central bureaucracy, emerged as principle actor at the local level (Rahman, 2005). Looking at the policy experiments with LGIs of British India the following conclusion has been drawn by scholars:

When Indians became politicized and began to demand the right of participation in the decision-making process at the central level, the British Government talked of decentralization and lauded the role of local government. Against a background of urban political agitation and rural agrarian unrest, local government with full government control was devised as a strategy of depoliticisation and intended to prevent polarization on key national political issues” (Subramaniam, 1980 cited in Ahmed, 2012:121).

While arguing about politics administration relationship, Hoque (1970:78) depicted that during British rule in India, the attitude of administration towards politics and politicians was not favourable. During that time the ICS officers were deliberately kept outside the control of the native politicians. The ICS officers were responsible to the Governor general only and the politicians were leading the movement of the freedom of India (Khan, 1980: 177). Hoque (1970:78) also stated that “Any nationalistic political activity was considered subversive to the interest of the administration, which was identified primarily with the executive and administrative branches of the government. Politicians could not be trusted. Persons in government only were considered to be patriot”. While describing the state of institutionalization of decentralization and popular participation at the local level during British rule, Khan (1985:245) stated that “the experience of Bengal during the British rule, in the arena of local self- government, was not very satisfactory.” Depicting Tinker’s argument, he further stated that “Indian Local Self- Government was still in many ways a democratic facade for an autocratic structure. The actual conduct of business was carried on by district officials with no official members as spectators”. The following characteristics can be summed up if the trends and forms of the then-LGIs of British India are compared as to present day’s decentralization discourses:

- There was the existence of “top down approach” of development activities i.e. the lowest tier of local government institutions was dependent on the highest tier. So, the LGIs were not autonomous bodies at the local level.
- Although two-third representation was given to Indians in Union Boards, this restricted people’s participation at the local level. The majority -

women and poor- had no voting power. The limited participation of people in the election process, in both the Legislative Assembly and LGIs, was not democratic in nature, since people's voting power was determined on the basis of their tax payment capacity.

- The responsible nature of Provincial government was absent due to lack of effective political parties at the centre. Thus, executives were at the centre of all administrative powers. In the year 1909, the Indians were awarded voting rights in the Legislative Council and, in the year 1919, in the newly-introduced diarchy in Provinces the executives were given the responsibilities of various important reserved activities like police administration, general administration and finance while the Ministers were entrusted with nation-building activities such as local self-government, education, and health. The Act of 1935 introduced responsible government where the executives were made responsible to the ministers.
- The functions of the-then LGIs were limited to a few functions, including public works, education, health services and tackling of the local law and order situation.
- Networks of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) and the international community for development did not exist.

#### **4.2.3 Pakistan Period: Initiatives for People's Participation and Accountability**

In August 1947, Great Britain relinquished its sovereignty over India. The British divided India into two sovereign entities. Following the partition of India, two new independent states, India and Pakistan<sup>16</sup>, emerged as sovereign states on August, 14, 1947 (Obaidullah, 1999: 1). From 1947 to 1971, the civilian and military administration played the dominant role in Pakistan's policy making and as such, control and influence of elected politicians was insufficient. During this period, there was limited scope for interference from politicians as the bureaucracy, particularly the elite Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) retained its institutional autonomy (Burki, 1969 cited in Hoque, 1970). Moreover, the

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<sup>16</sup> Pakistan adopted a federal form of government where there were two provincial Secretariats and one central Secretariat for the central government. The Provincial government in East Pakistan was more or less a replica of the central government. It had a provincial Secretariat, similar to that of central Secretariat, consisting of departments and respective attached directorates and subordinate offices patterned along the lines of central government. The administrative units in the Provincial secretariat were known as Departments, while these were termed as Ministries at the level of the central Secretariats. The Provincial Secretariat was headed by the Chief Secretary, who was the principal advisor to the Governors of the Provinces.

then Government concentrated heavily on administrative reform to transform its colonial administration into a welfare administration of national government (Obaidullah, 1999).

The early phase witnessed frequent changes in government both at the centre and in the provinces (Sayeed, 1967, Siddiqui: 2005,98-105). It has been revealed by Khan (1980:115) that during independence fifty British officers were chosen to serve in Pakistan. At that time, political and economic institutions were not geared to promote the goals of social and economic change and there was no strong and constructive political leadership after the untimely deaths of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan (Gorvine, 1966:187). General Iskandar Mirza, scrapped the Constitution and installed martial law government in 1958 after the abolition of the Constitution of 1956<sup>17</sup> (Pardesi, N.D.: 377-78). In the year 1962, another Constitution was framed and adopted. Ayub Khan continued to govern until March 1969, when he resigned from office, handing over power to General Yahiya Khan. General Khan kept the country under martial law until 1971 even though elections were held in 1970.

The attitude of Pakistani administration towards politics and politicians was similar to that of pre-independence India's administrators (Goodnow, 1964). The influence of executive officers over politicians continued and was aggravated in Pakistan due to two reasons (cited in Khan, 1980: 117-118).

First, elaborate safeguards were provided for members of the Civil Service of Pakistan (hereinafter CSP) in successive Constitutions, which meant that there could be little or no political control over them. Second, political instability during the first decade and two successive martial law regimes that followed and remained for more than twelve years, left the CSP- with the exception of the Army- the only cohesive and organized force in the country. The CSP members took full advantage of the situation and became policy-makers with accountability to none for their action.

Analysing the accountability situation, it should be noted that the enlightened British press acted as check against the misconduct of public administrators under British rule.

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<sup>17</sup> While describing the power struggle Pardesi (N.D.:379) describes, "Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan though working together as duo had different views on changing issues. Ayub Khan knew that power was only with the Army and he was ready to assert himself, while Iskander Mirza wanted more powers as an administrator for himself. He realized the difficulty of sharing of power and soon entered into an intense powers struggle with General Ayub Khan. He appointed Ayub Khan as Prime Minister to maintain a balance in the power equation and hand picked a new cabinet. Ayub Khan who had more powers, as Chief Martial Law Administrator was not satisfied with this set up. Taking his colleagues and military Generals in to confidence he arrested Iskander Mirza on October 27, 1958 and sent him in exile to Britain and himself became sole authority in Pakistan".



Yet such a free press did not exist in the Pakistani era. At that time, in Pakistan, the Government officials were checked neither by Parliament nor by a free press (Ahamed, 1981 and Birkhead, 1966:2).

**Table 4.2**  
**Local Government Structure Under Basic Democracy Order (BDO) in 1959, in East Pakistan**

<b>Tiers of local Government under BDO</b>	<b>Number of Unit</b>
<b>Rural Areas</b>	
Union Councils	<b>4036</b>
Thana Councils	<b>393</b>
District Councils	<b>17</b>
Divisional Councils	<b>4</b>
<b>Urban Areas</b>	
Union Committees	<b>37</b>
Municipal Committees	<b>29</b>

Source: Siddiqui (2005:55)

In 1958, the military junta of Gen Ayub Khan went back to the old practices of government as they had been in British India and he cancelled the conception of responsible government in local-level politics. It was argued that the Chief Military Administrator believed that representative government was not suitable for Pakistanis (Siddiqui, 2005:54). The military government was characterized by authoritarian government at the top and representative government at the local level (Siddiqui, 2005:54). Table-4.1 revealed the-then structure of local government in East Pakistan under the promulgation of the Basic Democracy Order (BDO), 1959<sup>18</sup>. According to Article 155 of the Constitution 1962, each Province was divided into 60,000 (at first it was 40,000 and subsequently increased by 60,000) electoral units. The elected persons from electorates of those electoral units were called “Electoral College”<sup>19</sup> and elected representatives of the Union Council were called “Basic Democrats” (Siddiqui, 1992:102 and Panday, 2008:59). The members of the “Electoral College” “exercised their franchise on behalf of the whole population in electing representative members of the District Councils, the divisional Councils, the Provincial Assemblies, the National Assembly and the President of the country” (Ahmed, 2012:124). Although each Union Council had one-third of its members nominated by the Government,

<sup>18</sup> Under this act the Provincial government was responsible for local government and the Provincial Government had the authority to create, terminate and fixing limits of Local councils.

<sup>19</sup> The average number of population in each electoral unit in East Pakistan was 1070 (which was 1270 when it was divided into 40,000 units).

by 1962, the Union Council had become a fully-elected body (Siddiqui, 2005:55). In 1965, the system of nomination was abolished in other tiers (Siddiqui, 1992, 101). Both the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Union Council were elected by the members among themselves. At that time, election was the only accountability measure and in the local government election process, citizens got their voting power<sup>20</sup> on the basis of universal adult franchise. These institutions maintained upward accountability. For any kind of misconduct, negligence or corruption, the Chairman or Vice Chairman or members could be charged by the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) and a vote of no confidence against them on any ground could not be questioned in any court of law (Siddiqui, 2005:56). The other three tiers, which was just the Coordinating Council, had little scope for people's participation.

It is argued that creation of this tiered system was done with a view to bringing the elected and government officials into close contact for solving local problems effectively (Siddiqui, 1992:102). But these institutions had substantial control<sup>21</sup> over the elected officials and Union council. The Divisional Commissioner at divisional council, the district magistrate/ collector, which was later designated as Deputy Commissioner, became the *ex-officio* Chairman of District Council and Sub Divisional Officers (SDO) at Thana Council were composed of both elected and Government-appointed officials (Ali, 1987:790, Ahmed, 1988:814). The Chairman of Union Council and Town Committee within the district elected as representative members of the District Council. It is argued that, although the Union Council Chairman represented half of the members of the Union Council, they had no power over local policy making and administration (Ahmed, 1988:814). Rahman, 1965 (cited in Ali, Rahman and Das, 1983: 49) stated that:

The main defect of the present system is not the lack of technical staff, but too much centralization. Moreover, the authority exercised by the Deputy Commissioner as the Chairman and the Assistant Director of Basic Democracies as the Secretary of the District Council made the position of elected Vice Chairman of the District Council obscure and powerless (Rahman, 1965:47-54 cited in Ali, Rahman and Das, 1983:49).

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<sup>20</sup> In British India there was extremely limited franchise and the poor (who did not pay tax) and women had no voting power.

<sup>21</sup> The Divisional Commissioner and District Commissioner were empowered to "(a) review any decision of a local council and substitute his decision for the council's decision (b) remove of elected and government officer from office (c) supersede a council if in his opinion its performance was unsatisfactory (d) approve the estimates of revenue, expenditure and other financial transactions and (e) exercise any or all the powers of a local council if it appeared expedient to do so.

It is revealed by Siddiqui (1992:104) that resource constraints was the main obstacle to successful operation of Union and District councils. The institutions were highly dependent on Government grants and lacked resource mobilization capacity. Moreover, it is argued that very few tenants were elected as the members and Chairmen of Union Council: rather local landlords were elected in every year of the BDO (*ibid*). In addition, Ahmed (2012: 124-125) noted that, at that time, a political Party named “Convention Muslim League” was formed from a split off of the old “Pakistan Muslim League”. The local Councilors were recruited for that purpose and they became the direct clients of Ayub’s new system (cited in Ahmed, 2012:124). Various programs such as Rural Works Programme (RWP) and Thana Irrigation Program (TIP) had been carried out for strengthening the economic power of the local Councilors. These local Councilors played an important role in Presidential elections since it is evident that 25% of the local Councilors were elected uncontested (*ibid*). Ahmed portrayed the corruption of local Councilors and control of Government by the bureaucracy at that time. He (2012:125) stated that:

The system apparently gave political power and a greater development role to the members of local government through ‘popular participation’ but, in reality, the system imposed governmental control more closely on the people. Here, with the cosmetic mantle of “popular participation in decision-making” in place, the central State established its full control over the political, economic and developmental processes, using the bureaucracy as its tool. The local council officials were considered, in every respect, as subordinate to the bureaucracy. The power of dismissing local councilors on the grounds of corruption and incompetence was given to the bureaucracy. The unaccounted and unaudited money channeled to the local councils corrupted by most of the councilors, unaudited use of money helped Government to control these councilors, threat of expulsion included fear of loss of financial privileges.

So it can be said that, through BDO, union councilors were elected for the election of President. Those councilors got patronage and privilege from the military rulers for making their power base strong. This strategy allowed the military rulers to capture governing power in the country at all letters.

#### **4.2.4 LGIs in Independent Bangladesh: Past Initiatives**

It is argued that local government reforms in independent Bangladesh were always made against the aspiration of the ruling elites (Westergaard, 2000, Khan and Hussain, 2001, Aminuzzaman, 2011). Since independence in 1971, several attempts have been made to

strengthen the local government system in Bangladesh. Both the Constitution<sup>22</sup> and successive Governments' policies<sup>23</sup>, ensured rationality of creation of LGIs at the doorstep of the grassroots. However, most of the time, rhetoric disguised the crude reality. Jahan (1980) characterised the first three political regime of Bangladesh in the following way,

“[t]he rise of charismatic and dominant leaders; ideological and symbolic approaches to solve the nation's problems; lack of respect for continuity of fundamental institutions; politics of patronage and corruption; politics of landslide victory and perversion of electoral process; imbalance in institution building; ground stand approach to do much too quickly; and of commitment and exodus of politicians” (Cited in Hoque, 2002:12).

The following discussion of the policy experiment with rural local government reform, especially with the Union Parishad (hereinafter UP)<sup>24</sup>, has two parts. Firstly, historical changes under various regimes of independent Bangladesh are discussed. Secondly, various provisions of the present Local Government (Union Parishad ) Act 2009, that have offered scope for people's participation at the decision-making process and planning and holding the accountability of the UP functionaries .

### **Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Era (1972 – 1975)**

Immediately after independence, the Awami League (AL) Government, under the leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, attempted to resolve many problems such as: restoration of law and order; reforming the administrative machinery; supporting the freedom fighters etc. A general circular was published to set up Relief and Rehabilitation Committees, from village to District levels, in 1972, to distribute financial aid worth \$10 million, to help the refugees and reconstruct the fragile economy (Rahman, 2005:152). Presidential Order No. 7, promulgated in 1972, dissolved all existing local government structure inherited from Pakistani rule. Relief distribution committees were formed, from

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<sup>22</sup> The Constitution of Bangladesh, Articles 59-60 provide the legal basis for creation of LGIs. According to article 59 (i) “Local Government in every administrative unit of the Republic shall be entrusted to bodies, composed of persons elected in accordance with the law; (ii) “ every local body such as is referred to in Clause (i) (iii) local government bodies; shall, subject to this Constitution and any other law, perform, within the appropriate administrative unit, such functions shall be prescribed by Act of Parliament, which may include functions relating to: (a) administration and the work of public officers, (b) the maintenance of public order and (c) the preparation and implementation of plans relating to public interests and economic development”. Article 60 states “ For the purpose of giving full effect to the provision of Article 59, Parliament shall, by law, confer power on the local government bodies referred to in that Article, including powers to imposes taxes for local purposes, to prepare budgets and maintain funds.”

<sup>23</sup> Appendix-4.1. It shows major experiments with UPs and its associated unit.

<sup>24</sup> Union Parishad (UP) is the lowest tier of the existing structure of local government system in Bangladesh. The other two tiers are Upazila Parishad (UZP) at the Upazila (sub-district) level and Zila (District) Parishad at the District level.

the supporters of the ruling Party, and the process of distribution became questionable (Rahman 2005:152; Hoque, 2002:411-412).

In order to continue local administration, the Government appointed administrators to the UPs. The Union Council was renamed Union Panchayat (later Union Parishad) and the District Council was renamed as the District Board (later Zila Parishad) (Hoque, 2002:412). The Presidential Order No. 22 of 1973 specified that each Union, composed of several villages, would be divided into three wards and three UP members would be elected from each ward. In the year 1975, the Government decided to form compulsory multipurpose cooperatives in 65,000 villages as envisioned in the 4<sup>th</sup> Amendment<sup>25</sup> of the Constitution. These cooperatives were supposed to be the basic economic and administrative units of the country (Siddiqui, 2005:64). The UPs were supposed to be abolished in order to make room for these cooperatives. However this attempt was nullified after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman<sup>26</sup> on 15 August, 1975.

### **Major General Ziaur Rahman Era (1975 – 1981)**

The military rulers experimented with the tiers and composition of the LGIs after toppling the democratic government. In the year 1976, the military government promulgated an ordinance and created three tiers<sup>27</sup> of local government units. UP was made the focal point of existing LG structure in 1976 and it was made a completely-representative body, with provision for nominating two women and two peasant members (GoB, 1980 and Rahman, 2005: 66). In that regime, in the year 1980, by an amendment of the Local Government Ordinance 1976, the Swanirvar Gram Sarkar<sup>28</sup> (hereinafter SGS) was introduced at the village level. The SGS was assigned the responsibility of increasing food production, eradicating illiteracy, reducing population growth, invigorating rural

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<sup>25</sup> On 25 January, 1975 under the 4<sup>th</sup> Amendment of the Constitution, a Presidential form of government was introduced in place of the Westminster-type Parliamentary system. On 24 February 1975, by the 4<sup>th</sup> Amendment (Article 117A) Sheikh Mujibur Rahman the-then President of the Republic, banned all political parties and declared the formation of a new national party “ Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League” (BAKSAL).

<sup>26</sup> The independence of Bangladesh was achieved through his leadership and he is called “the Father of the Nation”.

<sup>27</sup> The Local Government Ordinance of 1976 established three tiers of local government that was Union Parishad (UP) at the union level, the Thana Parishad (TP) at the Thana level and the Zila Parishad (ZP) at the district level.

<sup>28</sup> Swanirvar Gram Sarkar was consisted of a Gram Proddhan and 11 members including at least two women members. They were chosen by the consensus of the village meeting. The members of the Gram sarkar were chosen such a way so that different functional / interest group represent in the institution.

cooperatives and maintaining law and order in the village. But a Martial Law Order (MLO) abolished this tier in July 1982, after the brutal assassination of President Rahman<sup>29</sup> (Rahman 2005:70).

### **Lieutenant General Hussain Mohammad Ershad Era (1982 – 1990)**

This military ruler took some popular initiatives for decentralization. According to Local Government (Union Parishad) Ordinance 1983, the UP was to be headed by one elected Chair along with nine members and three nominated women members. It was made the lowest tier of rural local government. By the Local Government (Thana Council and Thana Administration Reorganisation) Ordinance 1982, the Upazila Parishad (hereinafter UPZ) was introduced and it was entrusted with the power to impose taxes rates, fees and tolls. The UP lost its authority as the UPZ became the center of responsibilities and authority of the rural local government system (Khan, 2011).

In the year 1989, Parliament enacted a Palli Parishad Act 1989. There are some similarities between SGS and *Palli Parishad*. The Circle officer (development) or Upazila Nirbahi Officer (hereinafter UNO)<sup>30</sup> was made responsible to operate of all activities of both institutions. The UP had no power over either the SGS or the Palli Parishad (Rahman, 2005). However, the Palli Parishad system was not put into practice in the Ershad regime. Later, it was omitted by Shahabuddin Ahmed, the then chief of Caretaker Government (Hasan, 2007:64). The Local Government (Union Parishads) Ordinance 1983 (amended up to 2003) provided powers to the UP in levying tax and fees, including women representation, at UP.

### **Begum Khaleda Zia Era (1991 – 1996) (2001 – 2006)**

After the changeover from autocratic military rule to the Parliamentary system of government in 1991, the first Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)<sup>31</sup> Government, under the leadership of Begum Khaleda Zia<sup>32</sup> (1991-1996), abolished the UPZ system and the Palli

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<sup>29</sup> President Ziaur Rahman had founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) on 1 September 1978 when he was elected as president.

<sup>30</sup> “The posts of CO (Development) and CO (Revenue), created during the Pakistani era, were merged into one post of UNO, to coordinate the functions of all UPZ-based departments. As a result, UPZ became the focal point of the development administration at the local level in Bangladesh, with a vast body of qualified administrative and technical officers placed under the UPZ” (Cited in Ahsan, 2012:55).

<sup>31</sup> The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (hereinafter BNP) is one of the two the largest political parties of Bangladesh.

<sup>32</sup> She is the wife of President Major General Ziaur Rahman.

Parishad. A high-powered Local Government Structure Review Commission <sup>33</sup> was constituted on 24 November 1991 to review the effectiveness of the contemporary structure of the local government. The Commission was formed to complete the process of reform which had been attempted several times and been only partially successful since independence in 1971 (Siddique, 2005). This Commission proposed a two-tiered system for the rural areas: Zilla Parishad at the District and Union Parishad (UP) at the Union level. The Commission also recommended a Gram Shava<sup>34</sup>, considering the village as the basic unit of the UPs. The budget and development plan of the UPs was supposed to be approved by the Gram Shava. The UPs were made accountable to the Gram Shava. At that time, three seats in each UP were exclusively reserved for women. The participation of women in UP was first institutionalized at that time. But the recommendation was not acted upon (Hasan 2007:68-71 and Rahman 2005: 328-331). The four Parties' Alliance Government, led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) (2001-2006) passed the Gram Sarkar Act 2003 to constitute a Gram Sarker (Village Government) in each ward of a union as a supporting institution of the UPs. However, this provision of creation of Gram Sarkers was declared contrary to the Constitution by the High Court in 2006.

### **Sheikh Hasina Era (1996 – 2001) (2008- present)**

During the second term of the Awami League (AL) Government, under the leadership of Sheikh Hasina<sup>35</sup>, another high powered commission on local government, known as the Rahmat Ali Commission<sup>36</sup>, was appointed. The Rahmat Ali Commission recommended four tiers of local government: Gram Parishad, Union Parishad, Upazila Parishad and Zila Parishad (GoB, 1997; Siddiqui, 2005:102-104). The Commission proposed that a Gram Parishad would be formed with 9 male members and 3 female members in each Ward. The members would be elected or selected at a meeting of all the adult members of the village. Besides, representatives of all disadvantaged groups and professions (fishermen, weavers, disadvantaged men/women, landless labourers, etc.), cooperative societies and freedom

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<sup>33</sup> In the year 1991, by a Notification, the Government appointed the Commission, consisting of fourteen members headed by the then Information Minister Barrister Nazmul Huda as its Chairman. Members of Parliament, academics and senior civil servants were included in the Commission as members.

<sup>34</sup> Gram Sabha, which consisted of 10 members, including 2 women, 2 farmers and 2 agricultural labourers and a Gram Unnayan Committee which is consisted of 10 members from each village.

<sup>35</sup> She is the daughter of “**the father of the Nation**” Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

<sup>36</sup> In the year 1996, the Government constituted a high-powered eight-member Committee, the “Local Government Commission”, headed by advocate RahmatAli, MP. The declared aim of the committee was “Strengthening of Local Government Institutions”. Members of Parliament, academics and senior civil servants were also included in the Commission.

fighters would be members of the Gram Parishad: but they would have no voting rights (Rahman, 2005: 389).

Parliament enacted the Local Government (Gram Parishad) Act, 1997<sup>37</sup> on the basis of the Commission's report, but the Act was not implemented during its term of office (Talukder, 2009: 42). The Government also led Parliament in enacting the Local Government (Union Parishad) (2<sup>nd</sup> Amendment) Bill, 1997 that made some changes in the composition of UP, like, dividing the union into 9 wards and direct election of women members in reserved seats (Hasan 2007:76). The other tiers such as UPZ and ZP were not put into practice.

### **Military-Backed Temporary Caretaker Government 2007 - 2008**

In the year 2008, the military-backed interim Government issued various Ordinances which were based on the Shawkat Ali Committee<sup>38</sup> Report. The Local Government (Union Parishad) Ordinance was ratified by Parliament after the 2008 election as the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act 2009. At present, the rural local government scheme in Bangladesh consists of three tiers: UP (4550), UPZ (488) and Zilla (district) Parishad (hereinafter ZP) (64)<sup>39</sup>. Except ZP the other two tiers are functioning with local people's representatives.

#### **4.2.5 Local Level Planning and Budgeting: A Historical Perspective**

The story told in the first half of this Chapter is a tale of unfinished business. Each Government, in turn, appointed Commissions of respected experts to advise on what to do with local government, partially adopted their reports in principle and usually took no further action in practice. The two major political Parties never came to any consensus about what local government should look like, each attempting to create a different number of tiers of local authorities. Not only was almost nothing achieved but such chopping and changing arguably damaged the effectiveness of the local governments,

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<sup>37</sup> The Palli/ Gram Parishad was assigned some specific functions such as the conducting of socio economic surveys, collection of vital statistics on births, deaths and marriages and maintenance of the register, supervision of primary schools and madrasahs, raising awareness about primary health care, promotion of primary health care, and promotion of public opinion and resistance against terrorism, theft, *dacocity*, violence against women and improvement of the general law and order situation and cooperation with different organisations regarding their programmes in the ward.

<sup>38</sup> In the military backed interim government a committee "Local Government Institution Accelerating and Strngthening Committee" was formed headed by Dr. A M MShawkhat Ali. The committee recommended for a three tier local government system (Union Parishad, Upazila Parishad and Zila Parishad) . The committee also advocated for a permanent local government commission.

<sup>39</sup> <http://www.bangladesh.gov.bd/?q=bn> Accessed on 01.10.2014.



since it is argued that political culture and tradition influence public resource allocation and accountability style of politicians (Lankina,2008:11).

In the first Awami League Government, after independence, the local administrator basically carried out local government activities. Swanirvar Gram Sarker (SGS) in 1980s and Gram Sarker<sup>40</sup> (GS) in 2003 were created for local level planning under UPs by the BNP Governments. After the assassination of President Zia, the Party members did not support the SGS. It was abolished by another military ruler, H. M. Ershad, in 1982 (Siddiquee, 1997:67). He abolished the Gram Sarker on the basis of the recommendation provided by the Committee on Administrative Reform/Reorganization (CARR) (Obaidullah, 1999:110). It has been revealed by the CARR that the institutional arrangement in the name SGS was created to strengthen the powerbase of the then-ruling military elite without much preparation for countrywide introduction of the same entity. The committee also found that the foundation of SGS was an isolated set up of LGIs and that the objective of developing such an entity was to make the UP the office bearers of the SGS. Various youth bodies had been created, with enormous power, which had subverted the SGS as well as the UP. Moreover, the government officials at the then thana level and the members of SGS were not provided any training and there was no supervisory mechanism from the side of the government (Obaidullah, 1999:110).

It is evident that both bottom-up and top-down planning processes were followed. In the top down process, officers of various Ministries engaged at Thana level sent projects to their respective UPs for implementation against ADP (Obaidullah, 1999:121-122). SGS was created for bottom- up planning and later the Huda commission also suggested such arrangement of local level planning. But it was revealed by Siddiquee (1997:65) that the real scenario was totally different and the SGS failed to “become a forum in which the rural poor could participate in local development process”. It has also been revealed by him that a dominant class of rich villagers belonged to the SGS, who were not elected, and their intentions were to extend their personal interests. It is argued that, for ensuring participatory local government institutions, there needs to be democratic processes whereby the masses can choose their representatives through secret ballots. Siddiquee (1997:64) further revealed that peoples’ representatives from all classes were absent and

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<sup>40</sup> A meeting was required to be held at least once every six (6) months in the presence of 10% of the eligible voters. The meeting is supposed to review the progress of the ongoing activities of the Gram Sarker.

the then circle officer (CO)<sup>41</sup> became all-in-all, since it was specified that selection of the members of the SGS would have to be made by the CO and s/he was the controlling authority of SGS. Siddiquee (cited in 1997:67) concluded that the BNP Government created that SGS to strengthen their power base:

The BNP sought to utilize the Gram Sarker and instructed its members to work for the Party's candidates for the election. In Colipur, which traditionally supported the AL (Awami League), Gram Sarker was the only base that could be used by the BNP.

It was observed by Obaidullah (1999:110) that “the Gram Sarker was politically pampered and controlled by the local power structure”. He further states that “A study in 1982, in three Gram Sarkers of Mymensingh, Comilla and Rajshahi districts, revealed the hollowness of the operation of Gram Sarker and of people's participation in the local level development activities” (cited in Obaidullah, 1999:110).

As noted above, the High Court (HC) also declared the Gram Sarkar Act 2003 illegal (bdnews24.com, 2005). The court observed that the concept of the Act was very good as the GS would act as a supporting organization to the UP, consisting of representatives from the villages, but it had no organizational shape (ibid). However, it is also observed by the court that the fundamental principle of the constitution is to uphold democracy by elected representatives (ibid). But the Gram Sarkar system had no such characteristics. By allowing Upazila Nirbahi Officers (UNO) to nominate the members of the Gram Sarkar, the Act had institutionalized the supremacy of the bureaucracy over local government and this was a violation of the provisions of the Constitution (Rahman, 2005). From the beginning of the implementation of the GS, the formation process invited criticisms from various quarters due to a lack of people's spontaneous participation (ibid). Many Gram Sarkars were formed without quorum and appropriate members, and the activists of the ruling Party dominated all these Gram Sarkars (Hasan 2007:77-78 and Rahman 2005:489-496). Hasan (2007:78) gave the following example while describing the non-functioning status of GS:

A survey based on the reports of formation of 1150 Gram Sarkars published in leading newspapers, found that the rules and procedures were not followed in the majority (53%) of the cases and there was no quorum in 60 percent of the places. At the end, Gram Sarkar has become the ward-based extension of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and is a parallel institution threatening the very existence of the Union Parishad, which is time-tested 135-year old institution.

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<sup>41</sup> the then administrative chief of Thana Parishad.

So, it has been revealed that the SGS and GS were banned due to the similar characteristics of those institutions. Those were neither representative in character nor did they perform their duty of enhancing people's participation in development activities. The UPZ during the ruling period of H. M. Ershad (1982-1990) and the Thana Parishad (TP) during first and second Khaleda Zia regime through TDCC<sup>42</sup> and TDC respectively followed Top-Bottom approach of planning. Thana Parishad was the middle tier between Union Parishad and Zilla Parishad. It is stated by Rahman (1997:29) that "Thana Parishad was made partially a representative body with the introduction of Thana Development Committees (TDC) consisting of all elected Chairmen of the Union Parishads (UP). This Committee was entrusted with the power of planning of development activities and implementation, where the Zilla Parishad was kept non-functioning".

It has been evident from historical analysis that, after the assassination of President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975, the country witnessed a strong political leadership vacuum, followed by 15 years under authoritarian rule. Like the "basic democracy" rule of Pakistani military ruler Gen Mohammed Ayub Khan, the (1975-1990) military backed government of Bangladesh experimented with the LGIs. The authoritarians, as well as the democratic rulers, had chosen the grassroots for expansion of their power base and long-term stability<sup>43</sup>. The democratic leaders overthrew the innovations of authoritarians without much analysis whether the continuation of that innovation was necessary or not, just because they wanted to extend their powerbase. The first AL Government (during 1972-1975) tried to institutionalize their Party's ideology with the LGIs, since the villagers trust those leaders who had been Basic Democrats during Gen Ayub's regime (Ahmed, 2012:126). The first and second military rulers in independent Bangladesh, with the assistance from international donor agencies and government officials, started maintaining public relations as well as strengthening their local power bases through those LGIs (ibid). In analyzing Ershad's policy regarding creation of UPZs, it has been found that UPZ chairs were given enormous power<sup>44</sup> to capture a rural power base as had

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<sup>42</sup> The Thana Development and Coordination Committee (TDCC), composed of UP chairs and several UPZ level officers, used to carry out development activities at UPZ level with central government grants.


<sup>43</sup> For detailed analysis of politicization of LGIs by the rulers during first ten years of independent Bangladesh see Ahmed(2012:126-132).

<sup>44</sup> The Upazila chairs were granted the status of a deputy secretary to the government. Some other facilities such as free accommodation, free transport, and free telephone (both at home and office), extended tenure of possession of the position from three to five years, their answerability only to the President and UPZ fund immune from the control of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) are provided to them as local level elected member (Ahmed, Ahmed and Faizullah, 2012:24).

been done by his Bangladeshi and Pakistani military predecessors earlier (Ahmed, Ahmed and Faizullah, 2012:24). Siddiqui (1996) explained the reasons why the BNP Government abolished the UPZ in the year 1991. He argued that the BNP had only a handful of Upazila chairmen; secondly, the MPs from the main political parties had taken their stand for abolition of UPZ because they did not want any powerful rivals in their own constituencies exercising substantial power over development resources and lastly, because bureaucratic power helps any Government to extend its powerbase efficiently in a short period of time.

During the second AL ruling period (1997-2001), the UPZ was again revived in the middle tier of the LGIs structure. The UPZ<sup>45</sup> was given the task of preparing an Annual Upazila Development Plan as well as a Five Year Plan and the UPZ was also entrusted to assist, supervise and guide the UPs in identifying their projects and implementation of plans (Obaidullah, 1999). It has been suggested that UPZ development administration included five essential stages for planning (a) plan preparation; (b) process of financing; (c) implementation; (d) coordination; (e) evaluation and monitoring. The planning process at UPZ involves four main steps and two additional steps which are shown in the following figure:

**Figure 4.2**  
**Suggested Process of Plan Preparation of Upazila**



**Source:** cited in Obaidullah (1999:114).

Finally, it can be concluded from two perspectives why the LGIs never executed their responsibilities of planning for the real growth of the country on the basis of the voices to be heard. First they thought of the LGIs as a power base, to be kept strong with the help of the bureaucrats; Secondly, the fact that Governments were not re-elected to second terms hampered the progress of the country as strong and reliable LGIs did not develop.

<sup>45</sup> Section 14 of the UPZ act, 2009 also provides such outlines of UPZ planning and budgeting process.

Instead, power shifted regularly from one Party to the other, each Party undoing the work of its predecessor for ideological reasons.

### **The Context of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009**

The GoB, with the assistance of various donor agencies, experimented with the UP, with a vision to strengthen it. It has been revealed that “different donor agencies have also taken over 30 programs and projects supporting local governance” (Aminuzzaman, 2011:201). Sirajganj Local Governance Development Fund Project (hereinafter SLGDFP) is such a project, which has been implemented in 9 UPZs with 82 UPs of Sirajganj district from 2000-2005 (Vijayalakshmi, N.D.). This program was designed to build capacity of general people in participatory planning, budgeting, project implementation and monitoring projects implementations of those UPs. It has been revealed that direct fund transfer to UP was found feasible and this enhanced the functional efficiency of the UP functionaries. These projects’ implementation proved it a myth that a high level of corruption is associated with the UP functionaries if their UPs get large cash injections. The UPs have the ability to plan when people’s participation is ensured. The UPs were capable of managing development projects through fair bidding with contractors, which showed the transparency of the working process in UPs (Aminuzzaman, 2011:202). It is important to add that it has been evident that increased women’s participation also helped to ensure implementation of the projects (Vijayalakshmi, N.D.). Based on the success and good practices of SLGDP, the GoB initiated the Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) from 2007-2011. At present, the GoB is implementing LGSP-II programs (2011-2015) with the financial assistance of the World Bank for another five years. The project is intended to strengthen the UPs’ capacity and support the UPs to become accountable and responsive through direct fund transfer to respective UPs (UP operational manual, 2012).

The LGSP-II has four components: firstly, the direct fund transfer would improve local service delivery as well as stimulate UP functionaries’ accountability and performance; secondly, it would strengthen both the system of upward and downward accountability and ensure transparency by involving people in the decision-making process; thirdly, it would strengthen key central agencies to provide local service in accountable and responsive ways; and lastly, this project would support project management, which includes project management, procurement, grievance redress and incremental operating costs (The World Bank, 2014).

It is often argued by scholars that Government ratified the UP Act, 2009 following the success stories of donor-driven projects relating to local governance (Aminuzzaman, 2011; Panday and Asaduzzaman, 2011 and World Bank, 2014)<sup>46</sup>. It has been thus manifested, in the subsequent discussion, that the project overview of LGSP-II has been embedded in the UP Act, 2009. The participatory planning process at WS and participatory budgeting process at OBM are some innovations of the UP Act 2009 which intend to increase transparency, efficiency and accountability of the UP functionaries. For the first time, attempts have been made to ensure direct engagement of UPs in the local-level planning. The previous attempts of creation of SGS/GS or Gram Shava failed because representatives were not elected democratically. Thus, Government's direct control made these institutions little more than their extensions. In addition, the authoritarian rulers created such institutions for strengthening their power base. On the contrary, WS and OBM have been made compulsory for the UP under the Act. These are important innovations can resolve the problems which overwhelmed previous reforms.

### **4.3 The present Rural Local Government Structure**

It has been argued that, generally, the LGIs have correspondence with the general administrative divisions (Obaidullah, 1999). Appendix 4.2 depicts the present general administrative units with their corresponding LGI units<sup>47</sup>. There is separate set of LGIs for rural and urban areas. At present there is a total of eleven (11) City Corporations<sup>48</sup> for the eleven largest cities<sup>49</sup> and three hundred ten (310) Municipalities<sup>50</sup> for urban areas, although it is revealed by Panday and Panday (2008:560) that the Bangladesh Census Commission recognized 522 urban areas in 1991 (areas with a population of about 5,000 or more). The municipalities are categorised into three classes on the basis of their financial strength. According to Section 7 of the Local Government (City Corporation)

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<sup>46</sup> Panday and Asaduzzaman (2011:166) stated that "for engaging people in their decision-making process and making the UP functionaries accountable for their actions to the people and for transparent governing process of UP the present AL government enacted the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009".

<sup>47</sup> It brings back the issue of the differentiation between local government and local self government. As it has been described in the earlier section, Articles 59 and 60 of the Constitution require creation of local self-government institutions in every administrative unit of the country.

<sup>48</sup> [http://www.lgd.gov.bd/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=32&Itemid=90&lang=en](http://www.lgd.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=32&Itemid=90&lang=en) accessed on 12.10.2014

<sup>49</sup> Previously there were four city corporations for four divisions: Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi. Dhaka City Corporation has been divided into two parts: North Dhaka City Corporation and South Dhaka City Corporation. Subsequently, Barisal, Sylhet and Rangpur cities became Divisional capitals and three other big cities, Comilla, Gazipur and Narayanganj, were granted the status of City Corporations

<sup>50</sup> <http://www.paurainfo.gov.bd/PortalUI/NavigatePage.aspx?DivisionID=29> accessed on 12.10.2014

Act, 2009<sup>51</sup> and the section 5 of the Local Government (Municipalities) Act, 2009<sup>52</sup> City Corporations and Municipalities are recognized as separate units of administration for the purposes of section 59(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh.

At present, the UP is the lowest tier of the rural local government system of Bangladesh. The other two tiers are Upazila Parishad (UZP)<sup>53</sup> at the sub-district level and Zila (District) Parishad (ZP) at the district level. The second tier, UPZ, was revived a second time, after an interval of 18 years as late as 2009.

The Zila Parishad (hereinafter referred to as ZP) (District Council) has never been revived in its democratic nature since liberation. Unfortunately, the LGIs of the country are not autonomous and devolution of power is absent. Research revealed that local government units at UPZ are extensions of central government where people's participation is limited (Panday and Assaduzzaman, 2011). In terms of policy guidelines, both UPZ<sup>54</sup> and UP are required to provide opportunity for people's participation. The UPZ is not an autonomous body, although it is operated by elected officials who were elected<sup>55</sup> by adult franchise of that UPZ. As of 2013, 17 government departments have been transferred to UPZ<sup>56</sup> (GoB, 2013:1). It is stated while describing the potentials about UPZ that:

The UZP theoretically has the potential to influence the making and implementation of local development plans and programmes. Following its democratisation, the UZP itself has become an important actor. The UZP is expected to undertake a range of functions. Yet its ability to perform such functions independently of the influence/pressure of other actors is very limited. The UZP is not an autonomous institution. Much of what it can do to fulfill its mandate depends upon the way other actors behave (Ahmed, Ahmed and Faizullah, 2012:10-11).

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<sup>51</sup> [http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/bangla\\_sections\\_detail.php?id=1026&sections\\_id=39933](http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/bangla_sections_detail.php?id=1026&sections_id=39933) accessed on 13.10.2014

<sup>52</sup> [http://www.lgd.gov.bd/images/pdf/local\\_government\\_paurashava\\_act\\_2009.pdf](http://www.lgd.gov.bd/images/pdf/local_government_paurashava_act_2009.pdf) accessed on 17.10.2014

<sup>53</sup> The Local Government (Thana Parishad and Thana Administration Reorganization) Ordinance, 1982 was the basis of UPZ administration in Bangladesh. However, in 2009 the Upazilla Parishad (reintroduction of the Repealed Act and Amendment) Act, 2009 replaced the UPZ Act, 1998 which was shaped by the Rahamat Ali Commission report (Talukder, 2009:58). "Due to some apprehensions among the elected representatives on the role of local MPs and UNOs in Upazila Parishad, the Act was again amended in 2011, which has created possibilities to make the Upazila an effective and vibrant local government (LG) unit" (GoB, 2013:1).

<sup>54</sup> The UZP is headed by an elected chairman and composed of different categories of members: two vice chairpersons - one male and one female, Union Parishad members, mayor of Pourashava (if any) and one-third women members of the Union Parishads and Pourashavas within an upazila. The chairman and vice-chairs are elected; while one third of elected women members from different Union Parishads and *Pourashavas* are members of UPZ. The MP of the concerned Upazila is the advisor of the Upazila Parishad (Talukder, 2009:60).

<sup>55</sup> Two consecutive elections were held, in 2009 and 2014, under the present AL Government.

<sup>56</sup> Appendix-4.3 shows government departments transferred to the UPZ Level.

The powers exercised by the officials of different ministries at UPZ level have been kept intact by the central government. The central government retains the power to instruct the LGIs through issuing various circulars and the lower level of LGIs are made responsible to comply with various financial statements to higher levels of LGIs as an accountability measure. For example, the policy guidelines<sup>57</sup> of the Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) under the Local Government Division of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives dictate that the rural infrastructural programs are under its purview:

LGED is responsible for construction and maintenance of Upazila roads, Union roads and village roads, along with the Local Government Institutions (LGIs) infrastructure and thereby contributing towards employment generation and poverty reduction. LGED is also responsible for providing technical support to LGIs both in rural and urban areas of the country (GoB, 2010:4).

When it concerns planning and budgeting, section 14 of the UPZ Act, 2009 requires that a copy of the draft of the UPZ's budget has to be sent to the MP of that UPZ, the UPs, municipalities etc. and uploaded to the UPZ's own websites for public comment. Section 14 also outlines that, after distribution and publication of the draft copy of the budget statement of a UPZ, discussion on the same will be held in presence of the UP members, councilors of the municipalities, heads of schools, private organizations, bank, entrepreneur and civil society of that respective UPZ<sup>58</sup>.

#### **4.3.1 Structure and Functions of the UP**

The present study is concerned with the participatory planning and budgeting process of the UP, which is a cyclic process. Moreover, this study is concerned with the application of RTI and CC by ordinary people in the participatory planning and budgeting process for holding UP functionaries accountability in those processes. According to section 8 of the Act, 2009 the UP would function as an administrative unit of the Republic in compliance with sections 59 and 152(1)<sup>59</sup> of the Constitution of Bangladesh. According to section 9 of the UP Act 2009, each UP is divided into nine wards. The UP would consist of one chairman and twelve members of whom nine from general seat of nine wards and three

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<sup>57</sup> [http://www.lged.gov.bd/UploadedDocument/UnitPublication/5/1/GIS%20Guideline\\_English.pdf](http://www.lged.gov.bd/UploadedDocument/UnitPublication/5/1/GIS%20Guideline_English.pdf)


<sup>58</sup> Section 14 (1,2,3,4,5) of the UPZ act, 2009.

<sup>59</sup> Section 152(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh states that "administrative unit" means a district or other area designated by law for the purposes of Article 59, which ensures local Government in every administrative unit of the Republic shall be entrusted to bodies, composed of persons elected in accordance with the law.



women members (one reserve seat from each three wards) from three reserved seats exclusively for women. All members of general and reserved seats and the chair would be elected directly by the voters of the locality (Article 10 of the UP Act 2009). The UP has the authority to control government officials transferred to the locality. Section 47 of the Act 2009 prescribes the following responsibilities<sup>60</sup> of UP: 1) administrative and establishment related; 2) maintenance of public order; 3) Service-related public welfare; and 4) Formulation and Implementation of the local economical and social development plan. According to the UP Act, 2009, UP operational manual 2012 and subsequent circulars issued from Local Government Division from time to time, a Ward Committee<sup>61</sup> (hereinafter WC) has to be formed to organize Ward Shava (hereinafter WS).

**Figure 4.3**  
**Present Set Up of UP**



Source: Author


The Planning Committee<sup>62</sup> (hereinafter PC) is required to distribute and send sector-wise demands to the appropriate Standing Committee (hereinafter SC) for analysis (UP operational manual, 2012:40). The standing committees then prioritise the demands/schemes on the basis of availability of resources and prepare a five-year plan.

<sup>60</sup> Appendix- 4.5 contains the functions of UP specified by the Act, 2009.

<sup>61</sup> A Ward Committee is formed with at least seven persons of the concerned Ward. The concerned Ward member, social worker, beneficiary, school teacher, and technical experts etc. are members of the WC.

<sup>62</sup> According to the UP operational manual, each UP is required to have a Planning Committee. A member of the UP would act as convener or Chairman of the committee. The other UP members, UP secretary, and the head of the government-transferred officers who are assigned to work in the UP would act as members of that committee. Anyone who is expert in development planning can be included as a member of that committee.

**Figure 4.4**  
**Cycle of Planning and Budgeting process**



**Source:** Modified by the author from UP operational manual 2012

The schemes will be distributed for year-wise implementation and first-year plan will be demonstrated with probable estimated expenditure. The PC then sends a complete year plan and a five-year plan, with the recommendations of SC, to Union Development and Co-ordination Committee<sup>63</sup> (hereinafter UDCC) and to UP for final approval. The approved plans are then published to all voters in the concerned UP. This Open Budget Meeting (OBM) is termed as Participatory Budgeting. These final plans then are sent to the UNO for final approval. The UNO sends all cumulative plans of all UP's under that UPZ to the DC, who is the administrative head of DP.

For the first time, the Act provides the Union-level extension services of the central government transferable to the UPs. According to Article 64, a Code of Conduct will guide the working relationship between the UP Councilors and the transferred personnel and other local level government officials. According to Schedule-3 (Article 63)<sup>64</sup> of the Act 2009, there is a long list of government functionaries working at the Union level. The Ward Shava, standing committee and open budget system are some important dimensions of the Act 2009 which offer people's participation in local level planning. These provisions have been discussed in the light of the Act, 2009 below:

<sup>63</sup> According to section 95 of the UP Act, 2009 Government can issue circulars related to UP. According to the UP Circular, a Union development and Co-ordination Committee (UDCC) would be formed with the chairmanship of UP chair. The UP members, all UPZ officers, UP officers, and representatives from social workers, NGO officials, and school teachers are also members of this Committee (UP Circular, 2011).

<sup>64</sup> Appendix-4.4 Shows transferred departments at UP Level.

## **Ward Shava**

Sections 4 and 5 of the UP Act of 2009 state that a WS (ward meeting) should be constituted in each Ward, consisting of all the voters enlisted in the voter lists. Ahmed states:

Ward meetings, participatory budget and placing budgets in an open public meeting have been introduced and practiced under the initiative of LGSP-LIC<sup>65</sup> during last five years (2006-2011), with the incorporation of those experiences in the latest law (2009) made those practices mandatory from 2010 for all UPs of the country (2011:6).

The quorum of the WS will be fulfilled with five per cent of the total voters. The voters of a Ward, through its WS, would meet at least twice in a year. Elected Members of the Ward would act as the chair of the WS while the elected women Member would act as the adviser. Thus, a women member is adviser of three Wards. The Members for the Ward would operate the meeting. According to section 6(4), the Secretary of the UP notes the Resolutions of the meeting and places these at a UP meeting and at the evaluation ward meeting about the progress report. The Chairman of the UP would ensure the formation of the Ward Committee. However, planning processes at WS have five stages, which has been discussed in Chapter Two above and the functions<sup>66</sup> of the WS have been specified by the Act, 2009.

## **Open Budget System**

Section 57 of the UP Act of 2009 also provides for finalization of the UP's yearly budget<sup>67</sup> in an open meeting, which is commonly referred to as an open budget meeting. Generally, budget means the income and expenditure statement of a specific period, more specifically for one year. The UP is responsible for placing their yearly budget before a minimum 60 (sixty) days of the financial year of an UP. The UP is to organise a budget session and present yearly budget before the standing committee and people of the UP. The priorities which have been identified at the Ward level are part of the consideration of a UP yearly budget. The Act, 2009 specifies that the UP will inform the concerned WM about the selection or rejection of any development project of WS.


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<sup>65</sup> LIC is one of the component of LGSP-II project. It provides "a means of piloting initiatives, testing their value and feeding into wider application in LGSP which operates across all UPs nationally" (LGD, 2010:7).

<sup>66</sup> Appendix- 4.5.1. It shows the powers and functions of the *Ward Shava* (WS).

<sup>67</sup> Appendix- 4.7. A bottom up approach of planning has been developed by author following the SFYP, PRSP and LG(UP) Act, 2009.

**Figure 4.5**  
**The Open Budget System**



**Source:** The Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009.

Along with the budget statement, the UP will present the real income and expenditure statement before the standing committee and general people. Moreover, according to section 6(2), the Ward Shava must publish the budget information in an open place for general information regarding budget allocations against various development activities, formulation of work plan, sector-wise money allocation, estimation, and the activities which have been or are yet to be implemented.

### **Standing Committee**

According to section 45 of the Act 2009, each UP forms 13 (thirteen) standing committees<sup>68</sup>. According to Section 45 (3), the Chairman of the Standing Committee is elected among the members of the UPs. A member of the UP acts as the Chair of Standing Committee. One third of all Standing Committees must be chaired by female members. The Chairman of the UP chairs the Law and Order Maintenance Committee. A Standing Committee is composed of a minimum of five to maximum of seven members. The committee may co-opt an expert (if necessary) but s/he would have no voting power. The other members will be nominated from local people who are capable to play a role in standing committee. Ahmed (2011) mentioned that the SCs will be composed of UP members, experts/enthusiasts/CBO/CSO members from the locality and officials of the relevant departments working at the UP level. The recommendations of the standing committee would be approved after the placement of the resolutions at the next meeting of the UP. The UP must provide written cause or state reasonable grounds if it rejects or disapproves any recommendation of the Standing Committee. The list of functions

<sup>68</sup> Appendix-4.6. It shows the list and ToR of standing Committees of UP.

decided by the Standing Committee must be approved by the General Meeting of the UP. The Standing Committee meets every two months but can meet more often if necessary.

### **Citizen Charter: An overview**

In the Constitutional name of the country, “the People’s Republic of Bangladesh”, “people” is kept in the centre and people’s<sup>69</sup> rights and interests are safeguarded by its Constitutional provisions. In Bangladesh, in the year 2000, the Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) for the first time recommended adopting Citizen’s Charters for administrative change and development. However, in June 2007, during the last caretaker government (Jamil, 2011) following the instruction, Citizen’s Charters, coined as “first generation Citizen Charter”, were adopted in all ministries. The second generation Citizens Charters<sup>70</sup> and the Draft of Sixth Five Year Plan also makes a similar commitment of introducing and institutionalizing CC by the Ministries and agencies to ‘provide regular feedback’ and ‘enhance accountability’ of public officials. The Ministry of Public Administration gave instruction to all Divisional and Deputy Commissioners (DC) to develop Citizen’s Charters at the local level. As a result, Citizen’s Charters were adopted in all the offices as required (Khan, 2010). Subsequently, CC became an important addition in the UP Act, 2009. Section 49(4) of the UP act, 2009 states that in circulating CC, the CC must include the following:

- a) Correct and clear description of each service;
- b) Cost of service;
- c) Terms and procedure for claiming and receiving services;
- d) Specific time for providing services;
- e) Responsibilities for citizens regarding services;
- f) Assurance for service delivery;
- g) Procedure for grievance resolution regarding service delivery;
- h) Consequences for refusing the undertaking of charter of service.

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<sup>69</sup> All powers in the Republic belong to the people, and their exercise on behalf of the people shall be affected only under, and by the authority of this Constitution. Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, *Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh*, Article 7 (1).

<sup>70</sup> The election manifesto of the present Awami League Government which came to power in 2008 contained a clear and specific electoral commitment to introduction of the second generation Citizen’s Charters.

### Right to Information Act: Historical perspective

The World Bank reported that “public access to information on decisions is poor owing to the bureaucratic practice of maintaining confidentiality in dealing with the public and there is no effective mechanism for appealing against arbitrary bureaucratic decisions” (World Bank, 1996:106). During 2000 and after, national and international actors began to raise their voices against the process of institutionalization of corruption which is the outcome of secrecy of public records (Panday and Rabbani, 2013). Panday and Rabbani (2013), in their study, depicted various actors’ involvement in the promulgation of RTI, Act 2009 in Bangladesh.

**Table 4.3**  
**Chronological Development of Freedom of Information Policy**

Name of Events	Time
The Press Council expressed a demand to the military-ruled government for publishing government information in the media	1983
South Asian Regional Conference on Right to Information was organized by the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative in Dhaka	July 1999
The Bangladesh Law Commission in 2002 sent a working paper to the law ministry to formulate the proposed law based on it, recognising citizens' right to information.	2002
The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) wrote to the Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs	August 2005
<i>ManusherJonno Foundation</i> prepared a draft Right to Information Bill	November 2006
The care-taker Government drafted a Right to Information Ordinance 2008	06.02. 2008
CHRI submitted a detailed recommendation to the Ministry of Information, Government of Bangladesh for strengthening the provisions of the draft.	February 2008
Right to Information Bill prepared and submitted to the Government of Bangladesh by civil society organizations under the leadership of <i>ManusherJonno Foundation</i> .	February 2008
The AL Government headed by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina led Parliament in enacting the Right to Information Act 2009.	On 29 March 2009

Source: Panday and Rabbani (2013:262)

It is revealed by them that the Vision 2021, including freedom of information and digital governing process at public offices, is embedded in the present AL Government’s political manifestos. The UP Act, 2009 added the provisions of people’s access to information regarding UP-related matters in line with the RTI Act, 2009 promulgated by the Parliament. Provisions of the UP act, 2009 relevant to RTI are:

Section-78(1/4) the UP Act, 2009 prescribes that any citizen is entitled to get any information by using the prescribed process. Section 78(4) dictates that government can instruct the UP to circulate various information regarding citizen's rights. According to section 79(1), any citizen can seek information from a UP by following process set down there. Citizens need to make formal application to the UP chair, paying required charges (if any) for required information. If the application is not rejected or settled, the UP secretary then would provide the required explanation within a specified timeframe.

- According to section 79(2), the applicant has the right to have a written explanation (if any) if anyone is not provided his/her required information by UP functionaries.
- According to section 80(1), the UP Secretary or other responsible officer is responsible to provide required information within specified timeframe other than information notified by Government as exempted.
- According to section 80(2), if responsible officers do not provide required information within specified timeframes upon information seeker's formal application Tk. 50 will be fined against the responsible officers and deposited to the UPs account for each day's delay.
- According to section 80(3), if the responsible officers do not provide information or provide fake information or hide information s/he would be fined Tk. 1000.

However, along with those provisions stated above, there are some other provisions through which Government can control<sup>71</sup> UPs. The written budget copy and real income and expenditure statement have to be sent to the UPZ offices. Section 71 and 72 outlines that the DC or any other empowered by him has the right to visit a UP and the UP functionaries are responsible to co-operate them. Section 72 dictates that any departmental head of government office and his/her selected technical staff can inspect various projects and related various records and papers of their department implemented

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<sup>71</sup> It is evident that the elected functionaries were always subordinate to the bureaucrats. The UP's elected functionaries are subordinate to sub-district and district office in the following matters: the Upazila Nirbahi Officer (UNO) supervises elections of the UP; on behalf of the DC or by his recommendation the UNOs have the right to inspect UP offices, investigate and recommend punitive action. The actual actions are taken by the Ministry of Local Government. The DC is the approving authority of the final Annual Budget of UP. The local MP is the adviser of UPZ (Siddiqui, 2000).

by UP. Section 73(1) dictates that government authority has its right to instruct regarding financial management, personnel management, project formulation and implementation, selection of beneficiary of any project, regulating the activities of UP and WS etc. and the UP is responsible to abide by those instructions.

#### **4.5 Conclusion**

The above discussions make it clear that the UP, act 2009 outlines people's power to decide in a formal way. Social as well as various public accountability mechanisms have been embedded at the UP Act, 2009 for participatory and accountable LGIs at the local level. It has empowered people by providing their right to seek information from UP and a CC has enabled people to have various information on services and the right to complain against the public officials. So, efforts have been made there to explore the planning and budgeting process of the UP of general people within this administrative and political context and feedback has been given to overcome the problems encountered with the process and contexts interaction of this study.



## **Chapter Five**

### **State of People's Participation at the Local Level: Role of *Ward Shava* (WS) and Open Budget Meeting (OBM)**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

Effective working of WS and OBM through direct civic engagement is essential for establishing social accountability. The intention of involving people in the planning process is to ensure social accountability of the working process of UP. It is expected that people will get themselves involved in the process of UP related plans and financial matters through the process of WS and OBM. The processes of WS and OBM are linked together to provide important information to the common people, for instance, which schemes were placed at the WS by the people and which schemes got approval at the OBM from the UP functionaries. Moreover, OBM is a platform where people get information about income and expenditure statements of the UP and the state of the implementation of schemes that were initiated in the previous year. This Chapter delineates the real scenario of people's participation in the UPs through analysis of both primary and secondary data. It depicts the process of WS and OBM of UP and illustrates the outcome i.e. the state of people's participation in the planning and budgeting process.

#### **5.2 Participatory Planning and Budgeting Process at the WS and OBM**

Previous analysis<sup>1</sup> suggests that the process of planning at WS and OBM is designed to be done in five stages.

##### **5.2.1 Stage -1 Formation of Ward Committee: Participatory or Paper Based?**

The intention of formation of WC<sup>2</sup> is that the involvement of general people from various categories would enable them to identify their problems related to UP at Ward level. But this study has revealed that the formation of WCs was merely paper works. Why it is so?

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<sup>1</sup> Figure 4.6, chapter-4

<sup>2</sup> Formation of Ward Committee (WC) is obligatory for organizing WS. The WC is such an entity which allow general citizens including school teachers, social workers, NGO officers, freedom fighter etc. to motivate all voters to participate in the decision making process of the ward.

**Firstly**, WCs were formed just to maintain the formality<sup>3</sup> of getting LGSP-II funds. The UP secretaries of different UPs have formed the WCs to qualify for LGSP-II funds. The auditors of LGSP-II project audit the formation of WC before disbursement of that fund. Although formation of WC has importance for ensuring effectiveness of the participatory planning process, this should not be the only condition for obtaining funds. Along with 06(six) UP secretaries it was stated by the District Facilitator<sup>4</sup> of Lalmonirhat District of the LGSP-II project that:

The formation of WC is obligatory for organizing a WS. But WS is not specifically required to get LGSP-II fund. It offers an opportunity for villagers to express their overall demands relating to their benefits. The LGSP funds have specific utilization sectors, whereas planning at WS is supposed to accumulate overall development plans of a ward. I have found that most of the UPs are preparing their plans narrowly for getting LGSP funds. But along with willingness of UP functionaries, awareness of general people is necessary for people's participation at WS.

All the WC members interviewed (9 out of 9) expressed that they know that their names have been included as WC members even though they have never performed their role of organizing WS. It has been revealed that, along with the UP functionaries, the WC members only knew that they formed a committee but they did not have any understanding regarding the functions of the committee. The school teachers as WC members, when interviewed, revealed that their names had been included as members but they were unaware about the functions of WC. This indicates the lack of interest of both the UP functionaries and other committee members towards formation of the WC.

**Secondly**, in most of the UPs, the formation of the WCs has been done totally from either the ruling Party's supporters or by relatives of the Ward members of the UP. It has been evident in Gogram and Ghurka UP<sup>5</sup> that political activists of the governing Party were the members of WCs and son, daughter in law, younger brother, wife, and sister in law of WMs have been selected as members of the WC in other UPs. They have been selected in the category of "social worker or general people". While interviewing a service beneficiary of LGSP-II fund it was revealed that she was the wife<sup>6</sup> of a UP-level AL activist. It is also noted that the same leader was occupying membership of WC and SCs.

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<sup>3</sup> The operational manual of UP under LGSP-II project fund specifies about compliance of the formation of various committees, people's involvement with these committees and functions of making plans for decision making of UP and implementation of those plans.

<sup>4</sup> Interview data, Lalmonirhat, February 13, 2014.

<sup>5</sup> It is mentionable that the Chairs of those UPs are supporters of the BNP.

<sup>6</sup> It has been observed that the economic condition of that AL leader is not bad and the wife of that leader has no training in sewing. So this wrong targetting of benefit occurred due to the lack of social mapping which has been discussed in the subsequent section.

It has been thus evident that attending at WS is not the only prerequisite for getting UP services. This is indicative of the fact that scrutiny of the lists of beneficiaries was not properly done by the LGSP-II project officials. This evidence indicates that power politics is hindering the process of common people's participation in the WC. As a consequence, due to the influence of ruling Party members, opinions of elected chairs of the UPs belonging to the opposition political parties- the BNP – and others - have been overridden in some cases. This research finds that the beneficiary names of the allocation in the name of FFW, TR etc. are being selected by the ruling Party's political activists. It is evident from the interview data with one of the UP chairs<sup>7</sup> who said:

Usually, I do not get any allocations. In our UP we could not impose house tax on the inhabitants of the locality. The local AL leaders and influential rich people took their opposition against such attempt of imposing tax on general people. So what will I do with WC? I have been elected chair for the last two terms at this UP. Before the UPZ election, I got some allocations. But now the elected UPZ chairs along, with other political leaders of AL, utilize all those allocations in the name of this UP. I have informed the UPZ chair about the necessity of taking necessary action for tackling river erosion in Ward no.7 six months ago. I think that, due to my being a member of the opposition Party, he has not taken any step yet.

Thus, it can be argued that the ruling party members interfere in the service delivery process of UP. In other words, it appears that individual interest and Party interests of the politicians has suppressed the collective demands for community development through cooperation.

**Thirdly**, the NGO officials,<sup>8</sup> as members of WC, along with the UP members, formed the WCs and organised the WSs in all wards of Hariyan and Gogram UP. So, it can be argued that the instruction provided in the UP manual to ensure representation of NGOs in WC has been followed by WC members.

Despite having limitation, a couple of positive things have been noticed through observing the process of formation of the WC. **Firstly**, at least the UPs have started practicing the official formalities<sup>9</sup> for getting LGSP-II funds. **Secondly**, NGO officials have been providing technical assistance in organizing WS, which have been discussed in the subsequent section.

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<sup>7</sup> Interview data, Vadai UP, 10 February, 2014.

<sup>8</sup> The local NGO Sacheton works under the Local Governance project name "Sharique" in Rajshahi District.

<sup>9</sup> Here official formalities mean the task of maintaining a record of formation of the committee.

### 5.2.2 Stage-2: Social Mapping – The Invisible Process

The objective of identifying local problems through dividing citizens among various groups, i.e. social mapping, is supposed to allow citizens to have access to information regarding UP's capacity for making decisions, through the planning process and its implementation, as well by direct monitoring. Local people's needs assessment and identification of the local problems are very important because feasible planning<sup>10</sup> will then bring greater socio- economic development. It is argued that a comprehensive survey of villages is necessary so that the problems will be identified and resource allocation to those specific problems will be ensured (Zahid and Rahman, 1994:19-32). **How are beneficiaries in fact chosen?** The answer has been studied by means of two methodologies.

**Firstly**, it has been revealed, in the interview sessions with general people and with UP functionaries, that there is no arrangement on the part of the UP functionaries for assessing the needs of the people in a UP. This social mapping is a separate part of the planning process which should be implemented before the planning process of WS. In practice, it has been observed and confirmed in interviews that this process is being implemented simultaneously with the meeting of WS, where people find very little time to observe their Ward's problems, social mapping, resource classification and discussion. It may be relevant here that the UP functionaries did not get any training<sup>11</sup> for doing comprehensive village-based social mapping. They need such training because UP functionaries are responsible for doing such social mapping to get a clear picture of need assessment of the villagers who do need what or which infrastructure should get priority in a certain village. In order to involve people in their planning process, the information of capacity and resources, financial, human and technical etc., have to be updated in each UP in each FY.

Available data suggests that the UP functionaries did not provide such information. Thus citizens could not access information about the UP's capacity to plan for a year or for five

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<sup>10</sup> Theoretically general people are supposed to participate in the project selection and finalization process. Here, feasible means the possibility of implementation of those plans that are proposed by the citizens at WS for implementation, even though scrutiny would be given by the members of the SCs.

<sup>11</sup> See chapter 6, table : 6.5.

years. The UP functionaries do not have sufficient conceptual ability<sup>12</sup> to provide such information to their voters. The voters' ability to access information of the UP functionaries regarding UP planning and budgeting is quite low since it is dependent on their education and training. Other data, like that concerning education and training<sup>13</sup> of the UP functionaries, have substantiated the fact that their skills are not sufficient to carry on a social mapping process for planning at WS. It has been evident that, as citizen's leaders, the WMs did not have enough understanding regarding social mapping.

**Secondly**, it is evident from available data of this research that, although the NGOs are providing technical assessment for conducting social mapping<sup>14</sup> for implementing their projects at all in the six UPs' working areas, there is no co-ordination mechanism of those NGOs with UPs update a combined social map<sup>15</sup>. It has been directly observed by the researcher at Ghurka UP that the payments<sup>16</sup> of the project beneficiaries of NGOs have

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<sup>12</sup> Theoretically, leaders in any organization need three types of skills: conceptual, human and technical. These abilities depend on the types of the administrators who run any organization. In any organization there are generally three types of employee: top level management employee, middle level management employee and bottom level employees. It varies with what organisations need, what types of employees the organisation has and what types of employees possess what types of ability (Katz, 1955:33). "Conceptual skills are the ability to work with ideas and concepts: whereas technical skills deal with things and human skills deal with people, conceptual skills involve the ability to work with ideas" ([http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/45968\\_Chapter\\_3.pdf](http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/45968_Chapter_3.pdf)).

<sup>13</sup> Appendix-5.1 and table 6.5. These show education level and training of UP functionaries.

<sup>14</sup> The Food For Work (FFW) programs by World Food Program (WFP) has been implemented at Vadai UP by a local NGO named "*Hitoishi*". The women of that locality deposit a fixed amount of money on a weekly basis with the NGO officials. According to the officer, the poor women members are depositing money with their organization. They got a certain amount of food grain against the food distribution program of WFP. After a certain period, the women would get their money back. She argued that this program will enhance their economic capacity to invest the money in another employment generation program. The Project officer of "Setu Project" of ESDO, funded by CARE, described his working procedure at Kakina UP in the way: "At first we, the officers of our project, divide the village people among small groups. We do well-being analysis of the local poor people. On the basis of the analysis we provided Tk. 8000-9000 as financial assistance to the poor men and women for the purpose of small business such as purchase for daily work, cow rearing, spice farming such as garlic and ginger etc. With this type of engagement with people, we are also doing some other project implementation. The people achieved 100% sanitation coverage. The people have decided what they need and we, the officials, have provided the service to help them to get it."

<sup>15</sup> There have numerous national NGOs (appendix-6.3) working in the study area. But unfortunately, the beneficiaries of the projects have been selected by the NGO officials exclusively for the NGOs program implementation. A combined social map from their side has not been made with the UP.

<sup>16</sup> It has been observed that, at Hatikumrul and Ghurka UPs, there are involvement of two NGOs who are implementing projects entitled Char Livelihood Project (CLP). A local NGO named Manab Mukti Sangstha (MMS) is responsible for the development of the citizens affected by river erosion. In those UPs, their programs have been implemented for the betterment of the population of the UP. At first, the NGO officials conduct social mapping about the socio-economic condition of the citizens of certain UPs of their working areas. Women members were selected for implementation of various development projects at Ghurka UP based on that social mapping. The members were provided a specific amount of food and money allocation as per instruction of the funding agency.

been provided by the project officers in presence of the UP chair. It is evident that both institutions are cooperating with one another in terms of sharing their resources, capacities and ideas, where the focus of the programs is to improve the livelihood of the rural poor. This is actually done for local development which is combination of programs that are taken by both public and private institutions. The possible reason of non-existence of social mapping with coordination of NGO is that the WMs do not understand the process. One NGO official opined<sup>17</sup> that the WMs actually do not understand the procedure of social mapping of UP. He said,

The UP member and Chairs felt that the demands that are placed at WS and shortlisted at OBM would be implemented by NGO officials. Actually they do not understand that we are working for NGOs and we have some specific programs with the people of the locality.

On the other hand, the UP functionaries could not interfere in the activities of NGOs. One of the WM<sup>18</sup> expressed his discontent with one of the NGO's activities in the following way:

The NGO officers selected their project beneficiaries. We have seen that they do not provide the service to the real beneficiaries. People lodge complaint to us but there is no formal mechanism through which we can select project beneficiaries of the NGOs.

On the basis of the above discussion, it can be argued that the legal framework of UP planning through social mapping gets obstructed due to the lack of the capacity of the UP functionaries.

### **5.2.3 Stage-3: Meeting of WS**

The data table<sup>19</sup> shows the number of people who attended at the WS. Available data suggests<sup>20</sup> that fake names have been entered into the WS resolution book as attendees of WS. It has been found that about 50.63% (40 out of 79) of respondents did not

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<sup>17</sup> Interview Data, Kakina UP, 09 February, 2014.

<sup>18</sup> Interview Data, Gogram UP, ward-1, 13 January, 2014.

<sup>19</sup> Appendix-5.2. This table has represented the percentage of total voters who participated at all those 18 WS while there is provision that at least one-twentieth of total voters would make a quorum. The attendance of WS and the number of voters of UP were collected from the respective WS resolution book and UP secretary respectively. Among total 54 wards of six UPs, 18 wards were selected as a sample frame for the study.

<sup>20</sup> At first, it seemed that people who were sampled for interview had really attended at the WS of the Ward no 1, 4 and 7 of all UPs. But it has been revealed that not everyone whose names had been enlisted in the book participated. In Hariyan and Gogram UPs, various service receivers' lists such as VGD, FFW etc. have also been cross-checked with the participants of WS. During field visits, it was revealed that the names of the respondents in Hariyan and Gogram were not found among those entered in the resolution book at the planning process of WS. So 4 respondents from each UP had been selected from the concerned UP's final service recipient list of FY 2012-2013.

participate<sup>21</sup>, even though their name was included in the WS resolution book, and 49.37% respondents participated at WS. So, it is evident that only 39 people (out of 71) participated at the WS. In the comparative analysis on the union-wise participation of people at WS, it has been revealed that 23.08%, 29.17%, 66.67%, 100.00%, 100.00% and 25.00% voters in the Hariyan, Gogram, Ghurka, Hatikumrul, Kakina and Vadai UP, respectively, participated in the WS. On the other hand 76.92%, 70.83%, 33.33% and 75% people of the Hariyan, Gogram<sup>22</sup>, Ghurka, and Vadai UP respectively have not participated at the WS. An analysis of the proceedings of 18 WS reveals that the **following types of meeting (Table 5.2)** have been organised in the study areas. It has also come out how the names of 34 people were entered into the WS resolution book.

**Table 5.1**  
**Union wise Distribution of Respondents Participated at the WS<sup>23</sup>**

<b>Name of UP</b>	<b>Participated at WS</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Did not participate</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Total</b>
Hariyan	3	23.08	10	76.92	13
Gogram	7	29.17	9(8*)	70.83	24
Ghurka	8	66.67	4	33.33	12
Hatikumrul	6	100.00	0	0	6
Kakina	12	100.00	0	0	12
Vadai	3	25.00	9	75	12
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>49.37</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>50.63</b>	<b>79</b>

\*08 respondents were interviewed exclusively at OBM in order to capture opinions of the participants about various aspects of that meeting at Gogram UP.

**Source: Interview data**

<sup>21</sup> The female respondents of Ward no 4 and male and female respondents of Ward 7 of Hatikumrul UP were not found for interview, since the resolution book of Ward no 4 did not contain any female participant's name and the researcher did not find the participants of Ward 7 in their ward.

<sup>22</sup> Although Hariyan and Gogram UPs are being supported by local governance projects of NGOs, it is also revealed that there are entries of fake names of participants in through the personal motives of WMs to organise such meetings is the factor that has brought local people in their planning process.

<sup>23</sup> This comparison has been made due to the fact that not everyone was sampled for interview has really participated at WS.

Available data suggests that the WMs have organised cultural programs<sup>24</sup> and tea parties<sup>25</sup> with the inhabitants of their localities. Apart from this, it can be said that most of the WSs were organised without any arrangement for invitation of all the voters of the respective Ward to the WS and the voters did not have information regarding the meeting. The empirical data have showed that the participation of people was very limited in the preparatory pre budget discussion at WS and sometimes it did not even have a quorum. In the data table<sup>26</sup>, it has been revealed that the legal obligation of presence of 1/20<sup>th</sup><sup>27</sup> of the total voters of a ward has not been ensured by the WMs. Instead, they have been identified as having low moral character, as they have made fake entries of names and signatures of voters in the WS resolution book.

**Table 5.2**  
**Forms of WS in different UPs**

<b>Name of UP</b>	<b>Social Mapping and meeting</b>	<b>WS as Cultural Program</b>	<b>Fake WS through Tea party with neighbours and relatives</b>
<b>Hariyan</b>	<b>W1, W4, W7</b>		
<b>Gogram</b>	<b>W7, W1</b>		<b>W4</b>
<b>Hatikumrul</b>	<b>W1</b>		<b>W4 , W7</b>
<b>Ghurka</b>	<b>W4</b>		<b>W1, W7</b>
<b>Kakina</b>	<b>W4,W1</b>	<b>W7</b>	
<b>Vadai</b>			<b>W1, W4, and W7</b>

**Source:** Interview and FGD data

<sup>24</sup> One FGD session with female inhabitants has revealed how the UP functionaries organised WS with financial assistance from a local NGO. The announcement regarding the WS was made in the name of a cultural program of that NGO. The WM arranged the meeting and 117 people were present there. Few participants of the FGD session were also present in the WS but their names were not included in the resolution book. Only seven demands regarding road construction, one tube well and sanitary latrines were placed in the meeting. The women participants did not place any demand in the meeting. This process took very little time and then the meeting turned to a cultural program with professional singers.

<sup>25</sup> The decisions of the resolution of WS of various wards of Vadai UP revealed that the WS was specifically confined to LGSP related demands and two demands were narrowly selected for each Ward for the FY 2012-2013. The process just maintained the formality of selection. In a true sense, this WS failed to accumulate people's demand. The meetings were organised at UP member's premises. The neighbors were invited at UP member's home and entertained with tea and snacks. The formality of organizing a WS had been maintained and signatures of the voters were taken for quorum. Neither UP member himself understood about the real objectives of such meeting nor the gathering placed any demands in WS. It seemed it was a **tea party** among the neighbours of the UP member. FGD data revealed that for fulfilling the quorum UP *chowkidars* were sent for collection of signature of the voters and the poor and powerless rural people signed in the resolution book.

<sup>26</sup> Appendix- 5.2. It shows % of people's participation at the WS for the Planning of Financial Year 2012 – 2013

<sup>27</sup> According to section 5(2) of the UP Act, 2009, 1/20<sup>th</sup> of the total voters of a ward make quorum.



It can be said that **negligence of duties and personal motives of WMs** are two factors that have made three types (Table 5.2) of WS in the study area. The term **negligence of duties** means WMs did not do the things which the statute and regulations require them to do. The UP operational manual (2012) specifies their responsibility of making wide-scale announcements with the WC members for organizing WS and OBM at Ward and UP levels respectively. However, 18 Ward members (out of 36) of various UP collected signatures of the voters for ensuring quorum in the WS and to help them to pass the audit requirement needed to release LGSP-II project funds in their favour.

In this study, **personal motive** implies the motives of WMs which lead them to do any activities. It has been revealed that<sup>28</sup> only three or four WS have been organised properly and the other WMs have collected signatures of the voters for creating the appearance of having organised an open meeting.

### **5.2.3.1 Changes/Outcome of the Participatory Planning**

The study has explored the extent of people's participation and the intensity of the answerability of UP functionaries at WS by analyzing the following perspectives as have been developed in the conceptual framework of the study.

#### **5.2.3.1.1 Access to Participation Mechanism**

This section has been designed to answer two questions: (1) why do the WMs not inform their voters and enter fake names and signatures of citizens and (2) why do the voters not attend such meeting when they are informed by those WMs who have invited them?

In response to the question, “**did every voter of your locality attend in the WS?**” the majority of the WMs (95.74%) affirmed that every voter of a ward did not attend at the meeting. Cross-sectional data revealed that, despite being informed, people were unable to attend those meetings. Most of the WMs expressed the view that neither did all the voters attend nor it is necessary that all the voters attend at WS. **Why did the WMs think so?** It has been revealed from the data table<sup>29</sup> that most of the families (47.37%) consisted of one to four and (46.13%) five to eight members. Thus, one female WM noted:

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<sup>28</sup> Interview data, Vadai UP, Ward No 1, 4, 7 06 February, 2014 and Interview data, Hatikumrul UP, Ward 4, 28 January, 2014 Interview data, Hatikumrul UP, Ward 7, 26 January, 2014

<sup>29</sup> Appendix-5.3. It shows UP-wise number of members in one family.

It is not necessary that each member of a family attend in WS since most of the families consist of 7/8 voters. Both male and female members in the same family cannot participate simultaneously at WS in a certain locality.

Most of the UP functionaries argued that people generally did not attend due to their daily workloads. One female WM<sup>30</sup> stated,

For years, people did not expect anything from UP. They did not come to UPs to get any service. Their perception about UP was that the allocations for the poor at the UP were consumed by the UP functionaries. The UP was such a place where the poor and powerless had no scope to speak up. Moreover, they felt that they had to pay charges and taxes for their needs.

Available data suggest that the poor and daily labourer could not attend at WS and OBM due to their time constraints. One of the UP female<sup>31</sup> WMs argued,

The general people do not like to attend such meetings. The daily labourers usually do not attend due to the fact that they think if they attend there they have to starve for a whole day without a wage to buy food for their families. Again, some neighbors asked me what they would get if they would attend the meeting. No one wants to attend such meeting without getting personal profit.

Table-5.3 suggests that 68.57%, 25.71%, 17.14%, 5.71% and 5.71% of WMs opined that professional obligation, lack of personal interest, lack of awareness, political reason, and meeting times respectively are some reasons that hindered people's presence at WS. On the other hand, it has been revealed from FGD data that 93.81% of people did not get invitations<sup>32</sup> about WS. It has been evident from FGD data that, being informed, people did not avoid attending the WS. The following Table shows the cognitive dissonance between the UP officials and the voters about the absence of most voters from the WS. It has been revealed that, in some UPs, being informed 4.55% (08 of 176) females did not attend at WS due to inconvenient meeting time and their hesitation to speak at public meetings while 6.82% (12 of 176) females did not attend due to their *Purdha* system and societal norms. Available data of this study have suggested that the Muslim women do not participate at WS as they usually do not go outside the home. This issue varied on the basis of region<sup>33</sup>. One of the participants of the FGD<sup>34</sup> session said,

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<sup>30</sup> Interview Data, Hatikumrul UP, Ward no. 7, 28 January, 2014.

<sup>31</sup> Interview Data, Gogram UP, Ward 1, 13 January, 2014.

<sup>32</sup> Since the provisions of the Act, 2009 regarding people's obligatory involvement at participatory planning have started to implement from the FY 2011-12 in UPs in general, the intention was to explore whether people had information regarding WS or not.

<sup>33</sup> The female participants of FGD sessions at Rajshahi District did not mention such reasons for not participating at WS. But restricted mobility of women has been revealed at the Sirajganj and the Lalmonirhat District. The local inhabitants of Lalmonirhat District have been found to have access in LGIs. However, it has been revealed that immigrants from Mymensingh, at Aditmari Upazila of Lalmonirhat District, maintained strong *Purdha* culture.

<sup>34</sup> FGD Data, Female FGD session, Ward No. 4, Kakina, 9 February, 2014.

I attended at the WS of our Ward. I got an invitation from the chowkider. I left the meeting in the evening. So, I did not know about the discussions of the meeting. I do not normally stay out of my home in the evening. Usually I have to do household works all day long and don't get time to attend such meetings. My husband does not think that I should go to such a place. Again, I hesitate to express my views among males.

**Table 5.3**  
**Reasons Why People Do Not Participate In WS**

Causes that general people do not participate at WS (UP functionaries' Perception)			Causes that general people do not participate at WS (People's Perception)			
Causes*	R=35	%	Name of the UP	Causes*	(R)	%
Professional obligations / Busy at work	24	68.57	All	Did not get invitation	303	93.81
Lack of personal interest	9	25.71	Kakin a (W7)	Hesitation and Meeting Time	08(176)*	4.55
Lack of awareness	6	17.14	Vadai (W1)	<i>Purdha</i> (Women Not Allowed In Public Without Escort/Other Societal Norms	12(176)*	6.82
Meeting time	2	5.71	<i>Total number of FGD Participants</i>		323	N/A
Political reason	2	5.71	*Total number of female participants and % has been calculated on the basis of that number <b>Source: FGD Data (2014).</b>			

**Source: Interview Data (2014).**  
**(\*More than one opinion)**

It has been evident that most of the tasks related to UP, such as birth registration of their child, various certificate collection etc. from the UP, are usually done by their husbands. In response to the question, **will you participate at WS if you are invited?** the participants at FGD session<sup>35</sup> replied,

You said both male and female persons gathered for placing their demands in WS. How will we join there? Our family members will not allow that. [meaning it is un-Islamic for men and women to meet in the same place]. Do you think that the way you come here and talk to us will make our family members allow us to join such a gathering?.

However, some encouraging examples of personal motives of WMs have also been revealed. Available data<sup>36</sup> suggests that, apart from the fake entries, the WMs<sup>37</sup> organised

<sup>35</sup> FGD Data, Female FGD session, Ward No. 1, Vadai UP, 6 February, 2014.

<sup>36</sup> Table 5.2 :Types of WS

WS with spontaneous participation of people. Undeniably, in order to organize WS, the leading responsibilities have to be performed by the WMs. This is evident from the field study that **leadership ability and responsiveness** of the WMs are the main factors that are responsible for organizing PP and PB in UPs. Here, in this study, the terms leadership ability and responsiveness imply that the elected officials have accomplished their tasks which have been assigned to them. It has been revealed in this study that, although there is no cooperation with or external assistance from NGO officials, the WMs have performed their responsibilities of organizing WS and OBM. It has also been revealed<sup>38</sup> that the UP functionaries have organised meetings with the revenue from that UP's own source. The WMs have knowledge regarding the Act, 2009 and this has made them responsive to their duties. It is evident from the interview session with one female WM<sup>39</sup> that, in spite of having long-term experience of organizing participatory planning and budgeting processes at the UPs of Sirajganj District the UP Act 2009 has made a difference.

Before the enactment of the UP Act, 2009, we had no legal obligation to organize WS and OBM. The Ghurka UP received donor<sup>40</sup> driven projects for organizing participatory planning and budgeting from 2000-2006. During that time, as Ward member, we did not inform all voters of the locality and the process of PP and PB maintained the formality of arranging meetings for getting the funds. But now, we organize WS and OBM as organization of WS and OBM have been specified by the UP Act, 2009.

So, it appears that the enactment of the Act, 2009 has had some effect in inducing the holding of WS. The following sections explicate the outcome of people's access to the participatory planning process in terms of their access to information and knowledge regarding meeting time, place and agenda of WS provided by the WMs.

### **Access to information regarding WS**

The finding of the study is that providing information to general people by the UP functionaries is important for people's access to the participatory process. Most of the

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<sup>37</sup> Although NGO officials have been involved with the planning and budgeting process of the Hariyan and Gogram UPs, it is true for all those WMs of all the six UPs except the WMs of Ward No 4 of Kakina UP.

<sup>38</sup> The real expenditure statement of Kakina UP revealed that the expenditure of organizing OBM has been shown there.

<sup>39</sup> She has been selected as FWM for once and elected for two times in Ghurka UP. Interview data, Ghurka UP, Ward No.1, 29.01.2014.

<sup>40</sup> Sirajganj Local Development support projects (hereinafter SLDSP). The description of that project has been given in chapter-4.

participants of the FGD sessions have expressed their willingness to attend at WS with prior notification. Participants<sup>41</sup> of one of the FGD session said,

We do not know about WS because no one informs us about it. We do not know what services are provided through UP. Would not the share of UP's funds be despoiled by us if we were called for attending at WS? Our members did not organize WS at our Ward. So why would they call us? But if we were invited at WS or OBM we would have attended there. If we get invitation next time, we will attend the meeting and will share various problems of our locality.

Above statement indicates general people's discontent about the activities of their WM. It has been revealed from all FGD data that people believe that the WMs have invited the persons of their same political identity and nearest people to speak at WS. One of the participants<sup>42</sup> of FGD session stated,

The member or chair never called me for any discussion of UP. They only come to me at the time of election. They might have invited their political fellows or those who are very close to them at the WS. If they would have invited ten people, atleast five would have attended at WS. But neither we were invited nor informed of such meeting.

It is interesting to note that in addition to political fellows of the ward members, large numbers of general people have been found participating WS as well. The table-5.4 suggests that among the participants of the WS 69.23% were general people.

**Table 5.4**  
**People's Participation at WS and Process of Invitation they Received**

% of General People Participated at WS			Question: How were you invited at WS? (people's Perception)		
Opinion	(R=39)	%	Opinion	(R=39)	%
1.General People	27	69.23%	1.Informed verbally by the UP members	30	67.65%
2.Political Influential People	3	7.69%	2.Received invitation letter	10	5.88%
3.Relative and Neighbor of WM	9	23.07%	3.Informed by the village police (chowkider), by the WM's mobile call, by WM's political companion and through announcement etc.	26	26.47%
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>Note: Respondents could give more than one opinion.</b>		

**Source:** Interview Data (2014)

<sup>41</sup> FGD Data, Male FGD session, Ward No. 1, Hatikumrul UP, 26 January, 2014.

<sup>42</sup> FGD Data, Male FGD Session, Ward No. 1, Hariyan UP, 18 January, 2014.

The ratio for political influential people and relative and neighbor of WM were 7.69% and 23.07% respectively. So it can be argued that among different issues, one of the most important issue that deters general people from participating in the meetings of UP is mistrust of elected leaders. By cross-checking both FGD and interview data, it can be argued that most of the citizens who did not attend at WS do not expect any service from UP as there were no such formal mechanisms of planning and budgeting at UP as has been created by the UP Act, 2009. When it concerns the mechanisms of inviting people to attend WS it has been found (table 5.4) that the majority of the respondents (67.65%) who attended the meeting of the WS were informed verbally by the UP members. Among others 5.88% of the respondents had received invitation letter while 26.47% of the participants were informed either by the village police (Chowkidar) or through cell phone call of the WM or WM's companions. Getting information is not enough for the participants to attend the WS meeting. Along with invitation they should know about the time and place of the meeting. The study findings suggest that among the participants 79.49% of the respondents were informed directly by the concerned UP member about time and place of the meeting. One of the female respondents<sup>43</sup> in the category of general people expressed her experience in the following way,

I was informed about the time of WS from my WM. He came to my home and informed about meeting time and place. He also called me over phone for attending the meeting. I felt honoured and happy because I have never got such kind of behavior from elected people.

Thus, it can be argued that the UP functionaries are trying to accommodate general people in the activities of the UP. By accommodating the general people they are making them informed about the rights and entitlements and encouraging them to raise their voice at different activities of the UP.

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<sup>43</sup> Interview data, Hariyan UP, 18 January, 2014.

**Table 5.5**  
**Invitation Process Utilised by the UP Functionaries and Reasons People Participated at WS**

Invitation procedure used by UP functionaries (UP functionaries' perception)			Reasons People Participated at WS(people's Perception)		
<b>Question: How did you invite people to participate at WS? (UP Representative's Perception)</b>			<b>Question: Why did you participate at WS? (People's Perception)</b>		
<b>Opinion</b>	<b>(R=35)</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Opinion</b>	<b>(R=39)</b>	<b>%</b>
1.Invitation Letter	10	23.81	1.By the Invitation of WM	31	79.49%
2.Announcement (Miking)	16	38.1	2.By the request of NGO Officials	3	7.69%
3. Personal Contact	30	71.43	3.Others (Through Mobile call, Chowkider, announcement etc)	5	12.82%
3.Others (Through Mobile call, message through Chowkideretc)	10	23.81	Total	39	100%
<b>Note: Respondents opined more than one options and the WM are the respondents excluding UP chairs and secretary.</b>					

Source: Interview data (2014)

47 UP functionaries interviewed expressed that people were invited at the WS utilizing various processes and most of them applied more than one process. Interview data compilation found that 71.43% UP members contacted their voters personally, 23.81% sent invitation letters, and 38.1% made announcements and 23.81% followed other processes as well. The data table-5.1 revealed that 12 citizens interviewed at Kakina UP participated at WS. There was no fake entry of name of voters in the WS resolution books of Kakina UP. There was no NGO involvement for organizing WS in Kakina UP in the FY 2012-2013. But the UP members, along with their chair organised the WS, having ensured the participation of voters of their locality. It was learned, while conducting interview sessions with the UP Members for Ward no 4 and female Ward member (of 4, 5&6) that they had carried out a huge publicity campaign to ensure participation of citizens at the WS. The participants of FGD sessions expressed their positive views about the announcement and invitation by the watchmen (*chowkider*) of UP for attending at the meeting. The respondents opined that the invitation process was adequate because most of them were invited by the UP functionaries personally.

From the example of organizing WS and OBM at Kakina UP it can be said that, if UP allocations are made for organizing WS and it is possible for the concerned WMs to make huge announcement with the help of the *chowkidars* to organize WS. Available data (table-5.5) suggest that 79.49%, 7.69% and 12.82% of the respondents who participated in WS were invited by WMs, through NGO officials and through other processes respectively. Thus, it can be said that people have participated in the WS meeting in response to personal invitation by their WMs.

In some cases (9 fake WS out of 18) it has been expressed by almost all UP members that they did not invite all voters through personal contact. In response to the question<sup>44</sup> **“how did you organize WS in your ward”** one FWM<sup>45</sup> expressed her opinion in the following way:

In the financial year 2012-13, we received LGSP-II funds only. The funds were distributed among us by our chair in a meeting. During that FY, we collected signatures of the voters in order to show evidence of organizing WS which was obligatory for us for the purpose of getting LGSP-II fund.

Another important finding of the study is that organizing WS, sometimes, becomes difficult due to resource constraints.<sup>46</sup> It has been revealed by the interview data<sup>47</sup> of this study with one WM who has explained why he organised WS as a tea party:

We have organised WS but we did not invite all the voters. Since there is no fund for the implementation for the projects what is the utility of having such plans? We don't get our UP's own allocations properly. Usually we, along with the UP chair, allocate the funds of the UP.

The WMs who did not organise WS were of opinion that, except for LGSP-II funds, they usually did not have enough financial resources through which they could fulfill people's demands. Thus, they do not feel motivated to organize WS beyond what they can get away with, as the process is itself “going through the motions” and cannot deliver anything. In response to a question **“whether the process of invitation, applied by the UP representatives, was adequate for informing the majority of the people to participate in WS or not?”** it has been revealed<sup>48</sup> 28 (out of 39) general people (17.95% +

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<sup>44</sup> The researcher was investigating whether the concerned WMs organised WS or collected signatures of the voters only.

<sup>45</sup> Interview Data, Vadai UP, Ward No.4 February 6, 2014.

<sup>46</sup> Appendix-5.5. It shows revenue earning trends of all UPs and it has been revealed that income from UP's own source is very limited.

<sup>47</sup> Interview Data, Hatikumrul UP, Ward. No. 4, 28 January, 2014.

<sup>48</sup> Appendix-5.6. It shows the level of satisfaction with invitation process of both general people and UP functionaries.



53.85%=69.80%) expressed their views positively, meaning that the invitation processes applied by the UP members were adequate for informing the general public to participate in the WS meeting. On the other hand, 26 UP functionaries (12.77%+42.55%=55.32%) also expressed their satisfaction with the processes that were utilised for people's gathering at WS since they have provided sufficient information to their voters for attending at WS.

**Table 5.6**  
**Reasons that UP functionaries' Dissatisfied with the Invitation Process**

Opinion	R=35	%
Lack of publicity	12	34.29
No allowance for organizing WS	21	60.00
Political pressure	6	17.14
Only for quorum	3	8.57
Lack of manpower	8	22.86
Less priority to women	6	17.14

**Source:** Interview data (2014) \*Note: Many respondents agreed with more than one option.

In response to the question, “**why do you disagree about the process of inviting people to participate at WS**”, 21 (out of 47) UP functionaries (44.68%) expressed their dissatisfaction with the invitation process. They were of opinion (table-5.6) that the process being applied for inviting people was not adequate and thus the majority of the voters did not participate in the WS meeting. 34.29% UP functionaries were dissatisfied since they could not arrange people's participation while 60% mentioned that, due to lack of allowance, they could not manage the cost of announcement for invitation to WS and so did not organize WS. 17.14% expressed political pressure<sup>49</sup> is the reason that they did not organize WS while 8.57 % organised fake WS for getting LGSP-II fund. 22.86% expressed that there is lack of manpower for organizing WS. Those WMs who expressed their disagreement about the process of invitation expressed doubts about the invitation process since it was not possible for them to communicate with all the voters of their locality. They expressed their opinion in favour of sending written invitation to the voters by the WMs 2/3 days prior to the WS. 17.14% of WMssaid that they did not invite women since they do not think women need to attend such meetings. This expression actually reflects the attitude of the WMs who have no understanding about gender basis participation in LGIs.

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<sup>49</sup> It has been in the case when the UP chair is a member of BNP and he did not instruct the WMs to organize WS.

So, it can be summed up that the UP functionaries who organised WS through social mapping have made contact with the voters in their convenient ways. They had tried to contact everyone through utilizing various processes but it is revealed that the voters who were invited through personal contact by UP members or by his messengers had participated at WS willingly.

#### **5.2.3.1.2 Ability to Participate at WS**

This section considers whether the participants, who really participated at WS, have understood the real objectives of the participatory planning or not. Two indicators have been used to assess this issue. These are people's understanding about planning process and their ability to place demands at the meeting.


#### **People's Understanding about WS**

Having observed three WS it has been noticed that the NGOs are playing a catalyst role in organizing WS and OBM in Hariyan UP. The NGO officials have provided training to the WM on the procedures of organizing WS. At the same time NGO officials have made people understand their responsibilities in the meeting. The NGO officials have made the WMs capable of conducting the entire meeting at WS. They have discussed with the UP functionaries about the demands that could be placed at WS following the UP operational manual. As such, demands which are gender sensitive and pro-poor have been found more importance in those WSs which are organised with the assistance of the NGO officials. The discussion of NGO officials with UP functionaries have made the UP functionaries capable of getting demands from the voters at the meeting. At the WS, the general people were asked to identify their local problems and prospective solutions by the WMs. Having observed the WS meeting, it was learned that both male and female voters identified their problems.

The interview data suggested that people's ability to hold discussion with ward members, neighbours and NGO officials have made them able to identify their needs. Practically, it is quite natural that most of them were not aware about the planning and budgeting process of UP, since these are comparatively new innovations in the context of functioning of the UP , that have started from the financial year 2011-2012. One encouraging finding is that those who participated in WS meeting showed spontaneous participation in the decision-making process. It is generally expected that people's participation in the decision-making process through participatory planning at the local

level increases general people's understanding about different allocations of the LGIs. That knowledge will enable them to become aware about the government's funds that will be used to meet their prioritised demands (Folscher, 2007:158).

**Table 5.7**  
**People's Understanding regarding Placing of demands at WS**

<b>Question: How did you know you can place demands in WS?</b>			<b>Picture: NGO official was making the citizens familiar with the planning process of WS at Ward No 2 of Hariyan UP</b>	
<b>Opinion</b>	<b>(R)</b>	<b>%</b>		
1.By the WM	15	38.46%		
2.Through discussion at WS	14	35.90%		
3.Did Not Know	10	25.64%		
Total	39	100.00%		
<b>Source:</b> Interview data(2014)			<b>Source:</b> Photo captured at the time of direct observation of WS by the researcher.	

However, the reality was different in the context of the present study. It has been found that the general people have not received detailed information about different allocations of the UP. Thus, such finding leads us to conclude that the planning process of WS has not been successful in generating people's knowledge about the UP's financial capacity since none of the UP functionaries has disclosed information about monetary allocations of their respective Ward at social mapping phase. When it concerns placing of demands by the participants in the WS meeting, the study has come out with an interesting finding: 74.36% of the respondents have placed their demands either through the UP member (38.46%) or having organised discussion (35.90%). Only 25.64% respondents have been found who have failed to place their demands in the WS. One female participant at the WS stated<sup>50</sup> that,

My home is adjacent to the UP Council office. But I have never gone there. Look at my home. I have been searching for an employment for long and passing a very painful life. The UP Chairman is my neighbour. But, I have never got an opportunity to share my problems with him. But, I have been advised by my WM to express my problems in the WS meeting. I don't know whether my problems would be solved or not but I am able to express my problems.



<sup>50</sup> Interview data, Hariyan UP, 31<sup>st</sup> May, 2013. This respondent is not included in the sample frame. Her opinions have been collected from the date of the direct observation of the OBM of Hariyan UP by the researcher.

Thus, it can be claimed that people have become knowledgeable about the purpose of planning through attending the meetings of the WS.

### Placing of Demands at the WS

This study has found the existence of two types of WS: the first type is that organised with the assistance of NGO officials, while the second type is exclusively organised by the UP functionaries. While observing a WS meeting in Hariyan UP of Rajshahi District it has been noticed that the UP members, along with NGO officials, first divided the participants into 5/6 groups and briefed them about the type of agenda they could set at the WS. One encouraging finding is that different groups of people have identified individual as well as group problems and prescribed solutions of each problem in the WS. It was found that people wrote down their demands in paper provided by the NGO officials. One noticeable fact is that women participated in the WS meeting in larger numbers that can be seen in the following pictures that were captured during a WS meeting in Kakina and Hariyan UP. Thus, it is really encouraging to see that the people are participating in the Ward meeting to prioritize community demands and discuss problems.

**Table 5.8**  
**People's Participation at WS in Kakina and Hariyan UP**

<b>Picture:WS at Kakina UP for the FY 2014-2015, where people were placing their demands before the UP chair and UP functionaries.</b>	<b>Picture:WS at Hariyan UP for the FY 2012-2013</b>
	

**Source:** Photo captured at the time of direct observation of WS by the researcher.

Yet why is the participation of women greater than that of men? It can be argued that the female WMs are performing their duty of assisting the participation of the female voters of their localities. It has been revealed that the UP functionaries are of the opinion that the

male voters do not participate since most of them are daily labourers. Two additional possible reasons for the lesser participation of male members is limited compared to that of their female counterparts are: both husband and wife of a family could not attend at the meeting at the same time, leaving the house and children unattended, or the WMs do not solicit<sup>51</sup> participation of the male voters at WS.

The findings of the study also suggest that the UP functionaries were capable of organising WS without taking assistance of any NGO. It has been observed in Kakina UP that the UP Chair, along with the advisor<sup>52</sup> and chair of WS for Ward no 1, organised the WS successfully. They encouraged people to place their demands to the WS and the UP secretary took notes of those demands and included those in the meeting minutes. While commenting on the WS one of the UP chairs<sup>53</sup> commented that:

I have organised WS for two terms. WS is such a platform where all people get an opportunity to express their problems. The main problem of agenda setting at WS lies in the fact that people either can't identify their needs or remain restricted within identification of their personal needs in the form of enlistment of their names in the list of Old Aged Allowance (OAA), Widow and Maternal Allowance, employment opportunities and so on. Various social welfare related activities are being carried out by our own organizational rules, practice and instructions. The UP Act, 2009 has provided that government officials of line departments will update the list of beneficiaries of SSNPs at the WS. But this process is yet to be practiced at the WS.

In addition to above, it has also been noticed that the participants have placed demands to create employment opportunities for them since employment generation for the poor and gender mainstreaming through engaging women in productive economic activities are two key challenges of the national policy agenda for development. It has been observed that the participants spontaneously identified their problems and the data table<sup>54</sup> depicts various demands that were set in the meeting of the WS. It has been evident that 61.54% of respondents have placed their demands relating to development and infrastructural programs while 23.08% respondents have wanted themselves to be included in the list of beneficiaries of SSNPs. On the other hand, 64.10% of respondents have placed their demands related to public welfare services, while 17.95% of respondents have placed their demand of organizing social activities such as campaign against dowry, early

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<sup>51</sup> Such comment is made because it has been revealed from FGD data that being informed people did not avoid attending the meeting.

<sup>52</sup> The Female Ward Member (FWM) acted as advisor at WS since it has been specified by the UP act. 2009.

<sup>53</sup> Interview data, Kakina UP, 08 February, 2014.

<sup>54</sup> Appendix-5.7. It shows the demands that are placed at the WS by the citizens.

marriage, polygamy and drug addiction. The remaining 7.69% respondents have placed their demands for generating self-employment programs, local people's interaction in cultural and sports activities and interaction with school and guardians. 15.38% of respondents have placed their demand that falls in the category of "others" (financial support for school going children, agricultural consultancy, financial support for the poor, equal treatment for all etc.) and only 17.95% of respondents have been found who have not placed any demand at WS. Despite revealing of encouraging findings one of the UNO<sup>55</sup> officials has shed light on the other side of the planning of the WS in the following way:

The demands that are placed in the WS are traditional in nature. No one talked about some issues that carry more importance. For instance, none was spoken about the development of sanitation system in a school. As a matter of fact, the UP functionaries and the local people are yet to understand the prerequisites of development agenda. Though various other information such as real income, expenditure etc. are displayed at the OBM but estimated money allocation for planning is have not been displayed at WS for people's information.

It is encouraging to note that both the general people and UP functionaries have been found satisfied with the process of placing of their demands at WS. Available data suggests (table-5.9) that most of the general people expressed their satisfaction with the process of setting of agendas in the WS. It has been revealed<sup>56</sup> that among 31 (out of 39) general citizens 12.82% and 66.67% have identified the level of their satisfaction as "**Strongly Agree**" and "**Agree**" respectively. **While** (8 out of 39) 7.69%, 7.69% and 5.13% of the respondents have identified the level of their satisfaction as "**Not Sure**", "**Disagree**" and "**Strongly Disagree**" respectively. Opinions of the respondents indicate the positive result on the overall satisfaction level about the process of placing demands in the WS meeting. In response<sup>57</sup> to a question relating to the reasons of their satisfaction, it has been found that people are satisfied because the Act of 2009 has created an opportunity for them to place their demands at the WS which was not in existence before 2009. 90.32% of the respondents have found satisfied due to the fact that they are at least getting an opportunity to place their demands formally. This has made them happy and satisfied.

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<sup>55</sup> Interview data, Kaliganj UPZ, 09 February, 2014.

<sup>56</sup> Appendix -5.8 shows people's perception about the satisfaction level of the process of placing demands at WS.

<sup>57</sup> These opinions are based on the expression that people provided through interview sessions and those who really participated at WS.

**Table 5.9**  
**Reasons People Expressed their Satisfaction placing Demands at WS (People's Perception)**

<b>Opinion</b>	<b>R</b>	<b>%</b>
Previously there was no scope for participation and the scope has been created through WS.	28	90.32
People can express their discontent about non-fulfillment of demands	1	3.23
People feel honored to remain present in front of UP functionaries at the WS	1	3.23
Demands have been fulfilled such as roads & culverts	1	3.23

**Source:** Interview data (2014)

While exploring the UP functionaries' opinion regarding the process of placing of demands by the citizens at the WS it has been found<sup>58</sup> that the majority of the respondents have been found satisfied with the placing of demands: 80.0% of the respondents have identified their satisfaction level with "strongly Agree" (19.1) or "Agree" (61.7%) while 6.4%, 10.6% and 2.1% have identified the level of their satisfaction as "Not Sure", "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree" respectively. When it concerns the level of satisfaction of the UP functionaries about the process of placing demands at the WS, it has been revealed that 37 UP functionaries out of a total of 47 have agreed their satisfaction about the process of placing of demands at the WS. It has been revealed that those who expressed their dissatisfaction towards placing demands at WS due to the reason that they did not organize WS or organised fake WS just for formality.

**Table 5.10**  
**Satisfied with Placing Demands at WS (UP Functionaries' Perception)**

<b>Reasons</b>	<b>(R-37)</b>	<b>%</b>
People can place their demands at WS.	32	84.21
Opportunity to discuss frankly with mass people about their demands as people's representatives	6	16.21
Participatory planning and the provision of working at by public opinion	8	21.62

**Note:** Respondents expressed more than one option. **Source:** Interview data (2014)

It has been evident in the data Table 5.10 that 84.21% UP functionaries expressed their satisfaction with the fact that the general people can directly express their demands to them. 16.21% expressed their satisfaction with the process of placing demands at WS as they got opportunity to discuss mass people's problems frankly with them. 21.62%

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<sup>58</sup> Appendix -5.8 shows the UP functionaries perception about the satisfaction level of the process of placing demands at WS.

expressed their satisfaction with the process of participatory planning and the provision of working with public opinion. It has been stated by one FWM<sup>59</sup> that,

Previously, we used to take all decisions in the meetings of the UP. Thus, there was hardly any scope for us to understand about our faults. But, at present, we take decisions having ensured direct involvement of the citizens. It is a good attempt. If outcome of any decision is wrong, the blame will not come on me only. We share responsibility of decision making and thereby its consequences.

In response to a question relating to the cause of dissatisfaction **it has been revealed that** dissatisfaction of general people (8) mostly stems from their lack of awareness about the process of placing of demands in the meeting of WS.

**Table 5.11**  
**Reasons that both General People and UP Functionaries Expressed their Dissatisfaction with the Process of Setting Agenda at WS**

People's perception			UP functionaries' perception		
Reasons <sup>1</sup>	R=8	%	Reasons	R=9	%
Lack of awareness of local people	8	100	People focus on self-interest rather than community development	4	44.44
No feedback from UP functionaries	6	75	Lack of people's Participation from all class.	2	22.22
Influence of local influential people	6	75	Limited numbers of demands were taken at WS.	6	66.67
UP functionaries organize WS for formality and fulfill their own expectations	4	50	Politics with the process of agenda setting at WS	5	55.56

**Note:** Respondents expressed more than one option. Source: Interview data (2014)

75 % (6) people opined that though they are satisfied with the process of placing demands at WS but they are not provided with the updated information by the UP functionaries. 75% (6) of the respondents expressed that the local influential people are receiving the benefits of UP and 50% (4) people opined that the process has been maintained only as a formality and the UP members had organised the meeting to showing the mere appearance of concern for them.

On the other hand, 44.44% UP functionaries were found dissatisfied because people are heavily focused on self-interest rather than community development. On the other hand 22.22% UP functionaries were dissatisfied due to lack of participation across class lines,

<sup>59</sup> Interview data, Ghurka UP, Ward no.7, 29 January, 2014.



while 66.67% of UP functionaries were dissatisfied since they have received very limited numbers of demands from their voters. And 55.56% UP functionaries were dissatisfied due to the interference of local politicians in the working process of UP.

Apart from dissatisfaction due to resource constraints the other reasons behind such dissatisfaction of citizens and UP functionaries can be described from two perspectives:

- **Firstly**, lack of awareness and lack of access to planning process;
- **Secondly**, Politics and Corruption.

**Firstly**, it has been revealed<sup>60</sup> that most of the people are illiterate who do not have enough knowledge about their participation in PP and PB processes which have been revealed as a challenge on the part of the UP functionaries. Available data suggests that the WMs expressed their dissatisfaction because they have deliberately organised WS with limited number of voters and they have selected very few projects for implementation. Three FWM of a UP opined unequivocally that they were satisfied with the process of placing demand at the WS but it would be better if they could ensure participation of all voters of their locality. One FWM's statement has substantiated the fact that they have organised such meeting with the voters of one or two villages, leaving out more villages of the respective ward:

There are thirteen villages in my constituencies. While attending three WS meetings, I noticed that the voters of only three villages participated in those meetings. I would have been satisfied if I could ensure participation of all the voters' of all those thirteen villages in the WS. Usually I do not get sufficient funds for project implementation. So, I did not inform all the voters of all the villages. I had worked hard in three Wards to win in the election. I don't know that women could be elected directly from any one Ward. I implemented a project to repair 20 fans of Chariakandipara government primary school the demand of which came through WS. I feel good when I fulfill any demand of my voters. But I am not able to fulfill the demands of the voters of all the three Wards simultaneously.

Apart from people's awareness it has been revealed that the WMs do not have clear understanding regarding the planning process. When WMs have been asked about the implemented projects<sup>61</sup> of their ward it has been found that they were unknown to those project information. It has been revealed from the following interview data<sup>62</sup> that the WM does not have exact allocation implementation information of his ward:

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<sup>60</sup> Appendix-5.1. It shows the level of education of both the general people and the UP functionaries.

<sup>61</sup> This project lists have been collected by the researcher through documentation review. While interviewing the respective WMs questions were asked about the implementation of those specific project implementation.

<sup>62</sup> Interview Data, Hatikumrul UP, Ward no. 4, 28 January, 2014.

Usually the UP chair made project implementation decisions in our UP. For example, I know that money allocation has been made against my ward in the name of the mosque committee for reconstruction of the mosque in the FY 2012-13. But the UP chair did not consult with me in this regard. The committee implemented the project with consultation of the UP chair. There was lack of monitoring on the part of the voters of my locality. I do not have information regarding the allocation made for the other projects implementation of my wards such as construction of graveyard, road etc.

**Secondly**, political influence has come out as one of the reasons for which the WMs have expressed their dissatisfaction with the planning process. The data table shows<sup>63</sup> that most of the UP functionaries have been found to have association with politics of either AL or BNP. In this connection, one WM<sup>64</sup> commented that: “people do not expect any service of those UP functionaries who are involved with the politics of the opposition BNP”. The possible reason stems from the fact that the political activists of the ruling government Party have been dominating the process of allocation of different benefits including TR, FFW, VGF etc. While conducting interviews<sup>65</sup> it has become evident that, being a supporter of BNP, the UP chair could not manage to provide tin to the victims of river erosion: rather the Female Ward Member (hereinafter FWM) has supplied 02 (two) bundles of tin to the affected people. She said,

I have been Chair of Salangathana women AL for the past fifteen years. I have good relations with our local MP. I always manage to provide assistance to the voters with the help of our MP.

This is a good example where a Party member has been found to do something for the betterment of the people. On the other hand, there are some other types of political activists who use such political connection with national level politicians for personal gain.

Among the participants who have expressed their discontent at not being getting answers from the UP functionaries this could be because only few of them have attended at both WS and OBM<sup>66</sup>. But, in reality, it has been evident that people expressed their dissatisfaction to their elected leaders. One participant<sup>67</sup> of FGD session stated that,

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<sup>63</sup> Appendix- 5.10. It shows the political affiliation of the UP functionaries with various political party.

<sup>64</sup> Interview data, Hariyan UP, Ward no.4, 17 January, 2014.

<sup>65</sup> The UP chair is supporter of BNP and the FWM is a supporter of AL. Interview data, Gurka UP, 29 January, 2014.

<sup>66</sup> The OBM is the formal space on behalf of the general citizens for getting reply from UP functionaries which has been discussed at the subsequent part.

<sup>67</sup> FGD Data, Male FGD session, Ward No. 4, Gogram UP, 14 January, 2014.

You are talking about WS and OBM. The UP members and Chairs are nothing in our locality. We do not attend any meeting. There are other people who actually decide on every matter. They are the political leaders of the present Government. The poor people do not get any service. The people who are connected with those politicians receive services. We do not cast vote for them but they became the controller of all services of the UP. I have seen that those people who are receiving different social safety net programs, such as VGD, FFW, etc. have strong connection with those politicians.

However, the available data of this study found that these types of interferences have been exercised by those who actually have decided to spent their entire life with the *dalali profession* (Mediator) and these *dalals* have always managed to get the recognition of being an activist of the Government party. The relatives of UP functionaries ranges from their wife and maid servant, local *matabbar*, local business elite<sup>68</sup>, local contractors<sup>69</sup> etc. have acted as direct service negotiator of the UP.

Aside from these limitations, it can be argued that the planning process at WS has offered scope for people's participation. People who were invited have attended in planning process and have placed their demands having understood the agendas of meetings.

#### **5.2.4 Stage-4: Preparation of the Union Development Plan**

The process of shortlisting and finalizing of the plans of WS for implementation is supposed to be done by three committees, including PC, SCs and UDCC, at UP level<sup>70</sup>. The objective of formation of PC is that the UP members would communicate with the general people of WCs, distribute and send sector-wise demands to respective SC, for analyzing technical and financial feasibility for taking various schemes which have been placed at the WS.

However, the same findings have been found in the formation and working of those committees as in the case of the formation of WC. The shortcomings of formation of various committees can be described from three perspectives:

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<sup>68</sup> Local businessmen have provided money to UP functionaries for election purposes and the chair and WMs have provided UP services in favour of those businessmen.

<sup>69</sup> These contractors have been found to get all the projects by the UP chair. It has been revealed by interview session with one of the WC member that he did not know anything about that committee rather it has been revealed that most of the projects have been implemented by him.

<sup>70</sup> Discussion on the formation of various committees and their functions including Planning Committee (PC), Standing Committees (SC) and Union Development Coordination Committee(UDCC) have been made in the chapter-4. For detail See Union Parishad Operation Manual 2012.

**Table 5.12**  
**State of Organization of Various Committees of UP**

<b>Name of UP</b>	<b>PC</b>	<b>SC</b>	<b>UDCC</b>
<b>Hariyan</b>	No	Yes	No
<b>Gogram</b>	No	Yes	Yes
<b>Hatikumrul</b>	No	Yes	No
<b>Ghurka</b>	No	Yes	No
<b>Kakina</b>	No	Yes	No
<b>Vadai</b>	No	Yes	No

**Source:** Documentation Review and Interview Data (2014)

**Firstly**, at the UP level, it has been revealed that there was no PC and the SCs were formed on paper only, although it is more representative in nature. Thus, it can be argued that the projects/schemes that were considered for implementation for the FY (2011-12) did not get approval through the process of technical and financial feasibility study. This was due to non-functioning of the SCs, whose responsibilities were to scrutinize sector-wise schemes, having ensured participation of experts, co-opted members and general people's participation. It has also been revealed that, except in Gogram UP, UDCC was not formed in the other UPs. In some UPs where there is no fund allotments, other than LGSP-II funds, the UP functionaries did not organize WS<sup>71</sup> and most of the UP functionaries did not have information regarding formation of PC and UDCC since formation of such committees are comparatively a new practice, the instruction of which was issued by GoB against the project fund utilization. In this regard, the following opinion of a FWM can be taken into consideration. Raising the issue of scarcity of resources she<sup>72</sup> commented:

I am a member of several standing committees of the UP. After taking oath, I have organised meetings of the SC (Agriculture, Fisheries & Livestock and other Economic Development Project) ensuring involvement of general people as I am the chair of that SC. My question is what would I do if I do not have allocation of funds for project implementation?

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
<sup>71</sup> It has been revealed in the previous section that resource constraints is one of the reasons for which the WMs did not organize WS and took some projects under LGSP-II funds. It has been revealed that the UP functionaries of different UPs have implemented few projects narrowly with the LGSP-II fund.

<sup>72</sup> Interview data, Hariyan UP, 17 January, 2014. FGD data of this study have also confirmed that some of the participant were also member of that SC and participated at that SC meeting.

Though SCs were formed and meetings of a few committees have been taken place, most of the WMs unequivocally expressed<sup>73</sup> their opinions regarding formation of various committees in the following way,

We know there are SCs. But we have never sent demands of WS to respective SCs. The LGSP fund allocation is very limited. The UP chair distributed that fund among us. So discussion on the demands of WS has been made in UP meeting.

**Figure 5.1**  
**Process of Participatory Planning and Budgeting followed by UPs**



**Source:** Interview data (2014) and Documentation Review

**Secondly**, it has been revealed from the interview data<sup>74</sup> that a very few government officers of UPZ level have participated at the meeting of UPs including WS and OBM, SC meetings and UDCC. The possible explanation might be lack of manpower, supervision and monitoring of UPZ level officers and apathy to follow the rules and instructions etc. are impeding the process of UP planning and budget. In the working of SCs of UZP, there is a provision that the UP chair, as member of UPZ Planning Committee, can place their demands there. One of the UPZ chairs opined<sup>75</sup> that the SCs of UPZ were not functioning so the plans generated at the bottom are being neglected at the top level. The UPZ-level officers have argued that they usually do not get project funds against ADP allocations made from central Government. While interviewing<sup>76</sup> one Upazila Women's Affair Officer (UWAO) it has been revealed that despite of her

<sup>73</sup> Interview data, Hariyan UP, Ward no. 1, 17 January, 2014. Interview Data, Vadai UP, Ward no.4 February 6, 2014.

<sup>74</sup> Interview Data, PIO (Project Implementation Officers (PIO), Paba UPZ, January 21,2014 , Interview data, SWO (Social Welfare Officer), Raiganj Upazilla, January 29, 2014, Women Affair Officer (WAO), Aditmari Upazilla, 11 February, 2014.

<sup>75</sup> Interview Data, Kaliganj UPZ, 09 February, 2014.

<sup>76</sup> Interview Data, Aditmari UPZ, 11 February, 2014.

willingness she does not attend at WS and make projects from UP-level demand lists. She states,

I have been performing my duties as UWAO in two UPZs simultaneously. For the last six years, I have attended various meetings of UPs under my UPZ. It is very distressing that, during six years working experience, with these two UPZs, my department has never got any project yet. After UPZ election, I have found that those projects' which were regarded as important by the UPZ chair got priority for implementation.

Moreover, the SCs of various other UPs have been found ineffective because, as co-opted members, the UPZ-level government officers have not performed their responsibilities to attend in such committees of UP. Shortage of manpower has come out as one of the reasons that the UPZ level officials could not attend those meetings of the planning and budgeting cycle of UP. While responding to a question “**why didn't you attend in UP meetings?**” one of the Social Welfare Officer (Hereinafter SWO) commented that: “it was not possible for me to attend any UP meeting since I am performing social welfare activities in more than one UPZ”. The finding of the study is corroborated with the finding of Ahsan's (2012) study, which also found that there is lack of skilled human resources in the UPZ. The argument of UPZ Livestock officer (Ahsan, 2012:88) is also corroborated with the present study findings,

None of the civil servants who entered the civil service possessed the required skill and knowledge. Skill is developed through a variety of professional training and experiences across their service career. Unfortunately, many officials have not undergone any comprehensive training program within 10 years of their service except their foundation training. I have hardly seen in my service career of 13 years that government employees are provided with training consistent with requirements of their professions.

This study finding is corroborated by the findings of Ahsan (2012)'s study, who also concluded that there is no monitoring system to supervise who is doing what and how in civil services. In addition, his study findings also revealed that rewards are given to the government officers on the basis of network and relation rather than performance of the officers in the public services. Available data of this study suggests that people do not have the information that there are some government offices which are supposed to work at UP level. No government officers have been found to work with their office room attached at UP level.<sup>77</sup> Most of the UP WMs opined that the UPZ government officers

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<sup>77</sup> There is provision in the Act, 2009 which specify that nine officers of various government offices will work with their attached department at UP level. See Appendix-4.4.

were not helpful for the WMs. The Project Implementation Officer (PIO), Upazila Women Affairs Officer (UWAO) etc. are supposed to work in association with WMs. The possible reason for such non-cooperation of the UPZ officials stems from the fact that the system of measuring their efficiency on the basis of their performance has not been started yet. There is lack of formal mechanism through which it could be monitored how the WMs have communicated with the UPZ level officials, for what purpose and what the result is. In this connection, this study revealed that there is no formal mechanism to monitor how the government officials at the UPZ level have supplied various circulars and government instructions to the UP offices.

**And lastly**, it has also been evident that the SCs have not been involved during the implementation of the projects of NGOs<sup>78</sup> with UPs for feasibility purposes. Rather these projects are being implemented in their own way. So, it can be concluded that, in terms of preparation of Union development plans, the schemes of WS were shortlisted and finalised by the UP chair along with the UP members. They have finalised estimated budgets for each Ward based on priority-based demands of people and availability of funds against those demands. Thus, it can be argued that peoples' participation has not been ensured in the stage when their demands have been shortlisted. The aggregated demands of nine Wards have been compiled as the yearly budget of the UP.

### **5.2.5 Stage-5: Disclosure of Annual and Five Year Plans (OBM)**

The study found that except Vadai UP, all the UPs have organised OBM. Perhaps, in Vadai, most of the people are unaware of the process of OBM and there is no formality for<sup>79</sup> taking attendance of the general people by the UP functionaries for getting LGSP-II funds. It has been directly observed<sup>80</sup>(Table-5.13) that the budget statement of the FY(2013-14)<sup>81</sup> and real income expenditure statement for the FY 2012-13 had been displayed through multimedia at Hariyan UP and displayed on a board by the UP secretary at

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<sup>78</sup> A joint initiative under Danish and Bangladesh Government named Hygiene Promotion, Sanitation and Water Supply Project (HYSAWA) is facilitating and promoting UP based investments focusing on the poor, unserved and underserved areas. It has been revealed that the tube well distribution under the project is being operated by the NGO officials only.



<sup>79</sup> Taking attendance for WS has been found to be an effective measure for monitoring Ward based planning process. It has been revealed that the signatures which have been taken by the WMs as token of attendance of the people at WS are available in the WS resolution book.

<sup>80</sup> A total of 04 (four) OBM have been observed by the researcher. The Sacheton assisted the two UP of Rajshahi district whereas it has been revealed that UP functionaries of Ghurka and Hatikumrul UP have organised OBM. They have also provided budget copies to the people participated there.

<sup>81</sup> Appendix-5.12. It shows Budget copy provided by the concerned UP.

Gogram UP. Moreover, written budget copies were distributed among all the voters of all those UPs who organised OBM. Unlike for WS, the WMs have played an important role for ensuring greater participation of the mass people at OBM. The invitation processes for organizing WS and OBM are almost the same. The UP functionaries have made various types of UP related information available for peoples' information. So it can be said that UP functionaries' **personal motive, responsiveness and NGO assistance** have helped the process of organization of OBMs.

**Table 5.13**  
**Presentation of Real Income–Expenditure of Previous Year and Budget Statement**

<b>Picture: UP Secretary is presenting UP's yearly Budget before the voters at Gogram UP(2013)</b>	<b>Picture: UP's yearly Budget was presented through multimedia before the voters at Hariyan UP(2013)</b>
	

**Source:** Photo captured at the time of direct observation of the OBM by the researcher.

Direct observation of OBM revealed that scope has been created for the general people for open discussion on the implementable scheme lists. It has been observed that the people could negotiate with their demands at OBM. In lines of Rahman's (2005) statement, it has been observed that PB is providing general people with the information regarding UP's income and expenditure. As Rahman (2005:32) argued that "participatory budgeting also describes the process in which citizens engage in debate and consultation to contribute towards defining the balance of expenditures, investments, priorities, and uses for public resources". Available data have also revealed that, through OBM, people have received various types of information regarding UP's income, expenditure, project beneficiaries name etc. However, the impact of UPs' budgeting process has been revealed by the following analysis:



## Access to Information about OBM

Having observed OBMs at Hariyan, Gogram, Ghurka and Hatikumrul UP it has been found (Picture-5.1) that prioritised demand lists of each ward have been displayed<sup>82</sup> separately in the meeting place for people's information at the beginning of budget session.

**Picture 5.1**  
**Displaying of Prioritised Demand Lists**



**Source:** Photo captured at the time of direct observation of OBM at Gogram UP by the researcher.

This transparent process has ensured UP functionaries' answerability towards their electorates. This process has enabled voter's right to have information about the selected projects lists<sup>83</sup>. **Here the question is: did every citizen attend such meeting?** It has been revealed from data table<sup>84</sup> that 65.8% of the general people did not participate at OBM among those who were sampled from the WS resolution book. It has also been revealed that 28.20%<sup>85</sup> and 27.84% of the general people attended both WS and OBM and only OBM, respectively, among those who have been interviewed in this study. They were requested by their WMs to attend there. So, it can be argued that people's access to the budgeting process has been ensured to some extent. It can be argued that practice of providing information by elected officials has just started to work as per the provision of the UP Act, 2009. This process has accelerated the process of ensuring openness of information, which is a prerequisite for transparency.

<sup>82</sup> Appendix-5.9. It shows prioritised demand list has been displayed at OBM.

<sup>83</sup> So it has been evident that may be those general people did not participate at OBM who have said that they did not get reply from UP functionaries.

<sup>84</sup> Appendix- 5.12. It shows participation of people at both WS and OBM.

<sup>85</sup> It has been explored by the researcher that 11 respondents among 39 respondents participated both at WS and OBM and the researcher interviewed more 08 person who have attended at OBM. It is revealed from data analysis through SPSS that total 27 general citizens have attended at OBM.

### 5.2.5.1 Understanding of the Budget Information

It is revealed through direct observation (picture-5.2 of OBM) that written budget copies were distributed among the voters attending at the OBM in Hariyan UP. 10 respondents out of 27<sup>86</sup> (40.74%) could understand the budget information. Data revealed that only 11 (13.92%) persons of the sample frame attended both WS & OBM and among them 5 persons (45%) sought answers from UP functionaries regarding their non-fulfillment of demand placed at WS and 6 persons (55%) did not raise any question.

**Picture 5.2**  
**Copies of Budget were Distributed among the Voters Attended at OBM at Hariyan UP**



**Source:** Photo captured at the time of direct observation of OBM at Ghurka UP by the researcher.

The UP functionaries have provided scope to general people to access to information and ask their elected members questions in the open meeting.

**Table 5.14**  
**Reasons that People do not Seek Answerability (People's Perception)**

<b>Opinion</b>	<b>R=6</b>	<b>%</b>
They think that the OBM had been organised just for formality and for people's watching.	4	66.67
The UP functionaries' did not even listen to their demands.	1	16.67
The UP functionaries give commitment only.	1	16.66
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Interview Data (2014).

However, interview data indicated that people have not expressed their satisfaction toward the budget process always. In response to a question “**did you ask WMs at OBM**

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<sup>86</sup> Total people participated at OBM.

**why your demands have not been prioritised?”** the Data table 5.14 revealed that 66.67% voters replied that the OBM had been organised just for formality and for a show for the people, 16.66% replied that the UP functionaries give commitment only and 16.67% replied that UP functionaries’ did not even listen to their demands. **Here, one may ask: why do people have such opinions?** Based on the previous findings of the WS it can be argued that along with resource constraints, local politics and lack of awareness are compelling people to make such comments. However, some extensive analysis in the subsequent part has revealed some interesting findings regarding the budget discussion at OBM.

#### **5.2.5.2 Ability to Participate at the OBM**

It has been observed that different prioritised demands have been reviewed by respective WMs and voters together at the OBM. Interview data revealed that the provisions of PP and PB have created an environment for the poor people to express their demands and it has also been revealed that these people are receiving services as well. The **case study-5.1** depicts the real picture of getting services from UP through the planning process at the WS of Gogram UP.

#### **Case Study 5.1**

##### **Outcome of PP process: Md. Shajahan Ali Got a Fishing Net for His Group.**

Md. Shajahan Ali is a poor farmer of Barshipara, Ward No. 7 of GogramUP. He knew about WS as he was invited by his Ward Member to attend at the meeting. He, along with other 5/7 inhabitants, have placed their demand for a fishing net at WS. He found that their demand was included in the resolution of the WS and finalised at OBM. His group got a fishing net to supplement their diets.

**Source:** Interview data (2014).

Through this planning process people have got a formal bargaining space. It has been observed at Gogram UP’s question-answer session of OBM that the local people were asking questions to their respective WMs about why some projects had been selected or some had been rejected. Available data suggests that this formal process has given the general people the idea that the services of UPs are designed for them. They have asked questions on different issues that range from infrastructure development to employment generation.

**Table 5.15**  
**Ability to Participate at OBM**

Picture : Question asked by citizen at OBM at Ghurka UP(2013)	Picture: Answer Session By UP functionaries at Ghurka UP(2013)
	

**Source:** Photo captured at the time of direct observation of OBM at Ghurka UP by the researcher.

When their demands were not given a place in the budget, the Ward Members replied to the questions asked by their voters. However, the replies of WMs were not found satisfactory by the participants. In response to a question, “**do you think that the reply was satisfactory?**” the majority of the respondents, 53.84%, expressed their agreement in the form of “strongly agree (15.38%) and “Agree (38.46%) while 30.77%, 11.54% and 3.85% of the respondent expressed their opinion in the form of “Not Sure” (30.77%), “Disagree” (11.54%) and “Strongly Disagree (3.85%) respectively.

**Table 5.16**  
**Satisfied with the Answers Given by the UP Functionaries (People’s Perception<sup>1</sup>)**

Opinion	R=26	%
strongly Agree	4	15.38
agree	10	38.46
Not Sure	8	30.77
Disagree	3	11.54
strongly disagree	1	3.85
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Interview data (2014).

The researcher hypothesises that the large group replying “Not Sure” did not have the required level of understanding about the total process that would allow them to judge the responsiveness of the Ward Member’s answers. Another reason could be that the entire meeting turns to a political discussion session rather discussion on estimated budget: by the local MP and the UPZ chair. The researcher observed this occur at Hariyan, Ghurka

and Hatikumrul UP. Thus, the majority of the people attending those meetings do have the capability to ask questions to their representatives, as can be substantiated through the above case example. Available data have suggested that people sometimes have not understood the answer of their elected WM/ chairs. The finding of the study is corroborated by the finding of a study cited in Folscher (2007:176), who states that “if local leaders are in opposition, the meetings tend to be highly critical of proposals in the budget. If the local leader is from the ruling Party, the session is overly supportive of the budget”. So it can be said that the behavior of political leaders of the country has hindered the smooth functioning of the OBM.

**“OBM of Gogram UP”** can be explained here as an example of successful OBM, as no political leaders were invited. The NGO representatives, along with donors were found facilitating the spontaneous running of that meeting. Folscher’s (2007:158) arguments thus have to be taken into consideration,

A CSO should be equipped with the expertise and resources to initiate a program to improve government effectiveness through various transparency and accountability mechanisms. Its efforts will not yield significant benefits, however, if the political system is rooted in the politics of identity, personality, and patronage. When issues of public policy get more play in voter preferences, politicians have less leeway to perpetuate behaviors that invite voter dissatisfaction.

However, it can be argued that if the meeting is oriented towards the general people rather than the political leaders it would provide more satisfaction to general people. Moreover, they could be more knowledgeable about the UP’s capacity, which has not been noticed in other UPs than Gogram UP. It has been revealed in the table<sup>87</sup> that in response to a question **“Do you think, overall budget discussion was satisfactory?”** a very few respondents have attended both WS and OBM and among them 7.6 % respondents expressed their opinion in the form of **“Strongly Agree”**, followed by **10.1%** as **“Agree”**, 10.1% as **“Not Sure”**, 2.5% as **“Disagree”** and 3.8 % as **“Strongly Disagree”**.

Some interesting findings regarding the process of OBM have been extracted from the opinions of the respondents who have attended the OBM. 51.85% general people (14 respondents out of 27) expressed their satisfaction with the overall budget discussion. 28.57% (R=4) people expressed their satisfaction with the budget discussion because the

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<sup>87</sup> Appendix-5.11. It shows the level of satisfaction of both general people and UP functionaries regarding overall budget discussion.

demands that were placed by them in the WS meeting were shortlisted at the OBM. Their satisfaction might have stemmed from their right to ask questions of the representatives. This feeling might have made them spontaneous in the participatory process. Information which was previously available to the bureaucrats only, has presently been made available to the citizens. The PB process, that is based on the practice of information-sharing values, has allowed the rural poor to be convinced that they have the right to access to information from the UP. It has been found that the poor rural people have identified their problems, which are closely related to the service delivery process of the UP.

Available data, gathered through direct observation, suggests that the UP functionaries have become more trustworthy in the eyes of the general people by this process. Thus, it can be said that people have found that their demands have been incorporated by the UP into the UP plans and this process has inspired them to have faith in their elected WMs. It is argued that the budget which had been prepared and implemented mechanically, without people's participation, cannot ensure sustainable development (Rahman, 2005:33). So, it can be argued that people's involvement in the PP and PB has assisted the development planners to identify issues which are closely related to sustainable development, since the budget copies are sent to the higher-level authorities. It is expected that allocations to LGIs would be made for the implementation of those projects which would be identified, ensuring involvement of the general people who actually need it.

It has also been revealed that 71.43% (R=10) of general people expressed their satisfaction with the budget discussion because they have been satisfied with UP functionaries' reasonable answers, even when they have not received any service. Thus, it can be claimed that a sense of collective understanding has developed between the UP functionaries and the voters as a result of the OBM. More specifically, it can be said that general people have become more sensible than before about the capacity of the UP through having discussions at the OBM.

On the other hand, 48.14% (13 respondents out of 27) have expressed their disagreement or strong disagreement that the budget discussion was satisfactory. 61.53% (R=8) of the respondents expressed their discontent with the budget discussion because they participated in the OBM at the request of their respective Members just to maintain the

formality of the meeting, while 38.46% (R=5) people expressed their discontent with the budget discussion since they did not get scope to speak at the meeting. In some OBMs the relatives of the UP chair and WMs have been given the floor to speak at the meeting in place of the general people. Most of the time, instead of offering scope to the general people to speak up or get involved in the open discussion, the UP functionaries used the time to describe what has been done by them. It is true for those OBM which have turned into a political platform.

On the other hand, in response to the question **“Do you think, overall, budget discussion was satisfactory?”** it has been revealed that most of the UP functionaries were satisfied with the process. 19.1 % of respondents expressed their opinion as **“Strongly Agree”**, **59.6%** as **“Agree”**, 6.4% as **“Not Sure”**, 14.9% as **“Disagree”**. Most of the WMs expressed their satisfaction with overall budget discussion because they considered that people become aware about the capacity of their UP. One of the UP chairs<sup>88</sup> opined that,

After election in 2011, I organised OBM in each FY. I am satisfied with the OBM process. Previously, no UP chair asked people what they wanted. But, now, people get information about various service provisions of UP from us. They come here and ask us about services of UP and we provide all necessary information to them.

However, a number of respondents have expressed their discontent regarding OBM due to non-fulfillment of their demands. In this regard, the following example cited by a FWM<sup>89</sup>, regarding distribution of sewing machines against LGSP–II funds for employment generation projects for women can be taken into consideration:

I have been elected by the voters of three wards. So, the expectation of the voters of me is more than of the male Member of my locality. Normally, the allocation of UP is very limited. I got allocation of two sewing machines for single FY for my locality. But I could not provide those to the real beneficiaries due to the interference of local political leaders.

This situation can be explained with reference to the power politics which exists in many localities of Bangladesh. The UP chairs explain that, usually, the influential power of local MPs hinders the delivery of various social safety net services to the real poor. Most of the UP members opined that they could not manage to enlist the real beneficiary's

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<sup>88</sup> Interview Data, Ghurka UP, January 29, 2014.

<sup>89</sup> Interview data, Gogram UP, Ward no. 4, January 14, 2014.

name for the safety net services. Rather, the local MP, UPZ chair and vice chair enlisted the names who were their followers or their relatives. This is, in fact, the real scenario of service delivery process under OBM which is dependent on the personal motives of the UP chair and local politicians. The opposite scenario has also been revealed with the opposite motive of the politicians.

### **5.3 Conclusion**

The decentralization of the State power is not new in Bangladesh. But the two provisions of the UP Act 2009, such as WS and OBM processes, are innovations in the context of LGIs in Bangladesh. The participatory planning and budgeting process have just started to make the general public joining in their own decision making process through UPs. Local governance is about the effectiveness of the LGIs as well as the effectiveness of the institutions which interact with the LGIs. Thus, emphasis must be given to the effectiveness and efficiency of all institutions functioning in any certain locality. The NGOs, the CBOs, the UPZ and other organisations of any specific UP, as well as the people of the local area, should be made conversant with the UP Act 2009. Real development will be only sustainable when each and every activity of the State will be controlled by its citizens. So, the challenges of people's participation in the working process of UP must be tackled. No other road toward development will be effective without equipping the powerless and poor citizen with all his rights.



## **Chapter Six**

### **State of Accountability at the Local Level: Role of Citizen Charter and Right to Information**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

In the economic interpretation of the role of local government, the voters who make demands from Local Government Institutions (Hereinafter LGIs) are regarded as “demand side” and their representatives, who provide the required goods and services to the citizens, are regarded as “supply side” (Smith 1985 cited in Kullipossa, 2004:769). In this study, the citizens are supposed to place their demands at Ward *Shava* (Meeting hereinafter WS), using the knowledge and information of the Charter of Services. Then, they ask whether their demands have been selected for implementation or not by their Right To Information (RTI) in the *Unmukto Budget Shava* (Open Budget Meeting hereinafter OBM). Thus, it can be said that accountability in the participatory planning and budgeting process of Union Parishad refers to such a state where the UP functionaries would respond to voters, who could then judge the reasonableness of their answers. This Chapter explores the state of actual accountability, as a result of introduction of the Citizen’s Charter (CC) and the Right to Information (RTI) in participatory planning and participatory budgeting.

#### **6.2 Process of Dissemination of Information and Charter of Services: A Focus on Openness and Transparency**

This study has explored the utilization of charters of services<sup>1</sup>, specifically related to WS and OBM. It has been presumed in the theoretical discussion that, through citizen’s direct engagement with the UP functionaries, CC is capable of ensuring accountability of the power holder in the participatory planning and budgeting process. The WS provides general people such a platform where they can take part in the making of yearly or five years plans. Moreover, it creates the scope for interactive collaboration among the public and government power holders for selecting and finalizing the beneficiary list of various social safety net programs, including Old Aged Allowance (OAA), Distressed Mother Allowance (DMA), Widow Allowance (WA), and others. In so, the UP functionaries are

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<sup>1</sup> Charter of services specify the service provisions to which citizens are entitled from any institution. The provisions which specify CC in the UP Act, 2009 have been discussed in Chapter 4.

supposed to disseminate the necessary information regarding the planning and budgeting in such a way that the voters of that locality could be benefitted by that information. Section 78 of UP Act 2009 specifies that the UP functionaries are obligated to provide information regarding UP to general citizens. The UP chair and the secretary are the formal structured authority for receiving applications from citizens demanding their required information; these governing officials must provide requested information under RTI Act 2009<sup>2</sup>. It is important to note that this study is confined to the access to information regarding the WS and OBM and it has been observed by the researcher that there was hardly any opportunity for general people to inform themselves about such matters at the notice board of the UP<sup>3</sup>.

In this section (1) dissemination of information regarding peoples' participation in WS and OBM and (2) information regarding the service provisions to be prioritized at WS and OBM have been chosen as the variables to measure the effectiveness of the UP functionaries' accountability. The process of information dissemination has been explored from the perspective of two information transmission media i.e. **firstly**, through Union Information and Service Centre (hereinafter UISC)<sup>4</sup> and through website and **secondly**, through Citizen Charter (hereafter CC) at UP notice board.

### **6.2.1 Information Dissemination regarding WS and OBM through UISC and Website: A Perspective from E-governance**

This section is based on information on the UISC and Local Government Division's website. Mohanty (N.D.:1) stated that "with process re-engineering, effective implementation of e-Governance can take IT to the common man, helping the government to align services with the changing needs of both citizens and other stakeholders". As a matter of fact, planning is a vast concept and local planning is also

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<sup>2</sup> See section 79, of the Local Government (Union Parishad), Act 2009. For detail see instruction of disclosure of information for the UP issued by Local Government Division (LGD) <http://www.lgd.gov.bd/images/pdf/download/up/Discloser%20of%20UP%20Info-697.pdf> Retrieved on 11.01.2015.

<sup>3</sup> In this study, except Kakina UP, all other UP offices have a single structure serving as UP office complex building. It is a policy decision made by the Government to provide services from the UP as a "**One Stop Service**" centre as it has been projected that all elected and career officers would provide all services from a single complex of UP offices. Each UP headquarters has a total area of 0.25 acre (25 decimal) of land which has been specified by Ministerial circular. So, in this study, information dissemination through notice board and billboard has been explored in the area of the entire UP premises For detail See <http://www.lgd.gov.bd/images/pdf/download/up/Construction%20of%20UP%20Complex.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> The Government of Bangladesh, with the technical assistance of UNDP and USAID, under public -private partnership, took this initiative of making each UP a **One Stop Service Delivery Outlet** at the lowest administrative level of the country. A total of 4,516 UISCs are being operated in 4,545 UPs. For more detail see [http://a2i.pmo.gov.bd/sites/default/files/Union%20Information%20and%20Service%20Centre%20%28UISC%29\\_09\\_Janu\\_14.pdf](http://a2i.pmo.gov.bd/sites/default/files/Union%20Information%20and%20Service%20Centre%20%28UISC%29_09_Janu_14.pdf) accessed on 20.01.2015.

helpful for the central planners to design overall plans for the country. Thus, an attempt has been made to explore how the UP functionaries, as well as general people, have got access to government information through application of ICT.

**Table 6.1**  
**Information Disseminated through UISC<sup>5</sup> Regarding Participatory Planning and Budgeting**

Name of UP	Name and contact Information of UP functionaries	Allocation of LGSP-II	Five Year Plan	Year Plan	Budget Information	Real Income Expenditure Statement	Formation of SC
Hariyan	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No
Gogram	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Hatikumrul	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Ghurka	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	No
Kakina	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Vadai	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No

The name and contact information of UP functionaries, allocation of LGSP-II fund, and Five Year Plan has been explored through browsing the websites of the local government division<sup>6</sup> and UISCs of UPs. It was found that the information in Table 6.1 was available for the information of the people. Five Year Plan (FYP), Year Plan (YP), budget information, real income-expenditure statement, formation of SCs etc. have also been observed, since such information is linked to PP and PB process<sup>7</sup>. Available data suggests that all the UP's websites have displayed the name and contact details of the UP functionaries, allocations of LGSP-II, Five Year plan, Year Plan and Budget information. But the information which are necessary for PP and PB, including UPs income-expenditure information, formation of various committees including WC, PC, SC, UDCC etc., and decisions of these committee meetings, have not been displayed at any UP's website.

<sup>5</sup> <http://harianup.rajshahi.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014; <http://gogramup.rajshahi.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014; <http://hatikumrulup.sirajganj.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014; <http://ghurkaup.sirajganj.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014; <http://kakinaup.lalmonirhat.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014; <http://bhadaup.lalmonirhat.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.lgd.gov.bd/>

<sup>7</sup> See the discussion of the planning and budgeting process of UP in Chapter 4. The instruction circular following section 50 of the UP Act, 2009 specifies that the UP would disseminate various data through its website, including Citizen's Charter, income expenditure statement, budget, scheme/project list, decisions of meetings, report of latest meeting, implementation state of the decisions of the UDCC and all notices and circulars of UP (GoB, 2014:2 retrieved from <http://www.lgd.gov.bd/images/pdf/download/up/Disclosure%20of%20UP%20Info-697.pdf> on 03.12.2014)

**Table 6.2**  
**Availability of the lists of the Service Recipients at UISC<sup>8</sup>**

<b>Service Recipient Lists</b>	<b>Hariyan</b>	<b>Gogram</b>	<b>Ghurka</b>	<b>Hatikumrul</b>	<b>Kakina</b>	<b>Vadai</b>
<b>VGD, VGF</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
<b>Old Aged Allowance</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
<b>Maternal Allowance</b>	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
<b>Widow Allowance</b>	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
<b>Disable People List</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
<b>TR, FFW, LGED</b>	No	Yes	No	No	No	No

It has been revealed from the data table (6.2) that the information on various allocations, including VGD, VGF, Old Aged Allowance, Maternal Allowance, Widow Allowance, Disabled People List (DPL), TR, FFW, ADP etc., which are distributed through the UPs, has been made available through UISC. Available data have revealed that the allocation information, including Old Age Allowance, Maternal Allowance, Widow Allowance, Disabled People List, TR, FFW, LGED are disseminated on the websites of the Hariyan, the Gogram, and the Ghurka UPs. But information of allocation in the name of TR, FFW, LGED have not been displayed at the Hariyan, the Ghurka, the Hatikumrul, the Vadai and the Kakina UPs' websites for peoples' information. The data table (6.2)<sup>9</sup> also shows that, in some UPs, various allocations of SSNP, which were allocated from UPZ, were neither added with the income of UPs nor were the beneficiary lists made by the UP functionaries against such allocation. It can be argued that the UP chairs deliberately tried to avoid dissemination of information in order to avoid conflict with citizens over the allocations. In spite of the fact that the UP is responsible for display of specified information on their website and on the UP's notice board, it can be argued that UP functionaries believe that their first duty is to survive in politics. In response to a question, "why did you not disseminate such information?" one WM<sup>10</sup> stated that,

<sup>8</sup> <http://harianup.rajshahi.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014; <http://gogramup.rajshahi.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014; <http://hatikumrulup.sirajganj.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014; <http://ghurkaup.sirajganj.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014; <http://kakinaup.lalmonirhat.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014; <http://bhadaup.lalmonirhat.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014

<sup>9</sup> Appendix-5.5. It shows the income source of different UPs which do not include the income sources specified under TR, FFW, LGED.

<sup>10</sup> Interview data, Hariyan UP, Ward no. 4, 17 January, 2014.

Our UP chair is the supporter of the BNP. If the other UP gets 40 tonnes of rice our UP will get 16 tonnes. In addition, we have to deduct and provide 30% of any grant to the representatives of UNO or MP. We did not provide this percentage of allocation by following any rules and regulation. They take such kind of allocation forcefully.

The interview session with one of the UP chairs<sup>11</sup> has substantiated the fact that they are actually not providing such information since sometimes distribution decisions of such allocations are not taken by them. He says,

The UNO and the local MP instructed me about distribution of VGD Cards to their known persons. If I disagree with either of them, I would not get any projects funded.

However, the opposite scenario<sup>12</sup> has been seen in the Gogram UP, where it was found that information was disseminated and maintained properly: meaning that people had access to such information through website and UP office records (Table-6.3). It can also be argued that negligence of duties of UP functionaries and lack of monitoring by government offices are some reasons for not providing information through UISC. It is evident that such misconduct has never been checked by any existing public accountability mechanism. In response to the question **“why was the income-expenditure statement not disseminated through UISC?”** one of the UP secretaries replied<sup>13</sup>, “I do not know that I have to disseminate such statement.”

However, some data in limited number (Table 6.1 and 6.2) have been displayed in all those UISCs. It is actually showing negligence of duty of the UP functionaries. Such negligence may be the result of absence of any formal institutional mechanism to check the negligence of the UP functionaries. Though there are provisions of the Act<sup>14</sup> and instructions for displaying necessary information, the UP functionaries are unaware of those provisions of the UP Act 2009; in short, the implementation is ineffective and insufficient. Moreover, it is clear that there are severe lacks of monitoring and accountability for procedural information use and dissemination by the government offices.

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<sup>11</sup> Interview data, Ghurka UP, 29 January, 2014.

<sup>12</sup> The same NGO interventions have been found in the Hariyan UP but it has been revealed that the entrepreneurs of UISC did not upload information through the UISC.

<sup>13</sup> Interview Data, Hatikumrul UP, 28 January, 2014.

<sup>14</sup> See Section 50 of UP Act, 2009.

**Table 6.3**  
**An Example of Information Regarding Various Project Descriptions Available at the UISC<sup>15</sup>**

<b>Description of Various Projects against LGED Funds (In the website of Gogram UP)</b>		
<b>Expiration Date</b>	<b>Project</b>	<b>Allocation/ Amount</b>
03/2013	Ring pipes are distributed for various street of the Union Council	50,000/=
03/3013	Tube well placed in Gunigram Primary School	50,000/=
03/2013	High and low benches are provided in various educational institutions	50,000/=
03/2013	Sanitary latrines (3+1) are distributed in various places of the UP	50,000/=

**Source:** Website of the UISC of the Gogram UP

It is interesting to note that, as the apex body of the LGIs, the LGD have been contributing to the information generation process of UP. Browsing of internet data suggests that information regarding allocations made under of LGSP-II for three consecutive years has been found available (Table-6.4) on the website of the Local Government Division (LGD), which is related to UP planning and budgeting process<sup>16</sup>. The following example of availability of information regarding allocation of LGSP-II of different UPs revealed that information flows of allocation of funds are easily accessible at this website. It has also been revealed that, along with monetary allocation of LGSP-II funds, other important information has also been made available on the website. All Acts and circulars relating to the UPs, various instructions/guidelines and operational manuals relating to WS and OBM have been found available on the website in such a way that it is easily accessible to people.

<sup>15</sup> <http://gogramup.rajshahi.gov.bd/> accessed on 25.05.2014.

<sup>16</sup> Information on money allocation is necessary for social mapping and, as explained in Chapter Five, WMs did not provide such money allocation information to the public, as they did not have access to such information.

**Table 6.4**  
**Availability of LGSP-II Project Fund Allocation Information at LGD Website**

Sl No	District	UPZ	UP Code	UP Name	Account No.	Bank and Branch name	1st Installment
445	Rajshahi	Godagari	1813447	Gogram	Current AC-013	RajshahiKrishiUnnayan Bank, Gogram	301,000
464	Rajshahi	Paba	1817239	Hariyan	Current AC-1232	Janata Bank, Katakhalibazar	301,000
557	Sirajganj	Ullapara	1889436	Hatikumrul	Current AC-236	Sonali Bank, Hatikumrul	301,000
518	Sirajganj	Raiganj	1886157	Ghurka	Saving AC 2074	RajshahiKrishiUnnayan bank, Ghurka	301,000
282	Lalmonirhat	Kaliganj	7523953	Kakina	1285/4	Sonali Bank, Kaliganj	301,000
257	Lalmonirhat	Aditmari	7520205	Vadai	Current Account 1067/5	Sonali Bank, Aditmari	301,000

**Note:** Disbursement of 1st installment of 25% fund of LGSP-II project to UP on the basis of allocation of District and UPZ for the FY 2012-2013. It has been found that three consecutive years' allocation i.e.FY 2012-13, 2013-14 and 2014-15 have been made available on the LGD website.

**Source:** Local Government Division Website<sup>17</sup>

So, what is important is that the WMs, UP Secretary and UP Chairs would be able to access that information. It is the responsibility of the duty bearers of the UP to disseminate the information through UISC so that people could have easy access to that information.

**How did the WMs provide information which is available on websites and how did the information of UP get disseminated at UISC?** It has been evident that most of the WMs did not provide information regarding monetary allocation at the WS and not all the UISCs have updated data related to UPs. The possible reasons may be the lack of their conceptual ability, which has been explained by lack of education and training on UP-related matters. The data table<sup>18</sup> shows that 40.4%, 29.8%, 14.9% and 14.9% UP functionaries are in the education range from illiterate - class V, Class VI-SSC, HSC-graduate and Higher study respectively. Available data found that 70% of UP functionaries are in the ranges of education of secondary schooling which do not reflect that they have the ability to provide information through internet browsing. The interview

<sup>17</sup> [http://www.lgd.gov.bd/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=57&lang=en](http://www.lgd.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15&Itemid=57&lang=en)  
Accessed on 25.05.2014.

<sup>18</sup> Appendix-5.1. It shows the level of education of both the general people and the UP functionaries.

data have also confirmed that the UP functionaries need training in computer operation and internet browsing.

**Table 6.5**  
**State of Training Received by the UP Functionaries**

Designation of UP functionaries	Training				Total
	No Training	Foundation Training	LGSP	NILG	
<b>Secretary</b>	1	2	1	2	<b>6</b>
<b>Chairman</b>	6	0	0	0	<b>6</b>
<b>Member</b>	17	0	0	0	<b>17</b>
<b>Female Member</b>	18	0	0	0	<b>18</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>47</b>

Source: Interview Data (2014)

It has also been revealed by Nahar and Nazim (2012:29) that all the UP Secretaries of Bangladesh require training urgently including: project implementation, computer operation, office management, tax assessment and collection, financial management, Public Procurement Act, 2006 and Regulations 2008, the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009, digital Bangladesh and e-Governance, and UISC (Union Information and Service Center). It can be argued that training in the above can enhance the efficiency of the UP functionaries and the efficient service delivery of the UP as well. But the dismal fact is that none of the elected UP functionaries have had such training in the last three years since the election held in 2011. Interview with one of the UNO illustrates how the training provision to the UP functionaries is not effective. He said,<sup>19</sup>

It is true that the newly elected UP functionaries have not got any training yet. The previously-elected UP chairs/WMs did not get training on the utilization process of the Project LGSP-I. And this time, the Government are taking preparation for providing training to the elected UP functionaries at the end of their tenure of working with the UPs.

It has been revealed from the data (Table-6.5) that only all the 6 UP secretaries (out of 6) have got foundation training on local government, LGSP fund utilization, capacity building of UP from NILG etc. It may be because they are permanent staff and some of them have long tenure of service experience with UPs. So, it can be argued that lack of

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<sup>19</sup> Interview data, Kaliganj UPZ, 09 February, 2014.



education and training are among the reasons that the UP functionaries do not carry out their responsibility of providing information about UP's resources and information.

In theory, it has been assumed, from the NPM perspective, that the UP will be resourced with human and technical resources to manage the development functions locally. It has been revealed that all those six UISCs are resourced,<sup>20</sup> in terms of technological support, by the Government Innovation Fund. Yet it has been evident that there is a lack of technical resource persons who can utilize those technical instruments of UPs for providing appropriate information to the citizens.

So, it can be summed up that most of the UPs did not make information available that is necessary for a truly-participatory planning and budgeting process. Very often, they made available those data that have become obsolete and year-wise data input with proper synchronization was absent in the data base. It has been observed that the data was uploaded whimsically and most of the domains are blank: although websites of UISCs were designed in such a way that all UPs would update and upload similar data.

## 6.2.2 Information Dissemination Regarding WS and OBM Through CC

It is quite natural that rural people's access to internet/ UP's website is not common. So it has been presumed that the UP functionaries would disseminate all important information regarding UP planning in the UP notice board in such a way that people could easily understand those. The following data table shows the present state of display of the CC in different Districts of Bangladesh.

**Table 6.6**  
**The State of Display of the CC in the Study Area.**



Name of DP	CC	Name of UPZ	CC	Name of UP	CC
Rajshahi	Yes	Paba	Yes	Hariyan	Yes
		Godagari	Yes	Gogram	Yes
Sirajganj	Yes	Ullapara	Yes	Hatikumrul	Yes
		Raiganj	Yes	Ghurka	Yes
Lalmonirhat	Yes	Kaliganj	No	Kakina	No
		Aditmari	No	Vadai	No

**Source:** Direct observation by the researcher (from July 2011-February 2014).

<sup>20</sup> Every UP has computers, printers, photocopy machine, internet modem, camera, projector etc. through which the entrepreneur of the UISC can make available the information of the UP. The elected UP functionaries are supposed to utilize such technological support to enhance the efficiency of the UP.

It has been revealed through direct observation that CCs (Table-6.7, picture-2) are displayed with clear and specific information regarding service provisions at each Department of UPZ offices of Godagari, Paba, Raiganj and Ullapara UPZ and UPs under those UPZ. However, the opposite scenario<sup>21</sup> has been depicted in the Aditmari and Kaliganj UPZs and UPs under those UPZs. It has been observed that the information that could be disseminated at the UP premises for planning and budgeting were not available, which means that it did not facilitate people's knowledge of their entitlements from UPs.

**Table 6.7**  
**CC displayed at different UPs**

Advertisement regarding participation at WS at HatikumrulUP Pre	CC at Hatikumrul UP
	 <p>Note: See the English Version of CC (Appendix-6.1)</p>




**Source:** Photos captured at the time of direct observation of different UP premises by the researcher.

The UPs, which have CCs, include in the CC all forms of services usually provided by the UP. However, it has been evident that the terms of the services that are to be placed at WS and finalized at OBM are not furnished at any UP's CC for people's information. It has been observed on the UP notice boards (Table 6.7, Picture: 1) that there were few posters of various donor agencies regarding information about the UP planning and budgeting process which were not understandable to illiterate people. The picture at Table 6.7 is disseminated at UP notice board as a measure for informing people regarding

<sup>21</sup> It has been revealed that though the UP chairs of both UPs opined that they knew about CC. But it has been evident that there was no charter of services at any of the UP premise.

people's participation at WS against local governance projects distributed by a national NGO but funded by USAID.

**Table 6.8|**  
**Information Displayed at UP Notice Board and Billboard**

Description of REOPA at Ghurka UP, Raiganj UPZ	List of NGOs working with Hariyan UP	List of responsible Government office and officer's designation at Hariyan UP
 <p>Note: See the English version of description of REOPA at Ghurka UP Appendix-6.2)</p>	 <p>Note: See the English Version of NGOs name (Appendix-6.3)</p>	 <p>Note: See the English Version of these office names and designations of the officers (Appendix-4.4)</p>

**Source:** Photos captured at the time of direct observation of different UP premises by the researcher.

Although information, including the budget information, real income expenditure statement and project implementation & monitoring charts, were available at those UPs which had CCs, the study revealed that the information regarding the time frame of planning and budgeting process had not been displayed at CC. For effective utilization of RTI, it is imperative that the citizens should know the authority from whom they will seek information and lodge any complaint if they did not get service properly. However, it has been observed that there was no such arrangement that people could have information from UPs, knowing from whom they will seek any information and lodge any complaint if they do not get service properly. The CC (Table-6.7) contains information regarding provision of services with its required charges. Yet it did not include the grievance procedure for the citizens. Information regarding allocations against various SSNPs such as EGPP, FFW and VGD were displayed at those UP premises. However the CC did not

display the information that the final beneficiary lists of these services would be prepared at WS. In addition, Ward-based money allocation before pre-Budget session at WS was not disseminated at any one of the UP notice boards. The information (table 6.8)<sup>22</sup> regarding the transferred government officers' names and contact numbers were available at UP premises of Gogram, Hariyan, Ghurka and Hatikumrul UP. The names (table 6.8)<sup>23</sup> of various NGOs were displayed on the notice board of the UP. Yet the programs of those NGOs that have been implemented with UPs were not displayed at the CC. Unlike the government services, the CC did not contain any information regarding planning and budgeting process of those services provided by the NGOs.

The possible reasons for so many ambiguities and mismatches of CC can include: **Firstly**, the possible reason for not having a CC with proper information of planning and budgeting may be because there is no co-ordination mechanism of the Government apex body involved in the planning and budgeting process. A bottom-up approach for planning has been taken in all the policy papers in the GoB. So it should be mandatory for the LGD to provide instruction to all those UPs regarding the process of planning. Such instruction should be embedded with the CC and RTI for peoples' information. However, from the process analysis of developing a Citizen Charter (Figure-6.1), it has been revealed that it is a continuous process from higher level authority of government i.e. of Local Government Division (LGD) in terms of developing a charter for UPs. CC preparation with citizen's involvement and mass campaign for publicity is important for application of the instrument. While describing the process of developing a CC it has been stated by Khan (2010:8) that,

Setting standards is considered as the backbone of the charter. In a charter the qualitative and quantitative standard along with the timeline is specifically set so that the service recipient claim and monitor whether they receive a certain level of service within the stipulated time. What level of service the concerned institutions set in its aim (quality, time, etc.), and against it what level of service it is providing, should be independently validated by a third party. The tendency among the service providers to determine its aim according to their own convenience without considering the client's need should be avoided.

But this study revealed that the people who participated at FGD sessions and interviewed had never been involved with such a campaign. Moreover, that people do not understand

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
<sup>22</sup> Appendix-4.4. It shows the name of the offices and the designated officers which are supposed to be placed at the UP.

<sup>23</sup> Appendix-6.3. It shows the list of NGOs which have programmes at the working coverage at the UP.

the information which has been disseminated at the UP notice board. The general people did not know the process of getting government services. The following example illustrates that people have problems: but what types of problems have to be resolved from which government office is still unknown to them (table 6.8). The participants of one of the FGD sessions<sup>24</sup> said,

There is only one tube well here in this school field for our locality. We the people in the Barendro region suffer from drinking unsafe water. We have made complaint to our WM but he did not pay attention to this matter. We do not know which government office is responsible for repairing tube wells at UP level.

**Figure 6.1**  
**Process of developing a Citizen's Charter**



Source: Khan (2010)

So, it is thus evident that lack of presence of transferred government officers at UP level<sup>25</sup>, lack of monitoring of their activities and lack of peoples' involvement with CC-making process are still some challenges prevailing at the working of the UP. **Secondly,**

<sup>24</sup> Male FGD session, Gogram UP, Ward No. 4, 14 January, 2014.

<sup>25</sup> Discussed in chapter- 5 section 5.2.4.

although it has been evident from the above discussion that the CC did not contain any information regarding planning of UP it has been revealed that some UPs have CC because they are provided CC by the NGOs. So it can be said that NGOs<sup>26</sup> are engaging in building capacity of the UPs. It can be explained that UPs are accepting changes in terms of utilizing new techniques from NPM perspectives. It can be argued that those UPs are in advantageous position with the assistance of the donor agencies compared to those which have no CC. **And lastly**, the UP functionaries have not disseminated such information due to their lack of responsiveness and ignorance.

### 6.2.3 The Process of Seeking Information and Lodging Complaints Under CC

Literally, the provisions of the UP Act, 2009 i.e. RTI and CC, empower people with knowledge about their right to seek any information and to lodge complaints against duty bearers at the UP if they do not receive any service or they have any complaint about the quantity and quality of services.

**Picture 6.1**  
**Digital Counter for Providing Information at Lalmonirhat District**



**Source:** Photo captured at the time of direct observation of Lalmonirhat DC office by the researcher.

This study explored these processes through documentation review and interviews with UP functionaries about whether they had arrangements for formal information-providing

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<sup>26</sup> It has been explored that at Hariyan, Gogram, Ghurka and Hatikumrul UP the officials of Sacheton and Manab Mukti Sangstha(MMS) provided CCs which had been developed by their funding agencies It has been explained in earlier Chapters that Sacheton is a NGO working in Rajshahi District on Sharique Local Governance Project funded by Intercooperation Bangladesh. Manab Mukti Sangstha (MMS) is a NGO has been working on the project name Strengthening Democracy and Local Governance (SDLG) funded by USAID in Sirajganj district.

authority and complaint-lodging procedures at their UPs or not. Available data suggests that people did not have any specific counter at UPs where they could seek information and lodge their complaint. Most of the UP functionaries opined that the people know who is the authority to give information sought by people. What has been observed at Lalmonirhat district office (Picture-6.1) was that there are digital counters where people could easily seek their required information and lodge their complaints (if any). Such facilities are absent in any UPs of Rajshahi, Sirajganj and Lalmonirhat districts. In this connection, it has been observed that there is a lack of display of the information of the provisions of the RTI<sup>27</sup> Act on the UP notice board. Citizens have received various land documents, including Cadastral Survey (CS), Revisional/review Survey (RS Khatian), State Acquisition Survey (SA Khatian), Bangladesh Survey (BS Khatian), licence of various businesses, solution of conflict resolution etc. from district information centres<sup>28</sup>.

In this study it has been explored that the counter “**Union Information and Service Center**” in all six UPs is not being utilized as an information providing wing. Rather, it has been observed that various other services, such as citizenship certificate, nationality certificate, birth registration certificate etc. are being provided through this centre. This centre is being utilized as a business centre by the entrepreneurs of those programs. There are no permanent and trained government staff who can provide information necessary for rural people. The study finding is corroborated with the study of Mohanty (N.D:3) who identified some challenges of e-governance as well as digital governance:

The challenges to e-governance, therefore, relate to people (e.g. lack of political will, official apathy, shortage of champions, lack of skills in government etc.); process (e.g. lack of process models, status quo-ism, poor legal-institutional frameworks, complex procurement etc.); technology (e.g. lack of architecture, lack of standards, poor communication infrastructure and hardware-approach etc.) and resources (e.g. budget constraints, disinterest of the private sector, lack of project management skills on the part of public managers etc.).

The mechanisms like “Information Centre at Lalmonirhat District (Picture-6.1), through which people can ask questions at a formal counter, is absent in all the UPs. As a result, it

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<sup>27</sup> Here the information of the provisions of the RTI Act means the information against the RTI ( Disclosure and Circulation of Information) Circular 2010. It specifies that any organization under this law is responsible for disclosure of information including, accountability and monitoring procedure of decision making process, the procedure of planning and decision implementation, budget, income and expenditure, amount and description allocations of government, description of beneficiary etc. For detail see [http://www.infocom.gov.bd/ic/images/stories/d\\_of\\_i.pdf](http://www.infocom.gov.bd/ic/images/stories/d_of_i.pdf) accessed on 03.12.2014

<sup>28</sup> For more detail see <http://www.lalmonirhat.gov.bd/node/991631>

has been revealed that the practice of making the UP functionaries accountable to citizens by the application of RTI provisions is absent. This argument can be substantiated by the findings compiled by Information Commission (hereinafter IC)<sup>29</sup>. In the year 2012 only 16,475 applications have been received by various government institutions and NGOs. Among the applications 84.50% applications have been received by government organizations and 15.50% applications have been received by the NGOs. Among these 11%, applications have been received by UPZ offices and there are no applications received by the UPs (IC Annual Report, 2012:43). This is the real scenery of country-wide RTI application receiving rate by various government institutions and NGO organizations as well as by UPs. The activities of IC are related to public accountability mechanism, which means that the IC would resolve the cases sent to them from their respective offices.

It is important that the IC would make proper circulation, monitor the procedure of application under RTI as per IC's guideline, and arrange publicity about rights of people to information, which will create a social accountability mechanism: but this is absent. It has been revealed in this study that people do not have such publicity regarding their right to information. Moreover, the IC lacks manpower to monitor country wide RTI application (IC, 2012). Thus, the conclusion can be drawn from this perspective that, the process of accountability by utilization of social accountability mechanism by citizens is still absent in UPs.

### **6.3 Outcome of Dissemination of CC and Utilization of RTI Regarding the Planning and Budgeting Process of UP**

It has been revealed from the process study of CC and RTI that, among six (6) UPs, four (4) UPs have displayed CC at the billboard of the UPs and information has been made available at UISC and government official websites. As explained in Chapter 4, for four decades, LGIs have become an element of experiment by the politicians and administrative elites. It is properly argued that practice of decentralization policy in Bangladesh is very difficult due to the existing political and administrative situation (Ahmed, 2012). Theoretically, fiscal and political decentralization, through participatory

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<sup>29</sup> The ICs resolve eligible complaints received from various organizations. For detail See [http://www.infocom.gov.bd/ic/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=59&Itemid=118&lang=en](http://www.infocom.gov.bd/ic/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=59&Itemid=118&lang=en)



planning and budgeting, allow people to get involved in their own decision-making processes. The effective utilization of CC and RTI will enable people to become empowered with knowledge. The following sections explicate the outcome of accountability of the UP functionaries by: (1) Responsiveness of the UP functionaries (e.g. Leadership Ability and Answerability) (2) Administrative Behavior (e.g. dissemination of the provisions of CC and RTI and information regarding Participatory Planning (PP) and Participatory Budgeting (PB) process). These indicators have been determined to evaluate the capacity of the demand side and the supply side as well the capacity of the social accountability mechanisms innovated by the UP Act, 2009.

### **6.3.1 Responsiveness of UP Functionaries**

As mentioned in the theoretical discussion, responsiveness is a state where elected and administrative staffs will respond to the voices of the general citizens. It has been assumed that social accountability mechanisms are working if it is found that citizens have raised their voices in the existing politico-administrative relationship (O'Neil et al 2007). From the NPM perspective, it is also expected that citizens will get high-quality public services and they will value that organization.

It is interesting to note that people generally ask questions under the RTI about the terms and conditions of different social safety net programmes, including Old Age Allowance (OAA), Deserted and Destitute Mother Allowance (DDMA) Maternity Allowance Program (MAP), Honorarium for Insolvent Freedom Fighters (HIFF) etc. Such finding seems to have strong ground since the Secretary of Gogram UP expressed his agreement with such finding. In addition to the terms and conditions of different safety net programmes, people also want to know the list of beneficiaries under various SSNPs. But it has been revealed from interview sessions with respective UP Secretaries (table-6.10) that, since inception, except the Secretary of Gogram UP, no UP Secretaries in other UPs received formal application for seeking information.

In response to a question “**whether the information providing officers received formal applications for seeking information or not**” the Secretary of Gogram UP expressed his opinion in a positive way, since he received 20 applications seeking information. The

Secretaries or chairs of other UPs have not received any formal application, seeking information or lodgment of complaint against them from citizens, until April, 2014. One possible answer is that Secretaries of these five UPs have been found providing information orally to those who seek information. That is why people do not file any formal application for any information.

**Table 6.9**  
**Applications Under RTI and Lodging of Complaints Under CC at UPs**

<b>Name of UP</b>	<b>Presence of formal authority for providing information</b>	<b>Application Received</b>	<b>Number of Application for RTI</b>	<b>Lodging of complaint against the UPs</b>
Hariyan	Yes	No	-	-
Gogram	Yes	Yes	20	-
Hatikumrul	Yes	Yes	1	-
Ghurka	Yes	Yes	1	-
Kakina	Yes	No	-	-
Vadai	Yes	No	-	-

**Source:** Interview data (2014).

**Note:** Data compiled from inception of implementation of the RTI act 2009 up to April, 2014.

Another issue is that people are not aware about the availability of application forms to be used for collection of information of UPs. Again, lack of knowledge of the RTI Act and CC and training on the utilization of its provisions by UP functionaries is the reason that they did not know how it can be applicable at day to day functions. Three FWMs<sup>30</sup> of one UP were found to have no idea about the main provisions of the RTI under the UP Act, 2009. They said:

We did not know anything about RTI Act. There are several NGOs working with us but the NGO officials never taught us about this Act. If we do not have any understanding of that Act, how will we make people aware about their rights?

In response to a question: **“whether the process of dissemination of CC was satisfactory”** the majority of the UP functionaries (72.34%) expressed (data Table 6.10) their dissatisfaction with the process of dissemination of CC at the UP billboard only. Most of them have given the opinion that CC dissemination at the UP billboard is not a convenient way to inform all the voters of the UP and suggested that village-based

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<sup>30</sup> Interview data, Hatikumrul UP, UP office Complex, 28 January, 2014.

display of CC is necessary for general people. It has been directly observed by the researcher that CCs were displayed at the billboard at the entrance of the UP office complex only. Not everyone visits the UP complex regularly. So those who do not visit the UP will have no information about the Citizens' Charter.

**Table 6.10**  
**Level of satisfaction of UP functionalities' regarding dissemination of CC at UP premises**

Name of UP	Strongly Agree	Agreed	Not Sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total
Hariyan	1	1	1	5	0	8
Gogram	2	1	0	5	0	8
Ghurka	0	1	1	6	0	8
Hatikumrul	0	2	0	3	2	7
Kakina	0	0	0	8	0	8
Vadai	0	0	0	7	1	8
Total	3	5	2	34	3	47
%	6.38	10.64	4.26	72.34	6.38	100

**Source:** Interview Data (2014).

Although the information-seeking and complaint-lodging procedure (Table 6.11) is not satisfactory, 55.32 % UP functionalities opined that people utilized their right to information regarding budget information and non-entitlement with UP for various services. 44.68% UP functionalities expressed that people do not know about RTI. While commenting on the shortcoming of the countrywide overall application of CC and RTI, one WM<sup>31</sup> mentioned that:

You know most of the people in the country are not aware about RTI and CC. There is no initiative from Government to make us aware, let alone the voters. How would people know about CC and RTI if they did not visit the UP even once in a year? You are asking me whether I have informed voters about money allocation for the FY or not? I did not know about money allocation. How could I inform others?

On the other hand, 6.38%, 10.64%, 4.26% and 6.38% UP functionalities answered "Strongly Agree", "Agree", "Not Sure" and "Strongly Disagree" to this question, respectively. The UP functionalities who have expressed their satisfaction (17.02%) maybe saying that they have a CC and have provided information and services to their citizens

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<sup>31</sup> Interview Data, Hariyan UP, 19 January, 2014.

about it. However, such a picture has been found in Gogram UP (Table-6.10), where it has been found that people have utilized their right to seek information. A possible explanation of such a positive result stems from the fact that NGO officials have trained the UP functionaries about several issues such as CC, RTI, taxation process, and formation of SC, WC, UDCC, WS, and OBM of UP etc.

**Table 6.11**  
**People utilize their RTI (UP functionaries' perception)**

Name of UP	Utilize RTI		Total
	Yes	No	
Hariyan	3	5	8
Gogram	6	2	8
Ghurka	5	3	8
Hatikumrul	5	2	7
Kakina	5	3	8
Vadai	2	6	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>55.32</b>	<b>44.68</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source:** Interview Data (2014).

The UP Secretary of Gogram UP<sup>32</sup> shares his experience of maintaining RTI and CC in the following way,

I have been working for 14 years with this UP. The NGO officials have trained me, along with the UP Chair and members, about ward planning and open budget meetings. They have provided us a lot of information regarding CC and RTI. Moreover, I have received various Government circulars and instructions regarding RTI and CC. I usually provide information regarding terms and conditions of SSNPs. Due to lack of time, I could not manage to take a formal application for that purpose. At present, I have started to receive formal application from those who come seeking any information. There are some people who cannot read and write and seek information from me: at that time, I arrange the information-providing process with the help of village police. People who seek information from the UP Chairs and members are also sent to me. 30% of the people of this locality are indigenous tribal. Previously, they did not visit any government offices. But, at present, they are coming to UPs. Their socio-economic condition has been developed in this way. I try to provide all information sought by the people.

The same NGO involvement also existed at Hariyan UP but the UP Secretary told the researcher that he did not take any applications when people come to him seeking

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<sup>32</sup> Interview data, Gogram UP, 22 January, 2014.

information. He did not maintain such databases as have been maintained by the UP Secretary of Gogram UP. The UPs of Sirajganj district has CCs but the UP Secretaries did not maintain such database. So, it can be said that **proper training and personal motivation** of the UP officials are two factors that have made the UP functionaries responsive to the citizens. The UP functionaries who answered “not sure” or “strongly disagree” may be did so because they have no information regarding CC and they have no CC. The UP chairs of Vadai and Kakina<sup>33</sup> said that they do not have CC at the notice board of the UP office for people’s perusal; although they knew it that it is mandatory under the UP Act, 2009. So it can be argued that they are not serious about their legal duties. Moreover, it can be also argued that there is a lack of monitoring on the part of the Government whether the UPs have CC and are publishing them or not.

Most of the UP functionaries replied that citizens knew about various services and their charges that are usually provided through UPs, such as birth registration certificate, trade license, citizenship certificate etc. However, the data of this study has revealed that most of the people do not have information regarding WS and OBM. It has been revealed that they have never been informed by anyone that information dissemination regarding planning and budgeting is necessary. Although NGO officials have provided a few posters at the UPs at Sirajganj District, the other UPs do not have such instruments to provide information. It has been revealed from interview data that very few UP officials have updated information regarding Government circulars relating to UPs. As such, it is found that information regarding disclosing the information of UP planning and budgeting is unknown to them. Among 47 elected and administrative officials only UP Chairs and Secretaries are found familiar with UP-related circulars to some extent.

**Table 6.12**  
**Information about CC and RTI (People’s Perception)**

Opinion	Know RTI	%	Know CC	%
Yes	77	19.15	15	3.73
No	325	80.85	387	96.27
total	402	100	402	100

**Source:** Interview and FGD data (2014).

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<sup>33</sup> The UP offices of Lalmonirhat District neither have CC nor did the officials maintain databases regarding applications they received for that purpose.

Another interesting finding of the study is that people did not participate at the WS spontaneously having been known the fact that participation at WS is their right. It has been explained in Chapter 5 that the WMs have major impact in organizing WS. Thus, it can be argued that UP members have started to make people familiar with UP-related matters, through providing information to the voters at WS and OBM. The planning process has offered people a scope to become knowledgeable about CC and allowed them the right to claim answers from the UP members. The following interview with an OBM participant illustrates the process:

I got my invitation letter for attending at OBM for the FY 2012-13 through chowkider (village policeman). I am also a recipient of a sewing machine from the LGSP-II fund allocation. There is no non-formal primary school like BRAC School<sup>34</sup> for children in our locality. I, along with others, felt that establishment of such a school was urgent in our locality. I was unaware about provisions like RTI and CC. I did not participate at WS but, at the OBM, I was given a chance to raise my demand. I have raised my demand about establishment of a school at the OBM. After that meeting, I have also contacted our UP Chair. The UP Chair assured me that he had talked with the UPZ education officer for that purpose. I have found that OBM is a formal way in which we can raise questions to the UP functionaries.

On the issue of the level of knowledge of the people about the CC and RTI, the study has come out with a discouraging result, since the majority of the respondents (80.85% and 96.27%) have been found to have no knowledge about RTI and CC, respectively. Only 19.15% respondents have been found to have knowledge about RTI while only 3.73% people have been found to have known about CC.

**Table 6.13**  
**UP wise distribution of Information about CC (People's Perception)**

Know about CC						
Name of UP	Yes	%	No	%	Total	%
Hariyan	4	7.14	52	92.86	56	100.00
Gogram	8	9.52	76	90.48	84	100.00
Ghurka	1	1.72	57	98.28	58	100.00
Hatikumrul	1	1.64	60	98.36	61	100.00
Kakina	0	0.00	70	100.00	70	100.00
Vadai	1	1.37	72	98.63	73	100.00
Total	15	3.73	387	96.27	402	100.00

**Source:** Interview and FGD data (2014).

<sup>34</sup> BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) a leading NGO of the country has been operating non-formal primary education since 1997. It has 12,450 pre-primary schools and 359,680 students, of whom 61 per cent are girls.

From the FGD data, it has been revealed that most of the people did not know anything about CC. A very few people had information regarding CC and those who were found having some information had visited UP or read about it in the newspaper. The data Table 6.13 revealed that 7.14 %respondent of Hariyan UP, 9.52% respondents of Gogram UP, 1.72% respondents of Ghurka UP, 1.64% respondents of Hatikumrul UP, and 1.37% respondents of Vadai UP have been found to have some elementary level of knowledge about CC. On the other hand, 92.86% 90.48%, 98.28 %, 98.36%, 100% and 98.63% of the respondents from Hariyan, Gogram, Ghurka, Hatikumrul and KakinaandVadai UP, respectively, have no information about the CC.

**Table 6.14**  
**UP wise Distribution of Information about RTI (People's Perception)**

<b>Know about RTI</b>						
<b>Name of UP</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>%</b>
Hariyan	7	12.50	49	87.50	56	100.00
Gogram	8	9.52	76	90.48	84	100.00
Ghurka	12	20.69	46	79.31	58	100.00
Hatikumrul	3	4.92	58	95.08	61	100.00
Kakina	30	42.86	40	57.14	70	100.00
Vadai	17	23.29	56	76.71	73	100.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>19.15</b>	<b>325</b>	<b>80.85</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>100.00</b>

**Source:** Interview and FGD data (2014).

The following data Tables (Table 6.14 and 6.15) show that 12.50 %, 9.52%, 20.69% 4.92%, 42.86% and 23.29% of Hariyan, Gogram, Ghurka, Hatikumrul and Vadai UPs, respectively, have preliminary knowledge about RTI. On the other hand 87.50%, 90.48%, 79.31 %, 96.08% , 57.14% and 76.71% respondents of Hariyan, Gogram, Ghurka, Hatikumrul Kakina and Vadai UPs, respectively, do not know about RTI. It is evident from the Table that most of the people at the local level, in the study area, do not know about the provision of RTI. This Table 6.14 also represents the fact that those who have understanding about RTI did not participate at WS. This is because of the fact that these people did not have information regarding WS and OBM, which is indicative of the fact that the publicity mechanism of the UPs is not quite good enough.

**Table 6.15**  
**Information about WS and OBM (People's Perception)**

Opinion	Know WS	%	Know OBM	%
Yes	14	4.33	16	4.95
No	309	95.67	307	95.05
total	323	100	323	100

**Source:** FGD Data (2014).

It has been also revealed from study data that only 4.33% people had information regarding WS and 4.95% people had information regarding OBM, meaning that the vast majority of the people did not have any information about WS and OBM. It has been revealed from FGD data that 95.67% of people had no information regarding WS and 95.05% people had no information about OBM. So, it can be said that lack of awareness of the general people, lack of responsiveness of the UP functionaries and lack of training and education are some challenges which are creating obstacles for implementation of the provisions of CC and RTI.

### **6.3.1.1 Leadership Ability and Answerability of UP Functionaries**

It is said by Goetz & Jenkins that answerability ensures people's right to heard from the functionaries about their action and enforceability ensures people's right to impose penalty on the duty bearers (cited in Yilmaz et al, 2008). It has been discussed in Chapter -5 that the WS and OBM have been organized in almost all UPs. However, interestingly, it was found that the majority of the respondents attended these meetings after having been requested by the UP functionaries. It has been found that those who got direct invitation from UP functionaries attended the WS/OBM. No one participated willingly who knew about the provisions of WS/OBM through CC. It has been evident that people were not aware about their right to seek information from UP. But it has been revealed from interview sessions and direct observation that people have held the UP functionaries accountable for their actions at WS and OBM. It is encouraging to note that WS and OBM have created avenues for people to demand answers from the UP functionaries and ask questions about people's right to information. Thus, it can be claimed that the provision of peoples' right to information at OBM has ensured UP functionaries' answerability and enforceability. One of the respondents raised questions at the OBM directly observed by the researcher. She asked questions of the UP functionaries at the OBM<sup>35</sup>,

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<sup>35</sup> Direct observation on OBM, Gogram UP, 04 May, 2013.



My home belongs to Barendra region and there is no road connecting to my home. I have seen that my demand of a road which has been placed at WS has not been prioritized at the OBM. I used to fetch water regularly by walking several kilometers and for that I am facing severe health related problems. I want to know when will my demand of a road at my home side will be implemented by the UP?

The researcher's direct observation found that the women voters could raise their questions at the OBM in such a way: it has ensured the UP chairman's answerability to them. The UP Chair explained why construction of road in their area was impossible. He argued that,

The place where the road is supposed to be constructed is under the possession of a local influential person. I assure you that I would take necessary actions to construct the road as soon as I could negotiate with those local influential people.

So it is evident that if the UP functionaries try to satisfy their voter they give answers to them. It can be argued that if general people are given formal space for raising voice they can make their elected members accountable to them. It has been revealed that the application of CC and RTI has not been effective yet for making the UP functionaries accountable for their action in PP and PB. But the WS and OBM have been found to be such platform where people get their formal space of bargaining. For effective planning and budgeting with all the voters of the UP except the utilization of CC and RTI there are no alternatives for people to become aware of their right and entitlement. So along with mass awareness of the provisions of CC and RTI, their availability at the UISC, website and UP notice board have to be ensured for maximum outcome of the provisions of the Act, 2009.

### **6.3.2 Administrative Behavior**


The UP is the lowest administrative unit at local level and it is a self-government institution. The intention of creating these institutions was to provide services to the local people at their doorsteps. Those who run these organizations, both elected and administrative, get remuneration for the accomplishment of the activities of the institutions. In providing service, the public official and the administrative officials are service-providing authorities and the public are service-receiving entities, who interact with one another. Huque (1990:53) states that "administrative behavior covers the pattern of these interactions, their causes and effects". In this study, application for RTI and CC by the people in the planning and budgeting process or for any other purpose, related to those processes, has been explored by the analysis of the following data.

### 6.3.2.1 Capacity of the Local Government Representatives to Provide Information

The UP functionaries are supposed to provide updated information regarding all income sources of UPs, such as block grant of LGSP for that FY, ADP block grant, other donor's funds, NGO's allocation etc. so that people can social map their local problems. It has been revealed from the study findings that those who participated at WS were not informed about the amount of money allocated to various projects in the financial year 2012-2013, which was a purpose for which they had gathered there. The UP members were responsible to provide such information, upon which the people were supposed to decide on UP-related matters for the coming year.

**Chart 6.1**  
**Information About Money Allocation**

(UP Functionaries' Perception)



Source: Interview Data (2014)

61.11% UP members did not inform the voters at WS about monetary allocation against various sector-wise purposes. It has been revealed, through interview with WMs, that most of them did not have the required level of knowledge or concern about sources of revenue mobilization of the UP. Most of the (16 out of 22 i.e. 72.73%) UP functionaries mentioned that they did not disclose information about the monetary allocation because no one wanted to know it: some (4 i.e. 18.18%) said that they did not know about monetary allocation and others (2 i.e. 9%) did not inform because there was no practice of informing the general people. Female Ward Members felt ignored by their male counterparts on this issue.

It has been observed that Ward-based shortlisted demands had been displayed at OBM and the UP Secretary presented the UP's yearly budget and income-expenditure statement

before the voters of the locality. Chapter 5<sup>36</sup> showed that people had the ability to participate in budgetary discussions and people could hold UP functionaries accountable by their questions. It has been observed by the researcher that UP functionaries were answering the questions raised at the OBM by the citizens. Written budget documents were delivered for people's information and the budget meeting conducted with due process at Gogram UP<sup>37</sup>. This process has enabled both citizens and UP Members to understand the UP's capacity. It has been observed that the process of answering questions at the OBM has just started to work. It has also been revealed from interview data that UP members expressed their **No Confidence**<sup>38</sup> over UP Chairs in the budget review discussion. The following statement of a UP member<sup>39</sup> affirmed the discretionary attitude of UP chairmen:

We, the UP members, did not attend the discussion on budget review at the UP premises. A project that was shortlisted and displayed at OBM for people's information was not implemented by the UP Chair. It seems that the allocations including ADP and revenue earnings of UP's are in his possession. The UP Chair considers himself all in all. He has taken projects at his discretion. He appointed contractors without any feasibility analysis for implementation of projects. The fund allocations to the projects did not maintain procurement process as per procurement rules. We, some UP members, placed a "No Confidence" motion against him. But you know each member is not the same. We did not have the majority that is required to pass the 'no confidence' motion. So, the decisions were not changed.

So it can be argued that, when WMs really wanted to satisfy their voters, they sought answers from their UP Chairs. People's rights to ask questions at OBMs had made the UP members responsive to the voters and the UP Chair to the UP Members.

The UPs have updated various lists of recipients of SSNPs and it is open and transparent to all which funds have been allocated to whom or which projects have been taken for what purposes. So it can be argued that such information is easily accessible because UP functionaries' aspiration is to facilitate transparency and openness in the working process of UPs. The documentation review of information of budget and income expenditure statement

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<sup>36</sup> See the section 5.2.5.3 in Chapter 5 concerning the OBMs.

<sup>37</sup> Budget process has been thoroughly considered in Chapter 5. It is revealed that, except Vadai UP, all have organized OBMs. Direct observation of that meeting revealed that the OBMs of Hariyan, Hatikumrul and Ghurka UP were turned into political platforms by the local politicians invited by the UP Chair.

<sup>38</sup> According to section 39 of the UP Act, 2009 "**No Confidence**" can be expressed against UP Chairs or Members by the UP.

<sup>39</sup> Interview data, Hariyan UP, 18 January 2014.

of Gogram and Hariyan UPs revealed that due process had been followed while maintaining accounting procedures. The example has revealed the UP Secretary's administrative skills of providing proper information sought by citizens'. The UP Secretary<sup>40</sup> states,

The citizens of Gogram UP pay house tax to the village police once in a year. Monirul Islam of Shekhali para has sought information regarding the taxation rate from me. I have made him understand with necessary information from the UP (Tax) Regulations of 1960. According to the regulation, 7.50% tax on the total value of house (with deduction of one eighth of maintenance cost and one fourth of the yearly cost of that house or with deduction of payable interest (if any) of the house) will be paid as house tax of the UP. Since we have been collecting house tax for last three years we have not decided to impose the prescribed rate. We the UP functionaries of our UP have fixed 2% tax on the value of house with the statutory deduction of tax amount. Monirul Islam has also been provided by the information that the taxation rate will be increased by 4% from the next FY.

Having reviewed the income-expenditure statement of Hatikumrul, Ghurka, Kakina and Vadai UP it has been revealed that these UPs have not followed the prescribed accounting procedure. The provision of RTI of UP Act 2009 has made the UP functionaries' responsible to keep various records such as year-wise UP budget and income expenditures statement and disclosing such statement at UISC for people's information. The Budget is a statement forecasting income and expenditure for the upcoming year. The real income-expenditure statement for a FY contains information about the amount of income with specific sources and amount of expenditure against sector-wise expenses incurred. So, it has been revealed that "No Confidence" debates, spontaneous budget discussions, giving information, maintaining databases on information provided by the UP Secretary, receiving applications etc. are some positive outcomes which have been possible due to the cooperation between the NGO officers and the UP functionaries.

### **6.3.2.2 Managerial Ability of the UP Functionaries**

The UPs are directly and indirectly dependent on DP and UPZ. Various programs and projects of UPZ offices are implemented through UPs. The following discussions have touched upon the UP functionaries' ability to deal with those organizations.

#### **6.3.2.2.1 Co-ordination with Line Offices at UPZ**

It has been revealed in the previous chapter that UPs receive funds from various external sources<sup>41</sup>. The LGSP-II fund<sup>42</sup> utilization generally takes a long time due to its allocation

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<sup>40</sup> Interview data, Gogram UP, 22 January, 2014.

by the UPZ on the basis of the respective UP's clean audit report and feasibility study of various projects. So, planning of a FY does not ensure the implementation of those projects which have been taken and shortlisted at WS and OBM. The LGSP-II fund allocation directly deposits to respective UPs' accounts and other government facilities are allocated to UPs through UPZ line offices. The fund utilization against various projects' implementation is made after the feasibility study of those projects has been done by the UPZ-level officers. In the case of utilization of LGSP-II funds, one of the UNOs<sup>43</sup>, as coordinator of Block Grant Co-ordination Committee (BGCC), opined,

Usually, fund release of LGSP-II fund is a long process and allocation and utilization of that fund does not maintain the actual timing of a financial year. Most often the projects are approved after the feasibility study of the projects has been done by the respective line offices at UPZ level.

While commenting on the overall planning and budgeting process he further expressed that:

.....But the main intention of the preparation of plans at the WS is neglected at the UPZ level. The plans that are placed at WS are not being implemented, although the legal provision requires that all plans are to be implemented following the "Bottom Up Approach". At the planning and short listing stage, deductions were made on projects since the practice is that big projects from the WS are not implemented by the UPZ. It is not practiced that plans of WS are implemented by ADP at UPZ level. The political motives and directions of the MP get priority in the implementation of development projects at UPZ level and 40% allocation of SSNP is utilized by local MPs.

So it has been revealed that the projects do not get funds for implementation for the current FY. In the first phase of the participatory planning process, the demands are placed at WS and then these plans are shortlisted at the UP. So, many of the voters solicit their respective Ward Members to find out whether the project will be implemented or not. So it is quite natural that the lengthy processes of allocation of project funds have made the general people mistrust the WMs. In this perspective, this study explored that in response to the question **"whether UP functionaries negotiate people's demands with their higher authority or not"** 57.14% (24 out of 42) of the UP functionaries have expressed their opinion as positive, as they are required to negotiate with the UPZ-level officers, while 42.86% (18 out of 42) of the respondents had not negotiated. 77.8% (14 out of 18) UP functionaries have not placed their demands to higher authority due to their

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<sup>41</sup> Appendix-5.5. It shows the income source of UPs.

<sup>42</sup> It has been discussed earlier that UPs are implementing various projects against fund distribution by the World Bank in the name of Local Government Support Project (LGSP)-II.

<sup>43</sup> Interview data, Raiganj UPZ, 29 January, 2014.

ignorance about the overall planning process and that they can negotiate with their higher authority and 22.2% (4 out of 18) did not negotiate or go to UPZ because they had no courage, thought it unnecessary to go to UPZ or thought that no action would be taken by the officers of the UPZ. It has been observed at OBM of Gogram UP that people raised demands in favor of increasing wages for FFW programs<sup>44</sup>. But there is no such formal mechanism through which such demand could be negotiated by the UP functionaries with Government officials since it has been discovered that the SCs in that UPZ are not working. It has been evident that, of those who negotiate with the UPZ-level government officers, the UPZ chair, the vice chairs, or the MP, they got only promises from them. The UP functionaries did not find that any project had been taken for implementation for that FY. It shows that UP functionaries have the ability to communicate with their higher level authority. So why do the higher level elected and officials not respond to them?

To understand this result, perhaps we need to recall the discussion in Chapter 5 about the final plan preparation stage of UP planning. The UPZ chair and MP show apathy to the project implementation of the UPs: they have taken no projects for implementation by ADP allocations. In other words, it can be argued that they are not responsive to the demands of the grassroots. Those UP functionaries do not negotiate with their higher level authorities perhaps because they do not trust their elected leaders and government officers of the UPZ level.

The Citizen Charter itself is a process and its objective is to attain the organization's goal (Khan, 2010). According to the UP Act 2009<sup>45</sup>, the beneficiary lists are supposed to be prepared at the WS, although each department of government offices has their own direction<sup>46</sup> for finalisation of their beneficiary lists. This overlapping of UPZ and UP offices has created serious problems in the working processes of both organizations. The UPZ offices do not take any initiative for providing any CC at UPs and there was no mutual agreement between UPZ officers and UPs on how they would select the final beneficiaries of government funded social projects through WS. The interview data of the Upazilla Social Welfare Officers revealed that they had maintained a database for selection of beneficiaries of various social safety net programs. For selection of beneficiaries, they

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<sup>44</sup> People get 175 Tk daily from the FFW (Food for Work) program and raised their demand of Tk200 daily.

<sup>45</sup> Section 6(3) specifies that the WS will prepare the final beneficiary list of various government programs on the basis of specific determinants and will hand over it to the UPs.

<sup>46</sup> For VGD allocations please see <http://www.ddm.gov.bd/officeorder/vgf12.pdf>

follow their own Department's directives<sup>47</sup> for this purpose. Moreover, new card issuance of various programs totally depend on government allocations on the basis of the data of the beneficiaries provided by the WMs. The WMs perform their co-coordinating role between the beneficiaries and UPZ level officers. As a result, it has been revealed that absence of information in the CCs at UPs , which office is implementing which programs, has paved the way for corruption of the WMs. The information gap has made many people think that the authority of such beneficiary selection process rests upon the UP Members and Chairs. Thus, people sometimes pay bribes to UP functionaries for getting them enlisted in the beneficiary lists. It has been evident that corruption allegations against the UP functionaries are made by almost all the ordinary people.

The rare example of checking corruption by WMs at the Vadai UP has been revealed (case Study- 6.1) in this study. However this does not confirm that CC is being used to check country wide corruption of the WMs in general.

### **Case Study 6.1**

#### **WM Checked Corruption Allegation: Rajendranath Got Old Age Allowance Card and His Bribe Money Back**

After the election 2011, present elected WM, Md Shafikul Islam, of Ward No 8 of the Vadai UP, got a complaint from Rajendranath of Kishamat Boraibari Mouza, that he had provided Tk. 2000 to the previous WM and he had still not got his Old Age Allowance card. Md Shafikul Islam knew that people do not need to pay money to get such cards He informed this fact to Union Social Welfare Officer (USWO) Md Abdul Wahab. Md Shafikul, along with the USWO, mediated the complaint. The corrupt ex-Ward Member admitted that he had taken Tk. 2000 from Rajendranath. He returned the money to him. The USWO enlisted Rajendranath's name in the Old Age Allowance priority list and Rajendranath got his card.

In light of this information, this study took up the matter of how corruption has become institutionalized at UPs due to information gap among citizens. People who have participated in FGD sessions and interviews said that no one had ever lodged any complaint by formal procedure against the UP Chairs or WMs. It has been revealed that people have made complaints orally before them but that the UP Chairs and Members did not take such complaints seriously. One participant<sup>48</sup> in the FGD sessions stated,

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<sup>47</sup> The Union Committee (UC) of Social Welfare Office for selection of SSNPs is composed of UNO, UPZ chair, two representatives of MP's with the chairmanship of UP chair. The committee arranges announcement for attending the prospective beneficiaries in a place and makes the final list. The SWO allocate new cards on the basis of the allocation of the government.

<sup>48</sup> Male FGD Session held on 14.01.2014, at Nakradighi, Godagari UP, Ward-4.

I was provided less foodstuffs<sup>49</sup> during the Eid festival. I asked the WM why I was getting less food. But the WM did not give attention to my question. Moreover, the WM replied that I should stay calm and be happy with what I had got.

It is a common complaint raised in each of the 36 FGD sessions of the study areas. It can be argued that the people who do not know about their formal right to make complaints remain helpless against the corrupt acts of the UP functionaries. Although the UP Chairs and Secretaries are formal authorities for receiving such complaints, it has been revealed that some of them are also engaged in such corrupt acts.

Who is accountable to whom? The people engagement as well as the public accountability mechanisms<sup>50</sup> do not help in checking such corruption of UP functionaries. It has been revealed that the UP Chair took bribes on a regular basis. The following example was expressed by a participant at a FGD session<sup>51</sup>,

I have given Tk. 2500 to a broker (dalal) to get employment opportunity from the UP Chair. But still now I have not got that work. The broker is the follower of the UP Chair. I neither got any work nor my money back.

Facing a similar experience, one of the participants in another FGD session<sup>52</sup> raised the following question, which reflects the trap within which the poor are living in the rural areas. She asked,

“If I had the ability to pay Tk. 3000, why would I have asked my WM [for help]?”

Opinions are commonly held by the common people that the rich and people closest to the UP functionaries personally get UP services. Of the five UPs of Syedpur UPZ of Nilfamari District in the project implementation named EGPP, it has been revealed that relatives of UP Chairs and WMs, retired government officials and rich people have got their names included in the lists of VGF beneficiaries (The Daily Kalerkantha, 2014). The

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<sup>49</sup> In the government project named “Vulnerable Group Feeding “(VGF) people are supposed to get 30 kg foodstuffs per month. The poor people who are owners of not above 0.15 acre of land, who have got no source of regular income or who have got no earning member in his or her family, day labourers, women whose husband is physically handicapped or the poor who have been affected by natural disaster are eligible to get food aid under this programme. The objectives of VGF Programme are (a) to ensure food security for the poor and afflicted people, (b) to help the improve the nutrition for the poor and distressed children, (c) to keep market prices of essential commodities stable, (d) to keep the supply of food normal during lean periods and (e) to render both social and financial help to the beneficiaries through food distribution under this programme (cited from <http://www.ddm.gov.bd/vulnerable.php>).

<sup>50</sup> The public accountability measures which are supposed to taken by ACC for checking corruption are absent in the context of the present LGIs of the country.

<sup>51</sup> Male FGD Session, Vadai UP, Ward-1, February, 06, 2014.

<sup>52</sup> Female FGD Session, Hatikumrul UP, Ward -7, 28 January, 2014.



report also revealed that the WMs have said they did not enlist the names at the beneficiary lists: rather those are made by local MPs and UP Chairs. This study depicted that the WMs are found to have maintained close relationship with PIO. One WM<sup>53</sup> replied that, if he would not have maintained such relationship, he would not have got anyone enlisted as beneficiaries. So it can be argued that the poor remain poor due to the corrupt acts of the politicians and government officers. The study finding suggests that the lists of beneficiaries are not prepared at the WS following the directives of the law. Selection of beneficiary lists of all SSNPs at WS is better than selection for each programs beneficiary separately at UP level, one after another. Thus, it can be argued that arranging social mapping<sup>54</sup> before pre-budget session can resolve such problems.

### **Case Study 6.2**

#### **Fisherman Selection Projects: Negligence of UP Chairs Restricts The Process of Identifying Real Beneficiary**

The UPZ Fishery Officer of Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock has been responsible for selection of fishermen of all UPs of Kaliganj UPZ for benefit. He has been instructed to select those who really spend their daily life earning from fishing activities. He has appointed surveyors for that purpose. The surveyors have selected fishermen of all UPs of Kakina of Kaliganj UPZ. The directive of the project specifies that the UPZ fishery officer, along with the UP chairs, would select such fishermen. Although respectable persons of the locality were present there, no UP Chair was found there at the meeting on the final selection day of the fishermen at UPZ premises at the office of the UNO. The UPZ fishery officer interviewed two well-known fishermen of the locality and removed the fake names of fishermen. The UP Chair was supposed to select the real fishermen of his/her locality but the officer had to do the work with the help of the fishermen. The UPZ fishery officer said that the UP chairs are not responsive to their duties. He further stated that most of the time they did this.

The UP, with the data of social mapping, will be helpful for UPZ level officers and the UPZ level official will thus select real beneficiaries. The example (Case Study 6.2 ), which was directly observed by the researcher at Kakina UPZ, revealed that there are problems of co-ordination in the working process of UP and UPZ and negligence of duties of UP Chairs at the UPZ office. The UP functionaries were supposed to update information of all citizens of each Ward through Ward-based social mapping. Having interviewed the UP functionaries, it was learnt that no such list has been updated at Ward level. Most of them were of opinion that Ward based effectiveness of CC is necessary for

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<sup>53</sup> Interview Data, Paba UPZ, January 21, 2014.

<sup>54</sup> The process of social mapping has been discussed in the chapter 5 which includes WC members together for identifying wards problems and listing of extreme poor people.

people's information. So along with local politics and patron-client relationship between UP members and local politicians, "negligence of duties" of the UP functionaries, as in Chapter 5, are limiting the effectiveness of application of CC and RTI.

#### **6.4 Conclusion**

The process study of the provisions of CC and RTI of UP Act, 2009 and changes that are supposed to be made with the application of those provisions in the planning and budgeting process revealed that application of those provisions are yet to be implemented in those UPs where there is a lack of NGO intervention in such programs. It has been evident in this study that willingness and personal motives of UP functionaries and NGO interventions have made some differences in the application of CC. But overall impression shows that existing political and administrative culture, lack of government intervention for developing CC, lack of strong monitoring of the application of RTI, lack of education and awareness of general people and lack of training and education of UP functionaries are still some reasons for which the CC and RTI could not be applied by citizens as tools for accountability measures of UP functionaries.

## **Chapter Seven**

### **Service Delivery at the Local Level: Challenges of People's Participation and the UP Functionaries' Accountability**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

This Chapter illustrates the real outcomes of the application of the processes of WS, OBM, CC and RTI in the working process of UPs. This Chapter analyses and measures the extent of responsiveness of UP functionaries and the extent of people's capability to hold their representatives accountable for their actions. It explores the changes in service delivery process to the general people and later discusses about the challenges which were encountered during working process those are the innovations of the UP Act, 2009.

#### **7.2 Change Management: A perspective from New Public Management (NPM)**

The fundamental objective of employing any new input in any organization is to bring about improvements in efficiency (Finan and Dean, 1957 cited in Obaidullah, 1999:180). Efficiency means utilization of minimum resources to achieve maximum output : to obtain this result, implementation and development of organization changes are necessary, as well as to achieve other objectives of the organisation (*ibid*). "Whatever changes are required to enable administrative organs to execute public policies in an effective end responsible manner" (*ibid*) is the substance of organisational change. Change is defined as, "making things different" and planned change is, "change activities that are intentional and goal oriented" (Robbins, 1996:718). Khan (2010:19) has described reform as an agent for change and stated, "Reform is the means of embracing and adapting change. Nothing stands still either in the natural or the social world. Change is the overwhelming reality of life. According to the theory of evolution, the species that fail to adapt to changes are eliminated in the process of the survival of the fittest". While commenting on the change approach, Tummers wrote that "the emergent change approach does not consider change as a linear process, or an isolated event, but sees change as continuous, recursive and unpredictable. Change appears to be unplanned and unexpected" (Weick, 2000 cited in Tummers, 2011: 559). Robbins (1996:719) has differentiated change into two divisions:

- First order change, which includes linear and continuous change, and
- Second order change, that is multidimensional, multilevel, discontinuous, and radical.

Summarising recent literature on reforms, Khan (2010:20) stated that:


Ideally, reform is a continuous process and not a short affair. In fact, reforms would be redundant if adjustments were made instantaneously, as ground realities change. In real life, there is always a gap between government initiatives and the changes experienced by the society. The larger are these gaps; the greater is the compulsion for reforms”.

It is a hypothesis of this research that reforms in the lowest unit of the administration can bring greater achievement for a country in general. Khan thus has properly cited Grindle’s statement regarding the importance and challenges of decentralization:

Decentralization can contribute to improved performance of local government; it can provide new opportunities for responsiveness to local needs; it can mean that if governance improves citizens may hold public officials and agencies more accountable. Decentralization is not a linear or consistent process, and it can suffer reverses, as often as advances, in terms of how local governments and citizens take up its challenges (Khan, 2013:77).

The objective of the planning and budgeting process set out in the 2009 Act, with people’s involvement is to create transparency, enhance participation of people and introduce responsiveness of the UP functionaries to the demands of the citizens who take part in the decision making processes of UPs. This study reveals that some planned changes have been made in the working process of UPs, including planning at WS, budgeting of OBM and maintaining financial records at the UP level, which is a continuous processes.

**Table 7.1**  
**Sources of Resistance to Change**



Source: Adapted from Robbins (1996:725)

While enhanced participation of people in the planning process at the WS was largely achieved, project implementation approval by upper level government offices, developing CC and application of RTI desired outcomes were not achieved, since these changes are multidimensional and include multilevel organizations. However, this study has presented some individual as well as organizational resistances<sup>1</sup> (Table 7.1) that impede the desired changes which are supposed to be outcome of the 2009. Act. Such resistances are well-documented research findings in other studies of organization change (Robbins, 1996:723). This section reveals the changing style of service delivery systems of UPs. These resistances are analysed from the point of view of the NPM ideology, as explained earlier in this study.

### **Strategic Planning**

In the “Draft Sixth Five Year Plan” (DSFYF) local program design and implementation is supposed to be facilitated by local-level planning and budgeting (Aminuzzaman, 2011:198). In the policy process, local level planning and budgeting are linked together through the process of planning at WS and budgeting at OBM. This is a bottom-up approach of planning which seeks that needs and demands of the ordinary people at UP level would be reflected at higher levels of government i.e. at the UPZ for project implementation process. The Plan implies that the UP seems to be a better Basic Development Unit (BDU) for local level planning, since the scale of dispersion of villages and households is scattered over a wide geographical area (Ahmed, 1994:58).

While describing the objective of strategy, Nutt and Backoff (1992:55) states that, “Strategy is used to create focus, consistency, and purpose for an organization by producing plans, ploys, patterns, positions and perspectives that guide strategic action” (cited in Hughes, 1994:169 ). As consistently stated in this study, the strategy of the Government, in the 2009 Act and related initiatives like the 6<sup>th</sup> Five Year Plan, has been to integrate local-level, community-based planning into national level planning. This study has already concluded that the local planners have deliberately escaped the social mapping phase. This is one of the most important steps for local level planning, as stated by Zahid and Rahman (1994:21):

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<sup>1</sup> The figure 7.1 conforms to the resistances depicted by Robbins(1996:725)

For the design and implementation of local level planning need assessment of local people and identification of the local problems are very important. If the needs and problems of the local people are not identified properly, accurate and feasible planning can neither be designed nor implemented.

As explained earlier, one of the reasons why the planning process has not incorporated social mapping is the lack of capacity of local officials. The social mapping process could solve problems like:

- Who should participate at WS?
- Who are beneficiaries of UP services? and
- To what extent people have the autonomy to spend their resources?

Instead, as stated earlier, sector-wise plans have been identified at WS and prioritized at OBM without social mapping. Therefore, theoretically, lack of knowledge on resource mobilization and prioritized demand has made those projects' implementation questionable. The knowledge gap has made the common people feel that the WS has maintained the formality of organizing meetings only to ignore the views expressed there. Some other factors in disappointing citizens in the planning include lack of resources for project implementation and a top-down approach of local officials to planning are impediments of the participatory planning and budgeting process are revealed in the discussion of the previous chapter. It reveals that at the UPZ level, priorities are given to those projects' implementation that are favoured by the MP or the UPZ chair. On the other hand, the UP chairs' formal scope to bargain in the UPZ level's standing committees (SCs) is not working, since the SCs have not been working. So, UP-level and government appointed officers remain inactive in implementing projects unless they get support from the UPZ level political leaders. So, there is mismatch between the bottom up approach at the UP level and the top-down approach at the UPZ level.

There is evidence that NGO officials' interventions have made differences in implementing policies like planning, budgeting, making CC and applying RTI in the working of UPs. So, for a better outcome, it is necessary that NGOs will work with UPs to enrich the capacity of the UP functionaries. So the bottom-up approach of policy implementation is suggested by scholars, since they argue that top down approach works best when the policy implementation requires no new adaptation or technical expertise from other government agencies and NGOs (Mohammed et al 2009).

It is argued that the public professionals face an intense pressure when implementing new policy regarding service delivery (Tummers, 2011). UPs provide services with traditional techniques. New techniques of service delivery including services provided from specific counters, user charges, taking formal applications, providing information about planning process and grievance procedure etc. are still absent and the UP functionaries have little understanding about such processes. This study confirmed the theoretical discussions depicted by Tummers (2011) that the NPM values toward effective service delivery creates a conflict situation for the public officials, since these values are tending to increase performance standards for the public officials.

### **Citizen as Customer**

In the theory of NPM, citizens are treated as customers. Service provisions of any institution are designed on the basis of needs of citizens when they are treated as customers (Hood, 1991). Hazlett's and Hill's (2000) study revealed that, in the public sector, there is a lack of clear customer focus. This study finds that lack of social mapping has also obstructed the UP functionaries in identifying the real need for UP services. No new technique has been developed for providing information to the public regarding planning and budgeting processes of UPs. It is thus evident that citizens have not yet been regarded as customers and they remain outside the decision-making processes of UP.

### **User Charges**

This study has found that, even when there is a charter of services, there is no database of recipients of services from which user charges can be calculated. This is consistent with the UNDP findings for the State sector in Bangladesh generally: "absence of a standard database management of the utility service providers, inadequate infrastructure and legal regulations means that there is not adequate support for online payment systems and transactional eService development" (UNDP, 2010b cited in Bhuiya, 2011:8). It is evident that people do not pay taxes in some UPs and people have expressed that services are rendered at various costs, assessed and collected by the UP functionaries themselves. A Voucher system (Ehsan, 2004) is a technique of NPM in decentralized LGIs which is absent in all the councils studied here; this reflects the absence of a transparent system of administration in most UPs. So, innovations and techniques of NPM are absent at the UPs. Rather, they use traditional processes of service delivery which lead to mistrust of the UP functionaries by most voters.

### **Use of Information Technology**

Bangladesh is in the middle of the E-Government Development Index (EGDI)<sup>2</sup>, of 38% (74 countries out of 193) of total countries of the world (UN, 2014). In the 'e-Government framework' of the Government of Bangladesh, it has connected its 25,000 government offices under a national web portal<sup>3</sup>, which is designed in such a way that allows efficient public services at national and local levels, using Information and Communication Technology (ICT). The UP has its own institutional shape and UISCs have been working with the regular working processes of UPs. Using IT in the working of any institution tends to have the following effects:

- (i) Managerial hierarchies and organizational structures are flattened.
- (ii) Rewards are given for the achievement of results, not simply for activity.
- (iii) Work units (i.e., sections or departments) change from functional units to become process (often "case") teams.
- (iv) Customers have a single point of contact with the organization (Fowler, 1997).

Considering the managerial hierarchies and organizational structures (Figure 4.7) of the UP, these are well-designed to provide public service to citizens. The problem, in practice, is lack of government administrative officers to occupy the hierarchies and provide services. The study reveals that the elected functionaries have not got any training yet to develop their ability to use IT to serve the interest of the local people. The UP functionaries do not have any reward system. The position of UP secretary is identified as the centre of the organisation, so he is overburdened with all the work<sup>4</sup> of the UP. The UP has introduced outsourcing systems, with the deployment of entrepreneurs at UISC, but placement of government officers at the UPs is necessary to manage local administrative functions. So this is the reason that people do not go to UPs for government services: rather they sometimes contact their upper-level government officers. This provides another reason why people's knowledge of their rights and opportunities for RTI and CC is not spreading.

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<sup>2</sup> There are three components of E-Government Development Index (EGDI): Online Service Index (OSI), Telecommunication Infrastructure Index (TII), Human Capital Index (HCI).

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.bangladesh.gov.bd/www.bangladesh.gov.bd/index91ec.html?q=en/welcome-official-web-portal-government-bangladesh>

<sup>4</sup> As the lowest unit of administration, the UP Secretary is the only government officer occupied with the UP. The UPs are being assisted by two entrepreneurs of UISC but these are not regular staff.



Kadia and Bhagat have argued that, in the developing countries, it is predetermined that outcomes of any organization depend on external factors while, in the developed countries, initiatives are taken in the internal working process of institutions that bring maximum outcomes. They argue that interaction among technology and cultural variations in both societal and organizational contexts have to be taken into consideration in an absorption study of new technology in any institution (Kadia and Bhagat, 1988: 568). In this study context of UP planning and budgeting, measures in the internal working process of UP have not been taken into consideration by the UP functionaries. These measures include attempting to enhance revenue earning from internal sources for budgeting, proper information dissemination through UP, attempt to enhance people's participation, etc. However, the policy of making ICT more convenient for the public remains unused at the UP, due to lack of experts who can transform innovations into practice in the UP planning and budgeting process. The study also reveals that lack of arrangements for CC dissemination, due to lack of monetary allocation, have restricted people's access to the mechanism. The opinion of the DDLG<sup>5</sup> of Lalmonirhat district can be taken into consideration in this perspective:

There is no budgetary allocation for displaying CC in UPZs and UPs of Lalmonirhat District. Recently, we got some funds for displaying CC in the UZP premises. Cost of displaying CC for all UPs and UPZs is very expensive. So I could not make arrangements for displaying CC in the UPZs and UPs of Lalmonirhat District.

As such, most people lack the information that is required by law to be easily available. This is the result of political interference, resource constraints, lack of manpower and lack of training of the elected UP functionaries. These causes are outcomes of external forces which inhibit the planning process of UP.

### **Financial management**

Some UPs have got LGSP-II project funds. It is a requirement, to get such funds, that the UP is the subject of a clean audit report made by the project officials. The study findings suggest that the UP officials got clearance by those officials who audited the process of performance auditing. It has been revealed that the UP Secretary has maintained the records of fund mobilization following the guidelines of the LGSP-II project fund's

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<sup>5</sup> Interview data, Lalmonirhat District, February 13, 2014.

manual instruction. So the research shows that the UPs who have got LGSP-II funds have made progress in keeping accounting documents, due solely to the requirements of LGSP-II. This suggests that a similar policy of providing block grants to UPs, with strict accounting requirements, can increase UPs' internal financial management capacity.

This study finds that the flow of financial information at the OBM has enhanced the understanding of village people regarding UPs' capacity. The question-answer session, data dissemination through board and multimedia, and collective understanding of both general people and concerned WMs about UPs capacity, are some characteristics which have enabled people to have enhanced faith in the UP functionaries. People have expressed their satisfaction about the process. So, it can be said that the process of dissemination of financial data has enhanced trust of people towards the UP and the UP functionaries as well.

### **7.3 Service delivery at the Local Level: A Perspective from Social Accountability Mechanism(SAM)**

According to political theories explained earlier in this study, in a democratic institution, LGIs would meet the needs of the citizens more effectively by better utilisation of scarce resources (Lankina, 2008). However, it must be noted that the changing patterns of service delivery of the UP that are outcomes of the LG (UP) Act, 2009.

**Table 7.2**  
**Types of Services Received**

<b>Types of Services</b>	<b>Respondent</b>	<b>UP</b>
Sewing Machine	4	Hariyan-2 Gogram-2
Fishing Net (Group Utilization)	1*	Gogram
Roads & Culverts Construction	1*	Kakina
VGD, FFW	2	Hariyan
Widow Allowance	1	Gogram
Tube-well	1*	Hariyan


**Source:** Interview Data (2014) \* Participated at WS

The interview data reveals that, among 71 people, 10 respondents (table 7.1) (whether participated at WS or not) had received services including sewing machine, VGD cards, name enlisted in FFW, widow's allowance card etc. The data of this study revealed that

70% (7 out of 10) respondents did not participate at WS but received sewing machines from UPs and enlisted their names in the VGF list. 30 % (3 out of 10) respondents have assured that project implementation decisions, including road and culvert construction and beneficiary selection of fishing net for group utilization have been made in the WS meeting and finalized at the OBM.

From interview data, it is concluded that project implementation decisions were taken and finalized at both the WS and OBM. People have also confirmed such service delivery which has been decided in WS. On the other hand, research reveals that the other services, such as enlistment of names in various projects as beneficiaries, has not been made through WS and OBM. It has been explained in Chapter Six, how the political persons and government officials make such lists of the beneficiaries' names without paying attention to the WMs of the UP. Now the data is further reviewed to understand this practice.

**Table 7.3**  
**Perception about UP Service Delivery**



**Note:** Many respondents agreed with more than one option. **Source:** Interview Data (2014)

Perusal and follow-up of beneficiaries' lists showed that 71.43% (5 out of 7) respondents were relatives of UP functionaries and 28.57% (2 out of 7) respondents had worked in the election campaign either of a Member or Chair of the UP concerned. They did not participate in the WS but received services. So, it can be argued that services do not reach to those who participate at WS. While commenting on the service delivery process of UPs, most of the people opined that the UP functionaries do not provide services only to the real beneficiaries. The interview reveals that 45.07% (32 out of 71) general people

said that the UP functionaries provide UP services to the real beneficiaries who need service while 59.15% (42 out of 71) respondents expressed their view that the UP functionaries provide UP services to their friends and relatives as well as to real beneficiaries. 18.31% respondents said that the UP functionaries only fulfill their own demands. This group of people also has commented that the UP functionaries only provide services to those who can give money and sometimes, they provide services on the basis of political considerations. On the other hand, 95.74% UP functionaries stated that everyone of a locality did not participate at WS while 92.86 % UP functionaries said that real beneficiaries receive government-allocated goods and services.

In response to the question **“how do you provide services to general people?”** 80.95% (34 out of 42) UP functionaries’ said that they verify beneficiaries for UP services on the basis of their own judgment. Most of them said that they know the socio-economic condition of the voters of their locality. Very often they discuss with neighbours to decide which infrastructure project could be taken in what places or which service could be provided to whom. Data indicate that WMs, who do not organize WS, use similar methods to approve beneficiaries and projects, while the others make decisions at the WS. 11.90% (5 out of 42) WMs have declared that they have an updated list of vulnerable people and 21.43 % (9 out of 42) have stated that they have provided services to people who have contacted them directly or whose situations have been discussed at WS. Most of the UP functionaries expressed that they know the status of local people very well and provide services to them accordingly.

With the application of the two provisions of RTI and CC, it has been possible to verify the service beneficiaries of the UP. Evidence shows that the information of the service recipient lists and various project lists have been recorded and updated by the UP functionaries, for the first time. Those who participated, either at WS or OBM feel that UP services are provided to those who need them. The UP functionaries have organized WS and OBM and provided people scope to make them answerable for their actions. It is evident that people become spontaneous when they get formal scope for placing their demands at WS and are able to demand answers from their elected leaders. It is evident that the common people have become aware about their formal space of planning and budgeting and their right to bargain at the WS and the OBM. These processes have

enabled them to understand how to get UP services. So, the process of WS and OBM has changed the traditional service providing system slightly. Social accountability mechanisms have started to work since the UP functionaries have provided their constituents their rights under the Act, 2009.

However, this study also reveals that the majority of the people do not participate at WS and OBM, since they are not invited by their members and they do not have information regarding participation at WS and OBM. On the contrary, UP functionaries were of opinion that people do not participate since they remain busy and they feel they do not get any financial benefit from it. That means, either people do not understand the objectives of the planning process at local level or the UP functionaries are not able to make them understand about the objectives of the WS and OBM. It is evident that UP functionaries have deliberately organized a few WS but in most Wards there was none.

### **7.3.1 Religious Code and Patriarchal Attitudes**

Women constitute half of the total population, and their voices will not be heard if they do not participate in the decision-making processes of the UP. This study reveals that the religious codes limit the participation of women in some UPs, although it is evident that women's participation is necessary for effectiveness of the processes, including WS and OBM. Such limitation of women's participation can be explained from two perspectives.

Firstly, the women do not go outside their homes due to the religious codes prevailing in the society. The data show that this applies to both female WMs and voters of the study area. The data<sup>6</sup> reveal that 83.08%, 15.92% and 1% of the population of the study area are Muslim, Hindu and others, respectively. 85.11% and 14.89% of the UP functionaries are Muslim and Hindu, respectively, confirming the study by Rahman (1986:75). He stated that, religiously<sup>7</sup>, Bangladesh is a plural society with a predominant Muslim population. He further stated that the religious practices of people in their daily lives has impact in government institutions, politics and administration. While discussing the value of

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<sup>6</sup> Appendix-7.1. It shows the religion of both the general people and the UP functionaries.

<sup>7</sup> "Every religion is characterized by a definite philosophy, a kind of symbolism, a code of ethics, various rituals, ceremonies or festivities connected with birth, death, marriage, etc. It is the core of morality and ethics, and is considered necessary for ensuring and sustaining virtues. Religion provides a code of conduct which is followed by people both for social discipline and for fear of divine punishment" (Rahman, 1985:75).

UP services, which could be helpful, one of the female respondents<sup>8</sup> stated that she would not attend at the WS due to her restricted mobility as a Muslim woman. She has stated that:

In this area my husband owns a very small amount of cultivable land. We have a tin shed home, so people might think we are rich. But we cannot afford our children's educational expense, clothing and other commodities. I take in sewing work. Often, I think of taking training, I feel if I could earn more effectively, I could help my husband. I did not know that, through the WS, we could place such demands to the UP. But my husband will not permit me to go outside the house for this purpose.

Arguments arise from the perspective of women's restricted mobility and *purdha* system (hiding of women) which impedes their participation in the political process. Some prominent researchers have found that Islam does not impose restrictions on the mobility of women that have been being practiced by Muslims (Monsoor, 1999). They argue that, in the Asian countries, the provisions of Islamic law and the verses of the Quran have been wrongly interpreted. Considering this matter, Kabbani's argument can be taken into consideration: "Women are now arguing that men have distorted Muhammed's<sup>9</sup> teaching to entrench the male elite" (cited in Monsoor, 1999:27). While explaining this distortion Monsoor (1999: 28-29) has depicted Smock's (1977) argument,

Islam, by the time of its entry in the subcontinent, already incorporated principles of patriarchal arbitrariness and sexual rigidity not compatible with the letter and spirit of Quranic provisions and many of Muhammad's teachings. Thus, the form in which Islam reached India, more than five centuries after the life of Mohammed and through the aegis of Turks, Afghans and Mughals, clearly accorded women a subordinate religious and social status.

The provisions of the Islamic law and verses of the holy Quran do not differentiate women from men in the matter of practicing spiritual knowledge. Evidence shows that the *Sunni* branch of Islam permitted women to have education, to work with men, to own property, to participate in war and have political rights (Monsoor, 1999:22-27). Common Bangladeshis were especially influenced by Sufism, which was far more egalitarian and informal than the official Islam practiced in Persia and Saudi Arabia.

This study reveals that the Muslim women, along with women of other religions, as WMs and voters, have participated in the planning and budgeting process of UPs. Not all women from all parts are maintaining such restricted mobility<sup>10</sup>. For example, in Gogram

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<sup>8</sup> Female FGD Session, Vadai UP, 06 February, 2014.

<sup>9</sup> In Islam Mohammed is regarded as the last prophet and messenger of God (The Quran 33:40).

<sup>10</sup> This is because the Muslims of this subcontinent absorbed, with Islamic belief, indigenous cultures which are akin to Hinduism (Mansoor, 1999).

UP,<sup>11</sup> women do not talk about such restrictions on their mobility, since most of them were from indigenous tribes and are not Muslim.

So it is the patriarchal attitude that has been extracted from the Islamic law and misinterpretation of the Quran which has made the women feel inferior to their men counterparts. Women affected by these beliefs do not participate at UP meetings as society does not accept their participation in such public gatherings. From FGD data, it is evident that, although women had information regarding WS, they did not participate. One female respondent<sup>12</sup> replied to the question “Why did you not attend the WS?”, as follows:

My husband is very serious. He did not allow me to cast vote in election. But if my husband allows me, I will attend the meeting next time.

Another female respondent reported that her husband had told her that they did not get anything from the UP, so it is not necessary to attend the WS. So, the mistrust of the UP functionaries have discouraged many villagers from participating, including the women. Most of the female participants at FGD reported that they were afraid to attend any government office. One participant in a FGD session<sup>13</sup> stated her experience in the following way:

If I visit the UP, the UP functionaries will make me explain whether my husband had allowed me to go there. The UP functionaries will complain to my husband. Once I went to the UP to get a VGF card. The UP functionary scolded my husband and asked him how he allowed me to go to the UP. My husband beat me when I returned home. From then, I do not go there. We are poor and only watch other people getting various services from the UP.

So, it is evident that this woman does not resist her husband and that the attitude of the public officials toward female participation has not changed. Folscher (2007:176) thus properly argued regarding their participation at OBM:

Despite several interventions (coloured cards to identify women’s issues, women-only groups in planning meetings, and women representation on committees), the voices of women are still not being heard, and men dominate most of the meeting.

However, UPs make no special arrangements for those women WMs and voters who remained outside the planning process. The Bangladeshi rural social setting reveals that

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<sup>11</sup> Region-based differences have been observed by the researcher, for example, that the indigenous tribal women voters and WMs in Rajshahi District make their voices heard and they perform their duties of organizing WS and OBM.

<sup>12</sup> Female FGD session, Vadai UP, 06 February, 2014.

<sup>13</sup> Female FGD session, Kakina UP, 09 February, 2014.

most of the married women are engaged in household activities. The women in the study area are carrying out their household and reproductive roles. The study data reveals (Appendix-7.2) that 87.11%, 1.78% and 9.33 % female respondents are married, divorced and widowed, respectively, and among those 88%, 5.78% and 6.22% female respondents are in the categories of housewife, daily labourer and others (dependent on son, widow or others etc.) respectively. Evidence shows that patriarchal attitudes of both male and female citizens of the society act against women's transcending household work to embrace other activities including economic and political ones. As a consequence, such attitudes have restricted their participation in the planning process at the WS and OBM, although there is a government policy to prioritize gender-sensitive demands with the participation of women. In reality, the women are not able to attend such meetings due to the patriarchal societal structure that influences every stage of planning from initiation to finalization stage.

Secondly, the discriminatory attitudes of the UP functionaries on the basis of their religious views and their attitude toward the other religions' female citizens<sup>14</sup> are limiting their access to the UP. One respondent stated her experience in FGD session<sup>15</sup> regarding her visit to UP in the following way:

Once I visited our UP office for my child's birth registration certificate. The UP Chair shouted at me, saying 'Have you cast your vote for me? Now you have come here for my signature. The Hindu voters did not cast their vote for me. Why should I provide service to them?' Saying this, he threw the paper in my face. Since then, I have been afraid to visit the UP.

The intention of making room for women, both as WMs and as voters, at the UP is for participation of more women in those institutions. This study provides evidence that 16% of women WMs do not perform their role as elected WMs: rather their husbands perform such activities of the UP. This study confirmed the findings of Panday (2008:162), who found that, due to existing societal norms and patriarchal values, women have not been accepted as elected officials by the society wholeheartedly. It has been explored in this study too. It has been revealed that FWMs play passive roles in terms of providing information regarding the participatory planning and budgeting process. Three FWM

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<sup>14</sup> There is no example from male voters.

<sup>15</sup> Female FGD session at Vadai UP, February 06, 2014.



have expressed this opinion<sup>16</sup> while answering the question: “Why do you not provide information to the voters?”,

We, the female UP representatives, are always kept unaware about UP-related allocations. We did not look at any letters which come to the UP. It seems the male members know everything but we do not know anything. I do not know about the resources that are allocated to my Ward. How will I inform my voters?

However, along with the variables of education and training<sup>17</sup>, such patriarchal attitudes are making the women feel inferior to the male WMs. The interview data, with those WMs who do not perform their role as elected UP members, revealed that, due to their religious beliefs, they stay at home. Available data suggests that female WMs did only those tasks that their husbands suggested that they do. Moreover, a patriarchal attitude of WMs is visible in the working process of the UP. It is easily comprehensible from the view which one WM expressed,

There is no need to call the female voters to the WS/OBM because they are unable to add value in the decision-making process. They should pay more attention to household work.

The same feeling was expressed by another female WM in the following way:

I do not get any scope to work with the UP. So what will I do for the voters of my locality? Male members get priority in the working process at UP. We are always ignored by our male WMs and Chair. We were elected to the UP just for formality. We are not involved with any activity of the UP.

Religion encompasses the patriarchal attitudes and restricts the elected FWMs and women citizens when they try to enter into the planning process at WS. In some UPs, women do not participate in the WS as they are not invited by their female elected leaders. So, in conclusion, female WMs are facing restrictions from two sets of people in the society: firstly, from family members, who generally do not allow them to perform their duties at UPs, and secondly, from their male counterparts of the UP, who do not allow the FWMs to work with them. It is seen from the example of those WS where FWM could attend at the meeting but became inactive in the decision-making process at WS. The researcher has directly observed in WS that, along with the female WM, the female voters of respective Wards have acted as a mass rally against the formality of the decision-making process at the WS: the female WM, officially an advisor, conducted the whole meeting.

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<sup>16</sup> Interview data, Hatikumrul UP, 29 January, 2014.

<sup>17</sup> Table 6.5 and Appendix 5.1.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the social setting of Bangladeshi rural areas does not encourage women to express their opinions freely and they feel hesitant to express their opinions. We must understand that the democratic model of participatory planning and budgeting has been, in the Act, 2009, superimposed upon a pre-existing structure of customary relations, which is fundamentally not democratic, and thus does not fit well. In such a case, we must recognise that the Act, 2009 cannot make major and rapid changes in practice, Yet we should fully appreciate the amazing level of change that has, nonetheless, occurred.

### 7.3.2 Lack of Education and Awareness of General People

Empirical data<sup>18</sup> suggests that the majority of the people in the study area do not know about the provisions of the UP Act, 2009. It is expected that the transparency and openness about the UP's income, expenditures, various allocation and project expenditure against those allocation of data disseminated at WS and OBM would enable people to apply citizens' RTI and CC and ask questions.

**Picture 7.1**  
**CC and People's Awareness**



**Source:** Photo captured at the time of direct observation of the VGF delivery to women by the researcher.

Data suggest that neither educated nor illiterate people possess information about CC and RTI. Moreover, people's access to such information, available through Web Pages, UP premises, newspapers, television and radio, are limited. Most of the UP functionaries are unaware about the process of providing information to the general people. Evidence shows that education has direct impact on participation of people in political processes (Berinsky and Lenz, 2010). Interview data reveals that 43.59% of general people who participated at WS are in the education range of Class-I-Class VII (only primary school or lower secondary school

<sup>18</sup> Chapter-6, Table 6.12.

education) while 53.5 % participants in FGD sessions were illiterate and some of them, who did not participate in the WS, could only sign their names. In this connection, the argument of Verba *et al.*, (1995) can be taken into consideration. They argue that “education not only directly increases levels of participation, but also allows citizens to acquire the civic skills necessary to communicate their concerns to politicians effectively” (Berinsky and Lenz, 2010:358). Direct observation by the researcher reveals that education is important for citizens to understand the information dissemination through CC. Picture 7.1 illustrates that<sup>19</sup> the majority of the illiterate women who come to UP for service do not understand CC. In response to a question what had been published behind them on the billboard of the UP they replied (picture-7.1):

We are blind. We are illiterate. We cannot see anything. You make us understand how will we understand the written facts if we cannot read?

The previous Chapter shows that people do not know about their participation process at WS and OBM through the information dissemination at CC. Most of the common people who do not attend at WS explained that they do not have invitations from the WMs. So, in those UPs where people do not know about WS/ OBM it might be because they have not learnt about their formal rights through any formal mechanism. From FGD and interview data it is evident<sup>20</sup> that 47.51% and 31.59% ( $39.05+8.46=47.51+31.59=79.1$ ) people are illiterate and have elementary level of education respectively while only 17.41% and 3.48% people are in the education range VIII-SSC and HSC- Graduate respectively. The following data table attempts to depict citizens’ access to various information media.

**Table 7.4**  
**Access to Information by Sex and District**

District	Reading Newspaper			Listening to Radio			Watching TV			Using Internet		
	Total	M (%)	F(%)	Total	M (%)	F(%)	Total	M (%)	F(%)	Total	M (%)	F(%)
Rajshahi	1.87	72.8	27.2	1.06	50.5	49.5	15.78	52.5	47.5	0.33	72.0	28.0
	Lac			Lac			Lac			Lac		
Sirajganj	9.43	96.2	3.8	1.27	56.5	43.5	12.08	53.9	46.1	0.20	92.8	7.2
	Lac			Lac			Lac			Lac		
Lalmonirhat	1.80	92.5	7.5	0.44	45.9	54.1	2.53	58.5	41.5	0.2	86.3	13.6
	Lac			Lac			Lac			Lac		

M=Male, F= Female

Source: Compiled by author from BBS (2011: 28-29)

<sup>19</sup> At the food distribution day of a local NGO Manab Mukti Sangstha (MMS), that has been working with Ghurka UP, Raiganj UPZ under VGF program of WFP.

<sup>20</sup> Appendix 5.1. It shows the level of education of both the general people (N=402) and the UP functionaries (N=47).

The data (table-7.4) suggests that in Rajshahi District only 1.87 lac, 1.06 Lac, 15.78 lac and 0.33 Lac people<sup>21</sup>; in Sirajganj district only 9.43 lac, 1.27 lac, 12.08 lac and 0.20 Lac people; and in Lalmonirhat district only 1.80 lac, 0.44 lac, 2.53 lac and 0.20 Lac people; have access to reading newspaper, listening to radio, watching to TV and access to internet, respectively. This study finding suggests that most of the people have access to information through the medium of TV and very few people have access to information through the internet and newspapers in the study area. It also reveals that access of men to various media of information is larger than their women counterpart.

Thus, this data shows why most of the people do not have information regarding CC and RTI. This situation has actually reflected the apathy of the government officers who are responsible for implementation of the policy of dissemination of CC at the UP level. The government officers do not perform their responsibility to circulate the provisions of the Act personally into the hands of citizens or to develop training programmes on CC in such a way that the illiterate people could obtain information<sup>22</sup>. This finding confirms the study findings of Baroi (2013), who found that lack of initiatives from Government to popularize the provision of the RTI Act 2009 is the main reason that the Act has not had much success.

However, the government officials have made some alternative attempts at the local level. In response to the queries of researcher whether the general people knew about WS or OBM, some of the women who gathered in the UP replied,

We did not know about WS and OBM. But, a few days back, the UP Chair, along with the UNO, informed us about WS and OBM at a meeting held at the UP. This time we will participate at WS.

But what is evident in this research is that group inertia of the UP functionaries has restricted them in providing information to the general people. This inertia is the outcome of the lack of education of the UP functionaries; lack of their conceptual ability to understand the provisions of the Act and lack of training on information-providing techniques. As a consequence, even most of the educated people in the rural area, who do not visit UPs, remain unaware about CC and RTI: those who are not educated have no access to information necessary for UP's planning and budgeting process.

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<sup>21</sup> Lac is a measure of 100,000 commonly used in the Indian subcontinent.

<sup>22</sup> Discussion has been made in 6.2.2. It has been revealed that CC must be developed with direct involvement of the people.

### 7.3.3 Resource Constraints

Resource constraint is another major obstacle to effective implementation of PP and budgeting process as has been mandated by policy makers. This challenge can be explained from two perspectives: 1) **Resource constraint for policy implementation** 2) **Resource constraint for projects implementation**. Numerous studies reveal that both financial and human resources are the key inputs in the effective implementation of policy (Baroi, 2013:26). Following the argument provided by Nachmias (1979)<sup>23</sup>, this study reveals that the Government did not take any initiative that could be measured (i.e. money spent for policy implementation, the unit of service provided, the number of staff employed etc.) for implementation of policy like CC and RTI.

The second challenge is related to poor state of revenue production of the UP and heavy dependency on central government allocation. This study confirms the study findings of Panday (2010) that dependency on central government is the main reason behind poor performance of UPZs in fulfilling the objective of the UPZ Act, 2009 (cited in Baroi,2013:26). In this study, the UP functionaries said that they are unable to organize meetings like WS and OBM and dissemination of CC and RTI due to lack of funds that could be mobilized from the UP's own sources.

However, the real income-expenditure condition of the UPs is apparent when one scrutinizes the real income-expenditure statements of all those six UPs for the FY 2012-13. The total income of various UPs has been categorized into the following three broad classes: a) Government Grants; b) Local Sources; and c) Other Sources. The data table of income<sup>24</sup> reveals that the revenue pictures of these six UPs differ to a large extent.

**Firstly**, it is evident that the total revenue income of different UPs from their own sources is very limited. The findings of Khan (2011:49), who argued that no Government took action to encourage the UPs to utilize their own sources of income and

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<sup>23</sup> Nachmias argued that policy output are tangible measures including money spent, the units of services provided, and the number of staff employed for policy implementation.

<sup>24</sup> Appendix-5.5. It has been revealed that the income statements include funds of some other NGOs and donor agencies other than the allocation against LGSP-II project fund in Gogram and Hariyan UPs. In Kakina UP it is revealed that there is information about LGSP-II project fund allocation. But it has been revealed that the Ghurka, Hatikumrul and Vadai UP did not include such information since these types of fund allocation depend on clean audit report of the respective UP. The study has explored that in the FY 2013-14 the fund allocation of LGSP-11 has been added with income with all those six UPs.

the prescribed sources of UPs income have gradually declined. There has been no mechanism for collection of house tax in some UPs. Revenue earnings from other sources other than house tax such as *Izara* of local *hat*, *Jalmahal*, trade license etc. are also limited in all those UPs. No valid database of those sources of tax has even been identified and developed by the UP functionaries of any UP. Rather, the in-depth interview with UP functionaries reveals that they mostly depend on the central government allocations. In addition, Khan's (2011) study also reveals that the majority of people had limited information regarding their tax liability and those people who did not pay taxes did not do so because they did not get expected services and other facilities from their UPs.

**Secondly**, documentation review and interview data<sup>25</sup> have substantiated the fact that the approved projects at UP level have not been selected by the UPZ officials for implementation. This study confirms the findings of the study of Khan (2011) to the effect that the UP has no scope in negotiation of intergovernmental resource allocation decisions: rather the UP functionaries have to take the blame of inappropriate use of government funds. Khan (2011:100) concluded, from data which he analysed, that:

1.88% of the total budget has been allotted for local government this fiscal year. But the lion's share of this allocation is given to the LGED. Consequently, the utilization of the funds is very poor: even 40% of the projected work is not implemented in a fiscal year. Corruption of the bureaucrats and the ministers is seriously undermining local development projects. Unfortunately, Chairmen and Members have to bear the blame for corruption, even though they may not be responsible for all of it.

Hence, it is evident that having no policy of sharing ADP between the central and local government (i.e. UP) is impeding the local level projects' implementation.

**Thirdly**, sometimes, elected political leaders of the ruling Party interfere with UP fund allocation, hindering the utilization of funds. The plans which are prioritized at WS have not been implemented by the respective UPs: rather influential political activists of the ruling Party utilized<sup>26</sup> those funds in their own discretion. At the same time, data also

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<sup>25</sup> Interview data with five UNO of five UPZ.

<sup>26</sup> It is evident from the income expenditure statements of some UPs that various incomes have not been represented by any government grants other than proportion of salary provided by government, 1% fund

shows that the WMs and UP chairs who are activists of an opposition Party became inactive in the fund mobilization and utilization process, which impedes the social mapping, planning and budgeting process of the UP. Evidence shows that a pro-Bangladesh National Party (BNP) UP chair successfully lobbied for local resources and, in the following example, we can see how activists of the ruling Party lobby when they really want local development:

A high-powered team from the Asian Development Bank Dhaka office visited Faridpur District Education Office in the middle of 2003, intending to make an assessment of priorities for building new high schools in the area. In our per-urban village, we spoke to a person who works as a peon (office assistant) in the District Education Office in the main sub-district complex in Faridpur, and who is also related to one of our Union Council Chairmen linked to the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). Hearing news of the mission, the peon quickly informed the Chairman, who phoned the local MP – a Cabinet Minister – in Dhaka and arranged an appointment. The Union Chairman urged the MP to ‘get a school for his Union’ from this Asian Development Bank initiative. Since the Chairman supports the ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP), he knew he had a strong chance of securing this favour. Before long, the District Commissioner (DC) of Faridpur received a call from the Minister – a call taken in front of the Chairman – instructing him to provide a school in his Union under the Asian Development Bank initiative, and coordinated all this with the District Education Officer (DEO) in Faridpur. The regulations provided that Asian Development Bank (ADB) would give money (about £90,000) for a high school, if the chairman or someone else contributed 1.3 acres of land to build it on, in exchange for having the school named after the land donor. However, finding someone interested in providing such a large donation of land proved difficult. So the Chairman and several other Union Council members again went to Dhaka to meet the Minister in order to request a land donation, suggesting to him that the school could be named after the MP’s mother. The Minister, also a large landowner in the area, liked this idea and finally decided to donate the land. Work on the new ‘Bhasan Char Begum Mohan Mian Ideal High School’ was begun in December 2004. The Chairman told us he had to go to Dhaka to meet the Minister four times, and had made eight trips to Faridpur District Office, in order to secure the new school (Lewis and Hossain, 2008:49).

Although study reveals that those UP Chairs or members, who are opponents of the ruling government, give as proof records of fund mobilization, they show their apathy to fund the mobilization process. They become non-performers when their Party does not have the status of ruling Government. So, above discussion gives evidence that plans of UP prepared at WS are collecting dust due to the power politics of politicians over resource allocation in

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from UPZ office against land transfer cost, and ADP. The allotment of other government grants in the name of that respective UP such as TR, EGP, FFW etc were absent in those statements.

the name of the UP, UPs own resource mobilization constraints, dependency on central government, lack of policy regarding intergovernmental resource distribution etc.

#### **7.3.4 Local Power Structure and Power Distance**

Politics embraces the relations between the State and the individual (Rogers, 1950). It is in fact, distribution of power<sup>27</sup>, as Pye (1966:29) defined politics as, “the activity by which differing interests within a given unit of rule are conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and the survival of the whole community”. The existing patron-client relationship which has been evident in this study can be explained by the statement propounded by Robbins (1996:463): “A person can have power over you only if she or he controls something you desire”. This is actually drawing attention to the factor of dependency that has been extracted from the definition of power.

In the perspective of power in local politics of Bangladesh, it has been evident that, during the last hundred years of British rule, the *Zamindars* (landlords) were in the centre of the local power structure until abolition of their position in 1950 (Islam, 1989:98-101). It means that the *Proza* were dependent on the *Zamindar* for their livelihood. As explained in the historical discussion Chapter, in the development of the local self-government institutions at the local level of this country, how rulers, during different regimes, have utilized those LGIs to strengthen their power base. However, researches show that the rural rich, who were owners of much land, were in the middle of the local power structure (Islam, 1989:98-138). In addition, *Ghosti* (kinship), high-status families who have urban influence and can maintain connection with political parties and bureaucracy, and religion-based leadership played important roles to regulate the power structure at the local level (Islam, 1989:98-138).

However, Panday (2004:32) found personal charisma and kinship ties as important factors in determining leadership at the national level of politics. Analyzing rural power structure Ann (1984:11) argued that “Basically, power in the rural areas was based on two kinds of relations: kinship and property relations”. It has been thus evident that the institutional

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<sup>27</sup> “Power has been described as ‘the last dirty word’ (Kanter, 1979:65). As power has been defined as “a capacity that A has to influence the behavior of B so that B does things he or she would not otherwise do” (Robbins, 1996:462). Robbins has conceptualized this relationship between A and B and found three characteristics: 1) a potential that need not to be actualized to be effective; 2) a dependency relationship; and 3) the assumption that B has some discretion over his or her own behavior (ibid).



power of the LGIs has been captured by the local influential and powerful persons. What was propounded by Weber<sup>28</sup> as impersonal authority structure in the traditional administrative executive's behavior is absent in the present day administrative system. It has been found that the institutions of this country are run by traditional authority system (Jamil et al. 2013:17). The symptoms named **“Patrimonialism”** or **“Paternalism”**<sup>29</sup> or **“Patron-Client Relationship”** of traditional authority system<sup>30</sup> are prevailing in the power structure of the country. It has been thus evident that families with high political standing play a prominent role in selection of leaders and exercise considerable power and authority in the society. The symptoms of local politics and power practices of the country are similar to the characteristics of “Large Power Distance” propounded by Hofstede in the figure-7.1. Jamil et al. (cited in 2013:26) thus properly depicted the nature of politics of South Asia and the consequences of such authority system,

Given the patrimonial nature of politics in South Asia, where leadership is personalized and authoritarian, power is exercised by a small group of people very close to the top leadership. While making major decisions, formal institutions are often neglected or by passed and decisions are made on the advice of a handful of family members and personal advisors, and are devoid of openness. As a result, the style of governance suffers from lack of transparency, accountability, and effectiveness.

However, in such a State, the political parties lack democratic practice in their internal Party organisation, the leaders at the local level follow only the decisions of the top level leaders. In practice, the election system does not work in the internal leader selection process of the political parties (Panday, 2004). Panday thus properly argued “the oligarchic nature of the Party leadership discourages local initiatives and prevents energetic and dedicated local members from rising to the top” (Panday, 2004:34). It has been evident that the less powerful persons accept the decisions taken by the powerful in the institutional arrangement, as has been assumed in the discussion of the conception of power.

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<sup>28</sup> The impersonal authority structure “is characterized by a clearly defined division of labour, an impersonal authority structure, a hierarchy of office, dependency of formal rules, employment based on merit, the availability of a career and the distinct separation of member's organizational and personal lives”(Turner and Hulme, 1997:83).

<sup>29</sup> In democracy, it is perceived that elected representatives are accountable to citizens. But, in reality, in paternalism elected representatives are accountable to the party leadership (Jamil et al.2013:19).

<sup>30</sup> To Weber it is a determinant factor which “protects and extends social privileges to certain persons belonging to certain family, caste and group (Jamil et al. 2013:25).

### **Power Distance**

Hofstede (1991: 28) defined power distance as “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Institutions are the basic elements of society like the family, school, and the community; ‘organizations’ are the places where people work”. From the data of this study, it appears that three layers of power structure have been prevailing in the local level politics that impact the governance process of the UP.

1. the power distance between the citizens and UP functionaries
2. the power distance between the UP chair and UP members
3. the power distance between UP functionaries and their upper level political and administrative authority.

This section has discussed the layers of power differences with the data revealed from this study and then analyzed the outcome of local governing process which is consequence of local power structure.

#### **7.3.4.1 Power Distance between the Citizens and UP Functionaries**

Mozumder et al. (2008:429) found a significant shift in power structure and exercise of enormous influence of the rural elites in the rural societies in Bangladesh, due to economic, social, cultural, infrastructural and political development. However, it has been also evident that the people in the rural areas are more educated than they were a decade ago. As Hofstede (1991:28) states,

Inequality within a society is visible in the existence of different social classes: upper, middle, and lower or however one wants to divide them-this varies by country. Classes differ in their access to and their opportunities for benefitting from the advantages of society: one of them being education. A higher education automatically makes one at least middle class. Education, in turn, is one of the main determinants of the occupations one can aspire to: so that, in practice, in most societies, social class, education level, and education are closely linked.

In contrast to the 79.1% illiterate/primary-level educated people, data showed that 40.4%, 29.8% and 29.8% (14.9+14.9) UP functionaries are in the range of Illiterate –Class-V, Class VI – SSC and higher study respectively. Data also show that there is difference in possession of land between most village inhabitants and their UP functionaries. Data from the study area shows that 72.39% (291 out of 402) of village residents have no land. The ownership of land data presented in the Table (Appendix- 7.3) indicate that 5.47%, 0.75%, 5.22% and 10.20% of village residents have only 0-16, 17-33, 33-66 and 67-above

decimals<sup>31</sup> of land, respectively. In contrast, 21.28% of UP functionaries have no land while 46.81% have only 0-16 decimals of land. Yet almost one-third of the UP officials (i.e. 31.91%) could be described as “landed gentry”: they have more than 200 decimals of land. Data in this study shows an interesting correlation between participation in the study’s FGDs and land ownership: very few FGD participants have any cultivable land.

The “landed gentry” description should not be overused: the majority of the UP functionaries own less than 16 decimals of land and almost half are small holders with 0-16 decimals of land. These are not necessarily the super-rich. Yet only one-fifth are landless and can thus be said to be of the same socio-economic class as most of their constituents. A later section of this Chapter will consider who the landless and who the landed Members of the UPs are and their relative roles in the UP decision-making process.

In terms of occupation and income range<sup>32</sup> of villagers (N=402), the data (Appendix 7.4) show that 20.90%, 45.52%, 21.14%, 6.22%, 3.73% and 2.49% are in the income range of Tk.1500-3000, Tk. 3000-5000, Tk. 5000-7500, Tk. 7500-10000, Tk. 10000-15000 and Tk. 15000-above respectively. It has also been revealed that 44% and 31%, respectively, are day labourers and farmers while 9% and 5%, respectively, are involved in business and service and 11% are involved in other occupations. Data shows that both male and female respondents expressed a need for more employment opportunities in their village. The day labourers become unemployed for six months every year in their agricultural society, as during this period the crops grow without much help or it is too cold to plant a new crop. Their work is mainly planting and harvesting.

**Figure 7.1**  
**Differences between Small and Large Power Distance Societies: Politics and Ideas**

<i>Small power distance</i>	<i>Large power distance</i>
The use of power should be legitimate and is subject to criteria of good and evil.	Might prevails over right: whoever holds the power is right and good.
Skills, wealth, power and status need no go together.	Skills, wealth, power and status should go together.
The middle class is large.	The middle class is small.
All should have equal rights.	The powerful have privileges.

<sup>31</sup> “Decimal” is a fraction of an acre, a measure introduced by the British in British India in the 1800s. 0.13 decimals is roughly 0.13 acres.

<sup>32</sup> According to BBS 2013 in the FY 2012-2013 per capita income is \$923 which is equivalent to 74,380/-Tk. This study revealed the same finding. In this study, a respondent’s income has been added to his/her family’s income.

Powerful people try to look less powerful than they are.	Powerful people try to look as impressive as possible.
Power is based on formal position.	Power is based on family or friends, charisma and ability to use force.
The way to change a political system is by changing the rules(evolution).	The way to change a political system is by changing the people at the top (revolution).
The use of violence in domestic politics is rare.	Domestic political conflicts frequently lead to violence.
Pluralist governments based on outcome of majority votes.	Autocratic or oligarchic governments based on cooption.
Political spectrum shows strong center and weak right and left wings.	Political spectrum, if allowed to be manifested, shows weak center and strong wings.
Small income differentials in society, further reduced by the tax system prevailing religions and philosophical system stress equality.	Large income differentials in society, further increased by the tax system prevailing religions and philosophical systems stress hierarchy and stratification.
Prevailing political ideologies stress and practice power sharing.	Prevailing political ideologies stress and practice power struggle.

Source: Hofstede (1991: 43)

Appendix-7.5 shows that 34.0% of UP functionaries earn their income from business, while 17.0% from agriculture, 17% from employment and 25.5% are housewives. Among the UP functionaries, 10.6%, 12.8%, 21.3%, 19.1% and 36.2% are in the income ranges Tk.3000-5000, Tk.5000-7500, 7500-10000, Tk.10000-15000 and Tk.15000 and above, respectively.

The obvious conclusion must be that, not only do elected UP officials own more land than do most of their constituents, they also have higher incomes. They are representative in a political but in not a socio-economic sense. Thus, we can understand why Aziz (1991:36) found a patron-client relationship between the representatives and the represented at this level. UP voters do not elect politicians to represent them: they elect richer people to help them by giving them resources: the State's or their own personal resources. Otherwise, the elections are useless formalities to the penniless constituents: they don't need a voice, they need basic necessities. Thus, these constituents may not be motivated to go to meetings and make demands on these members or ask them supervisory or information-seeking questions: they need them too much to cause trouble for them.

Under the existing socio-economic pattern, the rich are in the control of the institutions of power, authority and sources of production (e.g. land). As a result, the poor become dependent on the rich for their survival. Due to age-old dependency relationships of the poor with the power structure, through the maintenance of patron-client linkage, the leadership generally comes from the affluent families with vested interests, thereby leaving the vast majority of the disadvantaged rural people out of UP activities (Aziz, 1991:36).

So, those who possess a little more, sometimes a lot more, land among in the rural areas become the elected officials of the UP. Panday (2004:25) has thus properly stated while describing Patron-Clientism as “a feature of peasant or pre-capitalist societies<sup>33</sup>, found to persist in modernising societies, has been widely used to understand third world politics”. The above structure of income, education, occupation and land ownership of the representatives and the represented has thus reflected the dependency between the two, both on an individual and on a group level, the one being powerful, relatively wealthy and having high social status, the other having “none of the above”. (Islam, 2002 cited in Panday, 2004:25).

#### **7.3.4.2 Power Distance between the UP Chairs and UP Members**

Appendix-7.6 shows differences between the socio-economic statuses of the UP Chairs and the UP Members. The UP Chairs are in the range of higher study while the WMs have only elementary education. The male and female Ward members are not highly educated, which is substantiated by other research (Mohammed, 1991).

The data table<sup>34</sup> substantiates the finding of Panday’s study, in which he concluded that the highly-educated women did not compete in the election process of UP. Most of them had completed only secondary schooling (Panday, 2008:157). Data collected in this study indicate that 50% (9 out of 18) of female WMs have only primary-level education ,while 44.44% (8 out of 18) have secondary education and only 5.55% (1 out of 18) have higher education. Most of the UP WMs have only primary-level education but most of the UP Chairs have higher education. Mozumder’s study (Mozumder et al., 2008:433) found that the first and foremost factor holding positions of rural leadership is ‘**the level of education**’. The second and third important factors are ‘**personal quality**’ and ‘**affiliation with political party**’, respectively (Mozumdar, 2008).

This study collected data on the variable “**personal quality**”<sup>35</sup>. Available data suggest that, due to the lack of conceptual and technical ability, low morale and lack of responsiveness and leadership ability, the WMs neither know the allocation of their respective Wards nor do they utilise the money for any project implementation. As a

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<sup>33</sup> It has been also revealed by Khan (2010:204) that “dynastic loyalties are hallmarks of agrarian societies”.

<sup>34</sup> Appendix-7.6. It shows education level of members and chairs of UP.

<sup>35</sup> In Chapter Five Section: Section WS

consequence, the highly-educated and rich UP chairs take all actions. It has been revealed in this study that money is a key factor for winning in the UP election process. It has been said by all WMs and Chairs that they have invested money at the time of election. As a result, it is evident that elected UP chairs are those who have sufficient financial backing through their personal income range and land ownership in the rural areas. It is evident in this study that the UP chairs are also in better position in terms of land ownership, and income range<sup>36</sup>. The wealthier members of the rural society compete in the elections for UP Chair and they have political backing of the major two political Parties of Bangladesh. The interaction among money and political backing plays an important role in the election process of the functionaries of UP. Party data support the conclusion from land and income data that UP Chairs belong to the highest economic class in the existing rural society of Bangladesh. Many of those planning to participate in national level politics began their careers as Chairs at UP level. The UP Chairs have strong connections with the national level politicians or otherwise it can be said that the MPs utilize those political leaders at local level at the time of their election at national level. Given this context,, the WMs, who have lower economic and education and connection with upper level political leaders, tend to accept the decisions of the UP chairs.

#### **7.3.4.3 Power Distance between the UP Functionaries and their Upper Level Political and Administrative Authority**

Appendix 7.7 shows that 34.04 % of UP functionaries of the UP's belonged to the political group of Awami League (AL), the ruling Party of the country since December, 2008, while 34.04% UP functionaries belonged to the political group Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). It has been evident that local MPs, UPZ chairs, Vice Chairs and administrative officers at the UPZ level are comparatively better compared to the education, administrative knowledge, political connection of the UP functionaries.

Does such a power distance have an impact in service delivery of the UP? **Firstly**, this question can be analysed from the dependency theory of power. Planning process at WS is designed for participation of ordinary villagers. So the UP functionaries organized those WS when they realized that receiving funds depends on the organizing of WS.

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<sup>36</sup> Appendix 7.6 and 7.7 which shows the land ownership and income ranges of the UP functionaries.

Research suggests that WMs have organized some fake WSs. Their low morale has induced them to do so. The service delivery of UP to the real beneficiaries has been deterred due to the fact that those UP functionaries have manipulated the service delivery and become the owner of those services. So it is said that lack of people's participation due to the WMs' low morale is the cause of such outcome.

**Secondly**, interviews have disclosed that the political identity of the UP Chair has a substantive effect on UP-related matters. It can be argued from two perspectives. **Firstly**, if the UP Chair belongs to an opposition group, that UP does not get Government grant /allocations properly. **Secondly**, people do not expect anything from those UP Chairs who belong to the opposition. Which factors lead the UP leaders to belong to those Parties? It has been evident that the local politicians are being used by the national level leaders for their election campaigns. It is thus properly said that (Sobhan, 2004:4105). Both parties have developed Party manifestos which serve as little more than *pro-forma* obligation to their electorates which rarely intrude into their legislative practice or executive behavior. Party agendas tend to be designed by a few professionals, in consultation with few leaders, and are rarely exposed to debate within the Party or consultation with the rank and file, let alone with the public. The manifesto thus means all things to all people with little binding value as a guide to action by party workers.

It has been evident that the local WMs or chairs have no clearly identified role in the national level major political groups, since the UP are without Party labels and the UP is officially a non-partisan authority. There is no mechanism to measure political efficiency of the UP functionaries. It is only determined by the personal relation between local level leaders and with the central political leaders of the political group. In the power-dependency relationship, local MPs and UPZ chairs are being invited to the WS and OBM by the UP. The **picture 7.2** shows how general people are gathered in the name of OBM and entertained<sup>37</sup> with food. It is thought that the UP chair invites local MP and UPZ Chairs to show honour to them. However, there is no provision to make such arrangement in the Act, 2009.

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<sup>37</sup>Although there is a provision for arrangement of food for OBM (UP operational manual, 2012), in this case it has been evident that the MP as chief guest came late and the meeting turned into a political platform, so the people were provided with food.

**Picture 7.2**  
**Food Distribution among Citizens Participated at OBM**



**Source:** Photo captured at the time of direct observation of the OBM of Hatikumrul UP by the researcher.

So why do the UP Chairs do so? It is actually reflecting the patron-client relationship prevailing at the local level, where the UP Chair is expected to strengthen his/her political backing. Panday's argument thus properly depicted the picture of patron-client relationship, which is the outcome of power distance between the local and national-level politicians. While describing such situation it is stated,

In Bangladeshi politics, there is a high degree of "power distance"; political party generally discourages participation and casual about the process of consultation. Instead, a high premium is placed on personal loyalty, and relationships based on the pecking order. The general public prefers autocratic, paternalistically-oriented leaders. Deviant behavior and idealistic followers are less encouraged. Leader-follower relationships are characterized by protection, patronage and favour on the part of the leaders, and respect, loyalty and compliance on the part of the followers. Opposing a superiors' decision or raising a question is often considered '*beyadobi*' (out of one's proper place) (cited in Panday, 2004:27).

It can be thus argued that such power distance is the cause that leads the UP functionaries not to protest against the UPZ Chair or local MP or with the UNO when they interfere with the UP allocations. These findings conform with the viewpoint propounded by Lankina (2008), who argued that, if the local political representatives do not perform their duties properly at local level, the political leaders of the ruling Party manipulate the service delivery of that institution. In line with this argument, the local MP and UPZ Chairs have been found to interfere with the process of allocation of money of UPs. In line with Sobhan's (2004:4105) statement, it has been revealed that the followers of the ruling Party are not involved in publicizing their Government's new policies.



There is no perceived role for such ruling Party workers, either in disseminating the policies of the Government before the electorate or in monitoring the state of governance at the local level. Some workers do spontaneously take some initiatives in both these areas but this does not originate from any organized initiative by the ruling Party.

This is actually reflecting the structural dysfunction of involvement of the local level politicians in the LGIs. Again, theoretically, it is presumed that the formal planning at WS is supposed to form new political groups. Yet no new political group has emerged from the formal political process at WS and OBM. Rather, it appears that *dalals* (brokers) who always gain their credibility as ruling Party supporters, utilize the funds allocated at local level. They become the ultimate negotiator of local government allocations and services. The elected WMs and Chairs from Opposition groups remain inactive.

### **7.3.5 Lack of Transparency and Mistrust of the UP Functionaries**

“Transparency is generally defined as the open flow of information and the literature on transparency in the relationship between governments and citizens has strongly emphasized this concept of openness” (cited in Park and Blenkinsopp, 2011:256). In this perspective, it can be argued that, as social accountability mechanisms, WS and OBM have offered opportunities for people to become informed about the budget process and to have ensured access to various data including UP’s income, expenditure, project list etc. relevant to UP. It can be said that the direct engagement of citizens has been increased to a little extent by the information available at the WS and OBM. The written budget copies and budget statement are distributed and displayed for people’s information and the recipients understand that information. However, many WS participants have not participated at the OBM. Many village people do not understand the cyclic nature of UP planning.

Furthermore, most people do not have information regarding the entitlement to CC and RTI as it relates to the planning and budgeting process of UPs. While describing the “involved citizens” at the UP who are an integral part of the social accountability mechanisms, Sarker and Dutta (2011:7) stated that “these social accountability processes can be used if citizens are prepared for its use. Otherwise, there is always threat of capture of these processes by an elite class who would not be responsive to the interests of citizens”.

As already explained in earlier Chapters, information available on the UP notice board and through UISC only is not accessible to many: most people do not go there or do not read it.

Such means of publishing information is insufficient to provide a real right to participation at WS and OBM. Thus, as explained earlier, very few applications have been received by the UP functionaries for seeking information from or lodgment of complaints against the UP.

#### **7.3.5.1 Fear of UP Functionaries**

Not only do most not go to get information about CC and RTI, many do not have the conceptual ability to understand what CC and RTI are and their significance. Some of the participants expressed that fear of their respective UP Chair and WMs. Sobhan (2004:4105) explained the problem as the “**Criminalization of Politics**”. He further stated that “the ineffectiveness of the Party workers is increasingly driving them towards extra-legal activities. This tendency is aggravated by the increasing presence of “*mastaans*” (hoodlums) in the major political Parties”. In analysing the local power structure, it has become evident that the people who are comparatively in better position in terms of social and economic status and have strong political backing with central level politicians become WMs. This study conforms with the findings of Jamil *et al* (2013:27) as they depict the opinion of the Chairman of Anti-Corruption Commission (2012) that:

“Corruption takes place at two levels: at the upper level between political leader and businessmen; at the lower level between political leaders and goons and hoodlums”.

It is evident from the data obtained from FGD sessions that WMs and Chairs misuse their judicial power in local Shalish<sup>38</sup> by mediating between two parties. FGD participants<sup>39</sup> stated that UP functionaries always provide favourable decisions for those who provide money (as bribes) to them. People do not visit UPs because they have practical experience of being harassed by the UP functionaries. Moreover, many reported open threats to people who contradict the officials. Local political goons have interfered in the UP’s service delivery.

#### **7.3.5.2 Institutionalization of Corruption**

The corrupt UP functionaries, along with UP village police and their political supporters become the middlemen for UP services. This misunderstanding about SSNPs being provided in the discretion of local authorities has boosted corruption in the study areas. It has happened due to the low economic status of WMs. It is observed that 88.88 % female

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<sup>38</sup> It is a formal court at Union level. It is revealed by Qadir (1966) that the UP Chair and WMs are unable to contribute to the dispensation of proper justice due to their political motives, dishonesty and nepotism or due to their ignorance of legal procedure (cited in Siddiqui, 2000:146).

<sup>39</sup> Male FGD Session held on 18.01.2014, at Hariyan UP, Ward-7.

WMs and 94.11% male WMs belong to the income range of Tk. 3000-15000. Among the male WMs, 52.94% of them have land ranging from 2 acres in size. The female WMs have land ranging from 0-16 decimals<sup>40</sup>. The honorarium<sup>41</sup> they receive on monthly basis is inadequate. The poor WMs invest money at the time of election and most of them said that they would not have been elected if they had not provided money to their voters. One FWM stated<sup>42</sup> how she spent project money for her personal use. She said,

My husband died last year. There is no other earning member in my family. My neighbours suggested that I stand in the UP election. I borrowed money from my relatives. After winning in the election, I had to get back their money. The UPZ Chair also knows my condition. Sometimes, I spent project money for my personal use. It is also known to my Chair.

As such, it is evident that the following forms of corruption are prevailing in the LGIs of Bangladesh:

**Table 7.5**  
**Forms of Corruption in LGIs in Bangladesh**

Bribe(36.7)	Negligence of duties(11.0)	Interference by influential persons(6.30)	Embezzlement(1.50)	Cheating(0.10)	Threat(0.02)
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**Source:** TIB, National Household Survey cited in Monem and Baniamin (2013:245)

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the percent of affected households

It seems that corruption is considered permissible if the purpose is to repay campaign debts and expenses. Many of the poor WMs contested UP elections by investing money as it is considered a profitable business of getting a return on their “invested” money. Too often, however, UP functionaries are getting their money back by fraudulent acts on allocations made in the name of the UP. The FGD data revealed that the amount of bribery collectible ranges from Tk. 10 to Tk. 3000 for receiving any sorts of UP services<sup>43</sup>, including SSNPs. This is evident in all UPs, whether WMs are members of the ruling Party or of the opposition Parties. It is evident in this study that the WM’s personal

<sup>40</sup> Land Amount calculation: 100 decimal= 1 Acres, 1.65 Decimal= 1 Katha, 33 Decimal= 1 Bigha

<sup>41</sup> The UP Chair and Members get a total monthly honorarium of Tk. 3,500/- and Tk. 2,000/- respectively. The Government provides Tk. 1,750/- and Tk. 950/-, respectively, to the UP Chair and Member and the rest of the amount is provided by the UP itself.

<sup>42</sup> Interview data.

<sup>43</sup> The FGD data revealed that there are no fixed rates for providing services at any UP. Though there is CC in UP premises it has been revealed that services are provided at different rates to citizens. It has been revealed that the brokers of the UPs have handed over birth registration certificates to anyone at various rates. The WMs get money from beneficiaries at the different levels of processing for issuance of SSNP card.

contact with the local MP is a factor that offers opportunity to them. So, it can be argued that the social accountability mechanisms could not create the conditions under which the UP functionaries provide information to the public regarding various allocations in the name of their UP. Instead, the UP functionaries provide bribes to the agents of Government service providers and receive such allocations for their own interest. These results corroborate the findings of Panday and Assaduzzaman<sup>44</sup>(2011) that the village police, WMs, UP Chairs, local politicians and middlemen act as brokers in providing any sorts of service delivery or project implementation by UPs.

Analyzing the empirical data on “corruption” in LGIs, it can be described as misuse of distribution, as it restricts local level development. The allocations, in the names of various programs and projects, are being utilised by public and political officials for their personal interests. It is a direct threat to all those sectors including development, education, gender sensitive programs, and social safety programs etc., which are supposed to be developed by the direct allocations made by either central government or by their own revenue collections. Khan (2013:81) thus properly argued that:

Corruption perpetuates other problems, causing low human development, higher illiteracy, and income inequality between the rich and the poor. High levels of corruption also cause dissatisfaction among the people because a lot of the development projects suffer from corruption threats to the legitimacy of the Government among the public, and threatening political stability.

If the corrupt activities of the UP functionaries cannot be checked by the application of CC and RTI in the WS and OBM, development of various sectors will remain stagnant.

## **7.4 Conclusion**

Service delivery to the citizens is an important function of the LGIs. The changes at the local level service delivery which ought to be made under the provisions of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 is an attempt to empower the public, so that their voices could be heard by the service providers. This Chapter highlighted the challenges which impact the outcome of the process of service delivery at the local level. Although those challenges are also documented in previous research on the LGIs’ service delivery process, the formal process of interaction between the service receivers and providers, embedded in the Act, 2009 has brought some positive changes as well. As such, those challenges, which stagnate both the demand and supply side in the process of local service delivery, should be tackled expeditiously to enhance local development.

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<sup>44</sup> They used the term *Dalalchokro*. For detail see literature review section, chapter 1.

## **Chapter Eight**

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

#### **8.1 Introduction**

There are three issues to be resolved in answering the research question of this study: firstly, to what extent the demands and needs of the local electorates, i.e. local plans, have been articulated in local-level planning through WS and OBM?; secondly, to what extent WS and OBM have enhanced responsiveness of the UP functionaries?; and finally, to what extent CC and RTI have managed to hold the people's representatives accountable for their actions?" The answers of these questions portray the "local governance<sup>1</sup>" system at the lowest administrative tier of the country since the enactment of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009.

Analysis of the findings of the realities of people's participation and the UP functionaries' accountability has resulted in three sets of observations. The first set is related to the process or implementation of the provisions i.e. participatory planning at WS, participatory budgeting at OBM, Citizens's Charter (CC) and Right to Information (RTI) of the Act, 2009. The second set of observations is related to the outcomes/and changes which have occurred as a result of the implementation of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009. The third set has depicted the challenges which are the outcomes of the interaction among the provisions of the Act, 2009 and the pre-existing socio-economic condition of the rural people, local politics and administration.

The first set of observations has substantiated the findings of Sarker and Dutta (2011:17), who concluded that, for the very first time, ordinary people are engaged in the local level (UP) plan and budget preparation in Bangladesh, as a result of the enactment of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009. The history of local people's engagement with local level planning was not encouraging at all. Various attempts, including *Swanirvar Gram Sarker (1980)* / *Gram Sarker(2003)* (Village Government), *Palli Parishad (1989)*

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<sup>1</sup> The concept "governance" here is limited in its three major components: process, contents and deliverables. Here process is about transparency and accountability, content is about equity and justice i.e. content of goods and services must design for the needy and real beneficiary and delivery means delivery of basic services to them for whom the content has been designed.

(Village Assembly), *Gram Shava (1997)* (Village Assembly) have been taken by different Governments and some of those institutional arrangements faced rigorous criticism<sup>2</sup> which were put into practice. The attempts at creating local self-government institutions at the village level were abolished by succeeding Governments in the revolving door that has been Bangladesh politics. However, it is evident that the process of planning and budgeting, through WS and OBM as processes, are well-designed under the Act, 2009 as it offers people direct engagement for identifying problems related to their livelihood<sup>3</sup> at the Ward level. In each stage of the planning process, there are provisions for engaging ordinary people, as well as representatives of CSOs. The expectation is that general people can supervise the UP functionaries using their rights to question and demand information from functionaries. Theoretically, participatory planning at WS and OBM, as a political decentralization process, has enabled people's participation in their own decision-making process.

The process of dissemination of information through CC and RTI has also been observed and it appears that the flow of information has been prevailing in the UPs through the UISCs, website of LGD, at the notice board and billboard at the UP office etc. It has been evident that UP functionaries have provided information, including about UP's income, expenditure, government circular, budget information, project implementation information, SSNP beneficiary lists, formation of various committee, service list with required charges, decisions of committee meeting, answer to the questions asked by general people at the OBM etc. In terms of PP and PB, it can be said that transparency has begun to be ensured. People have access to information through these processes and the UP functionaries have begun to provide information to the citizens who had previously been neglected by them as well. It can be argued that the mandate of the process of dissemination of information under the provisions of RTI and CC of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 has made the UP functionaries responsive to the general people.

The second set of observations suggest that people's participation has been initiated and a satisfactory number of people have participated in the local planning and budgeting process due to partial compliance of the provisions of the Local Government (Union

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<sup>2</sup> For detail see chapter four; section:4.2.4

<sup>3</sup> The Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009 and Union Parishad Operational Manual, 2012.

Parishad) Act, 2009. It can be argued that, not only in elections, people have the opportunity to find out whether their elected members and Chairs are performing for them or not.

This study's findings conform to the argument of a "general will", which would emerge to serve the 'general interest', as propounded by Rousseau" (cited in Cooper, 1983:19). It has been developed in the process of people's ability to place demands at the WS. People's interaction has identified some common problems which are closely connected with their livelihood. Individual citizens' interest has turned into the interests of the general public.

The findings of this study suggest that, through collective unity, political education and awareness, people have got into a better position to influence the decision-making process at WS and OBM. The models and theories of people's participation talk about people's direct and active participation at the grassroot level since direct and active participation provides political education and builds awareness, form political groups, ensure political equality and, in a broader sense, ensure accountability of public leaders. It can be argued, from the above perspective, that the extent of responsiveness and accountability of the public representatives depends on the division of people among various political groups, sustainability of these groups and acting of those groups as pressure groups. It has been revealed in this study that people organised themselves at WS, when they formed a group with the assistance of the NGO officials and asked various questions to their elected Chair at the OBM.

The UP functionaries' accountability has been measured from three perspectives: their responsiveness to their electorates; their administrative behavior; and their answerability and leadership ability. Personal motives of the UP functionaries have been identified as one of the findings of this study that worked as a catalyst for the working of the UPs. It has been revealed through the planning process that the general people who have participated at WS and OBM mostly came as a result of the UP functionaries' personal invitations. People become spontaneous when they are invited to make their own decisions. It has been evident that, if the UP functionaries want, it is possible to organize spontaneous WS and OBM<sup>4</sup>. It has been evident that extensive publicity was undertaken by the UP functionaries, which encouraged the voters to attend at the WS and OBM.

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<sup>4</sup> The WS and OBM of Kakina UP are successful example that are organized by the UP functionaries.

However, this study also suggested that the leadership ability of the UP functionaries has provided the people scope to raise questions at the OBM. Providing answers to those questions, asked by people, has improved the UP functionaries' performance as well.

This study findings suggest that the responsiveness of the UP secretaries was spurred by the implementation of the provisions of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009. This research found that the UP Secretaries have maintained financial records of UP including its income, expenditure, budget copies, project beneficiary lists, project implementation lists, participant lists of WS meeting, resolution of WS and SC meeting, required papers for getting LGSP-II fund, application received under RTI etc. The UP secretaries have maintained such records as are necessary for the planning and budgeting cycle of UP.

These social accountability mechanisms have created transparency of the governing process of UP which was previously absent. The theoretical discussion on fiscal decentralisation revealed that, through this process, the UP functionaries have enjoyed the power and authority to spend money. In this study, it has been evident that WMs have informed residents regarding the money allocation for their respective Wards at the WS and they have presented the expenditure of that public money for various project implementations at the OBM. These are some responsibilities that people have vested in their representatives through election. The process of WS and OBM offer a chance both to the electors and to the UP representatives to clarify their roles

Through the process of planning and budgeting, it has been evident that the UP functionaries have challenged the existing power structure. It has been evident that the WMs have put motions of no confidence in the UP Chair to the meetings. However, in the final service delivery process of the UP, services, including infrastructure projects, i.e. roads, culverts and group utilization of fishing nets etc. have been provided to the real beneficiaries of the local level. The fund utilization process has been checked by the people at the OBM. This process has enhanced people's trust in the UP functionaries, since many of the citizens who participated at OBM have expressed their satisfaction with the process of OBM.

NGOs' interventions through local governance projects have also played a crucial role in enhancing people's participation at both the PP and PB in Bangladesh. NGO



officials' intervention has been identified as a factor which has motivated and trained the UP functionaries for collecting house tax, organizing budget meeting, formation of WC, SC, UDCC etc, dissemination of CC, application of RTI etc. Along with the personal motives of the UP functionaries, NGO officials perform their role as catalysts of the implementation of the processes of PP, PB and application of CC and RTI.

The third set of observations of this study suggest that people are not yet conversant with the entire process of planning and budgeting process of UPs. In the literature, political decentralization is seen as “political participation” and “political accountability”. In this process, people interact and divide themselves among various groups. These, in turn, facilitate creation of new political groups at the local level, through the practice of political activity (Olsen, 2007). Although people have been able to identify and prioritize their demands, those projects have not been implemented properly due to non-compliance with the “Bottom-Up” planning policy of the GoB. On the other hand, it has also been evident that the process of planning and budgeting through WS and OBM has lost its effectiveness due to lack of resource mobilization from UPs' own sources and dependency on the central government. Finally, it can be people have failed to act to achieve implementation of their planned projects as identified by them at the WS.

The finding of the study again corroborates the arguments of Rousseau, who believed that, in an economically equal society, people's participation in political activities will ensure people's political equality. Here, political equality means people's equal participation and enjoyment of equal civil rights. In the context of this study, the reality is that people are living in an asymmetric economic society based on their occupations, possession of assets and income ranges. The existing patriarchal attitude, of both men or women, towards women has also made for restriction of their mobility in the planning and budgeting process. However, this study finds that people with more land, education, earnings and connection with central level politicians become the elected Chairs of UPs. In the final service delivery process of UPs, influence of politics, corruption, negligence of duties of the UP functionaries, power and patron-clientism have been observed at the local level.

This study confirms the findings of Sarker and Dutta (2011:30) who used the term “**Cost of Social Accountability**” and argued that the cost of implementation of such

mechanisms should not be underestimated. It has been evident in this study that the shortcomings including lack of monetary allowance<sup>5</sup> to the poor citizens; lack of sufficient awareness building programs regarding CC, RTI, PP and PB ; lack of training of the UP functionaries to deal with the social accountability mechanisms; no refreshment arrangement for public; no special arrangement for participation for female voters; no experts for making technology available in practice; lack of NGO engagement etc., are hindering a better outcome of the social accountability mechanisms at the local level which could not be borne by the UP alone. However, it has also been evident that the challenges of the innovations of New Public management (NPM), including lack of attempts to enforce strategic planning for implementation of local projects, absence of clear customer focus, absence of realisation of user charges, lack of adequate staff, and lack of training on technology use for the UP functionaries are also obstacles to the change of the working process of UPs as envisioned by the provisions of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009.

Administrative constraints of higher level government officers, including lack of administrative staff, interference of MP/ UPZ Chair in the planning process of UPZ, negligence of duties of government officers, lack of co-ordination with UP officials, etc. are constraints which are creating obstacles to the functioning of various committees like SC, UDCC and the working of the WS and OBM as well. However, this study has not explored various public accountability mechanisms as the focus was on social accountability mechanisms.

Non implementation of CC and RTI by the UP functionaries stems from two reasons: first, people trust UP functionaries due to institutionalization of corruption. Second, UP functionaries do not have proper understanding about different provisions of the Act and mechanisms that work to reduce corruption. In addition. this study conforms the finding of Jamil et al (2013) who argued that, in the existing political culture, it is not possible to create formal accountability because impersonal accountability mechanisms are not used and elected representatives are not accountable to the people: rather they are accountable to their political masters.

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<sup>5</sup> The study of Sarker and Dutta(2011:30) found that people of the South Asian countries do not participate public meeting due to their fear of missing daily earnings.

Education and awareness is correlated with people's access to government offices and intervention with the political process. In order to make the UP functionaries responsive to the people, in WS and OBM, it is important that people should have at least an elementary level of knowledge about RTI and CC.

Otherwise, they would not be able to hold their representatives accountable. Having information regarding CC and RTI of any institution means that people know the service provisions of that institution, its charge, their responsibility for getting any service, right to seek information and right to lodge complaint (if any). This is the ultimate objective of the classical theory of democracy, where it is assumed that people would be politically-educated and they would be knowledgeable regarding their responsibilities as well as their rights. Thus, it can be argued that people who do not visit the UP or are illiterate, could not really understand the CC.

## **8.2 Recommendations**

There are aid agency and academic paradigms of governance in the local government of Bangladesh. The UPs which are implementing various projects under LGSP-II funds have shown some positive examples of organizing WS and OBM, maintaining transparent accounting systems, maintaining real income expenditure statements, maintaining collaboration between NGOs and CSOs etc. Responsiveness of the UP functionaries has increased in terms of planning, budgeting and dissemination of RTI and CC in those UPs where there is involvement of NGOs. These examples reflect the vision set by aid agencies working with UPs whose intention is to create transparency, accountability and efficiency in the local level public institutions. However, the traditional administrative culture and power and authority systems are impeding the smooth functioning of the LGIs of Bangladesh. It can be argued that existing administrative and political culture is the main obstacle that is creating hindrances in the process of establishing UPs as an effective unit of LGIs of Bangladesh.

### **8.2.1 Capacity Building of the UP**

The ultimate objective of the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act of 2009 is to ensure people's direct involvement in the planning and budgeting process. It would not be attained unless the WMs as well as the WC members perform their duties professionally. The WC members represent various groups of people of a certain Ward. They will be able

to make the voters understand what their priorities of development are. Formation of these committees needs to be monitored regularly. Lack of information, lack of training and education and lack of professionalism of UP functionaries are hindering the effective implementation of the PP and PB of the UP.

### **Box 8.1**

#### **Motivation, Mobilization and Monitoring - The Success of the Expanded Program for Immunization.**

The EPI is a vivid example of a successful public-service delivery system. Jointly developed by the GOB, UNICEF, WHO and the World Bank, the EPI has, since its inception in 1985, significantly improved the coverage of its vaccination program. Starting with the full vaccination of only 2 percent of children against measles, the program has managed to raise this proportion to 50 percent in just six years. Moreover, survey findings revealed a dramatic fall in under-five mortality compared with non-vaccinated children. The rate was 40 percent lower in populations where measles vaccination coverage was 80 percent. The outstanding performance of the EPI may be attributed to three major factors: staff motivation, social mobilization and program monitoring. Although the EPI falls under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, planning and implementation are considerably decentralized. The EPI effectively motivates local level managers to plan for their own wards or geographic areas, leading to keen competition between wards. Each Local Government (LG) control room has monthly targets, enabling the LG managers and related staff to review and improve their performance relative to that of other teams. This, in turn, motivates the field staff to maintain the delivery of services at convenient locations, i.e., at the beneficiaries' 'doorsteps', and to adhere to prescribed times and locations. Another important factor has been an extensive mobilization campaign. The Government launched an effective program of public awareness, using the combined efforts of the media, the business community, renowned personalities and NGOs. Television and movie stars, and sportsmen were used to generate a wide response to the program. This social mobilization assured community participation. Effective program monitoring by government and NGOs has ensured that there were no gaps in service. Performance reports are prepared regularly and analysis and feedback are duly conducted. Elected officials also make periodic visits to vaccination sites. The EPI program is a clear demonstration of the value of motivation, mobilization and monitoring (World Bank, 1996:36).

Box-8.1 shows how EPI programs have been successfully implemented in the health sector of the GoB. The planning and budgeting processes are important aspects that ensure inclusiveness of the excluded poor for overall development activities. Capacity building programs for the UP functionaries, which include training in village-based social mapping, utilization of IT, dissemination of necessary information, target setting and performance basis rewards etc. in terms of organizing PP and PB, are necessary to get these results. Social mapping, through comprehensive analysis of resources and problems

is necessary before planning at the WS. In the preparatory meeting of WS, the selection of the WC members should be made following the guidelines of UP operational manual-2012 during planning and the WC members must take responsibility to get the social mapping done. A comprehensive survey on subjects/sectors has to be undertaken in order to assess the condition of the people of the respective Wards. As such, the needs of different groups of the society will be compiled. At the same time, this survey will identify the excluded women and other disadvantaged groups who do not attend the WS and OBM. The co-ordination mechanisms, in terms of social mapping, with NGOs have to be ensured for this purpose. Thus, public –private partnership in the social mapping will bring about a better outcome.

The policy of placement of nine government officials at UP level has to be implemented for smooth working of the UPs. It is important for implementation of the projects which are taken as “Bottom Up Approach” of planning. So, co-ordination mechanisms have to be developed and maintained by both levels of officials for betterment of those institutions. Government instructions should be issued and strict monitoring have to made for the co-ordination for attaining the objectives of the organizations.

UP’s elected functionaries’ greater access to information about resources and public services must be ensured. Systems should be developed so that UPZ level officials compulsorily furnish information regarding UPs’ services and resources to UP functionaries.

WMs personal contact with the citizens has been identified as the main method of ensuring people’s participation at WS and OBM. The honorarium they receive is not enough to perform so many duties thrust upon them. Thus, a pay scale, following government workers’ pay scales, should be included for them.

### **8.2.2 Bottom Up Approach To Planning**

Even poor, illiterate rural people have been shown in this study to have the ability to identify their problems. A “Bottom Up Approach” to planning at the UP is required by the Planning Commission, in line with the Sixth Five Year Plan. A database of year-wise and five-year plans has been generated in all those UPs of the study area, following those instructions. Although the LGIs are extensions of central government and devolution of power is still a matter of debates the need for implementation of those plans, by any means, is not debatable.

### **8.2.3 Monitoring of PP and PB process**

It is the intention of the creators of social accountability mechanisms i.e. PP and PB is to empower people. Through these processes they will decide on their own development agenda. Yet the data in this study shows that they are still not aware about their right of planning and making decisions at PP and PB processes. In this regard, public accountability measures are necessary to monitor those processes. This monitoring process can be followed by a two-way communication process.

**Firstly**, for a 1-year plan, the WM should record the meeting process at WS and OBM level and upload that meeting process to the respective UISC through technological support. Consequently, valid records of WS and OBM will be created and reserved at UPs through UISC.

**Secondly**, government should recruit officials for monitoring the process of planning and budgeting throughout the country.

### **8.2.4 Representation of the UP Functionaries**

“Personal motive” has been revealed as an important factor which has acted as catalyst for the effectiveness of the provisions of the UP Act, 2009. Power politics of Bangladesh do not ensure that people with only good motive will be members of the UP. What has been observed by Mohammed (1991:37) is still existing in the election process of the country. He stated that “the election process has failed to recognize the authoritarian nature of traditional power structure and no provision has been made to protect the interest of the depressed and exploited class”. From the findings of the study, it can be recommended that proportionate representation from all classes of people in the electoral process of UP should be ensured, so that elected representatives of the UP represent all classes of rural people. However, the election of UP Chair among the WMs could be a remedy to challenge the existing patron-client way of life of the UP functionaries.

### **8.2.5 Negotiation between GO-NGO**

Proper guidelines have to be issued for the formation and meeting of various committees such as WC, UDCC and SC of the planning and budgeting cycle of UP. Public accountability mechanisms have to be applied against government officials for not performing their duties like organising and attending such committee meetings. For

mainstreaming the activities of the UP at the lowest administrative tier, linkages have to be created among UP and other government institutions, NGOs, LGIs like Pourashava, private organizations etc. Co-ordination mechanisms have to be developed by government for mutual benefit.

### **Box 8.2**

#### **“MAMA Bangladesh” Program “Aponjon” of D-Net: Spreading Information Regarding Maternal Health**

The MAMA Bangladesh program is called *Aponjon*, which means ‘the close/dear one’ in Bangla. After a year of pilot testing, *Aponjon* was launched nationally in December 2012 by Bangladeshi social enterprise, Dnet, in partnership with the Government of Bangladesh Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. To support this work, Dnet also brokered partnerships with six outreach organizations, five mobile network operators, and three corporate partners. Since launching, it has grown to serve more than 500,000 mothers and families and trained over 3,000 community agents and brand promoters who raise awareness of the service and assist subscribers in signing up. Information is delivered twice weekly in one of two forms: SMS, or 60-second voice messages. The voice messages are a mix of “mini-skit” messages, with local actors playing the roles of a doctor, pregnant woman, mother and mother-in-law; and direct messages. In the dramatic format, characters enact scenarios in an entertaining and educational way. Dialogues range from the doctor explaining the importance of iron-rich food, to reminding the pregnant character that it is time for her medical checkup. Messages around medical emergencies and warning signs that something may be wrong are in the direct, straightforward format.

**Source:** <http://mobilemamaalliance.org/mama-bangladesh>

In this era of advanced technology, mass advertisements have to be made more promptly and judiciously by the GoB, so that it ensures people’s access to necessary information regarding RTI, CC, PP and PB. Box 8.2 illustrates how an NGO is spreading the information necessary for maternal health. New strategies, techniques and tools for spreading information, including mobile phone text/voice messages, community radio, arrangement of plays with local actors, etc. have to be developed and used for this purpose. However, Government should take initiatives with the Private Voluntary Organisation (PVOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSO) to bear the cost of such arrangement of advertisement.

This study has explored the process of and changes in the governing process of UPs against the application of CC and found that there is no instruction and support from LGD for developing a unified CC for all UPs. So, policymakers should negotiate with the donors, who have developed such CC for UPs. If this succeeds, it will strengthen the capacity of all the UPs of the country for working better with CCs. It will also prove Government’s willingness to implement such a policy of creating transparency in public sector.

Initiatives should be taken by LGD for developing a unified CC for all the UPs, following the process propounded by the scholars. People's involvement has to be ensured for developing CC so that it can address people's problems of getting services from the UP and involving them atin the PP and PB process.

#### **8.2.6 e-Governance**

Another potential area of intervention in improving local governance is to ensure e-governance at the UP. The United Nations distinguishes between the following areas where governmental operations can be improved by the application of ICT(Mohanty, N.D.:2):

- e-Government: This applies to inter-organizational relationships, and includes policy coordination, policy implementation and public service delivery.
- e-Administration: This applies to intra-organizational relationships, and includes policy development, organizational activities and knowledge management.
- e-Governance: This applies to interaction between citizens, government organizations, public and elected officials, and includes democratic processes,open government and transparent decision-making.

The existing e-governing process of UP through UISC needs to be monitored regularly. It has been evident that training in applications of ICT for the UP functionaries is necessary so that they can provide information on websites to the citizens.

### **8.3 Implications for Further Research**

1. The concern of this study was to explore people's participation and their ability to select and prioritize projects in the OBM. However, this study did not examine whether changes have been made in the mentality of the citizens, whether a collectivist mentality has been created among the citizens or the extent to which they have been politically educated through the WS and OBM, has not been analyzed through this study. So, further study on the impact of the processes on the political thinking of the villagers would be most helpful in determining the effectiveness of participation of people at WS and OBM.
2. The extent of the unity among various groups has not been explored in this study of the political process of setting and prioritizing the demands at WS and OBM. So,



studies on the factors those affect the interaction among the individuals and facilitate the formation of groups deserve special attention for further exploration.

3. A study on local power structure and participatory planning process in terms of our changing information and communication technology era deserves consideration. The study will be helpful in examining whether technology can really transcend the realities of power in planning.
4. This study has revealed that there are differences in utilization of government grants in the name of TR, FFW, EGP etc. among the six UPs of the study area. The documentation review and observation in UISC revealed that the UPs have generated service recipient lists. On the basis of the existing power structure and planning process of WS an extensive study on the implementation of government grants in the name of TR, FFW, EGP etc deserves further analysis.
5. This study has only explored the social accountability system of UPs. This study explored the extent of accountability of UP functionaries in the application of the provisions of RTI and CC requested by citizens. A study of the impact of RTI and CC on the regular service delivery systems of UP deserve further exploration.
6. The local and national level planning is inter-connected as it has been shown that local government planning following a “bottom up approach” is helpful for central level planners. E-Governance can be more effective in the planning process although its potential role in interrelations among various governmental units has not been explored in this study.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 2.1 Typologies or Models of Participation – A Continuum

Level of participation	Typology of Participation				
	Arnstein (1969)	Koneya (1978)	Oakley (1986-1989)	United Nation (1981)	Moser (1983)
<b>C O N T I N U U M</b>	Citizen Control Delegated power	Citizens define the problem and decide the action	participation (authentic participation)	Spontaneous Participation	Participation as a end
	Partnership Placation Consultation	Presents problems & boundaries, but citizen decide  Presents problems, ask for ideas, then decide	Induced participation (co-optive & manipulative of an activity)	Induced Participation	<b>C O N T I N U U M</b>
	Informing Therapy Manipulation	Presents tentative decision, consult citizen, then decide	Compulsory participation	Coerced participation	
		Announces decision, permits questions  “sells” decision to citizen Decide, announces decision through bulletin			
<b>Low</b>					Participation as a means

**Source:** Adapted from Samah and Aref (2011)


**Appendix 4.1**  
**Major Experiments with UPs and its Associated Units**

<b>1. Sheikh MujiburRahman Era (1972-1975)</b>	
i)The President Order No. 7, 1972 ii)The president Order No. 22, 1973 iii)Fourth Amendment (Article 117 A)	The President Order No. 7 changed the name of union Council and renamed Union Panchayet and the order No. 22 changed the Unoinpanchayet to Union parishad. The Thana Development Committee (TDC) was introduced at sub district level. Under the fourth amendment (Article 117 A) it was decided to create one party political system “Bangladesh KrishakSramikAwami league” (BAKSAL) and abolished the UPs by creating cooperative societies at 65000 villages.
<b>2. Major General ZiaurRahman Era (1975-1981)</b>	
i)The Local Government Ordinance, 1976 ii)The Swanirvar Gram Sarkar of 1980	The ordinance established three tiers of local government that was Union Parishad (UP) at the union level, the Thana Parishad (TP) at the Thana level and the ZilaParishad (ZP) at the district level. In the year 1980, with an amendment of the ordinance 1976 the Swanirvar Gram Sarkar was introduced at the village level.
<b>3. Major General Hossain Mohammad Ershad Era (1982 -1990)</b>	
i) The Local Government ( Thana Parishad and Thana Administration Reorganization) Ordinance 1982 ii) The Local Government (Union Parishads) Ordinance 1983 iii) The Local Government (Zilla Parishad) Act 1988 iii)The Three Hill District Acts and (iv) PalliParishad Act , 1989	The basic structure of rural local government at this era was Zilla Parishad at the uppermost level, Thana/ UpazillaParishad at the central level and Union Parishad at the lowest level.
<b>4. Begum Khaleda Zia Era ( 1991-1996) (2001-2006)</b>	
i)The Local Government (Union Parishads) (Amendment) Act, 1993 ii) Local Government Structure Review Commission iii) The Gram Sarker Act, 2003	In the first Khaleda Zia era (1991-1996) the elected government at first abolished the UPZ system. At that time an amendment of the UP Act divide each UP into nine wards and it reserved three seats exclusively for women members who were to be elected by the elected UP chairman and members. The commission recommended a two tier local government system: Union parishad at Lower tier and ZillaParishad at the upper tier.  The second Khaleda Zia era (2001-2006) introduced Gram sarkar at village level but it was postponed by the verdict of the high court.
<b>5. Sheikh Hasina Era (1996-2001)</b>	
i) The Local Government (Union Parishads) (Amendment) Act, 1997ii) Local Government Commission iii) the Local Government ( Gram Parishad )Act, 1997 iv) The UpazillaParishad Act , 1998 v) The ZillaParishad Act ,2000	In the First ShekhHasina Era (1996-2001) with an amendment of the UP Act introduced direct election for the members of the three women reserved seats. The high powered commission on local government recommended a four-tier local government –the Palli/Gram Parishad at the village level, the Union parishad ,theUpazilaParishad and the ZilaParishad.

<b>6. Interim Government (2007-2008)</b>	
i) The Local Government Institution Accelerating and strengthening Committee ii) The Local Government (Union Parishad) Ordinance 2008 iii) The Local Government (Upazila Parishad) Ordinance 2008 iv) The Local Government Commission Ordinance, 2008	The Committee recommend for a three tier of local Government system : Union Parishad, Upazila Parishad and Zilla Parishad and for a permanent local government Commission
<b>7. Sheikh Hasian Era (2008 –Till to date)</b>	
i) The Local government (Union Parishad) Act 2009 ii) The Upazila Parishad (Reintroduction of the Repealed Act and Amendment) Act, 2009 and iii) the Gram Sarker prohibition Act, 2009	The parliament after the democratic election ratified the ordinances of military backed interim government. In this era there are three tiers of local government: UP at the lowest tier, UPZ at the middle and Zilla at the upper tier. The UP and UZP is functioning with the elected functionaries. The Zilla Parishad election did not held and for time being government appointed political leader to the Zilla Parishad as adviser.

## Appendix 4.2

### Present Local Government Structure in Bangladesh





**Appendix 4.3**  
**List of transferred offices at UPZ (Third Schedule, Section 24)**

1. Ministry of Youth and Sports
  - a) Department of Youth Development
2. Ministry of Public administration
  - a) Functions of UNO and officers under that office
3. Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock
  - a) Department of Livestock Services
  - b) Department of Fisheries
4. Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
  - a) Directorate of Health
  - b) Directorate of Family Planning
5. Ministry of Women and Children Affairs
  - a) Department of Women Affair
6. Ministry of Primary and Mass Education
  - a) Directorate of Primary Education
7. Ministry of Local Government, Rural development and Cooperative
  - a) Local Government Division
  - i) Local Government and Engineering Department
  - ii) Department of Public Health Engineering
  - b) Rural development and Cooperative division
  - c) Bangladesh Rural Development Board
  - d) Department of Cooperative
8. Ministry of Agriculture
  - a) Directorate of Agriculture Extension
9. Ministry of Disaster Management and Relief
  - a) Directorate of Disaster Management and Relief
10. Ministry of Social Services
  - a) Directorate of Social Welfare
11. Ministry of Education
  - a) Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education
12. Ministry of Environment and Forest
  - a) Directorate of Forest
  - b) Department of Environment

**Source:** Adapted from the Local Government (Upazila Parishad) Act-1998 and Amendment of the Local Government (Upazila Parishad) Act-2011

**Appendix 4.4**  
**List of Transferred Offices at UP**

1. Ministry of Local Government
  - A) Sub-Assistant Engineer from LGED and other staff
  - B) Tube-well Mechanics of DPHE
2. Ministry of Agriculture: Sub-assistant Agricultural extension officers and their staff
3. Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
  - A) Health Inspector and Health Assistant and their staff
  - B) Family Welfare inspector and Family Welfare Assistants and their staff
4. Ministry of Primary and Mass Education:
  - A) Assistant Education Officer and their staff
5. Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock
  - A) Veterinary Field Assistant from Livestock and
  - B) Field Assistant of Fisheries Department
6. Ministry of Social Services
  - A) Union Social Worker of Social Services department
7. Ministry of Home Affairs
  - A) Group Leaders of Ansar and Village Defence Party from Ansar-VDP Directorate.

Source: Adapted from the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act-2009

#### Appendix 4.5

##### Functions of UP (schedule 2 under the Local Government (Union Parishad) Act 2009)

1. To prepare five years and other term plans.
2. Development, preservation and maintenance of rural infrastructure.
3. Program related to primary and mass education
4. Implementation of health and family planning program
5. To initiate required program for development of agriculture, fisheries, animal and other development activities.
6. To take steps in controlling epidemic and disaster management.
7. To fix up tax, rate, toll, fees and collection
8. To resolve family dispute and implement programs relating to woman and children welfare.
9. To initiate and assist programs related to sports, social development and culture.
10. Take programs for environmental development and conservation nature.
11. Complying of government delegated responsibility and taking measures for maintaining law and order situation.
12. Registration of birth and death
13. Maintenance of public property, open place, garden and playing field.
14. Lighting of UP roads and public ways ;
15. Plantation and preservation of trees and protection of misusing and robber of this resource.
16. Management and maintenance of burning and burial grounds, common meeting places and other public property
17. Prevention and abatement of nuisance of public ways, streets and places;
18. Prevention of wastage of public lights.
19. Regulation of the collection, removal and disposal of manure and streets sweepings.
20. Regulation of offensive and dangerous trades;
21. Regulation of the disposal of carcasses of dead animals and regulation of the slaughter of animals;
22. Regulation of the erection, reconstruction and control of dangerous buildings ;
23. Provision and maintenance of well water pumps, tanks, ponds and other works for the supply of water:
24. Adoption of measures for preventing the contamination of the sources of water-supply for drinking and provision of the use of water of wells, ponds and other sources of water-supply suspected to be dangerous to public health;
25. Regulation or prohibition of the watering of cattle, bathing or washing at or near wells, ponds and other sources of water reserved for drinking purposes;
26. Regulation or prohibition of the steeping of hemp, jute or other plants in or near ponds and other sources of water-supply;
27. Regulation or prohibition of dyeing or tanning of skins within residential areas;
28. Regulation or prohibition of the excavation of earth stones or other material within residential areas;
29. Regulation or prohibition of the establishment of brick kilns, potteries and other kilns within residential areas;
30. Taking measures and assists government to deal with flood, storm, earth quack and other natural disaster.
31. To preserve list and help the widows and orphans, poor and distress persons;
32. Development and encouragement cooperative movement and rural industry.
33. Adoption of measurement for increased food production;
34. Provision for maintenance and regulation of cattle pounds;
35. Provision of first-aid centers;
36. Any other measure likely to promote safety, comfort or facilities convenience of the inhabitants of the union.
37. To initiate and encourage e-governance
38. Co-operation with other organization engaged in activities similar to those of the Union Parishad;
39. Other responsibilities delegated by government time to time.

**Appendix 4.5.1**  
**The Power and Function of the *Ward Shava* (WS)**

1. According to the Section 6 of the act, 2009 the ward has the following power, functions and right:
2. The ward Shava will assist the UPs with all important information for the formulation of the UPs development Plan.
3. The ward shava at the ward level will prepare project proposal and will prioritize the implement able schemes and development programs.
4. It will prepare the final beneficiary list of various government programs on the basis of specific determinants and will hand over to the UPs.
5. It will assist all sorts of help for the implementation of development projects.
6. The ward shava will inspire and assist the implementation of local philanthropic activities and development programs through voluntary work.
7. The ward shava will suggest about the place of the project implementation regarding street light, safe water and public health unit, irrigation support and other public welfare activities.
8. The ward shava will increase public awareness regarding cleanliness, conservation of nature, tree plantation, reduce environment pollution, publicity against corruption and illegal activities.
9. It will create harmony and good relation among people of various class and occupation, will form organization and will organize various cultural and sports programs.
10. The ward shava will inspire, monitor and assist the beneficiaries associated with various development project of ward.
11. The ward shava will verify the list of receiver of various welfare activities of government such as old age allowance, subsidy etc.
12. The shava will preserve the records of estimation of cost of feasible project of various location of the ward.
13. It will provide all records of all finished task and service.
14. It will informed by the UP about the justification of the accepted project of the ward shava.
15. The ward shava will assist various activities regarding public health especially prevention of various diseases and family planning. It will also assist to waste disposal of sanitation activities with voluntary laborer of the ward.
16. To identify the problems of safe water supply, street lighting and other service delivery and to take step to eradicate the problems.
17. To develop the relationship between the guardian and teacher of educational institutions of the ward.
18. To form social movement against social problems like dowry, early marriage, polygamy and drug addiction.
19. To help in the birth and death registration activities.
20. To encourage economical activities with self employed programs.
21. Perform others duties delegated by UPs and government time to time.

#### Appendix 4.6

##### List and ToR of Standing Committees of UP

###### **Name of the Standing Committee of UP:**

1. Finance and Establishment
2. Audit and Accounts
3. Tax Assessing and Collection
4. Education, Health and Family Planning
5. Agriculture, Fisheries & Livestock and other economic development project
6. Rural Infrastructural development, conservation and maintenance
7. Law and order Maintenance
8. Birth and Death Registration
9. Sanitation , Water Supply and Sewerage
10. Social welfare and Disaster management
11. Environment Development, conservation nature and tree plantation
12. Combating family conflict and welfare of children and women ( excluding the UPs of Hill Districts)
13. Cultural activities and sports

The ToR<sup>1</sup> (Ahmed, 2011) for the SCs have been developed by LGD and according to it each UP will have to adopt following TOR of all the SCs in a regular meeting.

1. The standing Committees have to be formed within the 30 days of the Oath taking of the UP members and Chairs. 2. The SC membership should not exceed seven including the co-opted member from the general public. 3. The participation of the officials of the concerned government departments should be ensured in the relevant SCs and the senior most officials of the concern department at the UP should be made the member-secretary of the committee. 4. One of the Elected UP member should be made Chair of the SC. The list of the SC including its Chair should be approved in the regular UP meeting. 5. The SCs should meet once in two months and every meeting minutes should be sent to UP for information and necessary decision. 6. The SCs are supposed to accomplish the following functions:

- a. The SCs will review, watch and observe the activities and functions of the government and non-government departments and agencies exist within the subject areas of the respective committee, such as education, health, family planning, fisheries, livestock, infrastructure, water and sanitation, environment, social welfare and disaster management, tree plantation, women and child welfare, sports and culture, etc. and produce reports for consideration and decision of the UP.
- b. The SCs will assist PCC and the Budget committee to formulate plan and budget in their respective subject areas for inclusion in the UP plan and UP budget.
- c. The SCs will collect, analyse and process data and information in their respective areas and help UP through PCC to create a UP Data Book.
- d. The SCs will visit the institutions and organisations such as Schools, health centers, offices, projects and schemes for the purpose of collecting information or as part of their overseeing and review functions

<sup>1</sup> Term of Reference describe the purpose and structure of a project, committee, meeting, negotiation, or any similar collection of people who have agreed to work together to accomplish a shared goal ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terms\\_of\\_reference](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terms_of_reference)).


e. The SCs will ensure the transparency and accountability of UP through their watch dog function.

7. The SCs may be reshuffled from time to time and every change in committee has to be approved in the UP meeting.

The function of the standing committee would be determined by circulars. But the general meeting of the UP would determine the function if the circular would not be circulated. The UP should form SCs within 30 days of their taking oath after elections. The SCs will basically discharge the following functions:

1. Create data base in their relevant areas/subjects, help to create a consolidated UP Data Book and update the data at the end of each year;
2. Create a development vision on their respective area(s) and formulate plan proposal within the SC's own area/subject;
3. Propose expenditure proposal and development schemes on the relevant sector under the purview of the committee;
4. Perform watch-dog function on the government and non-government agencies working at union levels;
5. Observe the performance of UP on the specific area include in the ToR of the SC and produce observation reports for discussion in the UP.
6. Assist UP in monitoring and evaluation of schemes and projects under FYP and ADP.

**Appendix 4.7**  
**Institutional Framework for Local Level Plan**



Source: Developed by author

**Appendix 5.1**  
**Level of Education of Both The General People and The UP Functionaries**

Educational qualification of general people interviewed and participated at FGD session			Educational qualification of UP functionaries' interviewed		
Level of Education	Frequency	%	Level of Education	Frequency	%
Illiterate	157	39.05	Illiterate-Class V	19	40.4
Can Sign Only	34	8.46	Class VI - SSC	14	29.8
Class-I-Class VII	127	31.59	HSC - Graduate	7	14.9
Class VaIII-SSC	70	17.41	Higher Study	7	14.9
HSC-Graduate	14	3.48	<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>100</b>			

Source: Interview and FGD data

**Appendix 5.2**  
**People's participation at WS for the planning of financial year 2012-2013**

Participation (% of total voters)	Ward-1	Ward-2	Ward-3	Ward-4	Ward-5	Ward-6	Ward-7	Ward-8	Ward-9
Participate at Hariyan UP	62	61	56	55	207	93	61	60	52
Total Voters at Hariyan UP	1218	1980	1540	1758	2495	2445	1885	1817	961
% of Total Voters	5.09%	3.08%	3.64%	3.13%	8.30%	3.80%	3.23%	3.30%	5.41%
Participate at Gogram	127	104	98	89	93	124	99	114	116
Total Voters of GogramUP*	2504	2202	1884	1297	2240	2915	2471	2551	2089
% of Total Voters	5.07%	4.72%	5.20%	6.86%	4.15%	4.25%	4.00%	4.46%	5.55%
Participate at Hatikumrul	151	193	207	201	216	197	145	155	170
Total Voters of Hatikumrul	2965	3844	2325	4402	5029	4004	3188	2679	2530
% of Total Voters	5.09%	5.02%	8.90%	4.57%	4.30%	4.92%	4.55%	5.79%	6.72
Participate at Ghurka	135	136	132	154	202	128	116	115	123
Total Voters of Ghurka	2659	1976	1951	3131	3940	1950	2035	2619	2405
% of Total Voters	5.08%	6.88%	6.77%	4.92%	5.13%	6.56%	5.70%	4.39%	5.11%
Participate at Kakina	80	109	81	110	140	69	119	65	101
Total Voters of Kakina	2471	2134	2342	2348	2349	1617	2838	1266	2238
% of Total Voters	3.24%	5.11%	3.46%	4.68%	5.96%	4.27%	4.19%	5.13%	4.51%
Participate at Vadai UP	137	45	110	17	70	134	138	137	137
Total Voters of Vadai UP	1882	2087	3065	1162	1363	1316	1526	1984	1556
% of Total Voters	7.28%	.003%	3.59%	1.46%	5.13%	10.18 %	9.04%	6.90%	8.80%

Source: Documentation review (2014)



**Appendix 5.3**  
**UP wise number of members in one family**

Name of UP	Family Member			Total
	1-4	5-8	9-above	
<b>Hariyan</b>	30	13	0	43
<b>Gogram</b>	23	33	4	60
<b>Ghurka</b>	20	18	8	46
<b>Hatikumrul</b>	25	26	4	55
<b>Kakina</b>	32	24	2	58
<b>Vadai</b>	23	35	3	61
<b>Total</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>323</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>47.37</b>	<b>46.13</b>	<b>6.50</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: FGD data(2014)

**Appendix 5.4**  
**Total Income Expenditure State of Different UPs**

Name of UP	Total Income	Expenditure	Balance
Hariyan	83,43,286	82,85,445	57,841
Gogram	59,14,214	58,71,300	42,914
Ghurka	66,69,746	60,09,461	66,0285
Hatikumrul	41,87,196	36,12,641	5,74,555
Kakina	52,97,700	61,35,550	8,37,850
Vadai	9,32,295	9,32,295	0

Source: Documentation Review of Real Income –Expenditure statement for the FY 2011-12

**Appendix 5.5**  
**Real income statement of Six UPs for the FY 2011-12 (Amount in TK)**

Name of UP	House Tax	Income Other Than House Tax	Salary GoB Part	1% fund from UPZ of land transfer	TR/ FFW	ADP	EGP	Donors/ NGO
Hariyan	2,59,402	2,78,585	1,68,675	12,07,000	39,32,425	8,00,000	3,25,000	13,72,199
Gogram	28,320	72,653	2,77,290	2,29,600	5,81,315	0	29,19,000	18,06,036
Ghurka	1,91,560	5,06,700	6,23,458	10,00,000	41,48,028	2,00,000	0	0
Hatikumrul	6,85,689	2,16,453	5,90,419	9,00,000	17,94,635	0	0	0
Kakina	5,46,000	1,87,000	6,43,700	2,00,000	22,25,000	2,95,000	0	12,01,000
Vadai	63,440	12,700	3,41,378	35,000	0	4,79,777	0	0

**Appendix 5.5**  
**Real expenditures statement of Six UPs for the FY 2011-12 (Amount in TK)**

Name of the UPs	Establishment Cost	Other Expense	Women Development	Infrastructure, Repairing and Development Activities through TR, FFW, EGP etc.
<b>Hariyan</b>	6,65,751	92,833	4,74,841	70,52,060
<b>Gogram</b>	2,86,790	1,03,437	2,20,000	52,61,073
<b>Ghurka</b>	6,23,458	3,10,695	0	50,75,308
<b>Hatikumrul</b>	5,67,423	22,268	0	30,22,950
<b>Kakina</b>	11,84,800	8,50,700	2,00,000	39,00,000
<b>Vadai</b>	3,57,828	94,690	0	4,79,777
<b>Total</b>	36,86,050	14,74,623	8,94,841	2,47,91,168
<b>Mean Value</b>	<b>6,14,342</b>	<b>2,45,771</b>	<b>1,49,140</b>	<b>41,31,861</b>

**Source:** Compiled by the author from the real income expenditure statement provided by UP

**Appendix 5.6**  
**Level of Satisfaction with Invitation Process**

People's Perception	R=39	%	UP Functionaries' Perception	R=47	%
Strongly Agree	7	17.95	Strongly Agree	6	12.77
Agree	21	53.85	Agree	20	42.55
Not Sure	4	10.25	Not Sure	0	0
Disagree	7	17.95	Disagree	21	44.68
Strongly Disagree	0	0	Strongly Disagree	0	0
Total	39	100%	Total	47	100%

**Source:** Interview Data (2014)

**Appendix: 5.7**  
**Demand placed in WS by citizens**

Opinion (R=39)*	Respondents	%
Development and infrastructural programs	24	61.54
Demand as beneficiary of various government programs i.e. SSNPs	9	23.08
Public welfare services such as street light, safe water, public health	25	64.10
Social activities such as campaign against dowry, early marriage, polygamy and drug addiction	7	17.95
Self-employment programs, local people's interaction in cultural and sports activities, interaction with school and guardians.	3	7.69
Others (financial support for school going children, agricultural consultancy, financial support for the poor, equal treatment for all etc.)	6	15.38
Do not know	7	17.95

**Source:** Interview Data \*Many respondents agreed with more than one option.

**Appendix 5.8**  
**Level of Satisfaction with the process of placing demand at WS**

Satisfied with placing demands at WS (People's Perception)			Satisfied with placing demands at WS (UP functionaries' perception)		
Opinion	Frequency	%	Opinion	Frequency	%
Strongly Agree	5	12.82	Strongly Agree	9	19.1
Agree	26	66.67	Agree	29	61.7
Not Sure	3	7.69	Not Sure	3	6.4
Disagree	3	7.69	Disagree	5	10.6
Strongly Disagree	2	5.13	Strongly Disagree	1	2.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source:** Interview data

**Appendix 5.9**  
**Plans of WS of Ward no. 7 for the FY 2013 -14 of the Hariyan UP**

Projects	Details project location	Planned budget	Income source	Number of Beneficiary
Re-construction of Road	From CharkhidirpurSamrat's house to Sumon's house. From CharkhidirpurBabu's house to Alal's house	22,632/=	LGSP 1%	1000 Person
Tube well Placement	Different location of ward (30)	3,85,666/=	HYSAWA	1500 person
Distribution of Ring Slub	Different villages of ward (100) set	66,666/=	LGSP 1%	500 person
Skill Development Training and Distribution of Materials for Women	Farm animals and training (20 Persons) • Training on Sewing machine and distribution Sewing machine(20) • Net distribution (20)	1,13,888/=	LGSP and Sharique Project	150 person
Construction of Culvert	East side of Chartaranagar	2,26,321/=	LGSP 1%	—

**Source:** Documentation review (2014)

**Appendix 5.10**  
**Income Range and Political Affiliation of UP Functionaries.**

Income range among the UP functionaries							Political affiliation with Political parties						
Designation of the UP functionaries	Income Range in Tk					Total	UP	BNP	AL	JIB *	other s	NA	Total
	0000 - 5000	5000 - 10000	10000 - 50000	50000 - 100000	above 100000								
Secretary	0	0	0	0	6	6							
Chairman	0	0	0	0	6	6							
Member	1	2	7	3	4	17							
Female M.	4	3	3	6	2	18							
Total	5	5	10	9	18	47							
0	10.64	10.64	1.28	19.15	38.30	100							


Source: Interview data (2014)

**Appendix 5.11**  
**Satisfaction with the overall Budget Discussion**

People's Perception			UP functionaries' Perception		
Opinion	R=79	%	Opinion	Frequency	%
Strongly Agree	6	7.6	strongly Agree	9	19.1
Agree	8	10.1	agree	28	59.6
Not Sure	8	10.1	Not Sure	3	6.4
Disagree	2	2.5	Disagree	7	14.9
Strongly Disagree	3	3.8	strongly disagree	-	-
Did not Participate	52	65.8	Total	47	100.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>			

Source: Interview Data (2014)

**Appendix 5.12**  
**Respondents who Participated at both WS and OBM**

Name of UP	OBM Only	OBM and WS
Hariyan	03	2
Gogram	10	6
Ghurka	03	1
Hatikumrul	03	2
Kakina	03	0
Vadai	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>11</b>

Source: Interview Data (2014).

**Appendix 5.13**  
**Budget Copy**

Real Annual Income-Expenditure Statement <b>Union Parishad: Kakina</b> Financial Year 2011-12 Amount in Tk.					
Income			Expense		
1. Revenue Collection	a) Tax on House	1,50,000	1. General Sector (Establishment Cost)	a) Honararium and Allowance for Chair and Members	2,77,000
	b) Tax on Business, Occupation and Livelihood / Maintenance	5,000		b) Salary-Allowance of Officer / Officials	4,83,800
	c) Entertainment Tax	15,000		c) Tax Collection (Establishment Cost)	89,200
	d) License Issue and Permit Fees	25,000		d) Salary of Peon and Sweeper	30,000
	e) Lease of <i>Hat Bazar</i>	67,000	2. Incidental Sector	a) Stationary	40,000
	f) License Fee on Vehicles other than Motor-cycle	35,000		b) Reception	55,000
	g) Khoar	11,500		c) Open Budget Meeting	1,10,000
	h) Outstanding Tax Collection and Others	3,96,000		d) Power & Fuel	35,000
2. Government Grant (Salary-Allowance)	a) Chair and Members	1,59,900		e) Various Day Celebration	15,000
	b) Secretary and other Officials	1,59,901		f) Miscellaneous (Newspaper and Others)	7,500
3. Public Grant (Development Sector)	a) LGSP	12,01,000	3. Development Sector	a) Agricultural Project	2,00,000
	b) 1% Land Transformation Tax	2,00,000		b) Health and Sewerage System	2,50,000
	c) ADP	2,95,000		c) Road Construction and Re-construction	6,50,000
	d) Other Grant / Extended Grant Allocation	3,25,000		d) Construction of Culvert / Deck Bridge with Bamboo	1,50,000
	e) VGD (Food Assistance)	19,00,000		e) Development of Education	5,50,000
4. Others (Miscellaneous Income)	a) Birth-Death Certificate	12,000		f) Training Facilities for Women Employment	1,50,000
	b) Village Court	500		g) Income-generation Activities for Pro-poor	50,000
	c) Citizen Certificate, Character Certificate and <i>artisan</i> Certificate Fee	15,000		h) Different Education / Reconstruction of Religious Institution	1,50,000
	d) Cattle Selling, Slaughter and Others Fee	1,000	4. Others	i) Natural Disaster	1,50,000
				j) VGD (Food Assistance, Vulnerable Development)	18,00,000
				a) Audit Cost	10,000
				b) Games	35,000
				c) Payment of Outstanding Honararium and Allowance of Chairman and Members	4,24,000
Total		57,29,700	Total		57,11,500

**Appendix 6.1**  
**Citizen's Charter**

<b>Ghurka Union Parishad</b> <b>Upazilla: Raiganj, Zilla: Sirajgonj</b>					
<b>Sl. No</b>	<b>Service Description</b>	<b>Service Charge</b>	<b>Period</b>	<b>Eligibility for Getting Service and Procedure</b>	<b>Contact Person</b>
01.	Nationality Certificate and Character Certificate	Free	Anytime	Permanent Residents of UP	UP Chair/ Secretary
02.	Birth Registration	Above 18 years 50.00 Tk	1 Day	Any Bangladeshi Citizens	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
03.	Newborn Registration	Free	1 Day	Any Bangladeshi Citizens	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
04.	Death registration	Free	1 Day	Permanent Residents of UP	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
05.	Death Registration Certificate	Free	1 Day	Permanent Residents of UP	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
06.	Inheritance Certificate	250 Tk	3 days	Respective <i>Warish</i>	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
07.	Old Age Allowance	Free	Depends on Allocation	UP's Permanent Poor Residents Above 60 Years	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
08.	Disability Allowance	Free	Depends on Allocation	Poor and Adult Disable person	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
09.	Widow Allowance	Free	Depends on Allocation	UP's Permanent Poor Residents	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
10.	Vulnerable Group Development (VGD)	Free	Depends on Allocation	UP's Permanent Poor Residents	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
11.	Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF)	Free	Depends on Allocation	UP's Permanent Poor Residents	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
12.	Employment Generation Programs	Free	Depends on Allocation	UP's Permanent Poor Residents	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
13.	Waste removal and Cleanliness of the streets	Free	Running	Based on priority	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
14.	Estimation of the projects taken by UP	As per the tender rules	On the basis of necessity	Anyone	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
15.	Management of Water system	Free	Depends on necessity	Up's permanent resident and important places	UP Chair, Secretary and WM

16.	Development , conservation and maintenance of rural infrastructure	Free	Depends on Allocation	UP's residence	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
17.	Necessary measures to protect law and order	Free	Running	Any people	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
18.	Judicial function for maintaining peace and order	Free	Running	Any people	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
19.	Provide list of widows orphans, disable and distress people	Free	Depends on necessity	On the basis of Application and Demand	UP Chair, Secretary and WM
20.	Use of the Government property including parks, playground, public open place	Free	Running	Permanent Residents of UP	"
21.	Implementation of national policy	Free	Depends on instruction	Any people	"
22.	Approval of animal slaughtering	Free	Running	Need basis	"
23.	Prevent unauthorized access to any public, roads and highways	Free	Depends on order	Any people	"
25.	Certificate for divorce, widows and orphans	50/=	1 Day	Permanent Residents of UP	"
26.	Poultry chicken firms, rice mills, fish firms hatchery firms certificate	500/=	2 Day	Any Institution Situated in UP	"
27.	Sanitation	Free	Depends on Allocation	Permanent Residents of UP	"
28.	New House Building Construction and Reconstruction Approvals	Free	3 Day	Permanent Residents of UP	"
29.	Right to Information/Providing information against people's demand	Free	1 Day	Any People and Institution	"
30.	Maternity allowance	Free	Depends on Allocation	Poor Pregnant Women	"
31.	Trade license and vehicle license	From 50.00 Tk to 500.00 Tk	3 Day	Real Businessman Lives in that UP	"
32.	Village Courts	Civil-4.00 criminal-2.00	15-90 day	Any people	"

**Source:** Bill Board of UP

**Appendix 6.2**  
**Rural Employment Opportunity for Public Asset (REOPA Project)**

Union Parishad: Ghurka; Upazila: Raiganj; District: Sirajganj.							
Programs	Implementation period	Number of worker		Labor day women/men		Daily fees (Taka)	Total budget
		Women/Men					
Road Maintenance Component							
Women labor (1st period)	15 Feb' 08 – 14 Feb' 10	30	0	21930	0	100.00	21,74,700.00
Women labor (2nd period)	1 May 08-30th Apr 11	33	0	24090	0	10.00	25,80,600.00
Management and Rehabilitation Component							
Reconstruction of road <i>GhurkaBissho</i> road to new UP ends.	07-12-08 from 26-12-08	0	68	0	340	100.00	1,48,640.00
Reconstruction of road from <i>ChakGobindopur</i> road to <i>Abu Shama's house</i>	12-12-10 from 12-12-10	6	30	50	310	150.00	60,000
Reconstruction of Mordia Primary Schools field	08-11-09 from 19-11-09	6	25	72	300	100.00	41,334
Filling with soil of Chakgobindapur Primary School field	12-12-10 from 21-12-10	20	40	400	800	150.00	2,00,000.00
Filling with soil of Ghurka High School	08-11-09 from 19-11-09	6	25	72	300	100.00	41333
Filling with soil of Bashudebkol Government Primary School	08-11-09 from 19-11-09	6	25	72	300	100.00	41333
Special allocation							
Training Program for Women	Number of Beneficiary: 5 people						

**Source:** Ghurka UP Bill Board



**Appendix 6.2**  
**Description of Various Projects Against Various Funds (in the Website of Gogram up)**

<b>Description: Implemented <i>Kabikha</i> (Food for Work)</b>			
<b>Expiration date</b>	<b>Ward No</b>	<b>Project Name</b>	<b>Allocation Amount (Tk.)</b>
01/2013	01	Reconstruction of road from <i>BottoliSaiful's</i> shop to <i>Shekhaliparakharut's</i> house end.	6,93,000/=
01/2013	04	Reconstruction of road from football playground of <i>Nakradighi</i> to <i>JayadaparaMamun's</i> house road.	3,30,000/=
01/2013	06	Reconstruction of Road From <i>Biroildeep</i> Tube well to <i>Borokharirdhar's</i> end.	3,96,000/=
01/2013	07	Reconstruction of road from <i>Chorokpur Bagbaipokko</i> junction to <i>Raninagar</i> primary schools end.	2,97,000/=
01/2013	04	Reconstruction of Road From <i>DariapurRafikul's</i> house to <i>Chamarmatha Haji Emam's</i> lands end	5,28,016/=
01/2013	01	Reconstruction of Road from <i>MollapurAfiture</i> shop to <i>NazimUddin's</i> house	3,30,000/=
01/2013		Reconstruction of Road form <i>Sakura</i> culvert to <i>ShahebBaganAkram Ali's</i> house ends.	3,30,000/=

**Source:** <http://gogramup.rajshahi.gov.bd/kabikha>

**Appendix 6.3**  
**List of NGOs in the working coverage of six UPs**

<b>Name of UP</b>	<b>Name of NGOs</b>
Hariyan	Sacheton, BRAC, TMSS, MSP, ESDO, Asha, Grameen Bank, SrigonMohilaSanstha (SMS)
Gogram	Sacheton-Sharique Project, Preep Trust, Asha, Grameen Bank, TMSS, BRAC
Ghurka	ManabMuktiSangstha (MMS), Grameen Bank, BRAC, BIZZ, <i>Gram Unnayan Kendra</i> , <i>PragatishilNariProcheshtha</i> , <i>NijeraKori</i> , Verk, NDP, ASA, SETU, SSS, Proshika,
Hatikumrul	ManabMuktiSangstha (MMS), Grameen Bank, BRAC, BIZZ, <i>Gram Unnayan Kendra</i> , <i>PragatishilNariProcheshtha</i> , <i>NijeraKori</i> , Verk, NDP, ASA, SETU, SSS, Proshika, NSKS, JMPUS, SHARP, INJURY.
Kakina	Project “Setu” of ESDO, BRAC, <i>Grameen</i> Bank, TMSS, Plan Bangladesh, RDRS Bangladesh.
Vadai	Project “Setu” of ESDO, <i>Hitoishi</i> , BRAC, <i>Grameen</i> Bank, RDRS Bangladesh, TMSS, <i>Proshika</i> , ASA, <i>JagoNari</i> .

### Appendix 7.1 Religion

Religion of people who were interviewed and participated at FGD Sessions)			UP Functionaries' Religion		
Religion	Respondents	%	Religion	Respondents	%
Muslim	334	83.08	Muslim	40	85.11
Hinduism	64	15.92	Hinduism	7	14.89
Others	4	1.00	<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100.00</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>100</b>			

Source: Interview and FGD data

### Appendix 7.2 Socio-economic Condition of Women of the Study Area

Marital Status of Female Respondents			Occupation of Female Respondents		
Marital Status	Respondents	%	Occupation	Respondents	%
Married	196	87.11	Housewife	198	88
Divorced	4	1.78	Daily Laborer	13	5.78
Widow	21	9.33	Others(Dependent on son, widow)	14	6.22
Others	4	1.78			
<b>Total</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Interview and FGD data

### Appendix 7.3 Cultivable Land

Cultivable land of the citizens							Cultivable land of the UP functionaries				
Amount of land* in decimal							Name of the UPs	data* in decimal			Total
Name of the UPs	None	0-16	17-33	33-66	67-above	Total		None	0-16	200-above	
Hariyan	77	0	1	5	6	89	Hariyan	3	5	0	8
Gogram	60	4	1	7	5	77	Gogram	4	1	3	8
Ghurka	37	9	0	3	12	61	Ghurka	1	4	3	8
Hatikumru I	61	0	0	0	2	63	Hatikumru I	0	5	2	7
Kakina	61	0	1	1	11	74	Kakina	2	3	3	8
Vadai	19	9	0	5	5	38	Vadai	0	4	4	8
<b>Total</b>	<b>291</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>%</b>	<b>72.39</b>	<b>5.47</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>5.22</b>	<b>10.20</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>21.28</b>	<b>46.81</b>	<b>31.91</b>	<b>100</b>

\*Here "Land" means cultivable land.

\*No data found in two other categories i.e. 17-99 and 100-200 decimal.

Source: Interview and FGD Data

**Appendix 7.4**  
**Occupations and Income Range of the citizens**

Occupation of citizens				Income range of Citizens		
Earning Occupation	Member's	Total	%	Family Income Range	Total	%
Day-laborer		175	44	Tk. 1500-3000	84	20.90
Farmer		125	31	Tk. 3000-5000	183	45.52
Business		38	9	Tk. 5000-7500	85	21.14
Job		19	5	Tk. 7500-10000	25	6.22
Others		45	11	Tk. 10000-15000	15	3.73
<b>Total</b>		<b>402</b>	<b>100</b>	Tk. 15000-above	10	2.49
				<b>Total</b>	<b>402</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: Interview and FGD data

**Appendix 7.5**  
**Occupations and Income Range of the UP functionaries**

Occupation of the UP member s and Chairs			Income range of UP members and Chairs		
Occupation	Frequency	%	Income Range	Frequency	%
Business	16	34.0	Tk.3000-5000	5	10.6
Agriculture	8	17.0	Tk.5000-7500	6	12.8
Job	8	17.0	Tk.7500-10000	10	21.3
Housewife	12	25.5	Tk.10000-15000	9	19.1
Others	3	6.4	Tk.15000-Above	17	36.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Interview and FGD data

**Appendix 7.6**  
**Education and Income Range among UP Functionaries**

**Comparison of education level among UP**

Designation of the UP functionaries	Education Level				Total
	Illiterate - Class V	Class VI - SSC	HSC - Graduate	Higher Study	
Secretary	0	0	4	2	6
Chairman	0	1	3	2	6
Member	9	5	0	3	17
Female member	9	8	1	0	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>47</b>

**Income ranges among the UP functionaries**

Designation of the UP functionaries	Income Range in Tk					Total
	3000-5000	5000-7500	7500-10000	10000-15000	15000-Above	
Secretary	0	0	0	0	6	6
Chairman	0	0	0	0	6	6
Member	1	2	7	3	4	17
Female M.	4	3	3	6	2	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>47</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>10.64</b>	<b>10.64</b>	<b>21.28</b>	<b>19.15</b>	<b>38.30</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Interview Data(2014)

**Appendix 7.7**  
**Socio Economic Condition of the UP Chairs and Members**

Amount of Land					Political Affiliation of the UP functionaries						
Designation of the UP functionaries	Land data in decimal			Total	UP	BNP	AL	Jamat	others	NA	Total
	No* Land	0-16	200 to above		Secretary	2	0	0	0	4	6
Chairman	3	2	0	6	Chairman	3	2	0	1	0	6
Member	6	8	0	17	Member	6	8	0	1	2	17
Female member	3	6	1	18	Female member	3	6	1	3	5	18
Total	14	16	1	47	Total	14	16	1	5	11	47
%	29.79	34.04	2.13	100	%	29.79	34.04	2.13	10.64	23.40	100

\*This has been expressed by two UP Chairs that they do not have land in their name but they are owner of inherited land.

**Source:** Interview Data (2014)

**Appendix 3.1**  
**Interview Schedule of general people participated at WS and OBM**

<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Name of the UP</b>	<b>Upazila</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Date</b>
1	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	18-01-2014
2	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
3	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
4	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
5	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	18-01-2014
6	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	18-01-2014
7	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
8	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	18-01-2014
9	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
10	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
11	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
12	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	18-01-2014
13	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	18-01-2014
14	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	22-01-2014
15	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	13-01-2014
16	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	13-01-2014
17	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	13-01-2014
18	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
19	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
20	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
21	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
22	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
23	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	13-01-2014
24	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	13-01-2014
25	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
26	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
27	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
28	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	13-01-2014
29	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	13-01-2014
30	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	27-01-2014
31	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	27-01-2014
32	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
33	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	27-01-2014
34	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
35	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	26-01-2014
36	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
37	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
38	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
39	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
40	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
41	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
42	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
43	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
44	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
45	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
46	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
47	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
48	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014

49	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	08-02-2014
50	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	08-02-2014
51	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	08-02-2014
52	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	08-02-2014
53	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
54	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
55	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	08-02-2014
56	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	08-02-2014
57	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
58	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	08-02-2014
59	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	08-02-2014
60	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	06-02-2014
61	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	07-02-2014
62	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	07-02-2014
63	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	10-02-2014
64	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	10-02-2014
65	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	06-02-2014
66	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	06-02-2014
67	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	06-02-2014
68	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	10-02-2014
69	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	07-02-2014
70	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	07-02-2014
71	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	10-02-2014
72-79(08 Respondents)	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	05.06.2013
Total= 79				

**Appendix 3.2**  
**Interview Schedule for KII (Key Informants Interview)**

<b>Respo n- dents</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Name of UP</b>	<b>Upazila</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Date</b>
1	PIO <sup>2</sup>		Paba	Rajshahi	21-01-2014
2	UNO <sup>3</sup>		Paba	Rajshahi	22-01-2014
3	Upazila Chair		Paba	Rajshahi	21-01-2014
4	Woman Affairs Officer		Paba	Rajshahi	21-01-2014
5	Social Welfare Officer		Paba	Rajshahi	21-01-2014
6	WC <sup>4</sup> Member	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
7	WC Member	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
8	WC Member	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	18-01-2014
9	NGO Representatives		Paba	Rajshahi	31-05-2013
10	PIO		Godagari	Rajshahi	22-01-2014
11	Vice Chair		Godagari	Rajshahi	22-01-2014
12	UNO		Godagari	Rajshahi	22-01-2014
13	NGO Representative		Godagari	Rajshahi	19-01-2014
14	WC Member		Godagari	Rajshahi	13-01-2014
15	WC Member	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
16	WC Member	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
17	UNO		Ullapara	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
18	PIO		Ullapara	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
19	WC Member	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	27-01-2014
20	WC Member	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	27-01-2014
21	WC Member	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
22	UNO		Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
23	PIO		Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
24	Social Welfare Officer		Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
25	NGO Representative		Raiganj	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
26	UNO		Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
27	Upazila Chair		Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
28	PIO		Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
29	NGO Representative		Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
30	Entrepreneur, UISC <sup>5</sup>	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
31	Upazila Vice Chair		Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	12-02-2014
32	Union Social Welfare Officer	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	12-02-2014
33	UNO		Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	13-02-2014
34	DDLG			Lalmonirhat	13-02-2014
35	DF (LGSP-2)			Lalmonirhat	13-02-2014
36	Upazila Women Affairs Officer (UMAO)		Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	11-02-2014

<sup>2</sup> Project Implementation Officer

<sup>3</sup> Upazila Nirbahi Officer

<sup>4</sup> Ward Committee

<sup>5</sup> Union Information Service Centre

**Appendix 3.3**  
**Interview Schedule of UP functionaries**

<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Type of Respondents</b>	<b>Name of UP</b>	<b>Upazila</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Date</b>
1	Chair	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	31.05.2013
2	Secretary	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	27-02-2013
3	FWM <sup>6</sup> -1,2,3	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
4	FWM-4,5,6	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
5	FWM-7,8,9	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	27-02-2013
6	Ward Member-1	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
7	Ward Member-4	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	17-01-2014
8	Ward Member-7	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	18-01-2014
9	Chair	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	05.06.2013
10	Secretary	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	22-01-2014
11	FWM-1,2,3	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	13-01-2014
12	FWM-4,5,6	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
13	FWM-7,8,9	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	22-01-2014
14	Ward Member-1	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	13-01-2014
15	Ward Member-4	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	14-01-2014
16	Ward Member-7	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	13-01-2014
17	Chair	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
18	Secretary	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
19	FWM-1,2,3	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
20	FWM-4,5,6	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
21	FWM-7,8,9	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
22	Ward Member-4	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	28-01-2014
23	Ward Member-7	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	26-01-2014
24	Chair	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
25	Secretary	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
26	FWM-1,2,3	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
27	FWM-4,5,6	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
28	FWM-7,8,9	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
29	Ward Member-1	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
30	Ward Member-4	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
31	Ward Member-7	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	29-01-2014
32	Chair	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	08-02-2014
33	Secretary	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
34	FWM-1,2,3	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	08-02-2014
35	FWM-4,5,6	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
36	FWM-7,8,9	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
37	Ward Member-1	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
38	Ward Member-4	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
39	Ward Member-7	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	09-02-2014
40	Chair	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	10-02-2014
41	Secretary	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	06-02-2014
42	FWM-1,2,3	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	10-02-2014
43	FWM-4,5,6	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	06-02-2014
44	FWM-7,8,9	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	07-02-2014
45	Ward Member-1	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	06-02-2014
46	Ward Member-4	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	06-02-2014
47	Ward Member-7	Vadai	Aditmari	Lalmonirhat	06-02-2014

<sup>6</sup> Female Ward Member



**Appendix 3.4**  
**Schedule of FGD<sup>7</sup>**

Serial No	Place of FGD	Type of FGD	Date	Participants
1	Hariyan-1	Male	18-01-2014	06
2	Hariyan-1	Female	17-01-2014	11
3	Hariyan-4	Male	17-01-2014	07
4	Hariyan-4	Female	17-01-2014	08
5	Hariyan-2	Male	27-02-2013	12
6	Hariyan-7	Female	18-01-2014	10
7	Gogram-1	Male	13-01-2014	06
8	Gogram-1	Female	13-01-2014	10
9	Gogram-4	Male	14-01-2014	09
10	Gogram-4	Female	14-01-2014	09
11	Gogram-7	Male	13-01-2014	12
12	Gogram-7	Female	14-01-2014	10
13	Hatikumrul-1	Male	26-01-2014	06
14	Hatikumrul-1	Female	26-01-2014	10
15	Hatikumrul-4	Male	28-01-2014	10
16	Hatikumrul-4	Female	28-01-2014	10
17	Hatikumrul-7	Male	27-01-2014	10
18	Hatikumrul-7	Female	28-01-2014	09
19	Ghurka-1	Male	29-01-2014	07
20	Ghurka-1	Female	29-01-2014	09
21	Ghurka-4	Male	29-01-2014	07
22	Ghurka-4	Female	29-01-2014	08
23	Ghurka-7	Male	29-01-2014	06
24	Ghurka-7	Female	29-01-2014	09
25	Kakina-1	Male	08-02-2014	10
26	Kakina-1	Female	08-02-2014	10
27	Kakina-4	Male	09-02-2014	07
28	Kakina-4	Female	09-02-2014	08
29	Kakina-7	Male	08-02-2014	07
30	Kakina-7	Female	08-02-2014	10
31	Vadai-1	Male	06-02-2014	07
32	Vadai-1	Female	06-02-2014	12
33	Vadai-4	Male	10-02-2014	11
34	Vadai-4	Female	06-02-2014	11
35	Vadai-7	Male	10-02-2014	08
36	Vadai-7	Female	10-02-2014	11

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<sup>7</sup> Focus Group Discussion

**Appendix 3.5**  
**Direct Observation made on WS & OBM**

<b>Category (WS/OBM)</b>	<b>No. of Observation</b>	<b>Union</b>	<b>Upazila</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>FY</b>
WS	02	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	2012-13
WS	01	Kakina	Kaliganj	Lalmonirhat	2014-15
WS	01	Shilmaria	Puthia	Rajshahi	2012-13
OBM	01	Hariyan	Paba	Rajshahi	31.05.2013
OBM	01	Gogram	Godagari	Rajshahi	05.06.2013
OBM	01	Hatikumrul	Ullapara	Sirajganj	29-05-2013
OBM	01	Ghurka	Raiganj	Sirajganj	27-05-2013

**Appendix 3.6**  
**Questionnaire and FGD guideline of the study**

**Interview Questionnaire for the Person Participated at both WS and OBM**  
(The information will be used for research purpose only and confidentiality will be ensured)

<b>Date of Data Collection:</b>		
<b>Name of the Village:</b>		<b>Ward No :</b>
<b>Union :</b>	<b>Upazila:</b>	<b>District:</b>
<b>Name of Respondent:</b>		<b>Sex:</b> 1.Male 2. Female
<b>In case of female Respondent:</b> 1. Married 2.Divorced 3. Widow 4. Others		
<b>Educational Qualification:</b> 1. Illiterate 2. Can Sign Only 3. Class I- Class VIII		
4. Class VIII-SSC 5. HSC-Graduate 6. Graduate-Higher study.		
<b>Age:</b>	<b>Occupation:</b>	
<b>Income Range:</b> 1.Tk. 1500/- Tk 3000/- 2. Tk.3000/-Tk 5000/- 3. Tk 5000/-Tk.7500/- 4.Tk.7500/-10000/- 5.Tk 10000 -Tk15000/- 6. Tk15000/-Above		
<b>Amount of Land Own:</b>	<b>Religion:</b> 1. Islam 2. Hinduism 3. Christianity 4.Buddhism 5.Others	

**Ward Shava Related**

Q1. Have you participated in Ward Shava?

1. Yes 2. No

Q1.1. If yes why did you participate?

**The reason people participate at ward meeting: people's assessment**

<b>Opinion</b>	
1.You knew about the legal obligation of ward meeting and attended spontaneously	
2. You attended at ward shava by the invitation of concerned ward members	
3. You attended at ward shava by the request of NGO officials	
4. You had information for ward meeting by public circular	
5. You had not attended ward shava as had no information	

Q1.2 If answer (2), how did S/He invite you?-----

Q1.2.1 If answer (3) which NGO? Please specify-----

Q1.2.2 Do you know about the amount of various block grants of GoB?

Q1.3 Do you think, the way you were invited is appropriate/ adequate way for participation of all people in WS?

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

Q1.3.1 If your answer is (4/5) what did the process lack?-----

Q2. How did you know you can place demands in WS?-----

Q 2.1 What types of demand did you place in Ward Shava?

<b>Opinion</b>	
1. Development program and infrastructural programs	
2. Finalize beneficiary list of various government programs	
3. Public welfare activities such as street light, safe water, public health etc.	
4. Social activities such as campaign against dowry, early marriage, polygamy and drug addition	
5. Self employed programs, local people's interaction in cultural and sports activities, interaction with school and guardians	
6. Others:	
7. Do Not Know	

Q2.1.1 If your option no (7) what were the reasons?

Q2.1.2 Do you think, in the way demands were placed in WS was satisfactory?

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

2.1.3 If your answer is (4/5) what did the process lack?-----

**Open Budget Meeting (OBM) Related**

Q 3. Have your demand been shortlisted by UP planning Committee and presented in OBM?

1. Yes 2. No

Q 3.1 If no what were the reasons? Please specify-----

Q3.2 Have you ever asked your member/women member why your demand has not been shortlisted?

1. Yes No

Q3.2.1 If **Yes** what did your member/women member reply?-----

Q3.2.1.1 Do you think, the reply was reasonable?

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

Q3.2.1.2 If answer is (4/5) what is your opinion? Please specify-----

Q3.2.2 If **No** (you did not ask your member/women member why your demand has not been shortlisted?) what were the reasons?-----

Q3.3. To you UP services are provided through:

Opinion	
1.They provide services to the real beneficiary who needs service	
2.They provide service to the people who are their nearest dearest one	
3.They will not provide any service and fulfill their own demand	
4.Others (Please Specify)	

Q4. Did you understand the concept "Budget" or written budget information?

1. Yes No

Q4.1 If yes have you ever asked the UP functionaries about any query on budget information?

Please Specify:-----

Q4.2 If No what was the reason? Please specify.-----

Q.5 Do you think, overall budget discussion was satisfactory?

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

Q5.1 If your answer (4/5) what is your opinion? Please Specify-----

Q.5.2 Do you think, you understand the concept used in WS and OBM?

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

**Right to Information Related:**

Q6 Do you know seeking information from UP is your right?

1. Yes 2. No

Q6.1.1 If yes have you ever utilized your right to information from UP functionaries?

1. Yes 2. No

Q6.1.2 How do the UP functionaries provide information?

1. Written 2. Verbal

Q. 6.1.2 Do you understand the written Information?

1. Yes 2. No

**Citizen Charter**

Q7 Do you know the types of services usually UP provide to its citizens?

1. Yes 2. No

Q7.1 If yes how did you know it? Please Specify-----

Q.8 Have you ever been benefited through CC/RTI? If yes please specify-----

**Questionnaire for UP's Elected Member and Chairman/Ward Committee/ Scheme Supervision Committee**

(The information will be used for research purpose only and confidentiality will be ensured)

<b>Date of Data Collection:</b>			
<b>Name of the Village:</b>		<b>Ward No :</b>	
<b>Union :</b>	<b>Upazila:</b>	<b>District:</b>	
<b>Name of Councilor:</b>		<b>Sex:</b> 1.Male2. Female	
<b>Educational Qualification:</b> 1. Illiterate2. Can Sign Only 3.Class I- Class VIII 4. Class VIII-SSC 5. HSC-Graduate 6. Graduate-Higher study.			
<b>Age:</b>	<b>Occupation:</b>		
<b>Income Range:</b> 1.Tk. 1500/- Tk 3000/-2. Tk.3000/--Tk 5000/- 3. Tk 5000/--Tk.7500/- 4.Tk.7500/--10000/- 5.Tk 10000 -Tk15000/- 6. Tk15000/-Above			
<b>Amount of Land Own:</b>		<b>Religion:</b> 1. Islam 2. Hinduism 3. Christianity4.Buddhism5.Others	
<b>Involvement in Politics for:Yrs</b>		<b>Political Affiliation with:</b>	

**About Ward Shava**

Q1 Had you organized WS at your locality?

1. YesNo

Q1.1 How did you invite people to participate in WS?

1. Invitation Letter
2. Announcement
3. Personal Contact
4. Others. Please Specify.....

Q1.1.1 Do you think, everyone of your ward was well informed about the ward meeting?

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

Q1.1.2 If answer (4/5) what was your lacking? Please specify-----

Q1.2 Had everyone participated in the WS?

1. YesNo

Q1.3 If No what is the reason?

1. Location of meeting place
2. Meeting time
3. Others. Please Specify-----

Q2.1 What types of demand can be raised in WS by the voters of your locality?

<b>Opinion</b>	
1.Development program and infrastructural programs	
2.Finalize beneficiary list of various government programs	
3.Public welfare activities such as street light, safe water , public health etc	
4.Social activities such as campaign against dowry, early marriage, polygamy and drug addition	
5.Self employed programs, local peoples interaction in cultural and sports activities, interaction with school and gurdians	
6.Others:	
7.Do Not Know	

Q2.2. Do you think, in the way demands were placed in WS was satisfactory?

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

2.2.1 If your answer is (4/5) what did the process lack?-----

Q3 Have you ever informed the voters about allocation of money from GO/ NGO?

1. Yes 2. No

- Q3.1 If No please specify the reason-----
- Q3.2 Is there any NGOs working with your UP?
1. Yes 2. No
- Q3.2.1 If Yes which NGO? Please Specify the process -----
- Q3.2.1.1 what are their activities for local poor people? Please Specify-----
- Q3.2.2 Have you ever contributed to identify the beneficiary list of their program?
1. Yes 2. No
- Q3.2.2.1 If yes what were those program? -----
- Q3.2.2.2 If No Why?-----
- Q3.3 Do you think, the real beneficiaries were enlisted for GO allocated goods and services?
1. Yes 2. No
- Q3.3.1 If yes how did you verify the real owners of UP services?
1. You know your local people very well
  2. You have updated a list of vulnerable people
  3. They Contact with You personally
  4. Others. Please Specify-----
- Q3.3.2 If No who are enlisted for UP services? Please Specify -----
- Q3.4 What were the criteria you followed for enlisting people in UP service?

#### **About Open Budget Meeting (OBM)**

Q4. Had your shortlisted programs been displayed at OBM?

#### **The UP Budget making Process: Councilor's Assessment:**

<b>Opinion</b>	
1.Budget on display and shared in public meeting	
2.Budget on display but not shared in public meeting	

- Q4.1 People's demand of your locality had been shortlisted due to:
1. Resource Constraints
  2. Political Reason
  3. Others. Please specify-----
- Q4.2 Have you ever placed such demand to your higher authority? Please specify-----
- Q4.3 Have people ever asked you about why their demands had not been shortlisted?
1. Yes 2. No
- Q4.3.1 If yes what was the demand and what had been replied by you? Please specify-----
- Q5 Do you think, the budget discussion was satisfactory?
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree
- Q5.1 If your answer (4/5) what is your opinion? Please Specify-----
- Q5.2 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----

#### **About RTI**

Q.6 Do you think people utilized their Right to Information (RTI) regarding budget information and non-entitlement with UP for various services?

1. Yes 2. No

Q6.1 If No what is the reason you think?-----

#### **About CC**

Q.7 Do you think the way charter of services is disseminated at UP is satisfactory?

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

Q7.1 If your answer (4/5) what is your opinion? Please Specify-----

Q7.2 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----

### Questionnaire for UP's Secretary

(The information will be used for research purpose only and confidentiality will be ensured)

<b>Date of Data Collection:</b>		
<b>Union :</b>	<b>Upazila:</b>	<b>District:</b>
<b>Name of Secretary:</b>		<b>Sex:</b> 1.Male 2. Female
<b>Educational Qualification:</b> 1. HSC-Graduate 2. Graduate-Higher study.		
<b>Training Program:</b>		
<b>Age:</b>	<b>Other Occupation (if any):</b>	
<b>Income Range:</b>		
<b>Amount of Land Own:</b>	<b>Religion:</b> 1. Islam 2. Hinduism 3. Christianity 4. Buddhism 5. Others	
<b>Job Tenure</b>	<b>Years</b>	
<b>Involvement with this UP</b>	<b>Years</b>	
<b>No of WS S/he present in FY 2012-13</b>		
<b>Involvement in Politics for: Yrs</b>	<b>Political Affiliation with:</b>	

#### About Ward Shava

Q1 Do you think, everyone of your UP was well informed about the ward meeting?

1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Not Sure
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

Q1.1 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----

Q1.2 If answer (4/5) what was your lacking? Please specify-----

Q2 Had everyone of UP participated at WS?

1. Yes
2. No

Q2.1 If **No** what is the reason?

1. Location of meeting place
2. Meeting time
3. Others. Please Specify-----

Q2.2 What types of demand can be raised in WS by the voters of your locality?

Opinion	
1. Development program and infrastructural programs	
2. Finalize beneficiary list of various government programs	
3. Public welfare activities such as street light, safe water, public health etc	
4. Social activities such as campaign against dowry, early marriage, polygamy and drug addition	
5. Self employed programs, local peoples interaction in cultural and sports activities, interaction with school and gurdians	
7. Do Not Know	

Q2.2.1 Do you think, in the way demands were placed in WS was satisfactory?

1. Strongly Agree
2. Agree
3. Not Sure
4. Disagree
5. Strongly Disagree

Q2.2.1.1 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----

Q2.2.1.2 If your answer is (4/5) what did the process lack?-----

Q3 Have you ever informed the voters about allocation of money from GO/ NGO?

1. Yes
2. No

Q3.1 If No please specify the reason-----

Q3.2 Is there any NGOs working with your UP?

1. Yes
2. No

- Q3.2.1 If Yes which NGO? Please specify the process -----  
 Q3.2.1.1 what are their activities for local poor people? Please Specify-----  
 Q3.2.2 Have you ever contributed to identify the beneficiary list of their program?  
 1. Yes 2. No  
 Q3.2.2.1 If yes what were those program? -----  
 Q3.2.2.2 If No Why?-----  
 Q3.3 Do you think, the real beneficiaries were enlisted for GO allocated goods and services?  
 1. Yes 2. No  
 Q3.3.1 If yes how did you verify the real owners of UP services?  
 1. You know your local people very well  
 2. You have updated a list of vulnerable people  
 3. They Contact with You personally  
 4. Others. Please Specify-----  
 Q3.3.2 If No who are enlisted for UP services? Please Specify -----  
 Q3.4 To you what were the criteria UP functionaries followed for enlisting people for UP service?  
**About Open Budget Meeting (OBM)**  
 Q4. People's demand of your UP had been shortlisted due to:  
 1. Resource Constraints  
 2. Political Reason  
 3. Others. Please specify-----  
 Q4.1 Have people ever asked you about why their demands had not been shortlisted?  
 1. Yes 2. No  
 Q4.2 If yes what was the demand and what had been replied by you? Please specify-----  
 Q5 Do you think, the budget discussion was satisfactory?  
 1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree  
 Q5.1 If your answer (4/5) what is your opinion? Please Specify-----  
 Q5.2 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----  
**About RTI**  
 Q6 Do you think people utilized their Right to Information (RTI) regarding budget information and non entitlement with UP for various services?  
 1. Yes 2. No  
 Q6.1 If No what is the reason you think?-----  
**About CC**  
 Q7 Do you think the way charter of services is disseminated at UP is satisfactory?  
 1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree  
 Q7.1 If your answer (4/5) what is your opinion? Please Specify-----  
 Q7.2 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----



### Interview Questionnaire for Upazilla Nirbahi Officer (UNO)

(The information will be used for research purpose only and confidentiality will be ensured)

<b>Date of Data Collection:</b>	
<b>Upazila:</b>	<b>District:</b>
<b>Name :</b>	<b>Sex:</b> 1. Male 2. Female
<b>Educational Qualification:</b>	
<b>Training on local Governance (if any):</b>	

Q1. As head of Block Grant Coordination Committee how did you coordinate the LGSP-II fund of UP? --Q2. Have you ever taken any attempt for enhance participation of people of UPs at Ward Shava and Open Budget Meeting (OBM)?

1. Yes 2. No

Q2. If Yes please specify -----Q.3 Do you think, in the way demands were placed in WS was satisfactory?

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

Q3.1 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----

Q3.2 If your answer is (4/5) what did the process lack?-----

Q3.2.1. Have you ever tried to reduce these obstacles? Please specify-----

Q4. Do you think, the budget discussion was satisfactory?

1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree

Q4.1 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----

Q4.2 If your answer is (4/5) what did the process lack?-----

Q4.2.1. Have you ever tried to reduce these obstacles? Please specify-----

Q.5 Do you think the charter of services regarding WS and OBM is available for people's watching? (Such as allocation block grant of Go, ADP, others Government grant, NGO grant, Social safety net programs etc and prerequisites of getting this services)

1. Yes 2. No

Q5.1 If Yes please specify -----

5.2 If No what are the shortcomings of effectiveness of Citizen Charter of UPs regarding WS and OBM?-

Q.6. Do you think citizens utilize their **Right to Information** regarding WS and OBM? (For not getting any service though they are entitled various Go-NGO allocation)

1. Yes

2. No

Q6.1 If Yes please specify -----

6.2 If No what are the shortcomings of effectiveness of RTI regarding WS and OBM of UP?-----

Q.7. What measures have you taken for enhance participation of peoples and accountability of UP functionaries?-----

8. Please provide some specific suggestions for enhance people's participation and accountability of UP functionaries at WS and OBM:-----

### Interview Questionnaire for Project Implementation Officer (PIO)

(The information will be used for research purpose only and confidentiality will be ensured)

<b>Date of Data Collection:</b>	
<b>Upazila:</b>	<b>District:</b>
<b>Name :</b>	<b>Sex:</b> 1.Male 2. Female
<b>Educational Qualification:</b>	
<b>Training on local Governance (if any):</b>	

- Q1. As PIO how did you verify real beneficiary of various programs of UP? -----
- Q2. Have you ever taken any attempt for enhance participation of people of UPs at Ward Shava and Open Budget Meeting (OBM) for implementation of various social safety net programs?  
1. Yes 2. No
- Q2.1 If **Yes** please specify -----
- Q3. Do you think, in the way demands were placed in WS was satisfactory?  
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree
- Q3.1 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----
- Q3.2 If your answer is (4/5) what did the process lack?-----
- Q3.2.1. Have you ever tried to reduce these obstacles? Please specify-----
- Q4. Do you think, the budget discussion was satisfactory?  
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree
- Q4.1 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----
- Q4.2 If your answer is (4/5) what did the process lack?-----
- Q4.2.1. Have you ever tried to reduce these obstacles? Please specify-----
- Q5. Do you think the charter of services regarding WS and OBM is available for people's watching? (Such as allocation of various Social safety net programs and prerequisites of getting this services)  
1. Yes 2. No
- Q5.1 If **Yes** please specify -----
- Q5.2 If **No** what are the shortcomings of effectiveness of Citizen Charter of UPs regarding WS and OBM?-----
- Q6. Do you think citizens utilize their Right to Information regarding WS and OBM? (For not getting any service though they are entitled for various social safety net programs such as old aged programs, FFW, employment generation program)  
1. Yes 2. No
- Q6.1 If **Yes** please specify -----
- Q6.2 If **No** what are the shortcomings of effectiveness of RTI regarding WS and OBM of UP?-----
- Q7. What measures have you taken for enhance participation of peoples and accountability of UP functionaries?-----
- Q8. Please provide some specific suggestions for enhance people's participation and accountability of UP functionaries at WS and OBM:-----

**Interview Questionnaire for UPZ Chair/ Vice Chair/ Social welfare officer/ Women affairs officer**

(The information will be used for research purpose only and confidentiality will be ensured)

<b>Date of Data Collection:</b>	
<b>Upazila:</b>	<b>District:</b>
<b>Name :</b>	<b>Sex:</b> 1.Male 2. Female
<b>Educational Qualification:</b>	
<b>Training on local Governance (if any):</b>	

- Q1. How did you verify real beneficiary of various programs of UP? -----
- Q2. Have you ever taken any attempt for enhance participation of people of UPs at Ward Shava and Open Budget Meeting (OBM) for implementation of various social safety net programs?
1. Yes 2. No
- Q2.1 If **Yes** please specify -----
- Q3. Do you think, in the way demands were placed in WS was satisfactory?
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree
- Q3.1 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----
- Q3.2 If your answer is (4/5) what did the process lack?-----
- Q3.2.1. Have you ever tried to reduce these obstacles? Please specify-----
- Q4. Do you think, the budget discussion was satisfactory?
1. Strongly Agree 2. Agree 3. Not Sure 4. Disagree 5. Strongly Disagree
- Q4.1 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----
- Q4.2 If your answer is (4/5) what did the process lack?-----
- Q4.2.1. Have you ever tried to reduce these obstacles? Please specify-----
- Q5. Do you think the charter of services regarding WS and OBM is available for people's watching? (Such as allocation of various Social safety net programs and prerequisites of getting this services)
1. Yes 2. No
- Q5.1 If **Yes** please specify -----
- Q5.2 If **No** what are the shortcomings of effectiveness of Citizen Charter of UPs regarding WS and OBM?-----
- Q6. Do you think citizens utilize their **Right to Information** regarding WS and OBM? (For not getting any service though they are entitled for various social safety net programs such as old aged programs, FFW, employment generation program)
1. Yes 2. No
- Q6.1 If **Yes** please specify -----
- Q6.2 If **No** what are the shortcomings of effectiveness of RTI regarding WS and OBM of UP?-----
- 
- Q7. What measures have you taken for enhance participation of peoples and accountability of UP functionaries?-----
- Q8. Please provide some specific suggestions for enhance people's participation and accountability of UP functionaries at WS and OBM:-----

### Interview Questionnaire for NGO officials

Name of the Organization :

Funding Agency :

Name :

Designation :

Occupancy of this organization :

Type of NGO : Local National International

Q1. What programs do your organization have on Local Governance?-----

Q2. What do you do for enhance participation of local people at LGIs?

Q3. Do you think, in the way demands were placed in WS was satisfactory?

1. Strongly Agree

2. Agree

3. Not Sure

4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

Q3.1 If your answer is (4/5) what did the process lack?-----

Q4. How did your organization try to reduce these obstacles? Please specify-----

Q5. Do you think, the budget discussion was satisfactory?

1. Strongly Agree

2. Agree

3. Not Sure

4. Disagree

5. Strongly Disagree

Q5.1 If your answer (4/5) what is your opinion? Please Specify-----

Q5.2 If your answer (1/2/3) why do you think so? Please Specify-----

Q10. What has your organization done for the enhancement of the accountability of UP members and Chairman?-----

Q11. Do You think citizen charter is making UP functionary's responsible about organizing WS and OBM ?-----

Q12. What are the shortcomings of effectiveness of Citizen charter in UP?-----

Q13. What measures have your organization taken for overcome this shortcoming?-----

Q14. How far right to information Act is applicable and effective in concerned UP?-----

Q15. What are the shortcomings of effectiveness of Right to Information Act?-----

Q16. What have your organization done for effectiveness of Right to Information Act?----

Q17. Give some specific suggestions for enhance people's participation and accountability in UP:-----

### FGD Guideline

#### **People's Participation and the UP functionaries accountability at the *Ward Shava* and at the Open Budget Meeting and utilization of Citizen Charter (CC) and Right to Information at Selected Union Parishads**

##### **Discussion Topic:**

1. Socio-economic information about the families living in the Unions (Number of members of Family, Monthly Income, Expense, Education etc.)
2. People's perception about UP and their expectation from UP.
3. People's perception about WS & OBM and exploration of the reasons they did not participate at those meetings.
4. People's perception about various income sources of UP including VGD, ADP, other block grant, LGSP-II project and other sources.
5. People's perception about charges of services of UP and existing redress management system against the utilization of CC.
6. People's perception about RTI and exploration of the existing mechanism of providing information through UP functionaries and UISC.

<b>FGD Session: Union Name: Ward No. Male/Female Date:</b>				
Sl	Name/Family Member/Income	Age/Occupation /Education	Know RTI and CC	Comments
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				

**Appendix 3.7**  
**Map of Bangladesh and Location of the Rajshahi, the Sirajganj and the Lalmonirhat Districts**

